



NATO Foundation  
*Defense College*

# DEEP MAGHREB: (IN)SECURITY AND STABILITY

NORTH AFRICA  
AND ITS SAHEL DIMENSION

Despite the many threats and risk that affect the Deep Maghreb, the conference has focused the attention on turning this arch of challenges into an arch of opportunities.

Europe, Maghreb and Sahel are three interdependent regions and a crisis affecting one of them, consequentially leaks in the other two. National and regional institutions have successfully cooperated over the last years, especially with NATO, with the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. However, the focus of these initiatives has been only a starting point, and needs further implementation. A more decisive commitment with NATO in terms of security is not enough, and must be accompanied with a clear political and economic agenda with the European Union and other political and economic actors.

Implementing effective policies would give considerable advantage and enhance growth in the whole region. Governance to address the problems and solutions would require transparent and inclusive decision-making processes that would give voice to the many actors involved in the current political landscape.



**Deep Maghreb:  
(In)Security and Stability  
North Africa and its  
Sahel dimension**  
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NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE FOUNDATION

**NATO Defense College Foundation**  
Via Alessandro Serpieri, 8  
Roma 00197  
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Edito da A.G.R.A. srl  
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00161 Roma  
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e-mail [info@agraeditrice.com](mailto:info@agraeditrice.com)  
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Finito di stampare  
nel mese di maggio 2017

Realizzazione editoriale: Agra srl  
Progetto grafico: Rosa Schiavello  
Copertina: Shutterstock  
Stampa: Sec1 Roma

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Special thanks to  
NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division  
and the NATO Defense College for the support  
and Radio Radicale for the media partnership  
Special thanks to PMI

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# DEEP MAGHREB: (IN)SECURITY AND STABILITY

NORTH AFRICA  
AND ITS SAHEL DIMENSION

*Co-organised by the*  
NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE FOUNDATION  
AND THE PASP DIVISION OF NATO

*in co-operation with*  
THE NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE



NDCF Conference “Deep Maghreb: (in)security and stability - North Africa and its Sahel dimension”









Desperate Arab woman in destroyed city









The Hassan II Mosque is a mosque in Casablanca, Morocco. Hassan II Mosque is the largest mosque in Morocco and one of the most b









The war in the Near East, combat actions



# INDEX

**Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo**

*President NDCF*

Foreword 13

**František Mičánek**

*Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome*

Welcome remarks 15

**Umberto Profazio**

*NDCF Analyst*

Background Paper 17

## Session 1

### **The Maghreb region: (in)security and beyond**

**Hafida Benchehida**

La situation politique actuelle au Maghreb 23

**Mariem Ben Hassine**

NATO and co-operative security: the challenges in the region 29

**Issandr El Amrani**

Tunisia as a political pivot country in Maghreb 33

**Mahmoud Gebril**

Scenarios of Libya's (de)stabilisation 37

**Mahmoud Karem**

On the regional situation 41

## Session 2

### North Africa: between two seas

#### **Youssef Amrani**

The strategic dimension of the Sahel-Sahara belt 47

#### **Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck**

Towards a shared de-radicalisation strategy in the region 53

#### **Dahan Ahmed Mahmoud**

L'expérience mauritanienne dans les risques transnationaux 57

#### **Mouhamadou El Hady Ba**

Le Sénégal au coeur des trafics 63

#### **Mamadou Diallo Bhatia**

Concluding remarks 69

Speakers' Biographies 71

Programme 75



AMBASSADOR ALESSANDRO MINUTO-RIZZO  
*President NDCF*

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## FOREWORD

I think that we should all welcome the outcome of this seminar on Maghreb security and stability. We have decided to focus on North-Africa and its Sahel dimension and it is a source of pride for the Foundation to have attracted a large audience to listen and to discuss with a high level group of speakers and chairmen of the panels.

There are good reasons why have we chosen this subject among many others.

We all know that the Arab region is in turmoil and that the Arab world presents serious challenges; we would like very much to turn them into opportunities. First of all opportunities for the Arabs, but also for the rest of the world. We have in front of us a vast universe which is impossible to resume in simplistic formulas. Each country has its own history, traditions, expectations and deserves a serious specific analysis.

Nowadays, we hear a lot about the Levant, especially on the Syrian civil war and its unbelievable atrocities. The Gulf is also very often on the front pages for different reasons. However, on this occasion, we have chosen to direct our attention to the Maghreb. A vast region going from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and down to the desert of Sahara that includes a Sahel dimension. At the east comprising Libya, which is in turmoil since already a few years. It is intuitive that those countries are significant from a strategic perspective but often they don't receive the attention that they deserve.

A few important conclusions have emerged and I invite to read this book which is full of facts. Issues of good governance, illicit networks of various kind, the need to unite forces, they all come out as significant factors, among others.

In sum, a very important part of the world with a great potential, especially for the Europeans and for countries like Italy, sharing the same environment and the same waters. Good reasons, I believe, to convene such a gathering.

The philosophy of the NATO Defense College Foundation is to give voice to men and women of the countries concerned, to listen to what is in their hearts and

their minds. They are the actors and they know, better than anybody, about their needs and their dreams.

We have put together in a pleasant conference hall the best possible expertise we can think of. Why? It is clear that in the present international environment we need, more than ever, a good reading of facts and a clever analysis. This Foundation was created five years ago with this purpose in mind. I thank everybody who has accepted the invitation to Rome, a city which is a natural meeting point for all those who live around the Mediterranean.

We know that today we cannot divide issues according to the traditional schemes. Diplomacy, economics, trade, security, technology etc. are not disconnected by walls as it had been the case in the past. On the contrary, they are closely interconnected and therefore making a good synthesis and to offer conclusions is not an easy affair.

I think that we have accomplished the natural role of the Foundation. In other words to help providing a good framework for an honest, high-level discussion. It is fundamental to encourage dialogue that offers different points of view, but always held with respect and recognition of the other, with a scientific approach.

I thank the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of NATO for co-organizing the seminar with us and supporting our work. We welcome resources to organize such large events. We are looking forward to other future interesting and rewarding debates concerning the Arab region. A part of the world so rich in civilization and in humanity that deserves the best possible destiny.



FRANTIŠEK MIČÁNEK  
*Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome*

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## WELCOME REMARKS

Ladies and Gentlemen,

My special greetings to Mamadou Bhatia, Minister of the Defense of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, and to the Ambassador Minuto Rizzo, President of the NATO Defense College Foundation. So, I was already introduced, I am the Dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome and it is my extreme pleasure to be here with you. The NATO Defense College is responsible for many courses for the Alliance, indeed we deliver advanced career classes for NATO member countries and even for partner countries. The proof of our good will is that today in this room there is a complete course on NATO regional co-operation, composed by more than 34 members, including partner countries, ranging from Africa to the Middle-East.

Since 2014 the world we have been in constant turmoil. We discussed the eastern flange, we discussed the south part. At NATO, we say we have a 360-degree approach, basically able to access to everybody and to everything. We play with words like *crisis*, *threat* and I say that in every crisis, in every difficult situation it is good to see some opportunities. And there are some opportunities here. Africa is a huge continent, many countries, many entities, many identities and it is not about the bad challenges – namely, uncontrolled migration, diversity, poverty, terrorism, smuggling activities, corruption, and others. There are a lot of valuable elements we can use and that we can connect with. We can arguably state that Africa and its future are very closely tied with the future of Europe.

The wider Maghreb is also, as I said, a region of hope and inspiration for new forms of regional cooperation. For example, the development of alternative energy sources, new investment opportunities and new forms of good governments is one of them. These are inspiring processes we have to follow up. We can even take them as a good example for some traditional European democracies.

We are honoured by the opportunity to discuss these topics with a group of distinguished and highly knowledgeable experts from Maghreb and Sahel, but also

from the Alliance. I am grateful for the NATO Defense College Foundation efforts and I would really like to thank President Alessandro Minuto Rizzo again, and the equally valuable Director of the Foundation, Alessandro Politi for organizing this event and enabling this cultural dialogue to continue here in Rome.

I wish all of you an interesting discussion, full of inspiring insights and I hope that we will spend two or three hours in a very useful way.



UMBERTO PROFAZIO  
*NDCF Analyst*

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## BACKGROUND PAPER

In the last few years the Maghreb has been experiencing exceptional transformations. Traditionally identified with the area of northwest Africa, the region has always had a strategic importance that goes beyond the three main countries of the region (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), both in economic and military terms.

Historically, the decolonisation process defined the premises for the negotiation of national identities and the creation of new nation-States. However, it was immediately clear how nationalism could prevent any effort of integration in the area. Despite the common struggle against the French rule, the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria immediately resulted in the Sand wars and was later exacerbated by the Western Sahara issue. The unsuccessful experience of the *Union pour le Maghreb Arabe* (UMA – created in 1989 and including Libya and Mauritania) further confirmed the dysfunctional relationship between the countries of the region, often competitors rather than partners.

The regional stalemate contributed to extend the life of authoritarian regimes until 2011, when an internal shock erupted and later shook up the whole region. The Arab Spring began in Tunisia with the Jasmine revolution, causing the fall of the long-time dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. It later spread to Egypt, Libya and beyond, affecting the entire Middle East. In the historic Maghreb, Morocco and Algeria showed an unexpected resilience in front of the uprisings, in part due to the monarchical and religious legitimacy of the Makhzen in Rabat, and to the fresh memories of the ‘black decade’ in Algiers.

In effect, during the ‘90s Algeria offered an early preview of the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, the regional dispute between security forces and Islamists (or according to the words of a Jean-Pierre Filiu, between the Deep State and the Islamic State) resumed in 2013. Despite the fall of long-standing authoritarian regimes have empowered Islamist parties in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the coup against the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 reversed the tide. The

crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood marked a swift return to the *status quo*, supported by relevant regional powers and Western partners.

However, the restoration was not complete. In North Africa, a more complex scenario began to draw. While in Egypt the new regime of President Abdel al-Fatah al-Sisi dissolved the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and defined the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group, in Morocco the Islamist *Parti pour la Justice et le développement* (PJD) of Abdelillah Benkirane won the general elections in 2011 and 2016. In Tunisia the Islamist Ennahda party was forced to give up the power after the Egyptian coup and the assassinations of relevant politicians, but remained an indispensable partner in the state-building process.

Tunisia's exceptionalism is often remarked. However, the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Quartet in 2015 and the recent shift of Ennahda from the political Islam to the Muslim democracy must not overshadow the increasing challenges that the country faces. The terrorist threat and the resulting economic crisis show the need of a relevant external support from international partners to a country that seems in a never-ending state of emergency.

On the other hand, Libya has suffered from internal infighting since 2011. The fall of Muammar Gadhafi unleashed a long-term civil war, exacerbated by the historic regional divide between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. At the same time Libya's parallel institutions struggle to contain the fragmentation process of which tribalism and local armed groups represent the main drivers. The failure of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes led to a proliferation of different militias, while the lack of a legitimate authority with the monopoly of the use of force nurtured external interests and the infiltration of non-State armed groups.

In this context, Libya's case is in some way exemplar. Apart from the evident infiltration of terrorist groups, Libya's instability facilitated the criminal rings already present in the region. Drug trafficking and arms smuggling strengthened these groups, while kidnappings and the trafficking of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers provided them with steady financial revenues. The humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean Sea also forced NATO to broaden its previous *Active Endeavour* operation into the new *Sea Guardian*, taking into account the need to force the arms embargo on the country and to stem the flow of irregular migrants.

Destabilisation, the civil war and the presence of long and porous borders are all factors which criminal networks and terrorist groups are keen on taking advantage of, in particular in the south of the country. With the battle of Sirte near its ending and concerns over the Islamic State militants fleeing towards the south of the country, the presence and the competition of different and powerful terrorist groups in the Sahel-Sahara belt highlights the strategic dimension of the region.

The political and security crisis in Mali and the risk of a convergence between the Islamic State and Boko Haram in Niger represent only few of the several issues affecting the region nowadays and that can have direct consequences on the north-



ern neighbours. The interplay between the Sahara States, North Africa and the Maghreb has already been perceived by relevant actors in the region and help us explain the significance of the 'Deep Maghreb'. A new regional concept in which economic interests, social factors and security issues contribute to detect the undeniable ramifications of the historic Maghreb towards east and south.



# Session 1

## THE MAGHREB REGION: (IN)SECURITY AND BEYOND





HAFIDA BENECHEHIDA

## LA SITUATION POLITIQUE ACTUELLE AU MAGHREB

Le thème qui nous retient aujourd'hui, la situation dans le Maghreb et sa dimension sahélienne, est des plus en plus préoccupant pour toute la région, non seulement pour le Maghreb mais aussi pour les pays de la rive nord de la Méditerranée.

Le Maghreb on peut dire qu'est bordé au nord et au sud, de deux mers intérieures, il se retrouve dans une situation géographique proche de l'insularité. Ainsi pour l'ensemble des pays riverains de l'océan sahélien, cette façade est à la fois une préoccupation de sécurité et un défi de développement.

Le Sahel, situé entre 10° et 20° latitude Nord, est une mer de sable, intérieure, un océan difficilement administrable selon les règles de droit international, caractérisé par un climat sévère, sillonné par des routes commerciales ancrées dans le temps et l'histoire des rivalités entre grands groupes ethniques pour le contrôle des flux commerciaux et des points d'eau. Les points d'eau, les oasis, les anciens forts sont autant des points d'appui indispensables à la survie. Le Sahel est parcouru par des populations nomades, pastorales mais aussi, depuis quelques décennies, par des éléments vivants de tous les trafics, la contrebande et le kidnapping.

L'extraordinaire richesse minière du Sahel a attiré toutes les catégories d'investisseurs et des compagnies de sécurité qui les accompagnent le contrôle des gisements, leur exploitation, leur itinéraires d'évacuation, qui dessinent une géopolitique nouvelle avec, en filigrane, une superposition de la carte des conflits à celle des ressources du sous-sol. Sahel, Maghreb et Méditerranée forment des espaces conjugués avec des développements coordonnés inhérents à leur histoire et à leur géographie commune, caractérisés par de fortes interdépendances et aux destins intimement liés. De façon globale, ces pays forment une même matrice travaillée par des forces et des logiques communes : la sécurité des uns est étroitement liée à celle des autres. L'éclatement d'un foyer d'instabilité au Sahel, menace la stabilité du Maghreb sur le long terme. Il est désormais impossible de poser la problématique du Maghreb en l'isolant du flanc sahélien. Europe-Maghreb – Sahel sont trois théâtres stratégiques interdépendants.

En outre, les menaces et les tensions projetées par l'insécurité endémique caractérisante l'espace maghrebo-sahélienne ne peuvent être considérées comme périphériques ou étrangères à la sécurité du continent européen. L'impact dépasse la frontière méditerranéenne et menace directement les pays de l'Europe. Ces menaces sont d'autant plus amplifiées que les pays maghrébins sont à des phases différentes d'évolution politique, de développement économique et de transition démocratique (comme par exemple la Lybie ou la Tunisie).

Ces pays sont exposés aux différentes menaces projetées par le vide sécuritaire qui caractérise le flanc sud sahélien, aggravé par le chaos libyen. La dynamique de la menace est ascendante : du Sud vers le Nord ; l'exacerbation des tensions tribales et religieuses (en Mali et Libye), les tensions intra-régionales, le Nord contre le Sud, et en plus, l'Est versus l'Ouest (comme on l'a vu en Libye) ; la fragmentation de la société libyenne se décline en outre, en clan et en tribus, au-delà des clivages régionaux, cité versus périphérie, et même entre quartiers au sein de la même cité. La Libye est devenue un foyer terroriste, doublé d'un sanctuaire pour les groupes armés qui menacent la sécurité des pays du Maghreb et du Sahel les attaques contre le complexe gazier de Tinguetourine (Algérie) en janvier 2013, les attaques terroristes en Tunisie et la tentative de prise et d'occupation de la ville de Benguerdan en Tunisie, etc.

L'opération Serval de la France au Mali, a poussé les groupes islamistes armés vers le sud de la Libye, ce qui ajoute plus de risques à la situation tendue entre les tribus (Toubou, Ouled Slimane, et quelques Khedhafa venus du Nord) et ceci ne fait qu'exacerber l'anarchie ; à cela il ne faut pas oublier l'afflux important de migrants sub-sahariens. Le désert libyen est livré au chaos et à la loi des milices rivales pour le contrôle du trafic d'armes et de la drogue.

Ce sont des bandes rivales aux intérêts disparates, parfois identiques, selon la recherche de gains des kidnappings ou le contrôle de trafic en tous genres avec une répartition territoriale bien marquée. Or, il ne s'agit pas de groupuscules, mais des groupes organisés à l'image d'armée quasi-étatique. Dans ce contexte, les états maghrébins peinent à faire face à cette menace qui requiert une stratégie coordonnée de lutte contre le terrorisme, s'appuyant sur des moyens sécuritaires et militaires qui souvent ne sont pas disponibles. L'instabilité du flanc sud sahélien amplifie cette vulnérabilité. La menace est réelle, elle se nourrit des rivalités politiques, des conflits d'intérêts entre nomades et sédentaires, entre Arabes et Touareg, entre Maures et ethnies noires (bambaras), et profite de la faiblesse interne des institutions, des services de sécurité, de l'armée, des inégalités sociales et du sous-développement des états sahéliens. Le chômage (centaine de Tunisiens partis en Libye dès 2011, puis en Syrie) et l'absence de progrès économique et social ont joué en faveur des recruteurs pour Daesh ou des commanditaires de la région.

La doxa islamiste permet à ces groupes mafieux de s'enrichir sous le vernis

idéologique mis à toutes les sauces ; AQMI<sup>1</sup> constitue un facteur aggravant de la situation géopolitique, économique et sociale. L'analyste Alain Chouet<sup>2</sup> cite « l'action de l'AQMI tient plus de la piraterie barbaresque, de trafics d'armes, de biens de consommation, de drogue, racket des transporteurs et de commerçants, prise d'otages contre rançon etc. Ses revendications *idéologiques*, comme par exemple l'abrogation des lois européennes sur le port du voile ou la libération de militants islamistes violents d'ailleurs soutenues avec mollesse, ainsi que ses proclamations répétées d'allégeance à la mouvance de Ayman Zawahiri, semblent d'abord destinées à lui donner un paravent idéologique islamique pour ses activités criminelles ».

Aux facteurs historiques (les Touaregs n'acceptèrent pas l'ordre postcolonial qui a conféré la suprématie des ethnies du sud sur leur territoire traditionnel) de véritables murs d'incompréhension se sont dressés qui ont longtemps bloqué la voie à l'édification d'une véritable appropriation nationale indispensable à l'émergence de l'Etat-Nation et ils s'ajoutent de nouveaux facteurs déstabilisateurs :

- la défaillance politique et économique : « failed state » incapable d'assumer les attributs de souveraineté sur l'ensemble de leur territoire ;
- la manipulation des islamistes par des forces obscures loin de toute foi religieuse ;
- l'instrumentalisation des référents identitaires, ethniques et religieux ;
- la sécheresse et la famine ;
- la pauvreté, la précarité économique et sociale et le manque de perspective pour de nombreux jeunes désœuvrés ;
- l'effondrement du système éducatif ;
- la forte croissance démographique (en 2040 la population sahélienne devrait doubler et atteindre 150 millions d'habitants) ;
- la montée en puissance de trafics en tout genre, notamment le trafic de drogue en provenance d'Amérique Latine ;
- la prolifération d'armes légères alimentant les conflits ;
- le terrorisme, incarné essentiellement par l'AQMI, mais aussi le MUJAO, DAECH ;
- la faible gouvernance, vécue comme un « non-état de droit » ;
- les tensions inter états
- les ingérences de toute nature et de toutes origines, exacerbent les facteurs de tension, pour mieux contrôler les richesses avérées et potentielles (pétrole, gaz, uranium, fer, or, cuivre, étain, bauxite, manganèse, terres rares, etc..) ;
- les vulnérabilités environnementales attisant les rivalités entre sédentaires et nomades ;
- les effets induits de la situation en Libye.

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1 Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique

2 Chouet A. « Qui veut faire du Sahel le nouvel Afghanistan » Juillet 2013

Le Sahel concentre donc, tous les ingrédients de conflit, qui à la moindre étincelle peut éclater en chaîne ; la révolte Touarègue a constitué un point de rupture. La réponse militaire peut réduire pour un temps les tensions, mais le règlement politique et la stabilisation de la région requiert une réponse à plusieurs niveaux.

Face à cette menace, les états sahéliens et maghrébins se concertent et se consultent ; des mécanismes de lutte et de coordination ont été mis en place CAERT<sup>3</sup> à Alger, CEMAC<sup>4</sup>, AFRIPOL, mais aussi des mécanismes de coopération entre l'OTAN et les pays méditerranéens: le Dialogue Méditerranéen ; le partenariat avec l'OSCE, le processus euro-méditerranéen, l'Union pour la Méditerranée, le partenariat avec le Conseil de l'Europe.

En 2009 a été lancé le processus des « pays du champ », entre l'Algérie, la Mauritanie, le Mali et le Niger, en l'occurrence les principaux acteurs concernés par la situation dans le Sahel. Ce processus s'est traduit par la mise en place du CEMAC (basé à Tamanrasset) et de l'UFL<sup>5</sup> (basé à Alger). Cela s'ajoute à l'appui que l'Algérie fournit au Mali et au Niger en particulier en matière de logistique, de partage de renseignements et de formation à titre bilatéral.

L'appui au processus de Nouakchott à travers lequel, l'Union Africaine, au titre de la mise en place de l'Architecture Africaine de Paix et de Sécurité dans le Sahel, a pris des mesures opérationnelles pour le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire entre les pays du Sahel. L'Algérie a proposé récemment la création à Tessalit d'un centre régional de formation et d'aguerrissement au combat en zone désertique au profit des Etats participants.

Ces initiatives en direction du Sahel viendraient en complément et non en substitution à la démarche des pays de la sous-région. Il est important d'éviter la duplication et la déperdition des efforts et d'encourager plutôt le renforcement des mécanismes régionaux existants. Cette démarche n'empêche nullement que des interactions aient lieu avec d'autres régions à commencer par le Maghreb où l'Algérie investit également dans la stabilité et œuvre pour faire avancer l'objectif de l'édification maghrébine. Les efforts entrepris pour la résolution de la crise en Libye participent de ce souci, sachant qu'une solution à la crise libyenne consolidera le processus de paix en cours au Mali et la sortie de crise en Tunisie. Il est largement admis que l'édification du « Grand Maghreb » est une nécessité régionale et un impératif dans le contexte de la mondialisation et de la multiplication des initiatives d'intégration régionale. L'affirmation d'un « Grand Maghreb » comblerait un vide stratégique.

Sans un « Grand Maghreb », il y aura un réel danger, ce serait la prise de contrôle du pouvoir par des groupes vivant de la rente criminelle. Ainsi pourrait se produire le basculement d'une criminalisation économique vers une criminalisation poli-

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3 African Centre for the Study & Research on Terrorism

4 Central African Economic and Monetary Community

5 Fusion and Liaison Unit



tique. Le coup d'État du 22 mars 2013 au Mali a eu l'effet d'un coup de tonnerre révélant à quel point la menace d'un crime organisé est invasive.

Route de la cocaïne en provenance de l'Amérique Latine et route de l'héroïne en provenance de l'Asie Centrale, se rejoignent pour faire du Sahel un hub du narco-traffic. Sous-estimé le crime organisé a proliféré connaissant un effet de souffle du fait de la mondialisation et des effets de la fragmentation affectants de nombreuses régions du monde. Les états sahéliens et maghrébins dépourvus dans certains cas, de capacités administratives, militaires, policières et douanières offrent un terreau propice à l'infiltration d'organisations criminelles transnationales ; si elles s'emparent du pouvoir, aboutiraient en fine à un renversement de souveraineté sur ces territoires.

A titre d'illustration, 50 tonnes de cocaïne transitent annuellement par le Sahel à destination de l'Europe, devenue le premier marché en termes de consommation ; marché estimé à 33 milliards de dollars en 2012. Les analystes de l'ONUDC<sup>6</sup> estiment que le trafic de drogue est un facteur majeur de déstabilisation de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, du Sahel et du Maghreb. La cocaïne est le produit générant la plus de valeur ajoutée alimentant les circuits de la corruption et de la prédation généralisée. Acheté à 2000 ou 3000 euros le kilogramme dans les zones de production – Colombie, Pérou et Bolivie – il se vend à 10.000 dans les villes de la façade atlantique ; 12.000 dans les capitales du Sahel ; entre 18.000 à 20.000 dans les grandes villes d'Afrique du Nord et enfin entre 30.000 et 45.000 dans les villes européennes. A l'échelle du Sahel, ce trafic a généré, en 2012, 900 millions d'euros de bénéfice, alors que le budget d'un pays comme la Guinée Bissau n'a pas dépassé 177 millions d'euros.

Depuis l'initiative prise en 1994, pour lancer le Dialogue Méditerranéen, l'OTAN suit avec beaucoup d'intérêt les conflits régionaux et la situation au Moyen Orient et en Afrique du Nord. La déclaration du Sommet de l'OTAN, à Wales, du 5 septembre 2014, a ajouté pour la première fois le Sahel à son agenda. La Conférence des ministres de la Défense de l'OTAN, de Juin 2015 a identifié la menace qui pose le terrorisme transnational comme une préoccupation requérant plus d'attention de la part de l'organisation.

En décembre 2015, les Ministres de Affaires Etrangères de l'OTAN ont pris des mesures devant permettre à l'Alliance de s'adapter aux défis sécuritaires provenant du Sud. Les ministres ont fait le point des progrès accomplis par la coalition mondiale contre Daesh.

Dans son volet coopération, l'OTAN aide ses partenaires de la région MENA et d'ailleurs à développer leurs capacités de défense. Dans ce cadre, des stages de formation sont mis en place pour la lutte contre les explosifs improvisés, la cyberdéfense, le crime organisé, la réforme du secteur de la sécurité, la lutte contre le terrorisme. Dans le cadre du partenariat, l'Algérie et le Canada, État membre de l'OTAN, co-pilotent le segment Sahel au sein du groupe mondial de la lutte

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6 Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime

contre le terrorisme. Toujours dans ce même volet, le Partenariat pour la Paix, PPP, offre aux pays partenaires de l'OTAN, de prendre part aux activités relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme, la lutte contre le commerce illégal des armes légères, la question des armes de destruction massive, la sécurité aux frontières et la gestion des risques majeurs.

C'était d'ailleurs à la réunion de l'OTAN à Istanbul en 2004 que le Dialogue Méditerranéen de l'OTAN a été élevé au rang de partenariat. Au sommet de Lisbonne, c'est un nouveau concept stratégique de l'OTAN, qui s'organise autour des idées et propositions sur l'environnement sécuritaire régional et international au XXIème siècle, s'est confronté avec les nouvelles menaces, complexes, imprévisibles et transnationales qui nécessitent une plus grande coordination internationale et une mise en synergie des efforts des Etats. La dimension stratégique du Dialogue Méditerranéen de l'OTAN a été déployée sur les axes de coopération relatifs à ses dimensions constitutives : politique et sécuritaire, et le volet civil et coopération scientifique pour la Paix.

A titre de conclusion, le statu quo n'est plus concevable, il convient d'initier une réflexion autour d'une approche nouvelle de la situation au Sahel et au Maghreb, d'abord pour instaurer la paix au Sahel, paix fondée sur le triptyque : sécurité, solidarité, développement.

Le règlement du problème national Touareg est crucial pour assurer la paix au Mali, et dans les pays voisins.

Autre facteur essentiel à la stabilité de la région maghrebo-sahélienne, le retour à la sécurité et la paix en Libye ; on a vu l'inter-connectivité et l'imbrication des éléments de menace communs aux deux pays, avec leurs effets domino potentiels sur les pays voisins. Le règlement de ces crises exige un effort de tous, une coopération et une coordination encore plus étroites entre les pays du nord et du sud de la méditerranée.

Je vous remercie de votre attention.



MARIEM BEN HASSINE

## NATO AND CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY: THE CHALLENGES IN THE REGION

I am delighted to participate to this discussion in such a distinguished panel concerning a very important and timely topic. I have been asked to talk about NATO's perspective, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the challenges that we are facing together and how we are working with our partners in the region to have them better addressing these issues.

As you know, NATO has been engaging with the Middle East and the North-African region for some time now. We have quite early recognized the strategic importance of the Mediterranean area – including the Maghreb – and, back in 1994, NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) including seven countries from the MENA region. Till now Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Maghreb countries are essential and active partners in the Dialogue. And what was meant to be simply a network for information sharing has become a fully-fledged partnership which can act on different levels of cooperation by helping these countries to address their social and security challenges.

The Istanbul Cooperation (ICI) Initiative was launched three years after the creation of the Mediterranean Dialogue, this time including the Gulf countries. We chose to create two different partnerships for different reasons. First, because the Mediterranean Dialogue had reached a new level of maturity in term of collaboration with NATO, but also because the needs in terms of security are different in the Mediterranean region and in the Gulf region. Nevertheless, the pillars of cooperation are both political dialogue and technical assistance.

Coming to the current security situation in the region and how we see the region and our overall approach to the Middle East and North-Africa, I think we all agree that the Arab revolutions have undoubtedly changed the geostrategic picture of the territory for years to come. Governments are struggling to manage the security environment that has been fundamentally transformed by the events of the Arab Spring. Of course, regional conflicts have given a safe haven for terrorist groups like Daesh. We assist at the proliferation of weapons, the growth of illegal traffick-

ing, the free movement of foreign fighters across regional borders. The extent and the complexity of the threats pose an unprecedented challenge to the security forces of the region and to the ministries and governments that oversee them. At the same time, the recent events in Europe – the terrorist attacks, the flow of refugees, the increase of foreign fighters – have made tangible that our security is linked to the security and stability of the Middle-East, North-African and Maghreb.

Hence, I think there is a rising awareness and recognition that we need to work more closely together if we need to address these challenges properly. No country will be able to face these challenges alone.

NATO has made important decisions at the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw. Certainly, the Alliance is not the first responder – we do not aspire to have such a role – but we recognized that we cannot continue or we cannot afford to look at the situation deteriorate without doing anything. NATO does not have maybe all the tools to face the current situation in the MENA region, but we must definitely make a difference as part of the overall efforts of the international community.

In the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 we took important decisions to further enhance our cooperation with MD and ICI countries, aiming at strengthening their defence capabilities. In an attempt to promote stability, helping countries further develop and enhance their defence skills ; managing process together is no longer a “nice to have”, it has become a necessity. At the Warsaw Summit, we very much talked on about the concept of projecting stability – this is the new term that we are working on – and let me say that NATO’s greatest contribution to the stabilization of the MENA region will not be military, it will be political, it will be through the political dialogue and practical cooperation that we have with our countries in the region, through the full use of our security and cooperative security toolkit.

As part of the Projecting Stability Agenda, the Defence Capability Building Initiative is a critical element. This initiative, launched at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014, aims at helping our partners in the region to better address the current challenges through advising, monitoring, mentoring and training activities. There are defence forces and defence establishment to help them dealing with these challenges. Focusing on training and advice in specific areas, including countering improvised explosive devices – which are very much used by Daesh – but also border security, cyber defence and data protection. Moreover, we are doing defence capacity building with countries which are not recipients per se, with all our Mediterranean Dialogue countries and our Maghreb countries including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, what we call the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programmes, tailored to the specific needs of each country. We are receiving more and more requests for support in key priority areas such as counter terrorism, border security, small arms and light weapons and counter improvise explosive devices.

To give you some examples, we have very recently launched a pilot project with Tunisia to train their special operation forces, allowing them to better tackle the terrorist threats. We are also advising the Tunisian authorities to develop or es-

establish their own “Intelligence Fusion Centre”. We have deployed NATO mobile training teams in some of our Maghreb countries to train them on the field against counter terrorism, counter insurgency. We have also established in Mauritania a National Crisis Management Centre and we are also working with other countries in the region to develop these kinds of projects.

This kind of cooperation include both civilian and military expertise to the benefits of the population. We, of course, continue our preparatory work to support Libya, if requested, to develop defence and security institutions, establishing defence staff as well as national security agency – when conditions so allow.

I would say that NATO has an important knowledge in projecting stability and defence capacity building. In this field, NATO can show its added value, demonstrating that one of the most significant ingredient to ensure security and stability is the strength of local forces and institutions. This is how we have invested to support our countries, our partners in the Arab region. And this is how we will continue to support them.





ISSANDR EL AMRANI

## TUNISIA AS A POLITICAL PIVOT COUNTRY IN MAGHREB

I was asked to focus my comments on Tunisia as a pivot country in the Maghreb, and the opportunities, hurdles and external supports it might face or enjoy. From the western point of view, Tunisia is almost the last hope of the Arab Spring ; a lot of hopes are invested in the success of its political transition to make democracy find a fertile and propitious ground where growing there.

However, in reality the situation remains fragile. Tunisia has achieved many goals in the last few years; its people and politicians showed great innovation and courage although the political, economic and security threats the country has been facing are absolutely serious. Moreover, Tunisia, a small country, surrounded by far more powerful, larger countries, has limited choices. Even the international context is becoming perhaps less favourable vis-à-vis the historic compromise between Islamists and non-Islamists seen in 2013-2014. Certainly, the election of Donald Trump and the possibility of appointing administration officials with remarked strong anti-Islamist views could carry to similar changes in European governments that have already subtracted enthusiasm for the current consensus between Tunis and Ennahda. Nonetheless, this compromise is likely the only reason Tunisia didn't follow the path of Egypt or Libya in the last few years. Undoubtedly, the global trends for Tunisia are uncertain – above all from the economic point of view because of the lack of support from the international community.

If you zoom in a little further, the regional situation is alarming. Indeed, from the regional point of view, Tunisia is greatly exposed to the political and security developments in Libya. The Ex-Prime Minister Mahmoud Gebril has explained his first-hand experience in the country and we all agree that the international community is running out of time in Libya. The last two-year political agreements are still not clear understandable and we do not know the upcoming aftermath. The Crisis Group, the organisation I work for, has advocated for a reset from the

political point of view<sup>7</sup>, but the risk of the current conflict over-spilling in several ways onto Tunisia is real.

It is real because we have just heard this happening in Algeria with regards to Libya. As long as it continues to miss its national and international vocation, it is a playground for various radical groups of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

This year in March, in an attempt to seize border in Ben Gardane, we have witnessed many Tunisian radicals coming from Libya in order to regain the foothold inside their own country. Thankfully, they failed and perhaps we should give credit to the ability of the security forces (police, national guard and the Tunisian army) to counter that threat; it was an encouraging move showing that Tunisia still has the resources to cope with these challenges. Certainly, a resurrection attempt in different cities of the country, it is quite alarming; especially, as we suspect that there may be further clashes of weapons and sleeping cells of the Islamic State or other groups in various parts of Tunisia that may be activated later.

Beyond the risk for terrorist attacks in Tunisia there are other perils. We have already seen the ability of certain western Libyan militias to send signals to the authorities in Tunis by controlling the smuggling trade at the Tunisian-Libyan border. Closing smuggling trade could cause political and social uproars in the southern provinces of Tunisia whose effect could be the country destabilisation.

Recent statistics have shown that about 65% of Tunisian economy is informal. Much of that depends on smuggling, basically, for the most part, between Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. Libya plays a crucial role on that. Initially, trading fuel, especially fine fuel into Tunisia borders, increasingly of “white goods” to praise customers’ needs. This would pose a danger to the Tunisian economy; not to speak of the potential for destruction that certain Libyan actors in the west of the country can have.

In its policy towards Libya, Tunisia has limited choice. It has been neutral in the Afghan-Libyan conflict and I think it aligned itself also on Algeria’s policy towards Libya, namely, to support the UN Pact, the UN-led peace process and to negotiate essentially, as far as it can, with the forces in the west of the country simply for practical reasons: these are their forces at its borders. I would say that the main issue Libya’s neighbouring countries are dealing with is the control the flow of radicalized fighters because of the lack of national authorities. At the same time, the country is exposed to uncertainty about the future presidential succession in Algeria as President Bouteflika has been a backer of the Islamist, non-Islamist compromise in Tunisia. Post Bouteflika is an open question.

In the Maghreb region, the division between Islamism and non-Islamism is strong. Particularly, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have been pushing for

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<sup>7</sup> “The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset”, [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org), November 4<sup>th</sup> 2016



anti-Islamists policies and still have not reconciled themselves with the fact that Ennahda is currently set to be – and to remain – a major political player in Tunisia for the foreseeable future. Of course, one of the major reasons is the deny of economic aid coming from the Gulf States.

Nowadays, the most important question regarding Tunisia is about domestic policy. To what extent the existing political consensus represented by the alliance between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes can be deepened. This alliance is eventually based on two personalities: President Beji Caid Essebsi and sheik Rashid al-Ghan-nushi, the presidents of the two parties. Both leaders are elderly, especially President Essebsi and, whether the consensus that was forged in 2013-2014 continues without that leadership – it probably does- but whether it is going to follow the same modalities is uncertain. Yet, the alliance is manifesting tensions; Ennahda's dissatisfaction towards President Essebsi forced the instalment of a new government currently led by Prime Minister Youssef Chahed.

However, some strains remain between Islamist and non-Islamist in Tunisia which could bring to the blockage of both political reforms and new laws at the parliamentary level. Nidaa Tounes, in particular, is a very divided party despite President Essebsi's leadership and his successful use of the party as a vehicle towards the presidency. Part of Nidaa Tounes has already split, constituting what Tunisian people are calling the "Borgebist" camp, the secular camp which continues to be fractured.

The question concerning which members of the former Ben Ali regime can return to the political scene or not is still unsolved and there are controversial personalities. These contrasts resurface in face of every sign of political tension in the country, especially after the terrorist attacks, but also they re-emerge as a side effect of the economic situation. Therefore, it is never easy to point the escape goat.

However, beyond the political issues between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, the question is whether the country is able to share a long-term vision deepening the consensus, the foundations of the current regime. And I think there is a need to address regional divisions in a much more serious way. The divisions between Southerners, people from the interior, who feel being marginalized from the state and, the traditional needs of the Sahel region, that since independence has tended to dominate both politics and economics. Hence, let's come back to the question about what is the informal role the economy could play; whether it might be a mechanism to partly integrate the informal economy into formal economy.

It is hard come up with policies that address the economic issue, the political issue and the security issue in towns like Ben Gardane, in the small villages in the interior of the country, that depend on the smuggling economy with Algeria, to give either alternatives for the people there or, as proposed in the past, maybe reconsider the possibility of regularizing the smuggling economy; namely the creation of free zones. Nonetheless, in order to carry on these proposals, Tunisia should have a negotiating partner both on the Algerian side and on the

Libyan one. Indeed, both the terrorism problem and the economic problems are cross-border issues that require good will on both sides to be addressed.

Tunisia is currently hosting an investment Forum hoping to attract \$20 billion of investment in the country. I know that one of the issues frustrating many of its potential international partners is that the vision and the roadmap for economic reforms is still a little bit uncertain. Part of this uncertainty is complex to sort out unless Tunisia works to deepen internal political consensus. The major points is concern who gets what role in the economy, who gets to be represented politically, how to relate with, for instance Libya and how would that work. There is a tremendous amount of Libyan money in Tunisia that has a political impact.

Then we heard about NATO's efforts to engage with the security sector in Tunisia. I think progress has been made, implementation is key. Last month President Essebsi signed the Counter Terrorism Strategy. It is usually an important step, now there must be the consultations and follow-up talks to make sure that implementation mean the same for intelligence sharing between the various parts of the country. Tunisia cannot really afford to waste time on these issues.



MAHMOUD GEBRIL

## SCENARIOS OF LIBYA'S (DE)STABILISATION

In my speech, I will address three specific issues. First, the Maghreb or North-Africa as a uniting factor in the future of Africa-European relationship. Or, as a dividing factor that might lead to unexpected consequences. Second, Libya as the black hole of the North-African coast: where is it going and what are the potential scenarios. Third, what should be done?

Numerically speaking, Africa will be approaching 2 billion people by the year 2050. Among them, according to the UN, no less than 360 million young Africans will be marching north, looking for job opportunities. While the total population of Algeria and Morocco combined will grow up to 92 million by the year 2025 and Egypt to 110 million by the same year, and in Sudan (combining both “Sudans”) to 73 million; in Libya the total amount of people will reach 8.1 million by 2025. The country, being albeit vast country and, rich in resources but with presents a relatively a small population compared to its neighbouring countries.

being a vast country, rich in resources but with a small population, disparity between Libya and its neighbours. will carry huge implications. Those 360 million Africans will move through the historical path they have traversed in the past, where historically slaves and trade usually went through: the so-called the Fezzan road<sup>8</sup>.

This is a potential threat for Europe whether we are talking about illegal immigration, refugees or terrorism. Whatever is the label we prefer to put on it. And I would be provocative enough to say that neither Egypt nor Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco – the latest of which has started to witness some prosperity in the last 3-4 years – will be stable unless Libya becomes stable. Terrorism, as everybody knows, is no more a phenomenon limited to the borders of a country. It sneaks like a ghost. You recall, when the campaign against Daesh in Iraq and Syria started, the

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<sup>8</sup> Fezzan Road is an asphalt road in central Libya, running from Abu Qurayn near the coast to Sabha in the Sahara Desert. It is 620 km (385 mi) long.

flow of terrorists to Libya increased unexpectedly, and if terrorists in Libya connect with those of Boko Haram and the Youth Movement of Somalia, we will have in front of us the worst nightmare. On the other hand, for the same reasons, on the North-Africa coast Libya can be a the potential of opportunity on the North-Africa coast

During the last four years, Libya has been wasting its own resources due to the lack of state institutions. Libya today is a stateless society, full of militias, tribal structures and weapons scattered all over the country. Today we have more than 30 million pieces of weapons on the territory which is more than enough to arm 7 African countries. I do not think that the terrorists' ultimate target is Libya. I think that their target is much wider and larger than Libya. With that amount of weapons Europe could be a potential target, as well as Egypt – the head of the Arab world.

So, why is this accumulation of arms increasing? And why does the flow of terrorists keep coming to Libya? This is a big question that we all should -be concerned with. What is left of Libya's financial resources today? Unfortunately, the previous governments and the three governments that are present on the scene today spent more than, 92 billion \$, of our financial reserves. What was left by 31st December 2015 was only 39 billion dollars. Just imagine Libya going bankrupt by the end of 2017. If that is the case, there would be a huge populated block of no less than 300 million poor Arabs on the North-African coast moving either towards north or towards east to the Arab Gulf states. Therefore, it would be advantageous for everybody to bring stability back to Libya – , that Libya finds itself today a state of “make it or break it”. It is not a national security issue for Libyans only, but for our neighbouring countries and, for different reasons, for the European countries too.

My own reading of the situation: if terrorism is not handled the right way in Libya, it is going to spread like hell, not only in Libya and North-Africa, but in the whole continent and even towards north. To handle the Libyan crisis properly the first thing – let us be honest enough – is reaching an agreement within the international community but it is illusive. Regional interests are also not coherent. They do not speak the same language; they do not have the same unified interest towards Libya. Equally, even the Europeans European countries do not have the same unified, coherent national interests when it comes to Libya.

This might stretch and prolong the conflict deeper and deeper and longer and longer. And if that happens, I would expect Russia to become a crucial player in Libya, as it was in the case of Syria.

I, personally, wish that the international community – if there is such a thing – help Libyans to negotiate with each other. In the past, regional and international players had negotiated on behalf of Libyans and whatever political agreements came out of those negotiations or dialogues, Libyans had nothing to do with it. I think our worst nightmare is that the situation will continue down this path. If one

wants to understand the Libyan situation, the understanding should be derivative from the Libyan situation. Not from a perspective of a regional players, or a European players.

So far, I do not think that the Libyans had a real dialogue among themselves. They talk to each other through different actors present on the stage and this is due to the mistrust accumulated during 40 years of Gaddafi's rule. Therefore, Libyans became totally dependent either on regional players or on European ones to solve their own problems and the worst case scenario is a where this intermediary approach will persist.

If this is the case, I would like to give you an example of what we might expect. The world net population will be increasing by 35% in the years from 2010 to 2050. 73% of this increase is going to be in the Muslim community; which means five times the increase in the Jewish and twice the increase in the Christian community. If we add to this lack of development, lack of a coherent and comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism, then, we can expect the worst ahead of us. Hence, we should come to grips with reality. First of all, the international community shall let the Libyans help themselves because Libya can be a solution for a very prosperous developmental process in the whole North-African coast. As we previously acclaimed, there is not enough labour force in Libya, while our neighbours have more than enough labour available and this can be a relief for the European Union which used to give annual assistance either to Egypt, Tunisia and to Morocco. Libya could offer solutions to the problem illegal immigration. So, it is in the vested interest of the Europeans to have a real development in Libya.

Libya could also be a barrier preventing many Africans from marching north by what it is called the "transformational training" on Libyan soil, namely the export of African skilled labour to Europe according to the specific needs of the European Union economy. This is what I think NATO should keep into consideration. It is not a question of guns any more. You cannot fight terrorism with guns only. Guns are just one step. Economic development is the name of the game. If you do not want those Africans to come to Europe, then help the developmental process on African soil. Therefore, those Africans either remain in their own countries or when they come to Europe, they represent the skilled labour required.

Coming back to what is left from Libya financial resources, this might be the seeds for a very prosperous developmental process that is compelling to everybody.

Concerning Libya's today scenario, I think the agreement signed on 17<sup>th</sup> of December in Skhirat<sup>9</sup> is coming to an end in terms of the results of that agreement of the Presidential Council. It is still recognized by the international community but it was not legitimized in the Libyans' eyes, simply because it miserably failed to deliver any services to the Libyans, who were deprived of every basic need in

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9 "The Libian Political Agreement" – UNSMIL

Tripoli and in any other Libyan cities. Human basic services Shortage issues are getting worse today because of a lack of humanitarian assistance; unfortunately, Libya does not qualify as a recipient of international humanitarian assistance as it is an oil producing country. And if you tell the international community that our financial resources and assets are frozen in European and American banks, the answer will be we go by the book, claiming that Libya as an oil-exporting country is not qualified to receive any humanitarian assistance.

So, we have a human tragedy today on Libyan soil in different cities an uncountable number of evacuees from Sirte, Tawergha, Benghazi who are all over the country in desperate need for all kinds of humanitarian assistance. Today Libya is a rich country, but it is only on papers. Libyan people today are desperate and looking for help.



MAHMOUD KAREM


## ON THE REGIONAL SITUATION

I feel very humbled about sitting right next to Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo. In your analysis, you mentioned the Mediterranean Dialogue, a successful story. We must really give credit to the main actors of this very particular juncture of history and I think this great man, Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo, was among the protagonists. I consider myself a small contributor to this dialogue. I spent five years of my life working on this dialogue and leading it to a peak that unfortunately we lost. There is no more dialogue among foreign ministers and it is a shame that we see this dialogue wither away after all these successes we have achieved because of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestinian case.

I will make three short remarks. My first one is that we should stop dealing with the idea of regional isolation. We cannot simply permit that security in one region should consequentially cause the isolation of all other regions. Sahel is integrated to the security in Libya, Libya security is integrated and very much symbiotically linked to the security in Egypt and so on and so forth. As a matter of fact, Egypt is not getting enough credit from the international community for the conflict in Chad and for the daily casualties that the Egyptian military is suffering. Equally, Libya is not getting enough credit. Sometimes the wrong people in Libya have been used instead of the wise men that we have. I believe that if we want to put this political process on track, we must use the wisdom of these people with more emphasis.

My second remark concerns the establishment of the Troika, a very important machinery including the League of Arab States, the African Union and the United Nations. Moreover, I was appointed by the League of Arab States, as a special representative for Libya. One of the major problems about starting a process of negotiations is that it works like a machinery, and could directly answer to the question "How to start". This machinery directly answers on the question of how





Mural painting of arabic calligraphy in the medina of Asilah on may 23, 2015









# Session 2

## NORTH AFRICA: BETWEEN TWO SEAS

to start; the League of Arab States has put considerable effort and we must make more usage of it.

My last remark is more of a question to the panellists than a comment. If the Iran Nuclear Deal falls apart, due to the newly President-elect Donald Trump's definition of it as "the most stupid deal in history", are we going to see more Iranian activities in the Sahel region, which could complicate things even more. This is another element that we need to keep in mind: it is not only the tribes, it is not only foreign fighters, it is not only the examples put before us by the panellists. We could have an additional issue that could trigger further discussion. How can the abolition of the Iran Nuclear deal impact the security situation in the Sahel?

Ambassador Armani, perhaps I should discuss this matter with you later, I wonder if you meant that Egypt and United Arab Emirates have taken a stand against the Islamic parties, if so, then I will differ categorically with you.

Well, Prime Minister Gebril stressed that the "Islam" often identified with the propaganda of ISIS and Al-Qaeda does absolutely not represent the proper interpretation. Notably, Egypt has been the host of the Al-Azhar University for more than one thousand years and our interpretation of Islam has been the most widely accepted in the Arab World. When we speak today of the need to reinvigorate, to rebuild Islamic speech we must reflect upon the words mentioned earlier by Prime Minister Gebril. In his remark, he rightfully said that it is not the weapons but rather the development and a better education of the people that constitute the turning point.



## THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION OF THE SAHEL-SAHARA BELT

There are two major reasons I am happy to be here today. The first reason is my old friend, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, who invited me here. For a long time, we have been working together while he was Deputy Secretary General of NATO. We tried to strengthen the relations between the Alliance and the Kingdom of Morocco through the organisation of the first North Atlantic Council in Rabat. The second reason is because Morocco, since its independence, chose to ally with NATO and within the Mediterranean Dialogue as we share a common destiny and we should work together.

Listening to the first panel, my conclusion was that we should work together because this is the future scenario. Today, I want to put the attention on the following reflections:

- How we could work together as partners within the MED Dialogue;
- How we could cooperate with the European Union;
- I would refer to the region, meaning the North Africa and the Middle East.

Another crucial element emerging from the first panel discussion is the collective response towards the current international challenges. Hence, we cannot only talk about North Africa and the Middle East but we should even consider our Northern partners' difficulties. Brexit, the European Union lack of ambition, the Security Council blockage – as Prime Minister Mahmud Gebril explained – and the uncertainty of the international community position are issues to be addressed all together. Indeed, today's crisis in Libya, Syria and Iraq are due to the international community inner division in dealing with these critical issues. I agree with Prime Minister Mahmud Gebril that the military solution alone cannot solve the current international deadlock; we need new approaches, new tools and a new vision to sort the situation out.

Nowadays, we found ourselves in a crossroad, both as a region and as an international community. We should stop blaming our partners (NATO and the Euro-

pean Union). All the countries in the region should co-operate with each other to reinforce the State apparatus in those states considered “fragile.” Just building up democratic states will allow us to move forward from this critical situation and rely on ourselves. Dialogue and experiences sharing are the key worlds.

Thus, before talking about our future, we need to confront with our reality. First, the violence wide-spreading in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen through the current conflicts. These countries are stuck in their *status quo* and are threatening the stability of the region. Second, the still unsolved Palestinian conflict; it has been creating frustration even in Maghreb and feeds the vacuum where extremists live. Third, the lack of governance in the region.

Maghreb insecurity poses numerous threats to the entire region. Yet, the area represents an enormous potential to create new jobs and fulfill the youngest generations’ expectations. From the economic point of view, the Marrakesh Agreement provides the area with the necessary tools to develop. However, the main issue stands at the political level and we need to work together – government and civil society – to promote regional integration.

Nowadays, the jihadist narrative makes it impossible to turn the attention away from the migration crisis and terroristic menaces. Yet, we do not have to stop talking about regional cooperation initiatives. We must collaborate to fight against extremist groups who have hijacked Islam and deconstruct their storytelling. This is what Morocco is experiencing, trying to combat terrorism not only with guns but also through narrative.

Even in the west we have assisted to the rise of populist movements. The populists build their policies on fear of the others and, in many cases now, on islamophobia. Therefore, the list of challenges for the Mediterranean region is endless and the only solution is working together. To my colleague at NATO, I would like to say we need to reshape and rebuild the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue.

NATO’s approach towards the Mediterranean is as legitimate as necessary. It is legitimate because the Mediterranean Dialogue has been for 21 years a key element of the cooperative security in the region and, necessary because NATO is one of the main actors in the regional geopolitical context. However, the Mediterranean Dialogue cannot exist alone and we need coherence between the Mediterranean Dialogue and other initiatives in the region. Moreover, the Mediterranean Dialogue cannot prevent us from looking to the Atlantic coast which is a priority for the Sahel countries.

Now, I would like to speak briefly about the European Union. Morocco and other countries of the Maghreb maintain strong relations with the European Union. However, it seems that the Union has less ambition towards its partners nowadays. We feel that the neighborhood policy is not enough, especially for those countries – like Morocco and the Western European partners – that have decided to establish a special relation. The European Union needs to play a more effective role in conflict-solving in its interest areas; on the contrary, it seems to have mar-

ginalized itself from conflicts resolution actions, settling for its economic role.

To conclude, I would like to repeat that the Maghreb must play as a region on the international scene. Therefore, it is necessary to build up robust states on democratic values. Morocco could serve as an example because it is a proper model of modern societies construction. King Mohammed VI had already implemented some reforms in the country when the Arab Spring burst out. Thus, the Arab Spring became an opportunity to consolidate the reforms he made, committing himself in the defense of democracy and human rights. Morocco has a vision-sharing the same values of the European Union – and a project for the future of Maghreb, which should be led by inclusiveness. That is what we need to do now.





War refugees at the Keleti Railway Station on 4 September 2015 in Budapest, Hungary. Refugees are arriving constantly to Hungary on the











DALIA GHANEM-YAZBECK

## TOWARDS A SHARED DE-RADICALISATION STRATEGY IN THE REGION

Today I have been asked to talk about the Sahel, the risks coming from the region and how we can deal with this arch of conflicts in order to transform it into an arch of opportunities.

As you may know, the Sahel covers an entire region of different countries from Senegal to Mauritania, South-Algeria, Burkina Faso and so on, and it represents 89 million inhabitants. The history of this belt in the Sahel has always been a history of conflicts. Yet, in the medieval Arab literature the Sahel was separated in two parts: North-Africa, which was called the “country of peace” and the South which was called the “country of dissidents”. So, conflicts are not a new issue in the area.

Currently, the Sahel came into the spotlight of Western media in 2012 when al-Qaeda, in the Islamic Maghreb – supported by the terroristic groups of MUJAO and Ansar Dine – was capable of taking the entire part of northern Mali. In addition, the fall of Gaddafi led to flows of experienced and well-trained fighters from Libya to Niger and Mali, showing the transnational nature of the terrorist threat and the role of Maghreb countries to restore stability in the region.

What are the risks coming from the Sahel? There are several risks ranging from traffic to contraband to jihadism and so on and so forth, but I am going to focus on these two (I call it jihadism, not jihad and not terrorism I can explain later why, but I am sticking on my word, jihadism.)

Contraband traffic and routes have developed in the Sahel throughout the last decade. Conflicts within the region in Niger, the “Black Decade” of Algeria and the recent clashes in Mali, have greatly contributed to contraband traffic, together with large scale corruption within local communities and local governments.

We can count several types of traffics.

Firstly, the traffic of cigarettes: as much as 80% of cigarettes on the market in Southwest and North-Africa are illicit cigarettes. Libya and Algeria are well known to be the two major countries for illicit cigarette consumption. Undoubtedly, there is a certain degree of connivance between the smugglers and some state officials.

Secondly, oil trafficking: it became a transnational criminal enterprise with some \$1 billion in 2009 – new figures are not available at the moment but I would not be surprised if they had risen. A sizeable portion of the smuggled oil is sold within the countries or within the Gulf of Guinea. Thirdly, drug trafficking: in 2013, sales in Europe, especially Spain and the UK, reached \$1.25 billion. The hubs of drug trafficking are mostly in West Africa where cocaine is transported to Europe via commercial air carries or via land, passing through Northern-Mali, Morocco, Algeria or Libya. Then, arms trafficking: in the Sahel, there should be between 7-10 million light-arm weapons. After the fall of Gaddafi, it has been heard that weapons came massively from Libya; however, a recent report, made by Conflict Armament Research, shows that the country is no more a *reservoir* of weapons, undertook by Ivory Coast. According to the same report, Ivory Coast became one of the principle weapon reservoirs in the crisis of 2002-2011. During those years, there was a serious increase of weapons and many of them are believed to have gone out of the country. The same report states that 100% of AQIM's rockets came from Ivory Coast. The weapons that used in the attacks in Mali were coming from the same branch of weapons that were used in Syria, in Kobanê. This shows how weapons travel around the region.

Yet in 2012, the Internal Security Forces of Lebanon got 150 tonnes of weapons coming from Libya. I repeat, weapons travel and, two might be the plausible hypotheses: fighters taking their arms with them when moving from a country to the other, or, groups that, although being antagonist, have the same supplier.

Lastly, human trafficking: there are up to 120,000 migrants every year. They can reach Europe in different ways, but as showed in a 2015 UN Report on Migration, the market value of illegal immigration smuggling amounts to \$75 million.

Before starting to speak about jihadism, I would like to say that I am an expert on radicalization. I started to study radicalisation process in 2005 because I was very interested in how a normal individual could turn into jihadist in the '90s in Algeria. Usually, when thinking about youths in the region, we observe through the lenses of jihadism and political violence, which is very problematic and, we think that the first reason of radicalisation is religion. Let me disappoint you because religious ideology comes at the bottom of the list. It is the poor social economic and the political conditions in the Sahel countries, as well as in the Maghreb, that make a fertile ground for Islamist jihadist militancy. The main functions of the statehood – protecting people, giving them opportunities and so on and so forth – are not fulfilled in the region thus creating a great resentment and a great sense of marginalization in many of the populations. Consequentially, many of the youths go to the jihadist group because there is no alternative or because the jihadist group brings them positive image of themselves.

There are different terroristic groups in the region but I am going to talk just about al-Qaeda. Why about al-Qaeda? Let's keep in mind that al-Qaeda lineage comes back to 1997 with the JIA, the Algerian jihadist group. In 1998 has some

Algerian jihadists decided to leave the JIA because of their takfir ideology and established their own group called the GSPC which stands for Group Salafist for Preaching and Combat. The same group that was established in 1998 decided, in 2007, to merge with al-Qaeda and called itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Why al-Qaeda? Because it is one of the oldest jihadist groups within the region and one of the most resilient. It showed its highest capacity of resilience and high capacity of adaptation. In 2009, al-Qaeda decided to open the Sahel front, giving this branch to Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The *sahelization* strategy has enabled the proliferation of extensive networks within local communities, criminal organizations and institutions. When al-Qaeda opened the Sahel front, it started to cooperate with different communities, with different state officials. The attack of In Amenas in January 2013 showed the transnational nature of al-Qaeda today. The commando was not only composed by Algerians but it was also composed by Libyans and Tunisians and so on and so forth.

Today there are recruits coming from Africa to the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It is actually believed to have trained people from Africa, affiliates of Boko Haram as early as 2006. Several members of the Boko Haram were recruited by an Algerian, called Khaled Bernaui, who used them in the south of the desert. So, this process shows again how these groups interact and how they are connected. As a result, al-Qaeda has been able to hit several states, the main target being the Algerian state and the overthrow of what they called the "Impeach state". Yet, al-Qaeda has been able to hit Algeria, since its inception in 2007, 600 times. It perpetrated also 227 attacks in Mali, 32 in Mauritania, 25 in Tunisia, 17 in Niger, and 11 in Morocco. So, al-Qaeda is resilient and it is still here and it is going to remain.

The cost of all that is directly impacts local communities living in a constant state of fear. But there is also economic cost, because no development prospects are believed to happen in the region. And there is also a human cost for the region and for Europe because we should keep in mind the refugee crisis that is still going on in the region.





DAHAN AHMED MAHMOUD

## L'EXPÉRIENCE MAURITANIENNE DANS LES RISQUES TRANSNATIONAUX

Ma présentation se focalise sur les risques transfrontaliers dans la région du Maghreb.

La Mauritanie est très consciente de sa propre responsabilité dans la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent en s'appuyant d'abord sur ses propres moyens et ressources avant de demander l'appui des acteurs extérieures.

Pour commencer, je voudrais dire que la Mauritanie a plus de 5800 mille kilomètres de frontières, dont 800 kilomètres sont frontières maritimes. Le pays n'a pas des frontières naturelles à l'exception de la frontière avec le Sénégal constituée par un fleuve qui est entièrement traversable dans toute sa longueur. La frontière avec le Mali longue de plus de 2200 kilomètres est la plus dangereuse et la plus difficile à surveiller. Des trafiques de toutes sortes sont pratiqués dans le Sahel ; cela va de la nourriture, des carburants jusqu'à la drogue et aux armes en passant par les cigarettes et les voitures volées. En plus, c'est une zone de passage pour les migrants subsahariens.

Ces trafiques étaient présents dans la zone avant l'apparition du terrorisme et ont su s'adapter.

Qu'est-ce que c'est le Sahel ? Le Sahel est une région qui va de la Mauritanie au Soudan ; Les habitants de cette zone, très austère, sont habitués à se déplacer librement, sur de larges distances, à la recherche de rares pâturages et de points d'eau encore plus rares, sans se préoccuper des frontières tracées à la règle par une administration coloniale incompétente.

L'action de la Mauritanie dans la lutte contre le terrorisme se déroule sur trois axes : un axe juridique un axe sécuritaire et une approche de travail.

Du point de vue juridique,

- L'adoption de textes juridiques spécifiques à la lutte contre le terrorisme et le blanchiment d'argent
- La promulgation d'un décret portant la création de pôles judiciaires chargés du

traitement des crimes terroristes au niveau de Parquet Général et de l'Instruction

Du point de vue de la sécurité,

- Le contrôle des frontières et régulation de la circulation 51 postes frontaliers
- La sécurisation de l'état-civil système biométrique relié à un serveur central
- L'adoption d'une nouvelle doctrine militaire forces d'élite ; attaques préventives ; zones militaires interdites; unités de dimensions différentes (groupements spéciaux d'intervention, escadrons d'appui et d'intervention, brigades maritimes et brigades de l'air)
- Renseignements mutualisés, partagés et modernisés

Approche de travail,

- La prévention dans la durée, visant à tarir les sources de l'extrémisme
- La modernisation de la structure nationale de renseignement
- La coopération avec les partenaires étrangers
- S'inspirer des expériences des autres pays
- Intégrer nos spécificités ; discours de prêche mesuré
- Suivi, débats et intégration des prisonniers extrémistes
- L'affirmation et le renforcement de l'état de droit
- La lutte contre la pauvreté
- L'éducation de valeurs
- Rapprocher l'Administration des citoyens sécurité, santé, éducation, infrastructures, services administratifs
- Approfondir l'étude sur l'extrémisme violent : IMES10

En Mauritanie on cherche à démonter le système intellectuel qui amène les personnes sur la voie du terrorisme. Je pense que la carotte et le bâton ne sont pas suffisants, qu'ils soient utilisés séparément ou ensemble, pour venir à bout de l'extrémisme violent il faut trouver le moyen de démonter le système intellectuel qui amène les personnes sur la voie du terrorisme et cette démarche ne passe certainement pas par l'inquisition mais par l'enseignement. J'ai été agréablement surpris par le discours du Première Ministre anglais, Madame Theresa May, qui affirme que le terrorisme n'a rien à voir avec l'Islam.

La Mauritanie, pauvre, désertique – dans lequel certains acteurs internationaux, mal intentionnés essayent en permanence d'attiser les tensions raciales et sociales – recevant peu d'investissement et se trouvant dans une zone classée rouge par les chancelleries occidentales n'a connu aucun acte terroriste depuis 2011 et nos citoyens ne font pas partis de ceux qui s'entassent aux portes de l'Europe ou meurent en essayant de l'atteindre

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10 l'Institut Mauritanien d'Etudes Stratégiques



Cela montre que notre méthode marche.

Pour conclure je voudrais faire quelques constations.

Ma première constatation est que l'extrémisme violent – comme Monsieur le Président Barack Obama l'appelle – n'existe que depuis trois décennies, l'Islam existe depuis 14 siècles : cela prouve que l'Islam n'est pas la cause du terrorisme.

La seconde est que l'offensive organisée par l'OTAN et les pays occidentaux pour déstabiliser le nationalisme arabe – pour protéger ses alliés – dans la région a conduit au chaos et à l'intolérance.

La troisième est que certains acteurs de la communauté internationale pensent que les conflits de basse intensité servent leurs intérêts. Toutefois, tout le monde peut constater que ce qui s'est passé en Libye dessert plutôt qu'il ne sert l'Europe.

La quatrième est que les hommes ne sont pas comme des ordinateurs et ils ne peuvent pas être mis à jour constamment, il y a une inertie de l'espèce humaine à l'accélération constante de la mondialisation et cela donne au Nord comme au Sud des formes de recroquevillèrent et de repliement sur soi qui peuvent prendre la forme du rejet de l'autre.

Je termine par des recommandations importantes et qui visent à rendre stérile le terrain où pousse le terrorisme.

- Lutter contre l'islamophobie ;
- Chercher à ne pas raviver les tensions ethniques, confessionnelles ou tribales ;
- Ne pas imposer certaines valeurs de la société occidentale comme universelles parce qu'il s'agit d'un viol aux autres cultures ;
- Ne pas appuyer la politique internationale uniquement soit sur la carotte soit sur le bâton et faire très attention à ne pas se laisser induire en erreur, lors des prises de décision par des acteurs régionaux au profit de leur propre agenda.

Il est aussi essentiel d'aider les pays du Sud dans l'éducation des nouvelles générations ; elles vont devenir vos futurs partenaires commerciaux, elles vont protéger les frontières communes et adopter les valeurs les plus attrayantes de la société occidentale.



The war in the Near East, combat actions







MOUHAMADOU EL HADY BA

## LE SÉNÉGAL AU COEUR DES TRAFICS

Quelles implications notre situation actuelle aura-t-elle sur notre espace sahélien, voire sur le Maghreb ?

Avant de parler de ça, évacuons d’abord le risque terroriste. En 2013, lors de la crise au Mali et face à la pauvreté de la réflexion stratégique au Sénégal, l’IPODE a décidé de poser une question ; qu’est-qu’ il se passe au Mali et est-ce que cela pose des problèmes pour le Sénégal. Le résultat de notre *working paper* – *La crise malienne et ses leçons pour le Sénégal* – a été l’individuation d’une distinction entre des cause proximales et des causes distales de la crise. Parmi les causes distale, on a découvert :

- L’exploitation des identités par le colonisateur français et l’existence subséquente de conflits inter et intra-communautaires au Nord
- Le tracé des frontières
- La sous-administration et l’enclavement du nord Mali.

Par contre, on a identifié seulement deux causes proximales :

- La jonction qui s’est opérée entre le MNLA, Ansar Dine et les organisations islamistes issues d’AQMI
- (et surtout) ce que nous avons pudiquement nommé l’effondrement des élites maliennes.

Ces analyses nous permettaient de tirer des leçons sans concession pour le Sénégal qui, comme le Mali, d’avant la crise fait figure d’exemple démocratique, alors qu’il voit la légitimité de ses élites s’éroder du fait des inégalités, voit son système éducatif se dégrader et surtout gère une CBI importante. Il nous semblait que le Sénégal lui-même pouvait potentiellement sombrer dans ce genre de phénomènes

D’ailleurs, une similitude frappante se retrouve dans l’attitude du Président Macky Sall qui a reproduit l’équivalent du consensus malien de Amadou Toumani Touré ; c’est-à-dire un consensus et une mobilisation basé sur la corruption.

Si comme nous le constatons, il y avait des similitudes si importantes entre le Mali d'avant la crise et le Sénégal, pourquoi notre pays ne s'effondre-t-il pas ? Y a-t-il un risque terroriste islamiste au Sénégal ? Il me semble que ce que nous avons négligé dans ce cas en 2013, c'est ce que je nomme ici le « paradoxe sénégalais ». Je vais illustrer ce paradoxe en partant de l'anecdotique à l'important. Puis je vais l'expliquer par le soufisme sénégalais. Après cela, je reviendrai à la question des trafics dans lesquels le Sénégal est impliqué.

Quand Macky Sal a été élu Président, il y a eu de nombreux discours sur le fait que pour la première fois on avait une Première dame sénégalaise, Madame Mariem Faye Sall. En fait, parmi ses prédécesseurs, Madame Colette Senghor était française et chrétienne, Madame Abdoulaye Wade était française et chrétienne, Madame Élisabeth Diouf était métisse franco-libanaise et chrétienne. Cet élément a été exploité par la communication de la Présidence de la République. Pourtant, quel autre pays religieusement homogène (94% musulmans) a eu un Président de la République d'une autre religion et 75% de ses Premières dames (3 sur 4) d'une autre race et d'une autre religion que la majorité de sa population ? Il y a une étude du Timbuktu Institute sur la radicalisation des jeunes de la banlieue dakaroise : 54% des sondés veulent un référendum pour que la charia soit appliquée au Sénégal mais que 81,7% de ces mêmes sondés se prononcent pour la conservation du système laïc actuel.

*Comment est-ce possible ?*

Parce que les musulmans sénégalais pratiquent un islam essentiellement soufi. Et que du soufisme, ils ont conservé l'acceptation de la marginalité. De ce fait, il y a une gouvernementaliste de la marginalité qui se fait via les confréries. Je vais vous donner un exemple ; Monsieur Serigne Modou Kara Mbacké et Monsieur Cheikh Bethio Thioune sont des guides religieuses.

*Quels sont les disciples de Serigne Modou Kara ?*

- Essentiellement urbains
- Marginaux au ban de la société
- Souvent consommateurs de drogue et d'alcool dans une société répressive
- Mais travaux d'intérêt général (cimetière)

*Quels sont les disciples de Cheikh Béthio Thioune ?*


- Essentiellement urbains
- Recrutement au collège lycée
- Mouvement diversifié

- Jouissance assumée
- Marie les jeunes et leur donne, si nécessaire, un pécule financier

Même si la société sénégalaise toute entière reconnaît le caractère peu orthodoxe des pratiques de ces mouvements-là, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'ils sont partie intégrante de l'une des confréries les plus importantes de ce pays : la confrérie mouride. Les groupes religieux marginaux récupèrent donc nos jeunes en déshérence minant ainsi l'attrait des groupes salafistes auprès des désenchantés. Cela c'est rassurant parce que ce n'est qu'en fin novembre 2015 que le Sénégal a semblé prendre un peu conscience du risque terroriste. Et cela s'est essentiellement fait par un discours inepte du Président sur le voile ainsi que l'arrestation d'imams marginaux. Par contre, si le risque terroriste est (relativement) maîtrisé est-ce à dire que tout va bien ?

**Non parce que le Sénégal est au cœur de toutes sortes de trafics.**


Examinons les cas des trafics de drogue et d'arme, de l'immigration clandestine et du blanchiment d'argent.



Si on regard cette carte, de 2008-2011, le Sénégal semble préservé sauf les vois du Mali et de la Mauritanie. Concernant les armes, le risque majeur pour le Sénégal est un effondrement de la Gambie avec un retour des rebelles casamançais. Par ailleurs le rapport de l'ONU dont nous avons parlé montre que le Sénégal est peut-être en train de réexporter des armes vers le reste de l'Afrique.


Pur ce qui concerne la drogue, Le Sénégal n'est pas (encore ?) un narco-État. Mais le pays a toujours été une plaque tournante pour la réexportation et ça change et en pire.





Le scandale de 2013 dans la police montre qu'il est possible que le cœur de la République soit compromis. Les cartels commencent à payer les intermédiaires non plus en espèce mais en drogue. Selon le Rapport ONUDC 2016 : Nous sommes devenus un pôle de consommation (1g de Coke= 4euros versus 80 en Europe).

Pour les migrations clandestines, Dakar est un hub important au cœur des voies maritimes et terrestres.



Mais attention...l'émigration clandestine est une soupape de sécurité pour un pays jeune comme le Sénégal. Une lutte trop résolue ce phénomène pourrait déstabiliser non seulement le pays mais la sous-région tout entière.

Au Sénégal, il y a aussi un boom immobilier à Dakar depuis les années 2000. Mise en place d'un cadre législatif de lutte contre les flux financiers illicites.

Année	Déclaration d'opérations suspecte	Transmission au parquet
2014	145	24
2013	112	22
2012	96	17
2011	92	
2010	84	15

La faiblesse même des chiffres illustre le constat du rapport du GIABA selon lequel sur des recommandations clé, la pratique sénégalaise est non conforme ou partiellement conforme.

Les cas des trafics de drogue et d'arme, de l'immigration clandestine et du blanchiment d'argent ne sont pas exhaustifs. Le Sénégal actuel est au cœur de la quasi-totalité des réseaux criminels (cigarettes, médicaments). Quelles conséquences pour le Sénégal et pour la sous-région ?

Les chercheurs (cf. Tamara Makarenko, par exemple) ont montré qu'il y a une porosité entre le crime organisé transnational et le terrorisme. Le Sénégal, en ne combattant pas les réseaux qui se renforcent depuis 2012, crée les conditions de sa future déstabilisation. Dakar semble également fonctionner comme un hub de blanchiment d'argent. Il pourrait servir de base de déstabilisation de la sous-région maintenant que la Burkina ne joue plus ce rôle-là.

En ce qui concerne le Maghreb, il me semble que nous pouvons tirer deux leçons :

- La gestion de la marginalité par le Sénégal est un exemple important à émuler
- Une déstabilisation du Sahel à partir du Sénégal pourrait mettre en péril les équilibres précaires que des puissances comme l'Algérie et le Maroc ont réussi un tant soit peu à préserver.





MAMADOU DIALLO BHATIA

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

La tâche que vous me demandez n'est pas facile du tout, comme je dois faire une conclusion des choses qu'on a dit depuis ce matin. Tout d'abord, je voudrais remercier la Fondation du College de l'OTAN qui m'a invité parce que c'était avec beaucoup de plaisir que j'ai assisté à cette conférence. Notre occupation quotidienne ne nous permet toujours d'avoir le temps pour écouter les autres. Par contre, aujourd'hui a été très refranchissant pour prendre un peu plus conscience de l'ensemble des enjeux liés à cette région qui nous est très chère, à savoir le Maghreb, le Sahel et bien sur l'Europe.

De ce que vous avez dit, la chose la plus importante est qu'il s'agit d'une situation globale. La Méditerranée a des rives mais aussi des marges et la sécurité de rives dépend de la sécurité de marges. Cela veut dire que la sécurité de la Méditerranée est liée non seulement à ce qui se passe dans la mer, mais aussi à la situation au Sahel qui constitue la marge la plus importante de la Méditerranée. La sécurité de la Méditerranée c'est la sécurité de l'Europe parce que le continent plus proche de l'Europe est l'Afrique ; même s'il y a des différences entre eux, ils constituent un unique ensemble géographique. En comprenant c'est premier point, nous pouvons bien avancer dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale.

La deuxième chose est la coopération. Il faut que les pays coopèrent de façon bilatérale mais aussi de façon régionale. La troisième c'est de diversifier la lutte pour la stabilité et la paix de la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent, en tenant compte de ce qui a été dit dans ce contexte. Cela signifie réagir sans oublier les aspects liés à l'éducation des jeunes à fin de prévenir qu'ils puissent être embrigader dans le cadre de ces théories qui supportent le terrorisme et puissent trouver des conditions culturelles et économique meilleures.

Mon pays, la Mauritanie, se situe dans ce contexte. Depuis 2011, la Mauritanie a subi 30 attaques terroristes ; pour cela, la Mauritanie a développé une stratégie qui a été bien présenté par mon compatriote, l'ancien ministre mauritanien des affaires étrangères et directeur de l'Institut mauritanien pour les études stratégiques,

Dahan Ahmed Mahmoud. Notre plan politique depuis cinq ans a pu contenir les attaques du terrorisme et garantir la stabilité dans le pays. Notre choix a été de chercher à protéger nous-même et notre territoire – qui est la plus grande contribution que chaque pays peut offrir – et de collaborer avec les pays de la région et l’OTAN. Au niveau régional c’est surtout le G5 Sahel<sup>11</sup> qui depuis deux ans fait beaucoup dans la région au niveau de la coopération. Il a à ces actif des forces militaires, des écoles et des plans de développement économiques. En tout cas, je vous remercie pour ce que j’ai appris aujourd’hui et je vous demande de poursuivre les efforts que vous fait pour cette région.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.g5sahel.org/>

# SPEAKERS' BIOGRAPHIES

## **Alessandro Minuto Rizzo**

*President of the NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome*

A strong focus on strategic outlook in complex issues. High level contacts and negotiations. Special attention on countries of strategic relevance i.e. the Gulf region. Frequent Public Diplomacy activities to discuss policies and open issues. He held the position of Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic- political-industrial area, in relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean. He is the author of the books: "The road to Kabul", publisher Il Mulino-Arel (2009) and "A political journey without maps, diversity and future in the Greater Middle East". (Rubbettino 2013).

## **František Mičánek**

*Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome*

František Mičánek (Brigadier General Ret) was appointed Dean of the NATO Defense College (NDC) in September 2016. Previously, in the years 1988-2005 he acted in various command and staff positions within air defense units, up to commander of the air defense missile regiment, and later, in position of the Chief of the Army Air Defense Forces. Since 2006 to 2009 he acted as Deputy Director of the MoD Force Planning Division. In 2009-2011 he worked as a mentor at the NATO Defense College, Rome. In 2011 he was appointed Director of the MoD Force Planning Division. Since September 2013 he is employed in the position of a head of the Center for Security and Military- strategic Studies of the University of Defense in Brno.

### **Umberto Profazio**

#### *NDCF Analyst*

Umberto Profazio holds a Ph.D. in History of International Relations from the University of Rome Sapienza. His thesis examines Libya's foreign policy after independence. Umberto is Maghreb Analyst for the NATO Defense College Foundation and a contributor for the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome on issues such as political developments and terrorism in MENA region, in particular in Libya. Since September 2015 he is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Geopolitics and Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS) in London and a Security Analyst for a consultancy firm based in United Kingdom. His first e-book on the Islamic State terrorist group, *Lo Stato Islamico. Origini e sviluppi*, was published in March 2015 by e-muse.

### **Aziz Mekouar**

#### *Special adviser to the Presidency at the Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, Rabat*

Aziz Mekouar was the ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United States from June 2002 to September 2011. He then embarked on a new career as an advisor for major Moroccan groups and multinationals. Previously, Amb. Mekouar served as the Moroccan ambassador to Italy, Malta, and, Albania, and the permanent representative to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Portugal, and Angola. He was the elected chairman of the Council of the FAO from November 2001 to November 2005.

### **Mahmoud Gebril**

#### *Former Prime Minister of Libya*

When the Libyan uprising began in February 2011, Mahmoud Gebril helped starting what is now known as the National Transitional Council (NTC). Mr. Gebril served as the interim prime minister of Libya during that time and also served as head of international affairs, playing a leading role in securing the recognition of the international community. Prior to the revolution, in 2007, he was appointed the security general of the National Planning Council in Libya. During that period, he also led the National Economic Development Board.

### **Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck**

#### *El Erian Fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut*

Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck is an El-Erian fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where her work examines political and extremist violence, radicalization, Islamism, and jihadism with an emphasis on Algeria. She also focuses on the participation of women in jihadist groups. Previously, she was a research analyst at the Carnegie Middle East Center.



### **Youssef Amrani**

*Member of the Cabinet of His Majesty the King Mohammed VI, Morocco*

Prior to his designation in the Cabinet of His Majesty in October 2013, Youssef Amrani was Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation since January 2012 and Secretary General of the Mediterranean Union in July 2011. From 2003-2008, he served as ambassador and director general of bilateral relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Youssef Amrani has also served from 1996 to 2003 as an Ambassador. He was the head of office of the secretary of state for the Arab Maghreb Union from 1989-1992. Afterwards, he was appointed Consul General in Barcelona.

### **Hafida Benchehida**

*Senator of the Algerian Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Algiers*

Hafida Benchehida is a Senator of the Algerian Parliament and sits in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Throughout her career as an international interpreter and consultant for international seminars, she has attended major regional summits and workshops. She is the founder and executive officer of the Algerian Women Parliamentary Network.

### **Issandr El Amrani**

*Director of the Crisis Group's North Africa Project, Brussels*

Issandr El Amrani is a Moroccan-American political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Egypt and the Middle East for British, American and Middle Eastern publications. Currently he serves as the director of the Crisis Group's North Africa Project in Brussels. From 2007 to 2009 he was the North Africa analyst for the International Crisis Group. He was the Cairo correspondent for Middle East International (MEI), and writes for The Economist, the Financial Times, the London Review of Books, Foreign Policy, The National, Bidoun and other publications.

### **Mariem Ben Hassine**

*Deputy Head Middle East and North Africa Section in the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of NATO, Brussels*

She is responsible for developing and promoting NATO policy, political relations, practical cooperation and better public understanding with Middle Eastern and North African countries, especially those participating in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Before joining NATO, Mrs. Ben Hassine was working for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Geneva, providing advice to 53 African countries for their trade negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

**Dahan Ahmed Mahmoud**

*former Mauritanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Mauritanian Institute for Strategic Studies, Nouakchott*

Former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Dahan Ahmed Mahmoud served as Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior in Tunis and Representative of the Arab League in New Delhi and Madrid. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Mashref (Naval Repair Company of Nouadhibou), he was the initiator and organizer during 6 years of the Euro-Arab dialogue days of Toledo. Author of articles on international relations and the role of the mass media in increasing crime.

**Mouhamadou El Hady Ba**

*Scientific Committee, IPODE (Innovations Politiques & Démocratiques), Dakar*

He is part of the Scientific Committee of IPODE (Innovations Politiques & Démocratiques), Dakar. Before joining IPODE, he took a philosophy course at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar where he is now teaching. He has written a master's thesis on Quantum Mechanics and a dissertation on the debate between Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty on relativism and realism in epistemology. Apart from the thesis work, his main focus of interests are Pascal, Spinoza, Sheikh Hamidou Kane, Anthony Trollope and Francis Scott Fitzgerald and serves as editor for the European Review of Philosophy

**Mohamed Jalel Ghedira**

*Member of the Tunisian Parliament Committee for the Administration of the Armed Forces, Tunis*

Member of the Mouvement Nidaa Tounes from 2014, he is now Member of the Tunisian Parliament and of the Committee for the Administration of the Armed Forces and part of the Commission for Security and Defense. Previously, he was Member of the Board of Directors of Tunisia Autoroutes (2003 - 2007) and Director - Colonel in the Directorate of Territorial Units of the National Guard (2007 - 2009). From 2003 to 2009 he was a coordinating member and supervisor of the National Commission for the Prevention of Crises and Natural Disasters and he served as General Manager - Colonel Major at the National Observatory of Road Safety until 2013.

**Mamadou Diallo Bhatia**

*Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Nouakchott*

Mamadou Diallo Bhatia was Councilor for Administrative Affairs in the Office of the Prime Minister from 2009 to 2014. Until 2014 he was active in the academics as a professor at E N A of Nouakchott. Previously he served as a Principal Advisor to the President of the Republic with Rank of Minister. From 1992 until 1997 he worked for the Office of the Prime Minister Councilor for the Sovereignty Sector. Between the period of 1986-1989 he served as the Director of Local Government in the Ministry of the Interior. Before he was the Advisor to the Minister of the Interior.



# DEEP MAGHREB: (IN)SECURITY AND STABILITY NORTH AFRICA AND ITS SAHEL DIMENSION

HIGH LEVEL SEMINAR

*Co-organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation  
and the PASP Division of NATO  
in co-operation with the NATO Defense College*

ROME, THE 30TH OF NOVEMBER 2016

Venue: Rome, Auditorium via Veneto, Via Vittorio Veneto, 89

- 14,30-15,30      Registration and welcome coffee  
15,30-15,40      Welcome remarks  
                      **Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo**, President, NATO Defense College  
                      Foundation, Rome  
                      **František Mičánek**, Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome

## THE MAGHREB REGION: (IN)SECURITY AND BEYOND

*The Maghreb region is of great strategic importance and is an essential contributor to international security. It is also marked by a lack of regional co-operation, which hampers an effective shared security and development. What are the means and the policies to proceed into this new course? How can external partners assist?*

- 15,40-17,20      Chair: Aziz Mekouar, special adviser to the Presidency at the  
                      Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, Rabat
- **Hafida Benchehida**, Senator of the Algerian Parliament,  
Foreign Affairs Committee, Algiers
  - **Mariem Ben Hassine**, Deputy Head Middle East and  
North Africa Section in the Political Affairs and Security  
Policy Division of NATO, Brussels
  - **Issandr El Amrani**, Director of the Crisis Group's North  
Africa Project, Brussels
  - **Mahmoud Gebril**, Former Prime Minister, Tripoli

## Q&A

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## NORTH AFRICA: BETWEEN TWO SEAS

*The region lies between a Mediterranean sea open to commerce, energy and financial flows, and a Saharan sand sea increasingly insecure due to organised crime, contraband, terrorism and illegal migrations. How do they affect the overall scenario and the regional geopolitics? what are the risks and the diverging/converging interests? Is it possible to transform this arc into an arc of opportunities?*

17,20-19,00

Chair: **Mohamed Jalel Ghedira**, Member of the Tunisian Parliament, Committee for the Administration of the Armed Forces, Tunis

- **Youssef Amrani**, Senior Officer, The Royal Cabinet, Rabat
- **Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck**, El Erian Fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut
- **Dahan Ahmed Mahmoud**, former Mauritanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Mauritanian Institute for Strategic Studies, Nouakchott
- **Mouhamadou El Hady Ba**, Scientific Committee, IPODE (Innovations Politiques & Démocratiques), Dakar

## Q&A

### FINAL REMARKS

19,00-19,10

**Mamadou Diallo Bhatia**, Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Nouackhott

*Media partner:*





Muslim women wear hijab praying








The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College.

Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network. The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of co-operation with NATO.

Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings. The Foundation was born five years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staffs.

Since it is a body with considerable freedom of action, transnational reach and cultural openness, the Foundation is developing a wider scientific and events programme.



Beyond Libya, ISIS, their repercussions on neighbouring countries and a limited intervention, it seems that there is no organic reflection regarding the Maghreb region. The NATO Warsaw summit has found a balanced solution on the East-South risks debate, but nevertheless the Mediterranean area appears stuck in a strategic fuzziness.

The traditional vision of the Maghreb has been lost in the disintegration of what was formerly known as the Middle East and it seems more appropriate to look at it in the new context created by the aftermath of the Arab Revolutions and the global economic crisis. Today the Maghreb is not only riverine to the Mediterranean Sea, but has acquired a new strategic security depth in the Sahara sand sea across the Sahel region.

Each country has a remarkable political tradition and economic potentials that, even when they are traditionally proven, can be further developed in the agricultural, extractive, industry and services sectors. The ongoing global economic crisis contrasts with the growth of African economies and North Africa must be in a position to fully exploit this opportunity through a reinforced co-operation.

All regional states are obviously concerned by the current security developments and their outlooks are continuously and directly influenced by the flows of arms, drugs, smuggled wares (subsidised foodstuff, consumer goods, cigarettes, etc.) and migrants across the “grey zones” within Sahel and Sahara. In order to develop a more insightful and balanced political and strategic reflection, the seminar has been organised into two panels. The first addressed possible ways and means to overcome the present instability through co-operative security and urgent appropriate support measures, both from internal and external actors. The second looked at the complex strategic picture of the region including its deep Sahelian space and its multidimensional criminal threats.

ISBN 978-88-6140-2164

