Non-state actors have significantly increased the disintegration risk for countries in the Arab region, while regional hegemonic competitions complicate an already volatile situation. In this difficult context, where the Sykes-Picot agreement has been seriously undermined, there is a clear need to understand how internal and external powers' interests can be reconciled. In this context the issue antiterrorism in a post-ISIS phase has been only superficially addressed.

How to find a way ahead towards balances, some kind of regional order and increased stability, getting out of the cycle of civil wars? Security partnerships can be extremely valuable when disintegration and centrifugal forces represent a clear and present danger. Indeed, NATO is active in supporting partners precisely towards a more consensual regional order.

In addition to this quagmire, the realities of conflict tend to obscure economic dynamics that underpin both stability and wars. Although some countries try to diversify their economy, in quest for solutions achieving a more sustainable development, growth has visibly slowed in the area and illegal trafficking is one of the main burdens towards recovery, fueling conflict and subtracting scarce resources for the countries.

Even a return to economic growth could be too weak to foster job creation, resulting in an unbearable pressure on fiscal systems, welfare and refugee assistance, i.e. directly on political viability.

The conference has aimed at: reaching a high-quality added-value interaction, contributing to an in-depth analysis and also to offer a sense of strategic direction for security providers.

The Arab region is undergoing a deep crisis affecting its regional, political and strategic landscape. Where disintegration and centrifugal forces continue to represent a destructive threat, because the existing political arrangements are unworkable, growth has clearly slowed down. At this point illegal trafficking, as well as organized crime, become an unsustainable burden for countries and populations.

Through the keen perspectives of outstanding panellists, this publication offers a contribution in writing a more realistic and coherent narrative on what nowadays has to be considered as a priority in the Arab region. The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative, with their purpose of building strong cooperative ties spanning across the region, must be one of the main priorities for all the parties involved because they help rebuilding a healthy multilateral diplomatic tissue fostering growth.

Despite this complex state of affairs, the region can still move from the turmoil of its revolutions and civil wars towards order and stability: regional and international actors' support is of course a fundamental tool.

The conversations in this book reflect the necessity of sharing a common understanding and alternative strategies with the purpose of promoting "a concert among different national and international actors", directed to balance the existing divergent policies. From this point of view, NATO responds promptly, continuing and intensifying the co-operation with its partners in the Middle East and North Africa.
The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College. Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network.

The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of co-operation with NATO. Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings.

The Foundation was born seven years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staffs. Actually the Foundation is active in three areas: high events, strategic trend research and specialised decision makers’ training and education. Since it is a body with considerable freedom of action, transnational reach and cultural openness, the Foundation is developing a wider scientific and events programme.
ARAB GEOPOLITICS FROM TURMOIL

BALANCES, STABILITY AND REGIONAL ORDER

Organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation

in co-operation with the Gulf Research Center Foundation, the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, the NATO Defense College and the NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division
NDCF Conference "Arab geopolitics from turmoil towards balances, stability and regional order"
The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the NDCF concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Map source: UNCS
The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the NDCF concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Map source: UNCS.
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FOREWORD

We welcome everybody and especially those who have travelled from abroad to this conference dedicated to the Arab region. It is very important to have a distinguished audience and a good group of speakers and moderators.

Somebody may consider that the title of the conference is too optimistic, I don’t think so. It is however an expression of our desire to look forward, beyond the crisis, to search for new avenues, to discuss about cooperative solutions.

We understand that we have in front of us a vast universe that it is impossible to resume in simplistic formulas; each country has its own history, traditions and expectations and therefore deserves a serious study. It is essential to give voice to as many views as possible in a respectful manner, collecting the best possible expertise.

Why to have chosen such a subject, difficult in itself and controversial as it is discussed from with different perspectives?

Not only because the region cannot be ignored, but also because we would like to help to transform the arc of crisis into an arc of opportunities. This very relevant part of the world has an enormous potential especially for the Europeans and countries like Italy, sharing the same sea and the same waters.

It is clear that today we need more than ever a good reading of facts and a clever analysis. We have started this Foundation with that purpose in mind. Today it is also clear that you cannot any more divide the issues according to tradition. Politics, diplomacy, economics, trade and security are interconnected as never before. In conclusion, to make a good synthesis is not an easy affair.

Since its beginning the NATO College Foundation has a strong focus on Arab affairs that we consider to be a priority to be addressed in the best possible ways. As a matter of fact this is the fourth conference that we organize, in a few years, dedicated to the subject. It resulted in three books that are easily available to everybody.
I wish to draw the attention of the reader on the fact that the College, here in Rome, hosts since already some years the Faculty for the Middle East. Civilians and military from all our countries meet for 10 weeks, twice a year, to study together strategic and international issues. We have the entire class here today and tomorrow and they are an anticipation of the much needed “interoperability of the human minds”.

In conclusion, we are here to provide a good framework for an honest and high level discussion, in a spirit of mutual understanding and on a scientific basis. I thank very much the Political and Security Division of NATO HQ, as well as the Science for Peace and Security Program, for their support, and al-Arabiya as our media partner. Special thanks to PMI.

The conference will be opened by Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the Secretary General of the Arab League in office. It is a great privilege for us to have him here and for me a special pleasure of meeting him again after some years.

I hope that the proceedings of this timely conference can be a useful contribution to the understanding of the issues at stake in the hope that this may also lead to finding common solutions.
HOW TO MAINTAIN A STABLE REGIONAL ORDER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to thank you for inviting me to this important conference. I wish it all the success. About three weeks ago I went to Iraq in order to put forward an initiative that would provide a way out of the impasse between the Kurds and the central government.

I met with the leaders on both sides and listened to their arguments. They both made sense, but the gap in trust between them was almost unbridgeable. Why? They would both give you different answers: the Arabs see the Kurds as eager to secede and difficult to satisfy. The Kurds on the other hand see the Arabs as difficult to live with and eager them even within a federal context.

We can track these problems back to the beginning of the 20th century with the partition of the Arab Mashreq to border lines serving the interests of the major colonial powers of the time – Britain and France. Sykes-Picot, for instance, was a partition plan that we were raised to abhor.

Yet now I, like others in the region, call on preserving the very map that it produced.

The reason? Because those lines gave us newly formed states that have transformed into nation states which in turn became integral parts of the Arab system. However, they were never able to seize on their multiethnic and multicultural nature, and at least some of these newly-formed states applied an overdose of Arab nationalism which came back to haunt them, and all of us, in the process.

True that the Arab League was established in 1945 on the principles of Arab nationalism. But it was a light dose of Nationalism that would help the societies under occupation to gain their independence and feel solidarity among each other. However, the excess of zeal in applying any type of nationalism, as we witnessed throughout history, can create real tragedies. And there is a great deal to be learned from the tragedies brought about by the extreme nationalism particularly in Iraq and Syria.
The biggest lesson of all is the following. In a region that is multicultural, multi-
ethnical and multireligious there is, in my view, no room – I repeat, no room – for
any form of exclusive nationalism or exclusive political processes. Only an inclu-
sive political formula has the ability to provide enough glue to hold such societies
together. At this day and age, the goal should always be to protect societies from
unravelling.

Fragmentation is not the answer. Division creates more problems. New equa-
tions and formulas will have to be devised. One of the reasons why I am alarmed
about the Kurdish separatism in Iraq is the negative repercussions it will have on
the future of Syria, which has its mosaic of ethnic and religious minorities too. If
federalism, which after all is a new form of government in the Arab world, fails
in Iraq, it will stand virtually no chance of success in neighbouring Syria. The
Arab world may have inherited poisonous border arrangements from the colonial
powers, but throughout the past century those inherited lines solidified themselves
into the consciousness of the Arab peoples, thus creating realities –nation states
– that are, in my view, impossible to change at this point, at least not without a
heavy price in blood and resources. Those new nation-states have become part of
the basic structure of the Arab order.

The title of our conference today refers to the “regional order”. It is a concept
that is rarely invoked those days.

“Order” is no longer in vogue, chaos seems more to be the characteristic of our region.

What is a regional order? It is basically and primarily a system of carefully put-to-
gether interests of states that is balanced and delicate, and hopefully well-rooted.
In the region we call the “Arab World”, i.e. the Arab-speaking countries, the basic
norm for keeping stability has been state sovereignty. The colonial no-so-distant
past made sovereignty even more cherished by the peoples of the region. Israel,
in this context, was a threat to the system since its inception particularly because
it usurped the sovereignty and independence of the Palestinian people. Similarly,
the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a blow to the regional order because it
obliterated an independent country in one stroke.

Recently, the flagrant interventions by the non-Arab regional powers, primarily
Iran, in the domestic affairs of some Arab states threatens the system and creates
turmoil because it simply infringes the sovereignty of countries. Iran substitutes
nationalism with sectarianism. In the process, it does not recognize political bor-
ders nor state sovereignty. We have all seen how this Arab regional order has
been shaken to its core in the last 6 years. Some nation-states were weakened and
ceased to exist or function as unified political entities. The dire consequences of
this phenomenon will not be confined to the boarders of the fractured countries.
Failed states produce:

a. health calamities, like what we see in Yemen,
b. refugee flows, like in Syria, and
c. safe havens for terrorist organizations, like the situation in Libya.

Failed states became an internal problem, not only a regional one. Today, it is with great sadness that we recognize that one in every two refugees in the world is Arab. The Arab refugee problem has even contributed to the radicalization of the political map in the EU. The displaced are in millions, and the refugees create pressures on the infrastructure of the destination countries. We have nearly 700,000 cases of cholera in Yemen. We have terrorist organizations wreaking havoc in Libya and Somalia. It is a human tragedy on a scale not seen for centuries. What can be done?

• State failure tends to be contagious. It spreads from one country to another. The first step is to stop this pattern. Countries that are struggling to cope with spill-over effects from crises across the border should be supported and provided access to humanitarian assistance.

• Inclusive political formulas should be put forward as the only way out for the fractured countries, namely Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen. Any such formula should rest on two principles: a central government that is fairly in control with a monopoly over the use of force, and a considerable degree of decentralization that entails devolving a range of powers from the central government to the local level allowing for ethnic and religious groups to enjoy some form of autonomy.

• Preserving the territorial integrity and state sovereignty of the countries should be the guiding principle in any political settlement to ongoing conflicts. Redrawing borders will open a Pandora’s box. For one, there are no clear criteria determining which ethnic or religious group should be entitled to establish a state of its own. Why Kurds but not Yazidis? Why Alawites but not Assyrians? History teaches us that separation and division usually creates more grievances and produces widespread violence and sometimes even ethnic cleansing.

• State sovereignty is not enough as a guiding principle for a stable regional order. It should be coupled with good governance, and economic viability. Sovereignty alone can’t keep states from disintegrating or fragmenting. Sovereignty alone can’t satisfy the aspirations of the young who constitute the majority of the population in the Arab World.

• Last but not least, the Palestinian problem cannot remain unsolved. It is a sore point in our region and our psyche. The establishment of the Palestinian state along the 1967 lines, is the only political move that could possibly have a deep and immediate positive transformative effect on the regional dynamics.
After the turmoil of the post-Arab spring period and the swift rise and rapid fall of the so-called Islamic State, a new order is in the making in the Middle East. This new era is characterized by two main factors: the decline of the political Islam in the region, following its unsuccessful record in power; and a return to the authoritarian rule, which in some cases reversed the gains of the revolutionary period.

However, many “question marks” remain with respect to the final outcome of this long transition, looking at mutable power relations and quick inter-states realignments. Syria is politically crumbled among regional spheres of influence; confrontational politics shakes the Gulf and Maghreb is still suffering from the persisting instability in its peripheries. The old, consolidated Middle Eastern order collapsed, paving the way for sovereignty erosion, the primacy of micro-identities and the rise of non-state actors. Uncertainty is going to last at a regional level, since metamorphosis is still ongoing and will likely become the essence of the new order. This triggers demanding challenges for NATO.

Regional trends are clear. The crisis of the Arab state constantly erodes states legitimacy, challenged not only by sub/trans-national actors, but also weakened by persisting states’ ineffectiveness. Intra-regional struggles foster polarization and sectarianism: identity politics has systemically become a tool of power politics. Transnational loyalties (based on ethnicity, religion, language and tribe) and threats (insurgencies and jihadi terrorism) grow as states weaken, leaving room for informal actors and alternative security providers’ proliferation. Patron-client relations are now able to spin regional events on a transnational basis.

In this framework, the role of energy and the nature of security undergo a deep transformation. The regional turmoil was also exacerbated by the economic crisis resulting from the oil slump, so displaying the frailty of rentier states’ social pacts. Policies of economic diversification can’t be paused or delayed, but they require a conducive environment to attract foreign investments. The inability to reverse the
downward trend in oil prices revealed how much OPEC has lost the pivotal and regulatory role in the oil market.

Security has no more the meaning it used to have a decade ago. On the other hand, the regionalization of security is a rising dynamic: Middle Eastern powers enhance efforts to exert/impose their own security agenda on neighbouring territories, so fuelling counter-alignments, arms race and intra-regional conflict. In such a volatile context, Arab states shift towards a patchwork security pattern: not only the fragmentation of many states favours locally-based security agreements and not overall, national frameworks, but competing security providers also multiply on the territory, as cases of coexistence/cooperation between armies and armed non-state actors (as occurs in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen).

While regional alignments and alliances are still in the making, NATO can’t wait for the creation of well-defined balances of power. It must cope with Middle Eastern metamorphosis now, building security partnerships in the Arab world as the only way to increase shared resilience, especially in the security field (with a special eye on Arab armies’ current transformation). Otherwise, the cooperative security goals risks remaining a never ending path.
Session I

STATE DISINTEGRATION AND RE-INTEGRATION
Royal Palace in Rabat, Morocco.
Royal Palace in Rabat, Morocco.
Excellencies, distinguished guests, it is a personal honour for me to be here again, and it is an additional privilege to stir this very remarkable panel. I would like to extend my gratitude to the NATO Defense College Foundation for organizing this timely conference and for all the other contributors. I would also like to give a special thanks to the dear friend Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo. Thank you for your continuing efforts in being a voice for reason and for being a distinguished figure in creating more dialogue across the Mediterranean region and beyond.

Our first session encompasses a group of outstanding speakers with diversify backgrounds. Their mission is going to be far from obviousness in order to explain us the title of this session. Are Arab states really moving from disintegration to more cohesion, unity and re-integration? Or it is just a myth and the looming reality is that we are approaching a third war in the region leading to more ethnical states and disintegration? In putting to our panelists such an eye-opener question, I was led by a group of factors, or developments on the ground that we have been witnessing.

The most recent development that we need to examine is the effect of the referendum – recently held1 – for the independence of the Iraqi Kurdistan and the disintegration impact it would have on the Levant countries such as Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. The Kurdistan of Iraq referendum not only hits the unity of Iraq at heart, but also jeopardizes the interests of Turkey, which is a NATO member state. On this note, what should we expect from Turkey in this regard? Today we hear about borders closure and oil supply cutting. Therefore, how do we interpret the Turkish-Russian recent cooperation highlighted by the Russian S-400 missiles proposed sale? Furthermore, is Turkey departing for once and for all from the EU/Western sphere after it stayed knocking on the EU door for decades without an answer? I think NATO needs to be concerned and worried about this.

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1 It has been held on 25th September 2017 in the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
Another relevant question regards the gas fields in the Mediterranean and the economic and security trilateral axes that are emerging: economic, energy and security cooperation between Israel, Greece, Cyprus plus to some extent: Bulgaria and Romania on the one hand, and an Egyptian/Greek/Cypriot cooperation on the other. Is gas supply the major element causing the recent standoff between Israel and Turkey? And, is the Kurdistan issue going to add fuel to the fire? Will this lead to forging an antagonist axis including Russia, Syria Lebanon, Iran and Turkey, and – with the reality of axes in the region – will it plunge the area into more disintegration? All these questions will facilitate, or hinder, the political solution in Syria and intuitively affect the nature of its outcome. The question now concerns the threats of disintegrating Syria and its spell over to Jordan and Lebanon, and how much realistic are the chances for the re-integration of this devastated country.

Then we will look at the ongoing crisis between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. We need to consider the future impact on the Gulf Cooperation Center (GCC) and the damage it could cause. In the sphere of this conflict the question pops up yet again: is Iran the elephant in the room? Is Iran hampering with the Arab geo-political interests (GCC a special case) or the reality is that are is no clear common Arab geo-politics?

Moreover, we will move to the west, to the Maghreb area, and we will look at Libya asking the following questions: “Is Libya a ticking bomb leading to further Arab disintegration? What are the prospects of moving from turmoil to stability? Do we need a more pro-active role that the EU ought to take in order to protect European interests?”. In asking these questions we should not let out of sight the role of non-state actors, led by the terrorist group ISIS (Daesh), and the damage it caused to state integration. I was also wondering if the exiting from Syria and Iraq and the consequent re-grouping in Libya is opening a new disintegration chapter and new battlefield.

Therefore, we have to examine the era of post-ISIS and non-state actors in the region and who should lead and what should lead in that era: security cooperation, economic re-building, or both? If we put states aside for one moment, what would be needed to re-integrate societies and peoples after this bloodshed and ethnical mess?

What is NATO’s role in that phase, especially in the light of a growing Russian hegemony in the Arab region, particularly in the Levant area?

Now, all these questions cannot be tackled without the shedding light on the present and future Arab League’s role in the Arab states’ turmoil. Has the Arab League delivered on its charter? If someone will say that the Arab League itself suffers from disintegration symptoms, is that due to organizational and structural weaknesses or fingers should be pointed at the powerless and non-committtal member states? Would a new model revive Arab common action?

Finally the question should be put as whether the disintegration of the Arab states eliminates any prospect for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace and if the chances for a Palestinian-Israeli two-state solution dwindle day by day.
After the First World War, this region went through many crises; however, the actual ones are completely different from what happened in the past, principally for two aspects.

The first one concerns geography. It is the first time that a crisis has projected its effects to the Arab North-East Africa and to the Gulf region. Today, all Arab countries are across the geographic region suffering from this crisis in a way or another.

Secondly, while the previous crises threatened the regimes, this is the first one which is threatening the structure of the State itself and its existence. If you ask to any Arab citizen whether he wants to be free, to change the government and to get rid of the corruption, very probably, you would have 99,9% of answers saying: “Yes, I want a moderate, good and democratic government”. But, if you ask a follow-up question saying: “If the risk of this democratic government would lead to chaos, state disintegration, flow of refugees, corruption – as it happens today – are you ready to accept this risk?”. I cannot assure you that 99,9% of them would say no.

If you talk of people in Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia or wherever in the Arab region, they definitely would not going to negotiate the relative stability for the sake of a promised freedom.

This is what basically killed the Arab Spring. Undoubtedly, it collapsed soon: its principles become negative since they were not accompanied by the reinforcement of the security measures and by economic reforms. As a result, the Arab Spring developed rapidly to threaten the state, the citizens and their normal life.

In my opinion, we have two issues that are threatening the integrity of the state: the terrorist groups and the armed ideology called militia – it must be said that there is no part in the world, exception for the Arab region, whose militia has been armed with ballistic missiles.

Concerning terrorism, I think that we should not celebrate pretty much early
the demise of ISIS. Yes, ISIS is out of Mosul, Tal Afar, Dayr az Zor and Raqqa, but we have already seen this before. We have seen it in Iraq, between 2007 and 2009, when Al Qua’eda and Islamic State in Iraq completely left the Al Anbar province for three years. After that, it come back much stronger than before. The reason here is that terrorism is a product of the political environment. If you do not change it, you can kill and arrest people as much as you want but nothing would get better.

At one stage you have to ask the following question: “Why people from of Al Anbar, in 2003/2004, considered ISI members as heroes?”. They were suffering from the government forces, from the Iranian militia and also from the American forces. Everybody of them had a group of killers to consider as heroes because they protected them and their families much more than the official government. The same happened in Mosul. How could 2.000 fighters from ISIS be able to drive out 40.000 regular forces?1 Because of the people. People of Mosul were suffering from sectarianism, discrimination and security forces of the regime. They interpreted ISIS as something coming from the heaven. It is human nature: I need someone to protect my interests and my family and those people are offering exactly this, even for a limited period of time. It does not matter that later they tend to be criminal.

So, if you do not change the sectarian, pro-iranian and corrupted political environment in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen you will always find terrorism as a product of this.

Therefore, statistics from have demonstrated that, from 2003 until now, there is about over a million ISIS members that have been killed. This means that the recruitment rate exceeds the elimination rate: I can kill 10 ISIS fighters, but there are 20 of them coming in the region. It is clear now that if we really want to solve the problem and destroy terrorism, we have to change the political environment. Without political change, forget about it.

The other question is the issue of militias. As opposite to terroristic groups, militias are officially supported by government, whether Iraqi, Syrian, Iranian etc... also in the ballistic missiles’ manufacturing. It is not surprising that, in many cases, militias become stronger than the state.

Consider, for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is stronger than the Lebanese army and has ballistic missiles (the Lebanese army does not have a single missile).

Furthermore, look at Houthi in Yemen: they fired missiles Burkan with an estimated 1.500 kilometres range2.

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1 On July 2017 during the devastating battle to retake Mosul from ISIS, over 40.000 civilians have been killed as a result of massive firepower used against them, especially by ISIS fighters.

2 On the 4th November 2017 Saudi Arabia announced it had intercepted with Patriot air defence missile a Burkan 2H missile fired from the Iran-allied armed Houthi movement in Yemen. The estimated target was the King Khalid International Airport of Riyadh. By end 2017 at least three missiles of this type have been fired against Saudi Arabia.
As long as militias exist in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon etc... people would never have stability. Militias, in fact, would not allow the rising of a stronger government since a very strong government would never allow militias to exist.

And here, I am calling for an idea: we need to criminalize the militia as much as we criminalize the terroristic groups. We need a Security Council able to put strong obligations on the militia armed ideology present in the Middle East; on the contrary, it is destined to survive as long as it is very profitable, capable to control the state and basically supported by someone outside who has interest in that.

Another crucial issue is the question of the Kurdish referendum. Kurds are de facto independent since 1991. As a consequence, in the Kurdish area not a single policeman from the Iraqi Central Government is present there. Anyway, they want to transit this de facto to a real independence not withstanding that it would mean opening a Pandora’s box.

First, the Kurdish state could change the political boarders of foreign states: Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. It could start from Iraq because of the weakness of the Iraqi government and also because Kurds have their two own peshmerga militias: the first one belongs to the Talabani party, the second to the Barzani’s party. They are a purely political party militia even if regularly armed. Without them, Kurds cannot easily tell to the Iraqi government not to interfere. So, again militia’s power appears significant. The irony here is that Kurdish independence is supported by Israel. It recognizes the right of the Kurdish people to self-determinate, but it does not recognize the right of Palestinian people for the self-determination.

If you are going to accept the division of Iraq – its division would not be stopped only by the Kurdish state – then, you are going to open a door, since you are deciding the disintegration of the whole region, going through a crisis of boarders, authority and trade financial resources that could last for 50 or 100 years. It is very complicated, but, in reality, you cannot have an official separation without the international community agreement.

We have a very simple example: Turkey invaded south of Cyprus in 1974. Now we are in 2017 and the only country that recognizes and legitimizes the Cyprus state is Turkey; the international community did not agree. Another example is represented by the south of Sudan which was done by two different agreements: the first by the Sudanese government\(^3\), the second by the UN Security Council resolution\(^4\), based on chapter 7 and supported by the five permanent powers.

I do not want to run away from the question of Qatar\(^5\). You have only to remember that the Qatari crisis has its roots in the palace coup in 1995; this was a consequence of the complicated relations between the Qatar and the rest of the Gulf.

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\(^4\) Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 17th August 2015.

\(^5\) The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani was deposed by his son Prince Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani on 27th June 1995.
States that were suffering from numerous problems. The government of Qatar, in fact, felt that the Gulf States did not accept those changes and it caused tensions between the region and the rest of the majority of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Qatar opted for a defensive/offensive policy to defend itself).

I think this crisis would disappear because we went through crisis since 1995, and, at the end of the day, all of them disappeared and it happened only when the leadership has come together in order to reach a sort of understanding so to be able to change the complex internal situation.
IS IT REALISTIC TO ACHIEVE SOME KIND OF REGIONAL ORDER? HOW TO PROCEED?

I am honoured to be here with you today, seeing old friends and meeting new ones. I am very grateful to the NATO Defense College Foundation and to its organizers. It is always a pleasure to be here with such esteemed people.

The Middle East has never been in a worse situation than today. That, for all who know the region, means a lot. Since the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), the World War I, World War II, the al-Naqba (1948), al-Naqsah (1967), the October War (1973), the Tripartite Agression (1956) and the Gulf Wars (1990-1991; 2003), the Arab world and the Arab people have suffered too many times.

The last decades have been a perfect storm that completely disintegrated the Arab society’s fiber. Arab citizens have faced:

- An increasingly militarised geopolitical competition;
- An absence of effective and efficient government;
- Economic stagnation and no job creation, especially for the youth;
- A lack of external shock absorbers, provided earlier by high oil prices and US strategic interest in the region;
- Global antipathy and animosity at an inter-personal level due to the acts of terror committed in the name of our religion.

In the past, the Arab world was very different from what is today. Looking back 100 years ago, the region was in a much better place. There was a sense of pan-Arabism demonstrated in several coalitions like the Arab Federation between Iraq and Jordan, the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria, and the Arab Cooperation Council between Yemen, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. Also the

1 Al-Naqba means the Catastrophe and it indicates the massive exodus and expulsion of 700,000 Palestinians during and after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Al-Naqsah means the Setback and is used to remember the second displacement of Palestinians after the Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories, following the third Arab-Israeli war in 1967.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was a very solid and united body. Today, unfortunately, we are witnessing the erosion of the “Arab” identity and the rising of nationalism, sectarianism and tribalism which are leading to further erosion of any sense of Arab unity and cohesion.

We, as Arabs, do not feel that actions such as these unite our own interest. The Sykes-Picot agreement is something that has never been truly accepted, because we have seen the fabric of our society and countries being torn apart: unity is now a dream for many Arabs. As a consequence, we have begun to look at ourselves as nation states, rather than a unified people sharing the same language, culture and history.

I believe that what we need to do should be directed less at state nationalism and more towards the European model, whose population – after the repercussions of two World Wars on the European world – has come together and viewed itself as European with common interests.

The facts on the ground are that there is no actor, nor any cohesive agent that can put the Arab World back together again in the short term. There is a transactional relationship between the global super powers and the Arab world. Therefore, there is no effective ‘concert of Arab states’ – the Arab League has been put aside on many issues – and it is needed more than ever as we are going through difficult times.

Where once the region was collectively inspired by a political, economic and social model, now the following are in disarray:

- The Arab youth – who makes up 70% of the population in the region – will not accept any more the old-school paternalistic authoritarianism;
- The outdated economic socialist model is bankrupt;
- Governments can no longer afford the old social contract due to the economic decline and the dip of oil prices.

Today, when we talk about countries that have not been affected directly by the Arab Spring, we are talking about real youth un-employment between 30% and 40%. We should also consider the millions of youth in those areas that are suffering of post-traumatic syndromes and who have been expecting to die, or have seen their families being captured, killed on a daily basis; many did not go to school, nor received proper medical care for many years. This is our biggest issue and obstacle: who is going to build the society? Where are the doctors, the engineers, the lawyers? Where will they come from? How can they imagine the future after seeing a such a dismal past and present?

The retraction of Western influence and the rise of a Russian MENA policy combined with the emergence of a new generation of young Arab leaders have

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2 Signed on the 16th of May 1916.
created newly assertive and independent foreign and military postures across the region. The fact that there is no clear western policy vis-à-vis the region (as opposed to a very clear Russian policy) has created a race between countries on how to expand their sphere of influence, starting an arms race that has created and magnified problems.

So, where do we go from here?

In the short term:

• I believe that the de-escalation of the tensions and the acceptance of the others by the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral relations is a must;
• We should build confidence measures between countries of the region and we need to strengthen bilateral and multi-lateral flows of trade and goods;
• Countries should not to interfere in the politics of other countries: they should encourage their citizens to trade/invest with each other, regardless of their political ties or affiliations, in order to begin the process of mutual co-existence and weave the fabric of unity;
• The Palestinian issue must be resolved as it remains the central issue in the region;
• The situation of Iran and Turkey is critical as well. They are not going anywhere. We need to co-exist with all these countries thinking of how to change their governments’ system when, as it has been showed, it drastically failed and created more complications for us;
• We need to combat extremist ideologies with unapologetic and forceful counter-narratives: we have to spend all our money on education.

In the medium term:

• A collective re-thinking of the Arab League and the rebuilding of its principles based on consensus building and a common vision. Since the region deals with its issues, we cannot afford for the Arab League to be put aside;
• Global powers should encourage the creation of an entity, similar to NATO or an extension of it, as an umbrella for MENA protection;
• Focus on the creation of a platform of trust and transparency between Arab states (Arab League, Arab College, etc.). It would be used, for example, to place a unified cap on military expenditure in order to focus spending on education, infrastructure and employment, to boost economy and quality of life for their respective citizens. Most importantly, we must focus on youth engagement and job opportunities to let our future generations flourish;
• A Marshall Plan for the Arab world is needed more than ever;
• International efforts must ensure that everyone is involved and no one should feel himself left behind.
In the long-term:

• We should hopefully induce countries to work together, agreeing that their cooperation is essential to build their societies and optimistically to cascade into a future of political development. We must learn to deal with each other in a win-win manner rather than zero-sum game;
• We have to learn from the EU experience after the Second World War (treaty of Rome 1957).

On a final note, if I may be a little bit offhand, as an example of what have been talking, I will mention Jordan.

Jordan is a country that has borne the brunt of all this evil. We have, over several decades, received millions of refugees. The international community has done very little, but definitely not enough for what Jordan has borne in term of responsibility.

Our region today is a complicated one. There are a lot of pragmatists who like to think that the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence. Jordan has a modern King who, in the last seven years, has written papers about how he thinks the country should move forward, encouraging discussions on parliamentary political developments, political parties, de-centralisation and the reform of the legal system. Jordanians have a parliament and a responsible government; they have been partners in the war on terrorism and, since the inception of the kingdom, a peace treaty with Israel was signed; the country therefore, agrees with the West in terms of standing up for the rights that we all hold dear. Nevertheless, Jordanian feel that they are carrying the brunt of these proxy wars that have affected and hurt us and have created exactly the opposite of what we hoped. We acted in Jordan as Arabs and we hope, as a member of the civilised world, to be treated the same.

Jordan is a voice of moderation in the region; we have excellent relations with almost all our fellow Arab nations as well as with the international community. We have taken many responsibilities in dealing with regional crises.

However, we are suffering from a major economic crisis and the citizens are uneasy with the current state of the economy. This unfortunately creates the impression in the region that “doing the right thing” does not pay off and other nations will look to conduct their affairs in a different way that is not in line with the values we hold dear.

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3 The Jordan–Israel Peace Treaty was signed on the 26th of October 1994. The treaty guaranteed to Jordan the restoration of its occupied lands (approximately 380 square km), as well as an equitable share of water from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers.
THE ROAD TOWARDS SUCCESS AGAINST RADICALISM. THE ROLE OF THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

I am going to focus on some non-state actors in the Maghreb region. I will not concentrate only on IS. As you may know, there are different jihadists groups that are active in the Maghreb; they do not have all the same motivations, but all of them have been responsible for the ongoing security crisis in the Maghreb-Sahel region. Talking about the Sahel is crucial: here in Europe, we think it is too far, why should we care? Because the Sahel is Europe’s African borders. What happens in the Sahel has repercussions on the Maghreb and by extension Europe.

The jihadist groups operating in the Maghreb-Sahel area, are hard to map for different reasons. But most importantly because they are often composed of several factions, which are themselves divided into semi-autonomous brigades, battalions, and sub-battalions. Groups put under the umbrella of “jihadism” are numerous and different. Nevertheless, I will stress the attention mainly on one of these groups that are – in my opinion – even more, dangerous than IS: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that has became recently after a merger with other groups called Jamaa3at Nusrat El Islam wa El Muslimin (JNIM). For those who are not familiar with the history of the group, AQIM is one of the oldest Salafist jihadi group in the region, and it was born from the ashes of the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria (GIA).

In 1997-1998, a branch of the GIA’s fighters decided to defect due to its raising takfiri ideology and, in 1998, established its group: Group Salafist for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which merged in 2006 with Al-Qaeda and called itself Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). We will continue to hear about it mainly for three reasons:

I It is one of the oldest Salafist jihadist group in the region;
II It was able to expand its scope of action and extended its presence from Algeria
to Tunisia, Libya, Mali and other Sahelian states; III It is one of the most adaptive, resilient and pragmatic groups in the region.

Since the reasons that allowed it to thrive are still present in the region, we will continue to hear about AQIM, and I have to say pragmatically that, unless Sahel intends to tackle these causes Al-Qaeda has beautiful days ahead. But, what are these reasons? We can schematize them as follow:

- Political, social and economic marginalization;
- Failing or bad governance;
- Understaffed military and gloomy prospects for Security Sector reforms: mainly in the region, exception for Algeria, there is no competent force that is capable of fighting Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Probably Morocco would represent an exemption, but, because of the complicated relationship with Algeria, cooperation has been difficult;
- Corruption, at all levels;
- Closing channels and opportunities for peaceful political expression;
- Distrust towards the state, especially from populations in neglected peripheries;
- The “declining authority of traditional elites”;
- Lack of opportunities and alternatives;
- Indiscriminate violence and repression from the local security forces.

Of course, there are different reactions among the population. People might be passive, follow terrorists just because they think that it is the right thing to do, or because others convince them. The most significant reason why people support jihadists is that they “fill the void” left by failing or weak states. Al-Qaeda provides people with meaning in life, but it also gives them a way to secure their livelihood. Here, a concrete example about that: in Mali, the minimum wage is of 45 euros per month. When MUJAO² and Al-Qaeda came into power, they offered every youth capable, able and eager to vandalize a façade of an institution 45 euros. Therefore, they have been able to give youth 800 euros to all those who could provide them with intelligence and information about the MINUSMA³. They were also able to help them marry and build families and lives for themselves. In those cases, it is clear that motivations are hidden by ideology. Moreover, as someone could ask, how do they have money? Until 2000/2005 it was the money of the ransom, nowadays we must think about the black market. On the one hand, there

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¹ These movements were also a result of the Algerian forces’ counterterrorism strategy: they pushed them towards the South that, due to its totally ungoverned hinterlands, was a fertile ground for terrorists activities. With these conditions, it was simple for Al-Qaeda to start the process of “sahelization”.
² Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAWA), called also with the French acronym MUJAO.
³ The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
is the smuggling of weapons (West Africa has more than 8 million of light arms), on the other, the smuggling of goods such as cigarettes. These jihadist groups are substantially fuelled by this kind of illicit trade. Al-Qaeda does not necessarily smuggle cigarettes, but it helps the smugglers offering them protection and helping their convoys move safely against a “tax.” Today, over 70% of the cigarettes that are consumed in Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco come from the black market. And over than 80% of illicit cigarettes consumed in these countries are from illegal white brand flows. Another critical issue— and few researchers have tackled the question — is how Al-Qaeda has been very pragmatic about creating deep ties with local communities and tribes. One of the solutions is connected to marriage and kinship. It is known, in fact, that in this region, when you marry someone, you are under the protection of the entire tribe and of the community. So, these groups are allowed to work there because they are protected by local communities.

So what’s next?

After 9/11, people believed that Al-Qaeda was done, but nobody believed that the offspring, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was going to be bigger and more powerful than the mother organization. In the Sahel or the Maghreb social contracts between populations and leaders are broken. So, as long as we have to deal with communities and societies in which this contract broke down, we are going to continue to hear for a while about jihadist groups. This happens because jihadism is seen as an egalitarian employer. It offers “grab-and-go” solutions to complex problems; a noble and glorious cause to fight for and a thrilling adventure. If we have societies in which we do not offer youth real opportunities and alternatives and we keep thinking that military intervention is going to solve problems, we will continue to hear about jihadism.
JIHADIST PENETRATIONS IN THE FABRIC OF THE MAGHREB REGION

First of all, I will refer to the sentence used to describe one of the goals of the NATO Defense College Foundation: “Our mission is to promote the culture of stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area and in NATO partner nations”. Everyone of us is here, in fact, to promote understanding, comprehension and knowledge of each other.

The previous speakers have been particularly brilliant about the Middle East and its important political issues, so, it is very difficult to take the floor as the last one, when everything has been said so brilliantly and eloquently. Nevertheless, as a Maghrebi, I would like to touch upon the differences in the social fabric of the Maghreb countries resulting from history, colonization, wars for independence, different relationships established with the former colonial power or with neighbours – even during the Ottoman Empire.

In the light of these factors, the conception of Maghreb rests on different approaches, mentalities and visions. However, what you can find in those countries (especially in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), more than in other regions, is the feeling and the culture of citizenship: despite the differences in the relationships, historical evolution and economic structures, those countries have the same link with the rest of the Arab world which are religion, language and, sometimes, the sense of belonging to the same cultural and political sphere.

Moreover, I am tempted to be provocative saying that, sometimes, what is sure and clear in the Middle East, does not always apply to the Maghreb region. For example, in the Maghreb area we do not perceive Iran – differently from what has been shown in other contexts – as the hegemonic power threatening its neighbours. We have different approaches and perspectives about it.

The Maghreb, and Algeria in particular, has been the collateral damage of the war in Afghanistan and Iran has nothing to do with it.

1 See: http://www.natofoundation.org/about-us/
It was only when Arab-Afghans came back in 1980 to Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt or Jordan, that we started to hear about terrorism\(^2\). Before that moment we never heard about jihadism, Islamism, Salafism or Wahabism. With their arrival, men started to use khôl in their eyes, to wear different attires, while women began to wear burka – which had never been wore before in Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco: from this moment on the idea of establishing a caliphate arose again.

Another terrible collateral damage that affected the region concerns the destruction of Libya’s structures. Libya has been totally dismantled, destroyed and divided: there are groups from the South, the East and the West which do not want to come together to build one single state.

Moreover, we should not forget what happened on Wednesday, 16\(^{th}\) January 2013 in Algeria. That day, a group of approximately 30 terrorists – among them Libyans, Tunisians, Sudanese, Canadians and Algerians – attacked one of the largest gas plant in Algeria and kidnapped its workers. If this terroristic attack had succeeded, it would have been like an atomic bomb, as Hiroshima. It would have destroyed completely not only the regional energy source, but also the major supply that provides gas to Europe and to our neighbours, as Tunisia and Morocco. Thanks God, or thanks to the security services and the army, their attempt of destruction failed.

From this perspective, when you talk about the Arab Region, you have to take into account our different history, what we have been through. So, the Arab Spring – as Jacques Benoist-Méchin referred to for the first time – is a disaster, a nightmare, a fall, winter, everything but spring\(^3\). It has not met any of the requirements of the democratic society that normally looks for pluralism, rule of law, multiparty system, fighting corruption and nepotism, ensuring stability and freedom.

What we had in result? The rising, like in Libya and Tunisia, of Islamist parties that were about to establish a caliphate. This is, what, for example, happened in Tunisia where, despite its democratic developments, it has seen the black banners of Daesh waving everywhere. Soon, terrorists from Daesh began to kill intellectuals, to force women to wear burka or hijab. They were also the first to claim for change even in the school curricula: they asked for preventing and banning critical philosophy as well as for teaching Arabic in Wahabi style.

So, this is how we feel in the Maghreb. We do not have the same common foes, we are facing different situations.

Ms Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, was very right in talking about how the terrorism spread to the Sahel.

We are concerned by the Sahel and by its trafficking which have evidently increased the finance of terrorist groups. A clear example is represented by the illegal

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\(^2\) The Arabs who entered Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War (early 1980s).

\(^3\) Jacques Benoist-Méchin (1901-1983) was a French politician, writer, journalist and historian expert of the Arab world.
traffic of cocaine that comes from Latin America and goes through the shores of the Atlantic through Senegal and across Mali and Mauritania arriving to the north of Algeria, to Morocco and then to Europe. So, in the light of this, circumstances in the Maghreb are quite different and complex, more than it seems.

We wish and we still believe that something can be done with the Arab League because, at the end of the day we belong to that world and to its culture. Despite the difficulties, we still hope in solidarity, stability and cohesion.
Session II

SUSTAINABLE ECONOMICS AND GAME CHANGERS.
THE ROLE OF ENERGY
A Mehndi design on hands with henna.
During my previous work experiences I held a unique position in running the Oil and Gas Division of a very large renewables company; I have also been a peer reviewer of the International Energy Agency and I managed the oil and gas assets across North Africa and the Middle East. In the light of this, I came to three conclusions about energy and economy in the mentioned regions. The first one is about potential. Europe will always be a big draw for energy from the world, a big consumer despite the growth of renewables, particularly fossil fuels consumption.

The North Africa and the Middle East are among the largest suppliers of hydrocarbons, second only to Russia and United States. As a result, I think that a strategic relationship between these two regions could be natural and we should see more ships and pipes carrying gas across the Mediterranean, the South and the East towards the North and the West. We should receive more gas than refugees as it happens today. The raising migration phenomenon across Europe means that something is not working as it should, most probably because this potential is not fully exploited and not trickled down to the economy.

The reasons of this are to be found in the other two conclusions I will draw.

The first concerns the alternatives that can be proposed to this kind of energy resources. I remember, when I was in Kuala Lumpur for the World Gas Conference (2012), the whole gas industry was still thinking about its war against coal. I raised my hand and I said “Forget coal. Now there are the renewables. New coal is expensive to build while renewable are cheap, fast and quick. It will be the future”. That time was before the big increase on renewable energy and so everybody scratched their heads and did not understand. Today things have changed. A wind farm takes one or two years to be built, it is very fast. A combined-cycle, as well, takes four or five years. In terms of electricity costs, a wind and solar farm today
costs less than if you build a new gas-fired power plant. It is obvious that these alternatives represent a new shock for the resource rich countries in North Africa and the Middle East. What will happen in fact when, by 2040-2050, Europe will generate 80% of its electricity from renewable sources and will run electric or hybrid cars so as to achieve a much lower consumption? Oil and gas operators have started to address this issue. They have reduced costs, they have moved in different directions. Governments are a bit slower also in terms of innovative initiatives. We proposed, for instance, to install solar panels and gas production facilities to produce more gas for marketing abroad instead of using gas for the plant’s own consumption. After four years that project has still to be approved: in this case governments tend to work with a time-frame that is more in line with the 2040-2050 horizons, but decisions need to be taken more quickly.

The second conclusion is about competition. Today we have two big competitors in the field of energy. First, the suppliers from Russia that are by far the cheapest suppliers that for Europe and the second is LNG2, mainly from shale gas in North America right now, but also from new other sources. This is the most flexible supply and this is very significant because, if you are a large gas consumer, you will need gas that is cheap, flexible and reliable. Currently, suppliers – both from North Africa and Middle East – are facing challenges in this regard because they are not the cheapest and they are not the most flexible. Even if there is a great potential, there are also huge constraints that undermine the relationship between Europe and the near energy rich countries in North Africa and the Middle East. This relationship is one of the key solutions that we need to develop in order to stabilise the region and, moreover, to offer an alternative to Europe for the sole source supply represented by Russia.

2 Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas that has been converted to liquid form for ease and safety of non-pressurized storage or transport.
Thank you very much, and thanks you to Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo for inviting me.

In recent years oil and natural prices had come down and we are dealing with the consequences of this major development in the Middle East.

Look firstly at Egypt. It is probably the largest owner of natural gas reserves we have in the East Mediterranean basin and 75% of the Egyptian economy depends on internal natural gas demand. As a consequence, in terms of exports, there is a small possibility of selling natural gas outside the country since, when fully produced, it represents a ray of hope for the Egyptian economy which still suffers from youth unemployment and low relative growth.

The discovery of the big Zohr gas field in Egypt, estimated at around 850 bcm, has been of extremely importance for the geopolitical scenario of the Middle East; in terms of gas exports, it could become a serious competitor for Israel which hoped to export some of its own gas to Egypt. This will be possible if the Egyptian economic growth outpaces the availability of its own energy resources.

Palestinian Gaza Marine gas field has with an estimated quantity of 32 bcm: a negligible quantity in terms of exports, but very meaningful for the Palestinian economy. The Gaza Marine gas could be easily connected to the Israeli system and Israel could, in turn supply the West Bank thus saving investments in infrastructure.

Israel has about 400 bcm available for exports. But, where to export and how?

One possibility is to transport gas to the LNG facilities off the coasts of Egypt and then to Europe; they are already in operation and what will be needed is to connect the Israeli gas fields to these facilities.

The other option is to export the gas to and through Turkey. The latter will have to double, in the next 20 years, its energy supply from 40 bcm to 80 bcm if it wants to keep its current economic costs and Israel is a natural supplier. The political re-

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1 Billion cubic metres (bcm).
lations however between Israel and Turkey are unpredictable and there is an added political risk which will require an added political risk insurance.

Lebanon is another example of bright economic prospects resulting from the natural gas but very uncertain political circumstances. It has public debt to GDP ratio of 160%\(^2\). This is, I think, the highest in the world or close to the record but income from natural gas could drastically change this situation.

Once again quantities estimates are much beyond the expected domestic consumption. Exports could be directed toward Turkey and/or Europe making Lebanon competing, in terms of LNG facilities, with Israel and Cyprus. The accumulated quantities of the various east Mediterranean actors could interest Europe especially if costs of getting the gas could be reduced. Cooperation between the producers could achieve savings, but, given the political situation in the East Mediterranean, this is not likely to happen in the immediate future. Furthermore, if Lebanon and Israel do not restrain themselves, they could easily found themselves in a mini-war over issues relating to the delineation of their maritime borders.

A related issue for all current and future producers is how to deal with the revenues generated from the sale of natural gas. Currently, the Israeli situation is characterized by the Dutch disease and the Norwegian remedy. The Dutch disease means directing the oil and natural gas revenue into the budget used for government running costs.

Norwegians have done something totally different. They created a fund, of about 800 billion dollars, and they invest in the long term, in education for example.

So, what Israeli government, as well as the Egyptian one, will do with the income coming from the companies that pays for natural gas? Or is it possible to think of a Marshall Plan in a world where there are no funds for reconstruction, rehabilitation?

By the way, let me remind you that the original Marshall Plan had a condition: the US funds were available to finance Europe only in case of a united Europe. This precondition if applied in the Middle East will require a level of regional cooperation which certainly does not currently exist.

Secondly, I think that all the countries of the Gulf and East Mediterranean which benefit from gas and oil revenues should appeal to the international community, offering matching funds for projects of reconstruction and rehabilitations in the Middle East. Unfortunately, oil and gas producing countries in the Arab World do not come with readiness to participate financially and I think that the international community will be reluctant to spend the necessary funds without regional willingness to share the burden. Natural gas is certainly a ray of hope, but we must direct its light toward a constructive future.

\(^2\) In economics, the debt-to-GDP ratio is the ratio between a country’s government debt (a cumulative amount) and its gross domestic product (GDP) measured in years.
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMICS AND GAME CHANGERS: THE ROLE OF ENERGY

We can identify three main cycles in oil prices, which have determined the scale of oil revenue. If we start from the end of the 1960s we can find a first period of 15 years, from 1970 to 1985, which was characterized by increasing prices at the beginning, and then by the conviction that they would remain high or could be kept high, through the action of OPEC\(^1\). This period ended in 1985 when Saudi Arabia gave up on being the swing producer within OPEC.

In the second period, from 1985 to 2000, prices were relatively low. There were flare-ups in conjunction with political or security disturbances, but basically throughout this period prices remained low, and the last year in this period, 1999, was characterised by extremely low prices. In 2000, things began to change; even more so after the 2003 U.S. intervention for regime change in Iraq.

The third fifteen-year period went from roughly 2000 to the summer of 2014. In this period the market kept generating high prices although production was systematically exceeding demand and stocks accumulated. In the summer of 2014 this situation became unbearable and prices collapsed.

We are today in the third year of a new period of low prices, which I believe may last another ten years and possibly even longer. How long it lasts depends on expectations about future demand for oil; if governments are serious about pursuing decarbonisation, the demand for oil will not grow very fast or, maybe, it will even start declining. This is what some people (not the majority of analysts) expect already by the mid 2020s.

If oil demand declines and countries are sitting on large reserves, as several oil producer countries in the Gulf are, they probably will try to sell their oil for as long

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\(^1\) The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, founded in Baghdad 1960 by five countries (Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela). Currently, the OPEC has a total of 14 Member Countries.
as it is in demand. Clearly, they do not want to keep oil in the ground until the
time when demand has disappeared. In the past decade the market was influenced
by concerns about peak oil supply, today we are all worried about peak oil demand
or unburnable carbon. If these concerns persist, producing countries will tend to
produce and inject oil to the market as fast as possible, thus allowing prices to
remain low.

The three successive periods of high or low prices had multiple political and
social implications. At the beginning oil had a major impact in terms of consoli-
dating the regimes of the principal oil producers, notably in the Gulf region. But I
would like to focus the attention on the last period, on the impact of high oil prices
during the last fifteen years. In this period we have seen the gap in income and
wealth distribution growing wider and wider between as well as within the Arab
countries, and both for the oil and non-oil producers.

In the established major oil exporting countries there was continuing reliance
on old mechanisms of rent distribution, starting from public sector employment.
Such traditional tools, which had been very effective in improving the well being
of a majority of the people during the 1960s, progressively lost their distributional
effectiveness.

Governments were unable to modernize their development strategy and adopt
new tools, which would effectively distribute income more equally. There was in
particular no revival of inter-Arab migration, which was the main regional circu-
lation mechanism in the 1960s: at that time millions of Arab were allowed and
even invited to migrate to the oil exporting countries; but, after the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in 1990, when sending countries like Jordan, Yemen or Palestine took
the side of Iraq, millions of migrants were sent back, out of fear that they could
become fifth columns at the detriment of national security. Instead, increasing
reliance was made on Asian, especially on south Asia workers.

Per se, the GDP rate growth in the oil-poor countries of the region was not un-
satisfactory throughout the first decade of the current century, but it did not trick-
le down. Generally, the kind of development strategy that has been chosen and
adopted aimed mostly at attracting and profiting from the oil rent of the oil-rich
neighbours (sort of piggybacking on the growth of the oil producing countries)
rather than addressing the need for more inclusive domestic development.

This led to non-inclusive forms of investments, where increasing the employ-
ment and improving the conditions of the poorer strata of the population is not
pursued. Regional distances between oil-rich and oil-poor countries have in-
creased throughout this period. We normally measure these distances in terms
of GDP per capita, but this measure includes foreign residents in the “capita” by
which GDP is divided. Foreign residents represent 90 per cent or more of total
residents in Abu Dhabi or Dubai, only slightly less in Qatar or Kuwait, and one
third of the total population in Saudi Arabia. If, instead of “per capita” we consider
GDP “per national” – as should be done to properly represent inter-Arab income
distances – the already large distances between oil-rich and oil-poor Arab countries are further magnified.

As already said, since 1990 there has been no effective revival of regional rent circulation. Arab workers must compete with Asians, mainly from Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, whose wages are extremely low. Moreover, Gulf Cooperation Council investors have a global outlook and limited regional preference: they prefer to invest in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America or Africa, where wages are lower or conditions more attractive, rather than in neighbouring Arab countries.

At the same time, we have witnessed the huge expansion of the Arab media, both television and social media, which has led to growing awareness of the income gaps.

The oil-rich countries face now the challenge of diversifying their economies in view of a future when oil income may decline. Unfortunately, there is to some extent a contradiction between the goal of the economic diversification and the goal of containing inequalities. The goal of economic diversification requires that you resist the so-called Dutch disease, i.e. the increase of domestic prices and wages; the Arab major oil exporters have done so through reliance on a large inflow of mostly South and Southeast Asian immigrants. At the same time, diversification also requires the promotion of the domestic private sector and the creation of a local bourgeoisie, which obviously are opposed to increased labour costs. Furthermore, this takes place in contexts where, there are no personal income taxes, thus allowing growing concentration of income and wealth in the hands of a very few.

In addition, the process of globalization is distracting from regional development. The oil producing countries are investing in industries – such as petrochemicals, aluminium or other heavy industry, or even services such as tourism, logistics and finance – which are globally oriented, and think that they can diversify their economy independently from what happens in the rest of the region. But globally oriented industries generally employ only very limited numbers, and/or mostly expatriates, and mobilization of the local work force remains problematic. Offering opportunities to the young nationals in a rapidly expanding population requires the development of a broader array of economic activities, whose market is local or regional. In order to better understand the region’s economic and political situation, we need to start our analysis from the recognition of the fact that political forces are regional. In the previous session we have heard a lot about sectarianism, localism and fragmentation. As I am an economist, I am inclined to believe that sectarianism originates from dissatisfaction. If someone does not have alternatives, then he will probably attach himself to sectarian identities. The only solution to this consists in providing hope for the future, employment and better income. Income concentration is a regional issue and translates into regional instability: for this reason the main political forces are regional: in different declinations, they are present in all countries of the region.

Today, we are in a situation of regional civil war, which is actively fought in
four countries (Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen), but really encompasses the entire region. They four active civil wars are interrelated and not confined only to the four countries: everybody in the region is involved.

Unfortunately, there is no end in sight to this civil war. Civil wars generally come to the end either if one side wins decisively over the rest, imposing a solution; or because people are exhausted, understand that fighting is futile and see that compromise is preferable. At the moment, no one of the forces involved in the Arab civil war can win and no side is ready for compromise. It is possible that a period of low oil prices, causing a reduction of the amount of resources available to all sides, may have a positive impact on finding compromises. But, unfortunately history cannot be turned back: recreating stability and order in the region is going to be difficult and until this is accomplished, economic development will be frustrated.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARAB REGION. WHICH IS TODAY THE SENSE OF DIRECTION? WHAT TO DO?

I am supposed to talk about the economic origins of the Arab uprising. I think the session before us has explained in details the “social order” collapse of the pre-Arab Spring and we can start by saying that any dream or aspiration of bringing back things to January 2011 is false.

Given that the old social contract, even when based on high oil prices and high oil income, was definitively not sustainable, I would like to highlight three important and influential dynamics to observe in order to predict their impact on the geopolitics of the region.

The first dynamic reflects what is happening in Saudi Arabia. The changing relationship between the national economy and the old social contract (based on the availability of almost free oil and energy to the population and on the absence of taxation) in addition to the evolving relationship between Saudi citizens and the government, are probably the most powerful engine of social change in the region, particularly in the Gulf, and the surprising thing is that, despite the current differences and conflicts between some members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, they are all going ahead with other policies.

Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia, in fact, are going in similar directions while changing the relationship between the availability of cheap oil and free services to their population (such as health or education) toward a more market-pricing based relationship.

Of course, when you move toward a market-based pricing system, the political economy goes way beyond the fiscal and what generally is perceived as a question of distortion of the economy, is, in this case, a issue of political economy and, in many cases, a issue of pure politics within the society.

So, I believe that, since what is changing in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf could have domestic consequences, it is extremely important to monitor.

The most important consequence is the possibility of facing, at a certain moment, the difficulty of not being able to finance the old social contract. Our numbers
were showing that during the next 20-25 years, if Saudis continues to consume energy at the least efficient energy consumption levels in the world, probably, it will not have enough oil to export. As a matter of fact, the Kingdom is now producing around 8 million barrels a day to export, but this quantity is actually being reduced relatively quickly. Therefore, the decision to embark on new policies, taking into consideration the question of continued and protracted low oil prices, undoubtedly reflects this concern.

The other dynamic that is worth monitoring and observing is the outcome of Syria-Iraq military scene. Particularly, we should observe what kind of political economy will emerge in the Northern hemisphere of the Arab world.

My concern is that Syria and Iraq are going to be very detrimental or negatively determining factors in the shape of the modern Arab Mashreq. This happens for purely simple and physical reasons: demographic integration, physical trade issues, family lineages and connections.

More importantly, those countries historically have been the opinion setters in the Arab region: Arab and Syrian nationalisms emerged from there as well as most of the communist movements in the region, including the Islamic movements. All of them have found their physical geographical space in those two countries. As a consequence, the relationship – first between the different components of those two societies and then between the ruled and the rulers (especially when it comes to the political economy) – is going to be an extremely influential element which, in the next few decades, will be a trend setter in the region.

The third dynamic in the region is represented by the serious economic reform programme that Egypt is undergoing. The fact that this country is able in managing these economic changes and in containing its possible serious social tensions represents itself an important trend setter in the region. Since there is no single Arab country that can be considered as leading entity, Egypt continues to represent the backbone of the region and, in a way or in another, this part of the world still follows it. It is important to notice that these three dynamics are interrelated and cannot be separated from each other.

Moreover, I would like to summarize some of the issues and themes we should be observing in the next few years.

The first one is what we call the macroeconomics of exclusion. Is the region capable of transforming a macroeconomic framework of exclusion? This issue, which serves small elites rather than the majority of the national interest and produces the informal economy, could be changed and its change would, of course, influence regional dynamics in the next 20 to 30 years.

The other theme that should be looked at is the cross-board dynamic. There has been a long talk in the last 10 years about the Arab identity saying that there is nothing called Arab nationalism. Anyway, we know that, despite several revolutions and wars, such as in Iran in 2009 or in Israel in 2010, the region has not been affected in its integrity.
The integration between Arab countries goes beyond what we think and the numbers of official statistics do not always reflect that integration. In the region we are much more integrated than we have ever thought. For instance, 40% of the Lebanese trade is inter Arab trade, but at regional level, inter Arab trade is only 8% of total Arab trade. The diversification and the percentage of it is very high, especially in the Mashreq region.

Nowadays, in fact, there is a cross-board dynamic that affects the region: millions of people are on the move, some of them will stay, others will come back and how they will do this is an important issue to be analysed.

The third dynamic that should be observed is the local dynamic. We have looked at the region in the 40 years before the Arab Spring, and by the way, we look at countries in that part of the world as homogeneous national entities. The reality is that we are not homogeneous national entities only, we are also countries with very important local dynamics. We need to observe how those local dynamics are going to emerge since they represent the base for the future and the shape of those countries, whether they will be federal, confederate, united or unitary.

If the dynamics and themes I have summarized do not produce dignity and hope for Arab youth, we will fail, and the Arab civil war will last at least for the next five decades.
Session III

FOSTERING VIABLE POLITICS: FROM TURMOIL TO CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY
Ksar of Ait Benhaddou, a fortified city, along the former caravan way from Sahara to Marrakech. UNESCO World Heritage, Morocco.
Arab geopolitics from turmoil towards balances, stability and regional order

Kasr of Ait Benhaddou, a fortified city, along the former caravan way from Sahara to Marrakech. UNESCO World Heritage, Morocco.
Allow me to thank the NATO Defence College Foundation for this meeting which allows us to exchange views and see if we have common thoughts about how things will develop.

I will make some brief remarks, then I will give the floor to the distinguished panellists.

In the Arab region many states in the last six years have witnessed unprecedented turmoil and upheaval. The genesis of this phenomenon was sometimes referred to as the Arab Spring. It is not easy to generalize what led to such explosions, but one can safely point out to some internal and external factors.

One internal factor could be the absence of good governance – all the people in the world expect to have a responsive and responsible government – which was symbolized by the phenomenon of presidents for life. Such rulers in the Arab region managed to extend their mandates and, in some cases, the arrangements for the creation of a dynasty were underway (similar to what happened in North Korean and Syria). The legitimacy of such rulers was always in doubt. It is worth noting that the so-called Arab Spring did not occur in any monarchy, only in republics whose rulers either stayed too long or assumed power in doubtful circumstances.

Then, there are several external factors and military interventions such as:

- Firstly, after 1948 with the creation of Israel. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was met by a massive resistance sponsored by a US/Saudi alliance with the support mainly of Pakistan and some Arab Countries created a powerful external factor. The resistance fighters consequently returned to their countries of origin, and produced the so-called Mujahedeen phenomenon. Madame Benchehida yesterday mentioned what happened in Algeria and I would say that the same happened in my country Egypt in 1997: there was a tremendous massacre of tourists in Luxor by terrorists coming from Afghanistan.
II Secondly, the misguided US invasion of Iraq, which resulted in chaotic conditions and the emergence of terrorist organizations in Iraq, where the situation is not stable until now.

III Thirdly, the Syrian tragedy which in turn produced untold misery for the population, the phenomenon of massive immigration to Europe and the emergence of unprecedented massive terrorism activities. This tragedy could have been dealt earlier and I will venture to say that in December 2011 the Arab League managed to sign a Protocol with the government of Bashar Al Assad for a ceasefire and for the introduction of civil observers. When they were there, they covered 16 cities and towns and did not allow fighting in the morning; despite this there were also some snipers firing when the observers were going to their quarters. This situation went on for a couple of weeks. Then, some Arab countries decided to withdraw their observers and things deteriorated as all of you know. At that time I asked the Security Council more than once to adopt a ceasefire resolution and for the introduction of peacekeeping forces there, but they were afraid and I was even very much embarrassed since, during my second visit to the Secretary, one Ambassador told me: “Secretary-General, why are you coming again? You already came without getting what you want!”

Another extreme factor is that interventions have occurred in several occasions, as in Syria and Libya. However, they were proxy wars: the real power behind them did not appear on the battlefield. They were properly proxy wars and the Security Council should have exercised its charter responsibility and order an end to the fighting.

Moreover, I would like to add one thought about the failure of the UN collective security system. Supposedly, we are living in an organized world. The UN Charter envisaged a plan for peace and the Security Council was authorized to use military forces to ensure that peace prevails. This did not happen. The charter was supposed to “save succeeding generations” from the scourge of war. This utopian design has hitherto failed to materialize. The only two exceptions were in Korea in 1950 and in 1990 when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait after the adoption, by the Security Council, of resolution 678, which called for the use of force to ensure the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces. Such clear-cut response by the Security Council has not regrettably materialized ever since.

I will therefore rapidly consider what happened in Ukraine. I realize that its territory was invaded by Russia but regrettably, the Security Council is not expected to act against a veto-yielding permanent member thus the five permanent members have what may called a license to use force.

The use of force however has occurred frequently in several conflicts: different measures should have been adopted directed at achieving a ceasefire and to the urgent dispatching of a UN monitoring presence. Conflicts tending to fester and deteriorate are, in fact, something opposite to the principles of the United Nations Charter.
In the light of this, one of the problems which we suffer from, everywhere in the Middle East, is the impossibility to end conflicts. This is what happens, for example, with regard to Palestine where a long series of resolutions that been adopted unanimously but never carried out.

In the final analysis, what is needed now is a new approach on both regional and international levels to focus on resolving conflicts, saving lives, and not merely managing conflicts as we now witness in many parts of the world.
FROM TURMOIL TO CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY

Let me focus on the reasons of why, at the moment, we do not have very much cooperative security in the region and let me offer you some thoughts on what we can do to overcome that.

One of the core reasons, we do not see a cooperative security dialogue in practice in the region is that there is no collective view about existing threats. Multilateralism does not presently play a role at the regional level; it is not even attempted, and there is little degree of coordination on policies within countries, within sub-regions of the Middle East, or within the region as a whole.

Given the state of affairs, establishing the outlines of a new regional order before reconstructing devastated societies and reconciling present diverging policies would appear not only difficult, but impossible.

Why are we in this situation? I think I can develop five reasons that are the main causes for this current predicament.

First, we do not see any common political objectives among the main actors, whether local, regional or international. For example, when it comes to Syria, the United States and Russia have divergent perspectives. Russia intervened in order to save the presidency of President Assad, while the US priority was on ensuring that a regime structure survives intact but one without Assad. Others in the region want to see the regime’s collapse. We see the same divergence, for example, on the issue of terrorism. It could be a threat that is supposed to bring everyone together, but at the same time, everyone has a different definition about how that threat manifests itself. Even within the region, states have different policies, for example, when it comes to the GCC states and the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some have declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, others have not. Many other examples could be cited.

I think that, without these common political objectives, it becomes extremely difficult to establish even a minimum consensus on the way forward or towards some collective security idea. So, the question now is: “How to build such needed
consensus? How to get people to start agreeing even on a minimum conception of moving forward?” While this is difficult and for the time being not a practical undertaking, I think much more focus needs to be given on how to construct a general agreement between the parties.

Second, the disintegration of the state and the breakdown of the regional order accompanied by the fragmentation we saw in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iraq, could, in any moment, further deteriorate as happened in Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon and Jordan. Within this context, the Middle East remains one of the most penetrated regions in terms of external influence and it still remains an open space for the rise and development of non-state actors. In Yemen, we have the example of the Houthi militia which is taking over the state, dismembering the institutions, coming with an ideological agenda and supported by a regional power (Iran) in undermining the security of the state. The same happens in Lebanon with Hezbollah where the militia itself has become stronger than the state. The bottom line is that there cannot be a coherent, inclusive state alongside a general breakdown of order and stability.

The third reason for the lack of a cooperative security approach is the existence of a still preponderant zero-sum mentality. If I look at regional security, it is simply dominated by a military paradigm constructed principally on mutual antagonisms and a win-lose balance-of-power approach. Everybody agrees that there is no military solution to the problem in the region, but everybody pursues just such a military solution in the end. Again, very little effort has been extended to find any sort of consensus building. However, if one go back to the work of the Palme Commission of the 1970s on common security, it underlined very clearly that neither side can achieve security at the expenses of the other. So, this is something that needs to be thought of.

Fourth, there is definitely a lack of leadership at the international level. If we see the region suffering today, it is clear that the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and the criminal negligence in managing the post-invasion war can only be characterized as a fundamental error in policy-making that has plunged the Arab world into a deep state of chaos. The same thing happened as far as the Russian intervention in Syria is concerned. It has been carried out on the basis of narrow national interests with actually very little concern for the plight and aspirations of the Syrian people.

This concern about what policies the major powers are pursuing in the Middle East has created additional uncertainty in the region itself and it has caused, for example when one looks at the Arab Gulf states, that countries are acting much more actively on their own interest and not always, I would argue, for the better. Everyone is pursuing individualistic approaches.

Fifth, we also have to look at the incredible weakness of the international institutions. The Arab League has been sidelined in many of these issues and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) itself has been potentially permanently weakened
by the crisis over Qatar which broke out in June 2017. On this latter issue I think there is a question mark over the future of the GCC. The deep social cleavage that has arisen as a result between the peoples of the Gulf is likely to be lasting.

At the international level the European Union is largely preoccupied with its own affairs, leaving its neighbourhood policy in shambles and carrying out policies that are designed to keep Europe’s neighbours at a distance instead of moving them into cooperative partnerships. It remains unclear about what role of international responsibility the European Union is ready to take on. The United Nations are almost completely absent from Arab world affairs or in a minimum functioning mode. In Syria, the UN was unable to broker an effective cease-fire, while in Yemen the organization has stated that it is not into a position to take over and effectively run the airport in Sanaa or the port of Hodeida on Yemen’s western coast. UN mediation efforts have led nowhere. Finally, there are also many questions in the region on whether NATO’s operations in Afghanistan can be seen as a success.

Given all of these examples, there is a rising notion within the Arab world that the rest of the world really does not care of what happens on the ground in the Middle East and instead the international community, if this concept can be even applied, more or less wishes to simply contain the instability in the region rather than attempt to resolve it. The Middle East here represents today a dangerous mix of desperation and resignation.

So, where do we go from here? What needs to happen? I think the first steps must be taken at home. Without having reforms involving education, rebuilding infrastructure, reforming institutions and creating widespread employment opportunities in a stable environment created within the Arab society, it is very hard to act on cooperative security at a regional level. Without such steps and a process for the creation of stable conditions on the ground, it is difficult to envision how a regional leadership can emerge on a cooperative security basis.

Second, the international community must remain involved in regional matter albeit from a point of departure entailing more responsibility. What is called for is a regional framework for reconstruction. We must be ready to act and support regional initiatives such as the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict or the proposal put forward by various Gulf leaders for a regional security framework in the Gulf. The former foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud al-Faisal, himself called for a region composed of a stable Iraq, a friendly Iran, a prosperous Yemen and a unified Gulf Cooperation Council. Unfortunately, his proposal fell largely on deaf ears.

The international community must recognize that the problems of the regions are not going to resolve themselves or to pretend that regional development do not have an impact outside of the region.

Unfortunately, many of these ideas generated about the region, many of which we put forward by regional leaders themselves, were never picked up and pushed
forward with any sense of urgency. These ideas and initiatives remain as relevant as ever however.

The turmoil that dominates the Arab world at the present stage needs to be tackled through a collective approach from the region itself and the international community. Only such a combined effort will provide the legitimacy from which an overarching consensus can emerge. It is the necessary basis for fostering viable politics and medium- to long-term stability and security.
YOU gave me a very difficult topic that everybody likes to avoid; the issue of cooperative security. Has cooperative security been discussed before in the Middle East? If so, when? Where? Which topics were discussed previously? In the event of peace in the Middle East, can peace treaties contain cooperative security articles and measures? I argue yes.

The example that I am giving is very well known. Let me say that within the Sinai Peninsula, after the signing of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel (29th of March 1979), particular cooperative security measures were established. The Treaty, in fact, contains specific measures of cultivating mutual security not labelled exactly as cooperative security, but directed to the increase of confidence between the parties. Moreover, Annex I, article II of the Egypt/Israel peace Treaty determined inter alia final lines, numbers of military divisions, armoured brigades, artillery types, check points, periodic follow up committee meetings, a liaison system to solve disputes in 48 hours and early warning systems. Also, the United States was asked for the adoption of specific arrangements.

But now for the definition of terms; I generally use a flexible definition of cooperative security because I believe that in areas of conflicts you have to be flexible and gradual, starting from an incremental bottom-up approach, offering parties of critical conflict torn regions a forum to cultivate dialogue, discuss focal points of cooperation towards conflict resolution and conflict prevention, nurture bold and new elements of a regional security framework, increase confidence and friendship between the parties, building up and leading to practical cooperation measures.

Historically there were three successful attempts in my view on cooperative security in our region.

One of them concerns the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In NATO, and I feel very lucky to be part of this success story under the leadership of Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo and Mr Nicola De Santis. During that time, important measures took place in the Mediterranean dialogue (MD) under NATO aegis. It
started in 1994 with the ideals of political dialogues and practical cooperation as fundamental pillars and aimed to achieve mutual understanding, dispel misconceptions and contribute to regional security. This dialogue was based on diversity, non-discrimination, non-imposition, self-differentiation, inclusiveness, complementarity and mutual reinforcement, and, in the light of this, it is very similar to my own definition of cooperative security. Something we direly need in our region.

Moreover, since the dialogue itself was extended to the other seven Mediterranean states, causing some positive consequences, as the widening of their partnerships with NATO, or with the regular meetings of foreign and defence ministers (under the umbrella of CHODS). Without doubt, a lot of energy was spent in the perspective of the development of all the cooperation ideas as a sound basis of a viable Mediterranean Dialogue, including disaster relief, search and rescue, peace support operations, intelligence sharing, active transparency with defence expenditures, civil emergency, cooperation with Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, mass destruction weapons, missiles etc. This long list demonstrates how successful we have been.

Secondly, there is another interesting example that we sometimes forget: the offshoot of the Madrid Peace Conference (30th of October 1991) where five working groups' were established and one of them was focused on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS). During these meetings, there were two “baskets”:

- The operational basket: including specific confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), i.e. confidence-building measures as we call them (CBMs);
- A Conceptual basket: for longer-term issues in this regard, i.e. threat perception, future regional security (WMDFZ – Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone).

If you look at the issues that were discussed at that time, you will find an exchange of military information. Parties, in fact, negotiated and adopted an agreement on pre-notification of certain military activities. These confidence-building measures included procedures for notifying other regional parties about certain military events and activities in addition to the other CBMs activities aimed at dispelling the fears of other parties by cooperating in the field of security and verification measures. Unfortunately, this period of ACRS, has not been well documented until today. In my opinion, drawing out or rehashing these ideas to the world once again, could represent a chance for us to understand that we have already experienced and enjoyed confidence-building measures and, as a consequence, we should start properly from these set of instruments instead of reinventing the wheel.

Thirdly, I want to address a contentious measure which happened in 2010 af-
ter the decision – taken during the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review – to convene a conference on a Nuclear weapon Free zone and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East by December 2012. The conference never succeeded never met, and consequently the village of Glion (Switzerland) was chosen to convene informal meetings which brought the Arabs, the Israeli and the Iranian together in order to sit and discuss some of the issues concerning confidence-building measures intended to cultivate that kind of dialogue and to increase confidence. The problem remains valid until today. When you discuss regional security can you just avoid or side-line a nuclear threat that is persistent from the 1960’s? Can you avoid an Israeli policy of a nuclear veto in the middle east? How can we all sit down and discuss common security for all and remove all conventional and non-conventional threats in the middle east?

I would like to conclude this section now considering the fundamental prerequisites necessary for a successful cooperative security in the Middle East. These include that all parties should share an equal stake, believing in equal security for all cognizant that global problems are beyond the capacity of any single states/nations. No one nation alone however strong it is, will be able to ensure collective security or even its own national security without cooperating fully in this regard. Parties, guided by clear political will, should be ready to move away from conceptual idealistic actions to concrete security measures on the ground.

Furthermore, other fundamental prerequisites include: an undisputed ongoing peace process with negotiations and dialogues, open lines of communication, mentors and shepherds assisting the parties with fresh initiatives and narrowing differences, a liaison machinery for monitoring, verification, and disputes settlements and a national capacity able to take advantage of the opportunity of ACRS to develop, cultivate and nurture dialogue and confidence domestically and among the parties.

Currently, even if the security predicaments of the region warrant a structured process based on: equal and common security for all, reforming of military doctrines, diverting of military expenditures to economic and social development and solving pending political problems, there is no security dialogue among the parties in the Middle East today. This is a serious loophole. We are not talking together! In many cases the enemy is the same for all: terrorists groups pose the same threats to Israel as well as to Arabs. We have to work together in order to fight these common fears.

Anyway, how can you circumvent deep political differences on major issues, such as resolving the Palestinian issue, proposing – for instance – a final settlement that makes any progress on cooperative security contingent on progress in the political field?

In the absence of any format between the parties to discuss cooperative security, the NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome remains the only venue that can perform this task between skilled and specialized participants from the region.
Some of the most important suggestions that I submit to the attention of the NDC include:

- Designing a new course tailored for this purpose;
- Drawing from ACRS achievements in search and rescue;
- Communication skills;
- Inspections and verifications;
- Military information exchange;
- Advanced CBMs.

Moreover, there is also a need to press on the parties the issue of regional cyber vulnerabilities, terrorism and a construct of regional cyber security regime, especially with many nations in the Middle East entering the era of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in full compliance with their inalienable rights enshrined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, art. IV). So, if you build nuclear power plants, you must develop, parallel to them, a framework of cyber security. One additional crucial area that cries for regional and international cooperation is cooperation in the field of illegal immigration.

I conclude by saying that NATO has an important peace-building role in disseminating a culture of peace. I think that these insights and perspectives coming from the activities and seminars organized by the NATO Defence College Foundation and by the NATO’s Public Diplomacy should be maximized and improved for the benefit of each and every one of us.
REGIONAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL EVOLUTIONS AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS. A SENSE OF DIRECTION

There is no doubt that reshaping a comprehensive security structure in the Middle East is an ambitious strategic prelude to improve the environment of security, stability and prosperity in the region. It is an issue that will leave positive impact on security and peace in Europe and the world. There has been a lot of talk over the past decades about Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran as pillars in any regional structure in the Middle East. However, over the past decade or so, the United Arab Emirates has emerged as an influential and key actor in the Middle Eastern regional policies and a qualified stakeholder to actively and competently engage in crystallizing and shaping security strategies in the region as part of a formula on which the UAE bases its foreign policy: supporting regional security and stability is an integral part of fighting extremism and terrorism.

The UAE has introduced its federal model of governance as a successful and attractive regional experience that is worth emulating instead of the disintegration and division of the nation-state in many parts of the Arab region. The UAE has pointed out this issue in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, Yemen and maybe Syria.

The adoption of any viable policies, which are designed to move from chaos to stability and co-operative security in the Middle East, must focus on cementing and stabilizing the nation-state in the Arab region by weakening all kinds of terrorist and extremist entities and militias. There is no doubt that regional and international efforts to support this endeavor, until this moment, have not been successful enough to suggest the availability of elements of success to establish a new security environment in the Middle East that enjoys the minimum level of agreement among influential regional actors and the necessary international acceptance.

Frankly speaking, there is an increasingly spreading conviction in the Arab region which claims that the United States, Western countries and other major capitals are benefiting from chaos and turmoil in the region, manipulating it in
draining regional parties and signing the largest number of deals in trade and armaments. Some can counter this claim as follows:

First, the feuding parties in the Middle East are basically the ones seeking these deals and consider them as an advantage in their inner competitions and struggles.

Second, these bickering parties bear the sole responsibility of working to settle their differences and face challenges of division, disintegration and problems arising from extremism and terrorism. In the core of this responsibility lies the need to adopt governance at the state level and co-operative security formulas at the regional level. To this end, the competing and quarrelling local and regional stakeholders must give up zero-sum games in managing their state and regional crises.

The UAE thinks that the best formula to foster viable policies to shift from regional chaos to cooperative security. More importantly, world major powers, notably, the US and Russia, should pursue a strategy to solve crises instead of only managing them. Furthermore, it would be something ambitious and exceptional if the international community and regional parties agree upon coherent, effective and serious strategic plans to solve regional conflicts completely within the next decade in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Palestinian territories. This will deal a decisive blow to forces of terrorism, and then cement co-operative security policies and shift from chaos to stability based on participation in designing a new security environment. To this end, we must deal with major obstacles that still prevent the realization of a new regional order in the Middle East where wars, conflicts and chaos retreat and replaced by reconstruction, development, improving standard of living, and fighting tyranny and extremism. These obstacles include:

I There is still no clear vision on the shape and nature of such regional security structure and its implications. Under current circumstances, we have seen no signs for a forthcoming agreement between GCC, Iran, Turkey and Egypt on some key issues associated with this move like terrorism, ending chaos, promoting regional stability and protecting gains of nations in the region.

II The Iranian side has not responded positively to initiatives that boost collective security in the region possibly prompted by its desire to achieve more strategic gains (in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen) in its bid to become a regional hegemony. Some argue that the deep resentment the US harbors towards Iran’s regional policies was not translated into concrete pressures on Tehran to stop its destabilizing agenda in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Gulf region.

III The creation of any regional security structure would require confidence-building measures to defuse tension and conflict among regional competing stakeholders. Unfortunately, this requirement has not been met yet by Iran, GCC nations, Egypt and Turkey. There seem to be no signs of such measures given the continuation of struggles in the region and division among nations over regional issues, not to mention stakeholders’ conflicting interests and agendas.

IV So far, there are no international actors willing to push for and guarantee the
creation and implementation of such a structure. However, these actors wait to see regional stakeholders, themselves, agree on a formula for regional security even without the emergence of a global initiative that defines the issues that need to be guaranteed by world major powers. This is particularly true since defusing tensions in the region should start by striking “a balance in the ambitions for power” between competing regional powers as well as by bridging gaps in their perceptions of the nature of common threats. That was proven true if we take – for example – the Syrian issue that has been shifted from a domestic-regional context to an international one.

V Regional powers in the Middle East are currently facing structural flaws and challenges as the Syrian issue has created shifts in Turkey’s relations with Russia, the US, EU, and Iran. Moreover, it seems that the current crisis between the Arab quartet and Qatar has left a strong impact on the “Gulf Cooperation Council” as meetings of bodies and committees working under this regional organization have not been convened since the eruption of the crisis with Doha in June 2017. As for Egypt, its major political concerns include the security of Sinai, economic hardships, the Nile water issue and the negative impacts of the Libyan crisis. Nonetheless, the partnership between the Gulf region, Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Israel for regional re-integration and development remains substantive and critical for a better tomorrow.

VI The need to change the rules of game and to shift from the politics of chaos to re-integration, stability, development, and cooperative security in the Middle East requires deep shifts in the actors’ positions as the strategic interaction between these actors in the past and their policies have eventually led to turmoil and crises in the region. Thus, defusing such crises will necessarily depend on changing these negative policies in the first place.

Last but not least, I would like to highlight two major points here:

First, the importance of building and maintaining a unified regional and global front to combat terrorism and extremist organizations such as ISIS, Al Nusra Front, Moslem Brotherhood, and Hezbollah. Moreover, Iran and Qatar must be held accountable for supporting terrorism and extremism. Media outlets and platforms that promote terrorism and incite violence need to be criminalized too. It is so important to look at the Gulf crisis with Qatar within this context. In other words, it has become necessary to counter the Iranian–Qatari destabilizing policies that support extremists and terrorists.

Second, the UAE believes that the region is still suffering from terrorism that is emboldened by regimes that aspire to become regional hegemonies. Therefore, Iran must end arming its proxies in the region including sectarian militias and terrorist groups. This requirement must be given a top priority at both regional and global levels so as to boost forces of moderation, development, rationality
and re-integration since the better future of the Middle East region will primarily hinge on justice and moderation. These forces must be embraced and supported through real agendas and policies in practice, which will certainly contribute to the protection of regional and global peace and security.
I would like to add my thanks to Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo and his team at the NATO Defense College Foundation for bringing together such an excellent gathering, throughout these two days, of speakers: experts, practitioners, an adequate mix of academics and officials and, of course, high calibre participants. All of you have highlighted during two days, the major challenges which affect the region, which were not born today, but go back in this region forty or fifty years to say the least, and that were complicated by a number of phenomena. Yesterday the Secretary General of the Arab League spoke of disintegration of nations states related to conflicts in the region. But these are phenomena that are not caused only by this kind of dynamic. Globalisation, for example, and the deriving fact that the economy is not run any longer by the nation state. Many ask whether we can still say that the economy has to be managed on a national level or, rather, it should be handled on a transnational level. This is just to underline that the concepts of multilateralism and cooperation transcend the national level. This is also true in the field of security. And our panel today is about cooperative security. I think that cooperative security is the answer to pessimism. If one looks at all the things discussed during these two-days conference, one could come to the conclusion that the Middle East is a region that is condemned by insecurity, instability, conflict and poverty. And actually what has been defined as the Arab Spring, a phenomenon that it is more correct to call the Arab revolts, because it was in reality, a revolt against regimes that had not respected and promoted human dignity, that had not provided what a human being has the right to have in a decent societies. When one travels to the Middle East, it is possible to observe that on the roof of any home, even in the poor sections of towns, that everybody has a satellite dish, so when they saw how lived and what they had in other parts of the world, they asked themselves a simple question: “why can’t I have that?”. This was at the basis of the revolts we witnessed in Arab societies. And if these that are the root causes of the Arab geopolitics from turmoil towards balances, stability and regional order
revolts are not addressed in socio-economic terms, this phenomenon will occur again. And we will all suffer the consequences.

Somebody asked during the conference whether the West was benefitting from chaos and disintegration in the Middle East. Nobody can benefit from chaos and disintegration in the Middle East: because the security of Mediterranean and Middle East countries and the security of European and North American countries are inextricably linked, they affect each other.

This has become somewhat evident today through the phenomenon of migration: from North Africa and from Syria; has affected different parts of the so called “West”, from Turkey but also through Libya.

Despite this evidence, I do not think that today anyone can deal with today’s security challenges alone, in a world in which security challenges and threats have become transnational in character, and affect us all. NATO countries and partner countries in Mediterranean and Middle East. That is the importance of cooperative security. NATO started this experience 24 years ago with the Mediterranean Dialogue. The approach we chose at the time is the same we should continue to adopt today: strategic patience. These security challenges are not easy to address. Because of they are multifaceted and multidirectional, they cannot be tackled by any state alone: not by the United States, not by Algeria, not by Italy, not by Tunisia, not by Turkey and so on. That is why, to be tackled effectively, they require a cooperative approach to security. What did we do 24 years ago when we started the Mediterranean Dialogue? Something very simple: we started with political dialogue. Realigning misperceptions about the Alliance in the Mediterranean region. When the Mediterranean Dialogue was launched it had three objectives: dispel misperceptions about the purpose of the Alliance, an Alliance which was transforming in 1994, that could lead to a perception of a threat and the nature of its dialogue with the Mediterranean countries involved. NATO was transforming in those years and the process of transformation had started with the NATO Summit in Rome in November 1991.

The concept of cooperative security took shape with the Rome Summit in November 1991 when the NATO did something extraordinary: it revised its strategic concept, which had always been up until that moment a highly classified document, and it made it public. We invited Russia and all the successor states of the former Soviet Union and countries in Central and Eastern Europe to built together a new security order. NATO moved from confrontation to cooperation in the security sphere.

In January 1994 NATO launched the Partnership for Peace Programme, to help organise the return into the family of democratic nations of the countries in the Eastern part of Europe that had been unnaturally separated from the rest of Europe by totalitarian regimes, ensuring that this would take place in a secure environment. Eleven months later we launched the Mediterranean Dialogue, through the same cooperative approach to security. It was difficult, especially at
the beginning, because while there was a strong demand of NATO in the Eastern part of Europe, there was not a demand of NATO among Arab countries in the South. NATO was misperceived as a kind of Col War relic, trying to reinvent itself.

Today, after 24 years all countries member of the Mediterranean Dialogue have an individualised programme of cooperation with NATO which responds to their specific needs in order to modernize their defence and security institutions. And from Tunisia to Libya, all ask for more cooperation with NATO. We trained, for example, Tunisian special forces in order to help this country develop the defence and security institutions and capabilities that are needed to face the threats affecting this country. In Egypt we cooperated through a two-year project to enable the Egyptian authorities to do mine-detection in the Nile region, to the benefit of the civilian population residing there. In Jordan, we have established Trust Funds to help destroy old ammunition and old remnants of war, for the security of the civilian population. And this cooperation has extended to Gulf states in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, through the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programmes developed with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. Therefore, we have built - through these individualised programmes- a new culture of cooperation in the security field also with our Gulf partners.

After more than two decades, all of NATO partner countries have inter-ministerial committees which define together with us how to assess and upgrade regularly our cooperation. This is something extraordinary and corresponds exactly at what we think cooperative security is on a practical level. And this is exactly what we need to win the pessimism. The cooperative security approach is also what allows us to identify the challenges and threats, the factors of instability and allows us to look at the dynamics that have – in the past – prevented in the Middle East developing an approach to deal with these challenges and threats on a regional level. Also considering that what we call “the South” involves the interaction of different areas: from the Balkans, to the Maghreb, to the Mashrak, to the Arab Gulf. This leads to the conclusion that it is, indeed, not correct to look at “the South” as a single region but rather as the interconnection of different regions, from the Balkans, to North Africa, to the Middle East. And in doing so there is a need for complementarity of efforts between different international actors, engaged with the countries in the Middle East and North Africa. That is why NATO has proposed to the European Union to give to this complementarity a concrete dimension, by working together on a pilot project to assist Tunisia. The EU has a strong socio-economic dimension. NATO’s added value is in the security field: assisting countries modernise their security and defense institutions or help them build security and defense institutions where they do not exist, like we are doing for example in Libya, upon the request of President Al-Sarraj. In Libya NATO responded, firstly, to the request of the Prime Minister appointed after the first ever general elections, Mr. Ali Zeidan. And later to the request by
the President of Libya’s Presidency Council Mr. Fayez Al-Sarraj, in the field of security and defense institutions building: assisting Libya in its efforts to develop a modern Ministry of Defence, a Chief of Defense Staff and intelligence and security services under the control of the Libyan government. In doing so NATO does not wish to take sides, it is responding to the request of the President of the Presidency Council that several UN Security Council Resolutions define as the sole representative of the Libyan people. But this work in the field of security and defense institutions building will be very useful for Libya, because whoever will be in charge in Libya in the future, will need effective security and defense institutions for the benefit of the whole country. Regarding Libya, NATO is working in complementarity and in consultation with the UN and the EU.

During the conference, I heard speaking of a Marshall Plan for North Africa. But we need to consider that there are a lot of funds going to the region but an important element should link the allocation of these funds for cooperation activities to a serious reform effort that must include some sort of conditionality. In sum: if you do not do this reform you will not have access to funds. Especially in case of the EU, linking the funds provided to North Africa to socio-economic reforms that will give the people of these countries the possibility of a better future, will allow avoiding the collapse of the economies of several of the countries in the region, in light of the growing demographic trends in the Middle East and North Africa, which are combined with low economic growth, high level of inflation and unemployment. These trends are also crucial components of the migratory flows from the region to Europe and beyond. Decades ago, because of the socio-economic imbalances, we witnessed migration within the countries: from rural areas to the cities, and from country to country within North Africa. We need to ask ourselves what will happen in MENA countries, if the increasingly younger generations will not find jobs, if children cannot go to school to get an education that will allow them to later get a job to lead a decent life and cannot afford getting married and building a family, within their societies, they will go somewhere else: outside the region.

Another issue that has been raised during the conference and that I would like to address, has been NATO’s intervention in Libya. Of course conflicts have to be managed. Let’s not forget that for Libya there was first a request of the foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, then a request of the Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States calling for the imposition of a No Fly Zone and then there was a legal basis for NATO’s intervention represented by two UN Security Council Resolutions, 1970 and 1973, which gave a mandate for the things: the imposition of an arms embargo at sea, a No Fly Zone and all necessary measures for the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas. People forget that when NATO Secretary General visited Libya right after the end of NATO Operation Unified Protector, he was welcomed by thousands of people. I invite you to go on the internet and look at the images of thousands of Libyan people cheering him.
The problem in Libya was not NATO’s intervention that, as recognised by the Libyan people, saved countless lives of the civilian population that Gaddafi was slaughtering but the fact that after the air campaign conducted by NATO the international community did not have the political will to do in Libya what we did in Bosnia: sending troops to stabilise the country. The League of Arab States, after saying yes to the air campaign said: “no troops on the ground” and that prevented the international community from sending troops to stabilise Libya the day after the NATO air campaign. Unlike Bosnia there was no new UN Security Council resolution to send troops to Libya. Nobody called NATO. We did not act there as we did in Bosnia. When we look at the lessons learned, we need to recall that in Bosnia, upon UN mandate, we stayed for 10 years, through two NATO-led operations: IFOR and SFOR. NATO disarmed paramilitary troops, put their weapons in cantonment sites and trained the armed forces of Bosnia and when they were ready, NATO left the country and passed the hand to the European Union, which sent an international police mission to Bosnia. I think that if the international community had done in Libya what we did in Bosnia, we would have avoided the deterioration of the security situation that we see today. We need to learn from our mistakes. NATO operations, under UN mandate, in Bosnia and Kosovo are very good examples of how diplomacy backed by the use of military force allows for a political solution to crises and helps stabilising a country after military conflict.

Going back to our partnerships with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) with four of the six countries member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, today these partnerships are based upon two pillars: political dialogue and practical cooperation. Our cooperation is bilateral, which means that it is not affected in a negative way by the dynamics that affect countries of the region. We recognize also that while we do not wish to import within our partnership the problems among countries, we also recognize the importance of confidence building. That is why for example, in the Mediterranean Dialogue in addition to the bilateral practical cooperation, we also have a multilateral dimension which facilitates dialogue and confidence building among participating countries, as a unique forum in the world where Europe, United States, Canada, Turkey, Israel and Arab countries can discuss security issues of common concern. Through strategic patience we need to continue to pursue political dialogue, regardless of the differences between countries and try to make the best of the richness of the diversity of the countries involved.

The same applies to the partnership with countries in the Gulf region, the ICI. Today, at NATO, we are concerned by the crises among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. While the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is not negatively affected by this crisis, because our cooperation is bilateral with four of the six individual members of the GCC, and this is an internal crisis of the GCC, we
appreciate very much the role played by, and that can still play, the GCC in the region. Without wanted to interfere with this crisis, we do believe that in order to address the complex and common security challenges affecting us all, we need the contribution of a united Gulf Cooperation Council. This crisis has to be overcome through political dialogue to reach a political solution.

Look, for example, at Kuwait, which has been the first Gulf country to create a NATO-ICI Regional Center to promote cooperation between NATO and the Gulf states members of the ICI but also open to the participation of Saudi Arabia and Oman, and to the GCC Secretariat. This Center offers also a venue to facilitate political dialogue and practical cooperation among Gulf states in a difficult moment. Of course this will not be taken up by NATO, because NATO is not involved in the GCC crisis and neither is seeking a role but the NATO-ICI Regional Center in Kuwait offers yet another opportunity for dialogue and cooperation for those wishing to take advantage of it.

So, in concluding my intervention, my message is let’s do not give in to pessimism, let’s continue to make the best possible use of cooperative security, building upon the political dialogue and practical cooperation in the security field that we have built with countries in the Middle East and North Africa for more than two decades through the Mediterranean Dialogue and more than a decade through the Istanbul cooperation Initiative, because if it is true that NATO shares with its regional partners common security challenges and threats, represented by conflict spill over from failing and failed states, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, it is equally true that we share with our regional partners something more important: the common aspiration for peace, security and stability to the benefits of the people in NATO countries and of the people in the Middle East and North Africa.
Handmade artisan colorful Arabic Turkish tea set in a Bazaar in Istanbul, Turkey.
Benjamin Franklin once said: “An investment in knowledge pays the best interest”, and I say: “Investing in communication, cultural education and international relations pays a great dividend”.

My topic today is: The role of effective communication in times of change. Social media and networks in Arab society.

The main points I will discuss are the following:

• The role of communication in times of change;
• Major factors affecting Arabs and their geopolitics;
• Then, I will try to give my humble potential solutions at the end.

Effective communication in my view is a process of understanding and sharing information and meaning of verbal and non-verbal stimuli. It is likely, as Jack R. Gibb (1961) stated, to create a supportive climate of interaction between two entities rather than a defensive one, taking into account the following dichotomies:

• Description of the issue instead of its evaluation;
• Being problem oriented: discussion of the problem, rather than trying to control it;
• Spontaneity rather than strategy;
• Being empathetic rather than neutral to all the other parties;
• Treating others with relative equality rather than superiority;
• Being provisional rather than certain because other people may have a better intervention than us.

The role of communication in times of change: the role of media journalists as watchdog versus lapdogs.
This concept was introduced by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein (1974) when they talked about the Watergate scandal under Nixon presidency. While lapdog journalists, especially in the Arab or MENA region, try to cover up for their leaders or politicians rather than discovering their wrongdoings to the public; watchdog journalists tell the truth to the public without covering up.

It must be said, therefore, that the Internet and social media networks played a major role in what has been called Arab Spring (I do not like to define it as Arab Spring, because Arabs have sand storms and winds, not spring).

Arab Spring was thought of as a way Arab youths resorted to for rebellion and change of their regimes from autocratic to democratic ones. Nevertheless, since autocracy has been present for a long time in our region, I doubt we would have any democracy soon.

So, during the time of change we witnessed I-reporting and citizens journalism: everybody has become a source of information instead of relying on the mainstream media in knowing what was going on.

Now, let me discuss some barriers, elements, features and tools of effective communication.

Barriers to effective communication:

• By-passing: when you talk and ignore the other parties, you do not give them something to say. It is an attempt to dominate the discussion all the time and without referring to the same thing;
• Polarization: the way to see the world in terms of extremes (either-or). A good example is the statement of G.W. Bush when he addressed all other nations by saying “either you are with us or against us”;
• Labelling: assigning unfair labels to others such as the example of the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who labelled Germany and France as “old Europe” under Helmut Kohl of Germany and Jacques Chirac of France causing their disappointment.
• Fact-inference confusion: this happens when inferences are treated as facts. Hence, acting on the base of influences and assumptions rather than on real facts is likely to create problems among people. Assumptions may be true sometimes; however, they are not true all the time;
• Stereotyping: generalizing about others. We know the stereotyping about Arabs. I remember the Oklahoma City bombing (1995): I was flying to deliver a talk in Indianapolis when, in all major international airports, the security stopped everyone who looked like Arabs, thinking that it was an Arab terrorist act. Eventually, the guilty was an American (Timothy McVeigh), who deserted the American army earlier;
• Static evaluation: we generally use the verb to be in the present tense all the time: we do not understand that people and their cultures can change. As a conse-
quence, we should clarify our statements by using the appropriate verb tense of language;

• Racism/sexism/ageism: the use of terminology that embodies ideologies like these, generally creates problems with interlocutors;

• Distortion of reality (double-speaking): it means saying one thing verbally while behaving in an opposite manner, non-verbally or without expressing properly the concept we would like to encode;

• Ethnocentricity: it is when we believe our religion, values and standards are the best. I faced this in teaching for over 35 years. I spent my entire life as student, teacher and researcher. During these years, I tried to teach my students that we do not need to thrill animosity of people thinking that believing in a different religion would have made us better than others. I wish I did my best in this regard.

Elements of effective communication:

• Acquiring knowledge about others and their styles of interaction;

• Valuing differences rather than ignoring them;

• Saving our and others’ face so as to be very respectful of each other;

• Accepting others: no matter who they are, where they come from, how different they are;

• Treating them with relevant equality: that is how I deal with my students. I start every semester by saying to my students that all of us are teachers and students at the same time. This sets the stage for positive climate of interaction with them. I can tell you that out of about 80 to 84 students every semester, I rarely get one or two negative comments that are related to testing.

Features of effective communication:

• Velocity;

• Reaching the masses of people;

• Outperforming mainstream media;

• Facilitating youth upraising. When refer to youth uprising, the MENA region witnessed previous revolts, but the Arab spring is the most important because of its geographical extension (from north-Africa to the Levant).

Tools of effective communication:

The tools of effective communication are definitely represented by the Internet and its various applications (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Web-logs, I-Reporting, and face-to-face interaction that I would call WOM or Word of Month.
Social media networks played an important role in Arab societies: even if they were met by weapons and killing, they were efficient in mobilizing public for regime change directed toward a “pro-democracy movements”.

If you remember, for example, the case of revolutions or demonstrations in Syria: they started peacefully for about six months or more, and then they were met with force, weapons, killing and barriers. This is a very tragic situation and I do not want to get deeper into that. Generally, Arab youths use social media more effectively than the elder population. They commonly use mobile phones for every single function and mobile media have been having a great effect on them.

Wael Ghoneem (the famous Egyptian Google executive) once stated: “If you want to liberate a society, just give them the Internet”. Internet has been claimed as effective weapon of the weak and disenfranchised against authoritarian leaders. Why? Because nobody could control the public by stopping it; they could stop the computer network for a little bit, but not forever.

Everybody remembers the presidential election in Iran (2009) when a lady was killed on the street and mobile media got this to the public. This is an example of i-reporting or citizens’ journalism: tumultuous events of Arab Spring have been covered by ordinary citizens by Twitter, Facebook, online blogs, and videos shared on YouTube, more than what the mainstream media did. After the 2011, Arab social media reported that 94% of Tunisian got their news from social media tools as did the 88% of Egyptians.

What are the factors affecting the Arab Geopolitics: Arab-Israeli conflict and lack of comprehensive solution to it.

• International powers’ lack of initiative to solve this problem, which is at the core of MENA’s troubles: if this issue will not be solved, it will create more terrorist groups in the region;
• Israeli’s attitude towards finding a comprehensive settlement. Even though Israel, for several hidden and complex reasons, does not move toward a comprehensive settlement, there must be an all-inclusive solution to reach peace and prosperity in the region instead of a persisting war;
• Creation and empowerment of non-state actors by regional powers: this is creating a lot of troubles especially because some of them became more influential than their own governments;
• Exacerbation of the problem and declaration of war on terrorism after the 11th September, 2001. President G.W. Bush claimed the invasion of Iraq took place because of the presence of weapons of mass destruction; however, this was proven not to be true and, after the fact, his wrong assumption led to the destruction of the country and killing of so many innocent people;
• Devastating consequences of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: this instability led to the creation of ISIS and of many other terroristic groups in that region.
Factors affecting Arab Geopolitics: Arab Youth and Arab Spring (as transnational diffusion):

- Almost half of the Arab youth is unemployed. The rate of the youth population is very high: about 60%. We are educating them, bringing western universities into our region; however, when they graduate, they do not find jobs. This because most of our leaders, instead of creating new opportunities, try to benefit/steal their people and smuggle money outside the countries at the expense of their own natives. When you get people desperate, they do not have anything to lose and killing themselves to kill others that are believed enemies, does not represent a moral obstacle. Tunisians, for example, started the Arab Spring burning themselves not because they were happy or because they were living peacefully, they were clearly hopeless.
- Arab Spring and the erosion/change of traditional regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen;
- Arab Spring and the changing stance of ruling elites in Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco that are aligned with Saudi Arabia;
- The latest issue between Qatar and several Gulf States with Egypt: it is still going on. We have to understand it very well before we decide what is the ambition of the Muslim Brotherhood and what to think about it;
- Civil sectarian war in Iraq, Syria and Yemen: interference of regional and international powers;
- Empowerment and engagement of non-state actors: regional leaders used non-state actors (Kurds, Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, etc.) in local and regional conflicts;
- Influx of immigrants from MENA: resulting in terrorist activities in Europe & beyond, etc.

Potential solutions:

My humble solution is that wars do not solve problems. They exacerbate them. However, education and effective communication can lead to solve potential problems. Many of my predecessors talked about education and I agree with them. We have to teach our youth what I consider to be the three major concepts of education: acceptance of others, respect, and equality. If every one of us will act on these basic ideas, we can certainly help in solving the major problems we encounter in our lives.

Life should not be complicated and can be made simple via four principles:

- Giving youth something to do in life;
- Advising them to love someone or something;
- Teaching them to have a strong belief in something; and
• Giving them something to hope for or dream about.

It is only by having trust, commitment, and love that we will ensure applying these principles for a better life in the MENA region and beyond.
SPEAKERS’ BIOGRAPHIES

WELCOME REMARKS

Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo
President of the NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

A strong focus on strategic outlook in complex issues. High level contacts and negotiations. Special attention on countries of strategic relevance i.e. the Gulf region. Frequent Public Diplomacy activities to discuss policies and open issues. He held the position of Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic-political industrial area, in relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean. He is the author of the books: “The road to Kabul”, publisher Il Mulino-Arel (2009) and “A political journey without maps, diversity and future in the Greater Middle East”. (Rubbettino 2013).

Ahmed Aboul Gheit
Secretary-General, Arab League, Cairo

H.E. Ahmed Aboul Gheit has been Secretary General of the League of Arab States since July 2016. From 2004 to 2011 he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Egypt. Prior to this position, he was Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations in New York (1999-2004). He started his diplomatic career as Third Secretary at the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Nicosia. Subsequently he was First Secretary for Egypt’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Political Consultant at the Egyptian Embassy in the Soviet Union and Ambassador of Egypt to Italy. From 1996 to 1999 he took office as Assistant Foreign Minister and Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Eleonora Ardemagni  
*NDCF Scientific Advisor*  
Analyst of the Middle East, focused on foreign policy and security issues of Yemen and the GCC region. External researcher (Mediterranean and Middle East Program) at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies and regular contributor for the Aspen Institute Italy.

Umberto Profazio  
*NDCF Scientific Advisor*  
Holds a PhD in History of International Relations from the University of Rome Sapienza. He is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Geopolitics and Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS) in London and a Security Analyst for a consultancy firm based in the United Kingdom.

SESSION I

Ahmad Khalaf Masa’deh  
*Former Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean, Amman*  
He served as a Minister, ambassador and chief of an international organization. Today, Ahmad Masa’deh practices law and is the Managing Partner of Khalaf Masa’deh & Partners Ltd. Between 2006 and 2010, Dr Masa’deh was the 7th Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the European Union, Belgium, Norway and Luxembourg. He was also the Jordanian Coordinator to the Union for the Mediterranean and Jordan’s Representative to NATO. In January 2010, Ahmad Masa’deh was elected Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean. From 2000 to 2005 he was an Assistant Professor of International Business Law at the University of Jordan where he also held the position as Assistant Dean for Development.

Mustafa Alani  
*Director of the National Security and Terrorism Studies Department, Gulf Research Center, Jeddah*  
Mustafa Alani is Senior Advisor and the Director of the National Security and Terrorism Studies Department at the Gulf Research Center (GRC). Before assuming his position, Dr Alani worked as Consultant on Middle East Security and Fellow at the Middle East Security Programme, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), Whitehall, London. Educated at the Department of Politics, University of Baghdad and later at the Department of International Relations at Keele University. He received his doctorate from the University of Exeter in England. Frequent lecturer in the fields of political and security developments in the Middle East region in general, with special focus on the Gulf states security and political developments (the GCC, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran).
Samir Rifai
Prime Minister and Vice-President of the Senate, Amman

Samir Al-Rifa'i is currently the Vice President of the Senate of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Before serving in the Senate, he held office as the 38th Prime Minister of Jordan (2009–2011). Prior to his appointment as Vice President of the Senate, he was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2013–2015). H.E. Al-Rifa’i was the founding CEO of Jordan Dubai Capital (JDC), established in 2005. In the year 2000 he was appointed as advisor to His Majesty King Abdullah II and General Secretary of the Royal Hashemite Court. He therefore took office as Director of King Abdullah’s Communications and Public Relations. In 2003, H.E. Al-Rifa’i was appointed Minister of the Royal Hashemite Court acting as principal coordinator between His Majesty the King and the Government.

Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck
El Erian Fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut

Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck is an expert on political violence, Islamism, and the radicalisation process, with a focus on Jihadism. She focuses as well on Algeria. Dr. Ghanem-Yazbeck was a research assistant at the Center for Political Analysis and Regulation at the University of Versailles (France), and she also served as a teaching associate at Williams College (United States) prior to joining Carnegie. She has published on political and extremist violence, including on Islamism in Algeria, the Islamic State organisation and the participation of women in jihadi groups. She has been a regular commentator on such issues in different Arab and international print and audio-visual media.

Hafida Benchehida
Senator of the Algerian Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Algiers

Hafida Benchehida is a Senator of the Algerian Parliament and sits in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Throughout her career as an international interpreter and consultant for international seminars, she has attended major regional summits and workshops. She is the founder and executive officer of the Algerian Women Parliamentary Network.

SESSION II

Marco Arcelli
Director of Development of EPH (Energeticky a Prumislovy Holding), Prague

Marco Arcelli is currently the Director of Development at EPH Energeticky a Prumislovy Holding in Prague. He was previously Executive Director of Oil&Gas at Enel, overseeing investments in Algeria, Egypt and Russia. Previously, Head of Business Development, M&A and Operations Support in the International Division; General Director and Vice Chairman of Slověnske Elektrárne; President and
CEO of Enel North America; Executive Assistant of the Enel Group CEO. He held several positions in project and construction management, dispute resolution, sales and business development for large infrastructure projects in energy, airports, transport systems. Dr Arcelli is also an Advisory Board Member of King’s College London’s European Center for Energy Security.

**Oded Eran**  
*Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv*

Mr Eran is currently Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and previously its Director (2008-2011). From 2002 to 2007 he was appointed as Israeli Ambassador to the European Union and NATO. Prior to this prestigious position, he held the office of Head of Israel’s Team of Negotiations with the Palestinians (1999-2000). He therefore served as Israel’s Ambassador to Jordan (1997-2000), Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Israeli Foreign Affairs (1992-1997), Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington (1986-1990) and Secretary General for the Knesset Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs.

**Giacomo Luciani**  
*Advisor, Master in International Energy, Sciences Po, Paris*

In addition to his role as adjunct professor, Giacomo Luciani is co-director of the Executive Master in Oil and Gas Leadership at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. He is also Executive Director of the Master in International Energy of the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po and a Princeton University Global Scholar. Professor Luciani is therefore Senior Advisor to the Gulf Research Center and from 2007 to 2010 he was the Director of the Gulf Research Center Foundation in Geneva. In 1997-2010, he was Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the SAIS Johns Hopkins University – Bologna Centre. From 2000-06, he was Professor of Political Economy and co-director of the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute.

**Abdallah Al Dardari**  
*Senior Advisor, Reconstruction for the Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank, Washington*

Dr. Abdallah Al Dardari, Senior Advisor on Reconstruction, Office of the Vice President, Middle East and North Africa Region in The World Bank since February 2017. In 2011 he joined the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) as Chief Economist and Director of the Economic Development and Globalization Division while, in 2014 he assumed the role of the organization’s Deputy Executive Secretary. Dr. Al Dardari also served as Syria’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs from 2005 to 2011.
SESSION III

Nabil Elaraby
Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Cairo

Dr. Nabil Elaraby is currently Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration. From 2011 to 2016 he served as Secretary General of the League of Arab States and prior to this position, he was appointed Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs in (2011). Dr Elaraby served moreover as director of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration and as Judge at the International Court of Justice (2001-2006). Among his prestigious roles, he was appointed as the Permanent Representative to the UN in New York from (1991-1999); member of the International Law Commission of the United Nations from (1994-2001); President of the Security Council in 1996; the Permanent Representative to the UN Office at Geneva from (1987-1991); Legal Adviser and Director in the Legal and Treaties Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from (1983-1987); Ambassador to India (1981-1983).

Christian Koch
Director, Gulf Research Center Foundation, Geneva

Christian Koch is the Director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center located in Dubai, UAE. Prior to joining the GRC, he worked as Head of the Strategic Studies Section at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi. His work at the Gulf Research Center combines the various international and foreign relations issues of the GCC states with a particular interest in GCC-EU Relations. Dr. Koch received his Ph.D. from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany with a thesis on the role of voluntary association in the political development of Kuwait. He also studied at the American University in Washington, D.C. and the University of South Carolina. In January 2007, he joined the advisory board of the German Orient Foundation.

Mahmoud Karem
Professor British University and former Ambassador to NATO and the EU and Commissioner Human Rights Council, Cairo

Dr. Karem currently teaches at the British University in Egypt. He also holds the title of Special advisor to the President of the University for International Relations and heads its Egypt and Middle East Centre (CEMES). He served as the Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Kingdom of Belgium, and the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, Head of Mission of Egypt to the European Communities, and Permanent Representative of Egypt to NATO, from 2005 till 2010. He was therefore member of the Advisory Board of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Disarmament Matters. From 2010 to 2012 he was nominated for three consecutive times to the post of Secretary General of the Egyptian National Council...
for Human Rights (NCHR). In July 2017 the Foreign Minister of Japan announced the establishment for group of eminent persons for substantive advancement of Nuclear disarmament, Ambassador Karem was chosen from the Middle East.

**Ebtesam Al-Ketbi**  
*President of the Emirates Policy Center, Abu Dhabi*

She is the founder and president of the Emirates Policy Center and the first Arab woman to lead a think tank. She is also professor of Political Science at UAE University and a member of Consultative Body of GCC Council. Dr Al-Ketbi served as a Secretary General of Gulf Development Forum and Board member of Association of Political Sciences. She served as a member of Consultative committee of the UAE Center for Strategic Studies, and Member of core team of Arabic Human Development Report 2006. She is a founding member of the Emirates Human Rights Association.

**Nicola de Santis**  
*Head, Middle East and North Africa Section, NATO Headquarters, Brussels*

Nicola de Santis is the Head of the Middle East and North Africa Section in the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In this capacity he is responsible for developing and promoting NATO policy, political relations, individual practical cooperation programs and better public understanding with Middle Eastern and North African countries, especially those participating in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). He also ensures coordination with all other Divisions of NATO’s International Staff, International Military Staff and relevant NATO Military Authorities for all aspects of NATO’s cooperation with countries in the Middle East and in North Africa. Prior to that, he was the Head of the MD and ICI Countries Section in the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division.

**Mahboub Edmond Hashem**  
*Professor of Mass Communication, American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates*

Mahboub E. Hashem is a professor of communication at the American University of Sharjah (AUS). He was also the Founder and Executive Editor of the Global Media Journal-Arabian Edition. Prior to that, he chaired the Department of English, Mass Communication, and Translation at the same university. Dr Hashem also served as Vice President and President of the Kansas Speech Communication Association, Chair of Administrative Affairs of the College of Communication and Documentation at the Lebanese University, and Chair to numerous committees and programs at international, national, regional, and local conventions. In addition, he served on the GMJ Advisory Board and took office as a Director of Graduate Studies of the Department of Communication at Fort Hays State University in Kansas, USA.
ARAB GEOPOLITICS FROM TURMOIL TOWARDS BALANCES
STABILITY AND REGIONAL ORDER

CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY
the NATO Defense College Foundation
in cooperation with the Gulf Research Center Foundation, the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, the NATO Defense College and the NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division

ROME, 5th - 6th OCTOBER 2017
Venue: Rome, Auditorium via Veneto, Via Vittorio Veneto, 89
Thursday, 5th October 2017

14,00-15,00 Arrival of participants - Registration
15,00 Welcome remarks
  • Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
  Opening speech
  • Ahmad Aboul Gheit, Secretary-General of the Arab League, Cairo

Session I
STATE DISINTEGRATION AND RE-INTEGRATION
The deep crisis affecting the regional political and strategic landscape makes even more necessary to act towards concrete solutions. The actual debate in the governments of the region tends to overlook the seriousness of medium and long-term implications of state disintegration and non-state actors disruptive power. Security partnerships would be also valuable, when disintegration and centrifugal forces continue to represent a threat to the state. Indeed, NATO is active in that direction. Post Isis is also a serious issue not yet addressed. The panel should analyze this complex state of affairs and suggest alternative strategies.

15,30-17,00 Chair: Ahmad Masa'deh, former Secretary General, the Union for the Mediterranean, Amman

  • Mustafa Alani, Director, National Security and Terrorism Studies Department, Gulf Research Center, Jeddah
  • Samir Rifai, Former Prime Minister and Vice-President of the Senate, Jordan
  • Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, El Erian Fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut
  • Hafida Benchehida, Senator of the Algerian Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Algiers

Q&A
Session II
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMICS AND GAME CHANGERS.
THE ROLE OF ENERGY
The realities of conflict tend to obscure economic dynamics that underpin both stability and wars. Although some countries try to diversify their economy, seeking solutions for a more sustainable development, growth has visibly slowed in the area and illegal trafficking is one of the main causes of the economic output reduction. Economic growth could be too low to foster job creation, resulting in a non-bearable pressure on fiscal systems, welfare and refugee assistance.

17,30-19,00 Chair Marco Arcelli, Director of Development, EPH Energeticky a Prumislovy Holding, Prague

• Oded Eran, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv
• Giacomo Luciani, Scientific Advisor, Master in International Energy, Sciences Po, Paris
• Abdallah Al Dardari, Senior Advisor, Reconstruction for the Middle East and North Arica Region, World Bank, Washington D.C.

Q&A
Session III

FOSTERING VIABLE POLITICS: FROM TURMOIL TO CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY

The Arab region is undergoing a fundamental upheaval that poses extremely serious problems to influential actors, both distant and near the theatre of operations. Syria has both an international and a regional dimension, that applies also to other cases. It requires an important step towards “game changers”, as the crisis is revealing an underlying structural fragility. Cooperative security must be the goal. It is clear that some kind of stability and order needs to be established, at the same time it is necessary to assist successfully these countries in their post crisis efforts aimed at re-building their institutional structures. How to reconcile the present diverging policies? Is it possible to promote some kind of “concert among different national and international actors”?

How to exit the present diverging policies? is it possible to promote some kind of “concert of nations”?

10,00-11,30 Chair: Nabil Elaraby, former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Cairo
- Christian Koch, Director, Gulf Research Center Foundation, Geneva
- Mahmoud Karem, Professor British University and former Ambassador to NATO and the EU and Commissioner Human Rights Council, Cairo
- Ebtesam Al Ketbi, President, Emirates Policy Center, Abu Dhabi
- Nicola de Santis, Head, Middle East and North Africa Section, NATO Headquarters, Brussels

Q&A

12,00-12,15 Special intervention
- Mahboub Edmond Hashem, Professor Mass Communication, American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
Arab geopolitics from turmoil towards balances, stability and regional order
Arab geopolitics from turmoil towards balances, stability and regional order
The Arab region is undergoing a deep crisis affecting its regional, political and strategic landscape.
Where disintegration and centrifugal forces continue to represent a destructive threat, because the existing political arrangements are unworkable, growth has clearly slowed down. At this point illegal trafficking, as well as organized crime, become an unsustainable burden for countries and populations.
Through the keen perspectives of outstanding panellists, this publication offers a contribution in writing a more realistic and coherent narrative on what nowadays has to be considered as a priority in the Arab region. The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative, with their purpose of building strong cooperative ties spanning across the region, must be one of the main priorities for all the parties involved because they help rebuilding a healthy multilateral diplomatic tissue fostering growth.
Despite this complex state of affairs, the region can still move from the turmoil of its revolutions and civil wars towards order and stability: regional and international actors’ support is of course a fundamental tool.
The conversations in this book reflect the necessity of sharing a common understanding and alternative strategies with the purpose of promoting “a concert among different national and international actors”, directed to balance the existing divergent policies. From this point of view, NATO responds promptly, continuing and intensifying the co-operation with its partners in the Middle East and North Africa.
Non-state actors have significantly increased the disintegration risk for countries in the Arab region, while regional hegemonic competitions complicate an already volatile situation. In this difficult context, where the Sykes-Picot agreement has been seriously undermined, there is a clear need to understand how internal and external powers’ interests can be reconciled. In this context the issue antiterrorism in a post-ISIS phase has been only superficially addressed.

How to find a way ahead towards balances, some kind of regional order and increased stability, getting out of the cycle of civil wars? Security partnerships can be extremely valuable when disintegration and centrifugal forces to represent a clear and present danger. Indeed, NATO is active in supporting partners precisely towards a more consensual regional order.

In addition to this quagmire, the realities of conflict tend to obscure economic dynamics that underpin both stability and wars. Although some countries try to diversify their economy, in quest for solutions achieving a more sustainable development, growth has visibly slowed in the area and illegal trafficking is one of the main burdens towards recovery, fueling conflict and subtracting scarce resources for the countries.

Even a return to economic growth could be too weak to foster job creation, resulting in an unbearable pressure on fiscal systems, welfare and refugee assistance, i.e. directly on political viability.

The conference has aimed at: reaching a high-quality added-value interaction, contributing to an in-depth analysis and also to offer a sense of strategic direction for security providers.