



NATO Foundation
Defense College



AFRICA IN ACTION

**TAILORING SECURITY
TO NEEDS AND THREATS**

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Africa in action:**Tailoring security to needs and threats**

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NEEDS AND THREATS

Organised by the
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Kenyan shepherd leading a flock of goats.



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ALESSANDRO MINUTO-RIZZO
President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

FOREWORD

This book is a welcome outcome of our international conference focussed on Africa and the various dimensions of security concerning the continent. Our objective was an in depth discussion on such relevant subjects and we did our best to prepare the framework for an interesting and fruitful exchange of views.

We have in front of us a vast universe that it is impossible to summarise in simplistic formulas. Each country has its own history, traditions and expectations and therefore deserves a serious consideration. The political, economic and social context is diversified and in a continuous change.

We have chosen a number of subjects that can be discussed from different perspectives. As a matter of fact it is important to give voice to as many views as possible, in a respectful manner, putting together the best possible expertise coming from various sides.

On the other hand it is clear that it has become impossible to continue to divide issues according to tradition. Politics, diplomacy, economics, energy and security are closely interconnected; in other words, to have a clever analysis and a good synthesis it is not an easy affair. Yet, it is worth the effort, because Africa is too important, has an enormous potential relevant for the entire world. It has now taken the front stage in international affairs after having been side-lined for too long.

We notice geopolitics emerging as an indispensable pillar to understand how security is working around the world. The number of actors has greatly increased even if this reality is not fully digested. We normally look at national governments as the sole source of power and the only legitimate actors. This is not today's reality: as a matter of fact non-state entities, groups of people, even individuals are present and sometimes dominate the scene. There is an unprecedented diffusion of power that makes stability more uncertain and international coordination more difficult. The same concept of security is much wider than in the past. Conflicts and crisis in the traditional sense are mixed with terrorism, organised crime and

illegal trafficking. We believe that such problems are not for specialists but for a larger public, as a matter of fact for all concerned citizens.

The NATO Defense College Foundation has a strong focus on those strategic issues that we consider to be a priority. It has been so since its beginning seven years ago. It is our desire to look forward beyond the crisis, to search for new avenues of understanding and to promote cooperative solutions. In conclusion, we wish to provide a good framework for a high level and honest discussion, on a scientific basis and in a spirit of mutual understanding.

This conference has focussed on three main topics. First addressing existing threats, including illegal trafficking, criminal groups and terrorism in a context of political instability.

The second panel concentrated on security in a more traditional sense, advocating a growing role for the African Union in coordinating crisis management at a regional level.

The last one discussed effective government and the interaction between various actors including the private and public sector.

A distinguished Algerian senator opened the proceedings that were closed by the Minister of Defence of Mauritania. I wish to thank the speakers and moderators, those who have supported us, PMI in the first place, Al Arabiya our media partner, the NATO Defense College, the large public attending a good conference.



ALESSANDRO POLITI

Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

POLITICAL SUMMARY

The conference was first of all significant per se: after 25 years, the strategic debate within a key NATO and EU country confronted Africa not as an issue of (under)development, poverty and migration, but as an emerging geopolitical subject. It has been the logical extension of the past 2017 conference “Deep Maghreb: (In)security and stability – North Africa and its Sahel dimension”, where for the first time an African strategic and security dimension was broached by the Foundation.

Indeed in traditional and contemporary geopolitics Africa is often seen as an object of competing external influences, mostly due to history and the scarce control over its adjoining seas. This unfortunate situation is still reflected in the usual strategic subdivision of the continent into geographic sectors (North, South, East, West, Central) that have more often than not a tenuous connection with political and security situations on the ground.

The economic growth of the continent in the last decade, together with a gradual political consciousness and empowerment of national elites, well documented by the remarkable progress made by an embattled African Union, has opened the opportunity to a strategic shift from external assistance to tentative partnerships with great and medium external actors and among African countries.

The security situation has vastly improved in the past twenty years to the point that, even in the very critical eyes of some private security company, more than 50% of the Continent enjoys low-medium security risk conditions in varying degrees comparable to those of the USA, European countries, Brazil, Bosnia or Russia. The extreme risk areas are closely connected to the deep crisis of specific states like Libya, Sudan (Darfour), Somalia, Central African Republic or to festering guerrilla and terrorism phenomena like in Northern and Southern Nigeria, South-Central and Western Democratic Republic of Congo and Sinai.

On the other hand, across the Sahel there is a high risk belt cutting almost in two Africa from Mali to Somalia, whose capstone is unfortunately a disintegrated

Libya. Paradoxically the Sahel is both a legitimate and vital communication zone between the Mediterranean façade of Africa and its continental, Atlantic and Red Sea networks and at the same time the conduit for any sort of illegal trafficking (people, drugs, arms, fuel, cigarettes etc.).

Different speakers have shown under different angles that the old North Africa is no more an Arab-speaking appendix of the Middle East, but is inextricably linked through the Sahel to the rest of the continent. They have also indicated that what were considered “protective” barriers, as for instance the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara desert, are two seas that inevitable connect instead of separating.

The most important political messages from the collective understanding of the conference can be resumed in few points:

- Africa’s economic and demographic dimension ask not just to an undefined international community, but specifically to Europe (Brexit notwithstanding) a change in paradigm from the usual top-down intervention to meaningful partnership, if the Old Continent wants to manage both sizeable population flows and a sustainable economy in the African Continent;
- A patient work of political and social rehabilitation is indispensable to gradually reduce the areas of trafficking that have been first secured by military or police means. Although the expression “state building” has fallen into oblivion, there is a distinct African demand from local populations for a functioning government, a reliable state and a reasonably decent ruling class. Partnerships from external actors (post-colonial or not) should take concretely into account this need, if they want to avoid nasty backlashes in terms of popular support and security risks;
- NATO in this context is still developing its dialogue with the AU knowing that, on the one hand Africa is not a top priority in the short term for the Alliance, but that its multiple capacities offer distinct enabling assets to any partnership based on wisely limited, but common interests.



THIERRY TARDY
*Director, Research Division,
NATO Defense College, Rome*

WELCOME REMARKS

I have just joined the NATO Defense College, coming from the European Union. One dimension of NATO activities that I see as essential to its performance is NATO's cooperation with other actors, be they the European Union, the United Nations or the African Union – and that is partly the topic of the day.

I would like to make two remarks about this topic. One is that interinstitutional cooperation in the field of security governance is simply indispensable, because of the complexity of the crises that are multidimensional in nature, and because of the level of ambition of the so-called international community: no institution can do it alone. Because the sources of instability are civilian and military, political and societal, economic, security-related and development-related, internal and external; because all of these, then the responses have to come from actors that can play a role at one of these different levels – actors that have the expertise, and actors that have the legitimacy to intervene. So the question is less whether institutions must cooperate, than how they can cooperate – and I suppose that the debate today and tomorrow will be a lot about this “how” question, much more than about the “if” question.

This leads me to my second remark, which is more specifically about the relation between NATO, on the one hand, and the African Union, on the other. I think it is fair to say that the NATO-AU relationship is not the most intuitively obvious, and in practice it is probably one of the least developed partnerships. There are several reasons for this: one is that the two institutions have so far operated in geographic spaces that are distinct and, therefore, finding areas of cooperation is not necessarily easy. Second, there has been a painful episode of interaction between NATO and the African Union over Libya, a few years ago, which has probably shaped the mindsets on both sides.

Third, there are political differences between the two institutions that concern their membership, their mandates and a certain conception of sovereignty or in-

dependence; these differences constrain the relationship between the two organisations.

This being said, quite a few activities have been developed between the two institutions in the field of NATO's operational support to AU-led operations, through strategic air and sea lift for example, through capacity building to the AU Peace and Security Department, through support to the operationalization of the African Stand by Force (ASF) and, more generally, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). There is also a great potential for further cooperation based on mutual needs, in the field of *inter alia* counter-terrorism, information sharing and lessons learnt on counterterrorism, migration control, maritime security, and training of African forces that are increasingly involved in African Union-led and UN-led peacekeeping or peace support operations. These are just a few areas of potential cooperation that we may want to explore and discuss throughout the day and tomorrow.



GIUSEPPE MISTRETTA
*Director, Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic*

WELCOME REMARKS

I believe that I have been invited not only because I am the present Director for Africa, but also because I served for a long period of time, twenty years of my life, in Africa; I also feel a little bit African myself since I was born in Sicily, so actually very close to the area we are talking about.

The paradox that we see today when we talk about Africa – and it is true that is very usual today to talk about Africa, with or without any competence – is that Africa presents us two very different scenarios. On the one hand we have the Africa that has a double digit growth and therefore it is an opportunity for investments, commerce etc.; on the other side, though, there is a broad part of the continent which is very unsafe – and, in my opinion, it is in much more unsafe conditions that sometimes in the past. There are these two conditions at the same time, and we should consider, for instance, the current situation in the Sahel region, which has become for us, for all Europe, the very number one priority, since everything is in there: terrorism, criminality, illegal trafficking, trafficking of human beings; there is also a good commerce of pasta, because all the containers that transport illegal things, then come back full of pasta – this being a new discovery in the area.

Even for what concerns the situation in the Horn of Africa, Somalia, for example, it seemed to go forward and then it is seeming to go backwards, just to remain on the surface; in South Sudan there is not only a political crisis, but a terrible humanitarian catastrophe; the Democratic Republic of Congo represents another case of instability.

As last post, I served as Ambassador of Italy in Addis Ababa; I was then in contact with the African Union and I had very good relations with many people who worked as members of it or of IGAD: honestly, I do believe that, nowadays, the conception of peacekeeping, security and platform stability in Africa is much more developed than before. It is not anymore only about sending troops or armies or soldiers as interposition forces, but it is much broader: it requires addressing the so-called root causes of the problems in Africa. Therefore, every time we talk

about any kind of problem, we have to take into consideration the climate change, the rule of law, the empowerment of women, the need of investment in jobs and occupation: all these are actually the root causes of wars, displacement of people, migration etc.

Hence, if I can humbly suggest one of the topics of conversation for the future panels of this conference, it would be to foster and to concentrate on capacity building, training and formation. In that regard, it is important that NATO, in its dialogue with the African Union which is not simple at all, proposes itself like an institution which can provide expertise not only as far as soldiers, armies and strategies are involved, but also as far as training, formation of soldiers, human rights, empowerment of women are concerned – and they are indeed very appreciated by the African Union and the African states in this moment. With these humble suggestions, I would like to leave the floor to the other speakers.



HAFIDA BENCHEHIDA
*Senator, Foreign Affairs Committee, People's
Democratic Republic of Algeria*

OPENING REMARKS

Lorsque j'ai reçu l'invitation de l'Ambassadeur Minuto-Rizzo, j'ai réalisé qu'il fallait aborder les défis de l'Afrique, connaître l'Afrique, ses défis réels. Pour moi, le premier défi c'était de pouvoir répondre à ce thème, parce qu'il est très complexe : les origines sont complexes, elles sont aussi bien économiques, historiques, sociales, ethniques. Si l'on veut remonter jusqu'à la Conférence de Berlin de 1884, qui a duré une année et qui, comme vous le savez, a largement divisé l'Afrique, il y avait l'Italie, la France, l'Angleterre, l'Espagne, le Portugal et d'autres puissances européennes qui avait décidé de se repartir le gâteau – comme l'avait si bien dit, le roi Léopold II de Belgique, et lui aussi, « il a pris sa part du gâteau ».

Toutefois, nous ne sommes pas là pour parler du passé, nous avons tous connu la colonisation, mais aussi la décolonisation. Et la décolonisation ne s'est pas toujours faite de façon idéale, de façon soft et façon facile. Dans beaucoup de pays, elle a laissé son impact et c'est dans ce « legs » qu'on retrouve finalement les causes premières, les racines des conflits, c'est-à-dire la pauvreté, le chômage, la désertification, l'émigration, l'absence de développement, l'absence d'accès à l'eau, à l'électricité et à l'éducation, toutes choses qui vous connaissez, et ça n'est pas tout. Dans beaucoup de pays la colonisation a aussi contribué à la désintégration du tissu social : les pays qui souffrent le plus actuellement, le Sahel, le Mali ou la Libye, sont des pays où la cohésion, l'intégration, la fusion de ce qu'on appelle le tissu social a été très faible ; plus tard, la décomposition, la déstructuration, l'implosion même – que l'on a vue – des institutions, des structures étatiques dans ces deux pays a encore renforcé cette perception que le tissu social avait été désintégré. Il y a des raisons aussi à cela et je reviendrais encore au découpage après la Conférence de Berlin, car souvent les découpages se sont faits en dépit du bon sens.

Il me vient à l'esprit le cas du Nigeria : sur toute la côte, de l'est à l'ouest, il y avait pratiquement les mêmes ethnies, avec le même langage, les mêmes origines ethniques, les mêmes fonctions, les mêmes sources d'enrichissement, de travail.

Or, le découpage colonial, post-Conférence, ne s'est pas fait dans le sens est-ouest, mais il s'est fait dans le sens nord-sud, et ça a aussi contribué, à mon avis, à la perte de quelque chose qui me tient beaucoup à cœur, c'est-à-dire la cohésion sociale.

La cohésion sociale n'est pas simplement parler la même langue ou appartenir à la même tribu ; c'est aussi sentir que l'on appartienne à un état-nation, et ça c'est très difficile de reconstituer le sentiment d'appartenance, quand le tissu social a été défait. On sait très bien qu'il y a, en plus de cette absence de cohésion sociale et d'intégration sociale, d'autres éléments qui ont fait que les jeunes ou les moins jeunes ont été attirés par l'extrémisme et par la violence : la perception d'une injustice, une injustice qu'elle soit économique, sociale, même vis à vis de l'application de la justice. Si on ajoute le fait aussi que dans pas mal de pays africains il y a une grande faiblesse de l'état – et la faiblesse de l'état se traduit également par l'absence ou le manque de rigueur dans l'application et le respect de ce qu'on appelle l'État de Droit. La perception d'un non-État de Droit, qu'il n'existerait, renforce le sentiment profond d'une perception d'injustice et fait que les jeunes se sentent pour le moins frustrés – et comme vous savez, 70% de la population du grand continent africain est constituée des jeunes de moins de trente ans.

D'où, l'attrait du chant des sirènes, l'appel de l'extrémisme qui leur donne, d'un côté, une justification, un sens de l'existence et une raison d'être, aux plans social, culturel, culturel, mais aussi qui leur promet « un ticket d'entrée au paradis » ; cet attrait est fondé sur le fait que nous avons des populations vulnérables, des structures institutionnelles pas solides, et les populations qui ne sont pas rassurées et ne se sentent pas protégées ; alors, elles n'ont pas d'autre recours. Il y a en effet une quête de sens, une quête de respect, une quête de dignité qui ne seraient satisfaites que si l'on a un appui, un socle prometteur – cet appui ce sont les forces extrémistes qui le leur donnent.

À propos des progrès qui ont été faits en Afrique, je citerais avant tout l'Architecture Africaine de Paix et de Sécurité (APSA), la Force Africaine en Attente (FAA ou ASF), la Commission d'Alerte Précoce, les différentes réunions du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité : ces sont des éléments absolument nécessaires pour essayer de lutter contre la violence qui s'est répandue, qui est très complexe, qui est multiforme, qui exige donc aussi des solutions multiples et approches multisectorielles ; elles doivent être au même temps économiques, éducatives, offrant l'accès aux opportunités de travail, et à une plus grande insertion sociale. Il y a aussi, bien entendu, le rôle des femmes : notamment l'autonomisation des femmes, comme objectif, mais on peut aussi faire appel aux femmes dans une sorte de prévention, d'alerte précoce.

C'est un thème qui me tient beaucoup à cœur, parce que les femmes peuvent très vite détecter dans la famille, dans le clan, dans la tribu, les modifications et les changements étranges de comportement des jeunes qui essaient de cacher leur début d'appartenance à un groupe ou font montre de certaines convictions, propre à les mener vers les groupes terroristes.

L'ambition de l'Afrique c'est aussi d'établir la paix, le développement, la prospérité, et cette ambition on la retrouve dans les textes de l'Union Africaine en particulier. On peut la voir dans tout ce que a été fait pour assurer la paix, et là, je crois aussi que les décisions régionales sont très importantes, comme au niveau de la Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO ou ECOWAS), qui a son bras armé, l'ECOMOG : les Communautés Économiques Régionales (CER ou RECs) peuvent jouer un rôle, ils ont joué un rôle. Il y a d'autres régions qui ont essayé de faire la même chose, l'IGAD à l'Est, le groupe de G5 à l'Ouest. Ces différents groupes régionaux essayent de trouver des solutions, à l'échelle régionale. Pour les femmes et pour les hommes des groupes de médiation ont été établis : il y a déjà une organisation des femmes médiatrices de l'Afrique qui coopère avec les médiatrices de la Méditerranée et d'autres régions. Enfin, il y aussi les échanges de plus en plus fréquents grâce aux organisations régionales et aux organisations continentales.

Ceci me rappelle les échanges qui ont existé par le passé, parce que dans l'Antiquité, notamment, il n'y avait pas de visa. S'il y avait eu des visas, l'Italie n'aurait jamais eu saint Augustin, qui venait de l'Afrique du Nord, ni Sainte Monique, ni Leonardo Fibonacci. Leonardo Fibonacci a vécu à Bougie¹, dont son père était Consul à l'époque – mais il était beaucoup plus important, car marchand très riche – et il y avait une université. Dans cette université, le jeune professeur Leonardo Fibonacci a étudié et, plus tard, il a ramené en Italie les chiffres arabes et le fameux logarithme qu'on appelle « la suite de Fibonacci ».

Ceci me mène à aborder une autre préoccupation : maintenant nous avons des visa, et le grand problème qui se pose, pas pour ceux qui obtiennent facilement les visas, mais pour ceux qui ne les obtiennent pas, c'est la migration. La migration reste un des grands problèmes. En Europe je crois qu'il est perçu comme un énorme, insurmontable problème, peut-être même sur-exagéré, parce que: qu'est-ce que c'est cent mille migrants ? Ce chiffre n'est pas énorme, car dans toute l'Afrique il y a environ 35 million de personnes qui sont déplacées, qui sont réfugiées, qui sont migrantes, et qui sont accueillies dans beaucoup des pays africains, comme le Kenya – un pays qui partage, pardonnez moi l'expression, même la pauvreté avec les plus pauvres ; il accueille beaucoup de migrants. Il y a d'autres pays qui accueillent des migrants : les pays de l'Afrique du Nord. Nous accueillons beaucoup de gens du Sahel ou de plus loin que le Sahel, même de la partie anglophone de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.

Donc, cette question de migration peut se résoudre. Ça n'est pas un problème insurmontable, et il peut se régler, dans le cadre d'une solide coopération, nord-sud, qui respecte la dignité des Africains, de toutes les populations africaines, dans le respect aussi du pays d'accueil, dans le cadre d'échange qui serait un peu plus

¹ L'actuelle Béjaïa, une commune algérienne située en bordure de la mer Méditerranée, à 220 km à l'est d'Alger.

humain, mais aussi qui tienne compte des intérêts de tous. Il ne faut pas oublier les aspects socio-économiques, le développement humain, la formation, qui seraient une sorte d'arrangement gagnant-gagnant pour tous.

J'ai déjà évoqué la prévention des conflits: nous avons les systèmes d'alerte précoce, de la médiation, de la négociation, les missions de paix. L'Afrique contribue aussi avec l'ONU et avec l'OTAN dans les missions de paix. Dans le contexte des opérations de maintien de la paix, et il y en a quinze au total dans le monde, huit sont en Afrique. Ce qui donne une idée de l'importance des conflits qui existent en Afrique ; conflits qui sont parfois des guerres civiles endogènes, mais aussi avec des interventions exogènes, extérieures, qui n'ont pas toujours été du meilleur bon sens, ni des plus fructueuses – on en a vu les conséquences, y compris l'augmentation du nombre de migrants.

En conclusion, je voudrais insister encore une fois sur des solutions, peut-être les plus immédiates qui me viennent à l'esprit : renforcer le développement économique et investir dans la formation, dans l'éducation, dans la santé, dans le renforcement des institutions, dans la coopération internationale, tant au niveau inter-africain, qu'entre l'Europe et l'Afrique – c'est à dire régional, parce que, après tout, qu'est-ce que cette séparation entre ces continents, ce petit bassin, qui est la Méditerranée ? On pourrait presque se dire, c'est un même continent.

Encore une fois, donc : renforcer les institutions en Afrique, coopérer au plan régional, favoriser les accords multilatéraux, renforcer tous les systèmes qui existent déjà et compter sur la solidarité.

Session I

EXISTING THREATS VERSUS REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES



Ethiopian women selling baskets in the Aksum basket market, Ethiopia.





ALAIN JUILLET

*President of the Club des Directeurs de Sécurité des
Entreprises and of the Académie de l'Intelligence
Economique, Paris*

THE CHAIR'S PERSPECTIVE

Our panel has the goal to speak about existing threats versus regional and international initiatives. During this session we will hear three speakers and, after, we will obviously discuss with you, in order to enlarge and to enforce our exchange.

First of all, I am very happy because we have three speakers who are covering really different matters. For what concerns our topic, it is clearly in the middle of a lot of influences, a lot of issues, some of them being local or global when it comes to one area or another. Therefore, it is important to understand and to keep in mind that each speaker will bring his own experience, his own view, starting from his culture, from his origin, and, consequently, it will be interesting for you to blend all what has been said. On my side, just to start, I think there is a story by which I would like to begin our exchange on the African region. This area is like a river with two banks, the North African bank and the sub-Saharan bank; in the middle, since a long time, since thousands of years, nomadic peoples have moved all the time: Sahel is a very poor area and people living in it have always tried to survive fighting against each other, going south or north to recover people, cattle or material goods. Nowadays, there is still a very little financing in this area and everything is made through barter: the main part of economic activity is carried out in that way. For this reason, it is certainly interesting to judge and to understand what happens in this area by our own views, but it is also very important to understand and to see how they react through their own views.

About what happened in this area and its main illicit activities, I have to say that, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, this area has always suffered illicit activities, illicit trade being a way of life; twenty years ago, it was mainly based upon tobacco smuggling. Later, we saw an increase of untaxed fuel, drugs, and weapons trafficking. More recently, we saw a very important growth of migrants, allowing human trafficking. When you check all these illicit trades, you see that all have been made through the same roads; they have been made through the

same kind of traders, the same group of people. And that is the reason why there is a link and a mix between everything. When I think or speak about this region, I always remember about one of the main terrorists of the area, who is called Mr Marlboro¹. He started selling and illicitly trading cigarettes, then he moved to the weapons and foreigners kidnapping. He is now one of the terrorists' leaders and he has carried out lots of operations. For instance, he has been the leading guy for the In Amenas operation, an attack of an oil extraction area in Algeria², and he is now resting, if we can say so, in the south of Libya – being difficult for him to be in other places, since everybody is looking for him.

We have to understand – and we will see it through our speakers – that it is necessary to include a lot of various aspects to be closer to reality: the local conflicts, for instance, which are coming from hundreds of years, hundreds of centuries, or the external financing, because we do not have to forget that in this area they received and continue to receive financial support from other countries.

In this regard, to give a very clear example, when Chadian and French troops came to city of Gao, in the East of Mali, some planes from Qatar have had to take off immediately. They were the support of a religious promotion towards Tuaregs and Peuls exchanging rice bags against Quran and Sharia practice. It is always efficient to bring food in a very poor country, especially when it could spill-over all around. Do not forget that we are in the Sahara desert, going from Mauritania to Sudan and Somalia: considering the fact that a SUV can do roughly 700 kilometres per night, you can thus move yourself, your groups or your products from one place to another very easily. It is extremely difficult to control the area – and I am not only speaking about terrorist groups, but also for all illicit trades.

Furthermore, I am sure that another issue we will have to look on, concerns the fact that some criminal groups and mafias are now using regions of certain countries, from Atlantic Coast to the Red Sea, as base camps: since there is not enough police or army to control them, some areas have really become free zones – and I am not referring to free trade, but to free flow zone including production trade and storage. In the future I am convinced that it will be one of the greatest problems for all the countries we are speaking about. They need our help, and when I say our help, I mean everybody's help, because in this situation it is necessary to exchange knowledge and to work together; it is impossible to find a solution alone. That is true also for the countries around, that is true for the continent and that is true at the international level. Therefore it is so important to hear the vision of our three experts coming from these three sides.

1 The man's real name is Moktar Belmoktar. He is an Algerian veteran jihadist who fought in Afghanistan and has long been a target of French counter-terrorism forces. Today, he leads a group called Al-Mulathameen Brigade (The Brigade of the Masked Ones), which is associated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

2 The attack took place at a gas facility near In Amenas, in eastern Algeria, on the 16th of January 2013. More than 800 people were taken hostage and, among them, there were 132 foreign nationals.



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EVOLVING TERRORISM: THE AL-SHABAAB CASE

I think that the person who chose the topic of the evolution of the terrorist scene really thought well, especially for us who are from the African continent, where sometimes we feel like the rest of the world has forgotten us; when we feel that people are thinking of us – and thinking very well of us, on how the challenges that we face in the continent can be dealt with –, then we are really delighted. Therefore, thank you very much Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo for thinking of Africa.

Let me start by saying that, when I was a child, my mother had one thing that she used to tell me: when you go to Rome, do as the Romans do. Now that I am here, I saw that they spoke from the heart and they did not bother putting on PowerPoint presentations; therefore, I will follow suit, I shall be like a person from Rome and do what the Romans do: speak from the heart.

Nowadays, the contemporary international system, as we know it, faces a serious challenge and, in fact, a threat to its existence coming from non-state actors. Today we seem to worry more about non-state actors – be they ISIS or, in our continent, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab –, than perhaps we did about the interstate conflict that characterised the Cold War era. Hence, my argument here is that, while the post-Cold War era had a wave of democratisation, it has also consistently brought to us a new security challenge: the one we are facing from non-state actors. Moreover, within this framework, we are facing both existing threats and evolving and emerging threats. Indeed, while we have a good understanding of the existing threats, we still face the challenge of understanding how these threats are evolving into the new ones.

What perhaps it is troubling is our response to these threats: I shall say that the responses that we have had to the threats that the international system is facing have been more reactive than proactive – and I want to give a simple example about what I mean by saying that we have been reactive, one that I like quoting.

When a Russian plane has been downed by terrorists in North Sinai¹, I do not know how many of you remember what the Russian president said. If I recall correctly, he claimed that “the work of forgiving terrorists is the work of God, but the work of sending terrorists to God is my job”; as a result, what we did see were all the best Russian military equipment and supplies headed to Syria.

In this regard, what experience shows is that, when you have such overreaction, the people you are harming, most of the time, are the innocent civilians; we have seen it especially in Somalia and Kenya, two of the countries that have been facing the non-state actors’ threat in our region. Moreover, together with those innocent civilians, you also loose a portion of population who get to join extremist groups.

Hence, what did we ultimately obtain from when September 11 happened? We had the popular saying “either you are with us or with them”, and that meant that we started loosing a section of population: during the process you are not discriminating; in the moment you hit a place, most of the people you will hit, will be most likely the innocent civilians; even if you do not hit most of the people who have suffered from all the acts that we have heard, most of them are still innocent civilians.

Therefore, that brings me to the very question about the issues that we are dealing with – and I am going back to the African continent and to the Horn specifically. Since Boko Haram has been in existence for sixteen years and al-Shabaab for twelve years, the fundamental question we need to ask is: what has changed? How are these groups evolving?

To respond to this in a way by which you would be able to understand these groups and how they have evolved, I want to submit to you three levels of analysis. Before we start, allow me to say that, for what concerns tactics, these groups do not differ very much and they are much more similar then expected; for this reason, I shall focus more on where I would claim to have a fairly good understanding: al-Shabaab and its affiliates in the Horn.

The first level of analysis is the national, domestic, environmental level. Within the national level analysis, al-Shabaab has demonstrated that it has what one could define as techniques, both in terms of operations’ tactics and procedures; it has also become very adaptive, very pragmatic, very dissident in terms of its operations. When it moved from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and became the independent al-Shabaab², it rapidly decided to provide the services that the government was unable to provide. Indeed, these groups have learnt how to play with the psy-

1 The Metrojet Flight 9268 was an international chartered passenger flight operated by Russian airline Kogalymavia (branded as Metrojet). On the 31st of January 2015, the Airbus was destroyed by a bomb above the northern Sinai, following its departure from Sharm El Sheikh International Airport, Egypt, en route to Pulkovo Airport, Saint Petersburg, Russia. All 224 passengers and crew who were on board were killed.

2 The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was a group of *sharia*-based Islamic courts that united themselves to form a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, in the years 2000-2006. Al-Shabaab has been the armed wing of the ICU until 2006, when it splintered into several smaller factions after having been defeated by the TGF.

chological mind of the people: they started providing basic and essential services as well as security; the only thing they did not want to provide is education: they know that they cannot provide the right to that, since education means that you become critical. In addition, al-Shabaab also developed a very good structure in terms of its leadership, exactly like a good military organisation: they have a very well structured intelligence wing, Amniyat, which is able both to provide a propaganda war and to win that propaganda war.

In terms of attacks, what I meant by it being pragmatic is that it has been able to play well within the clan/religious dimension in Somalia, for instance, and I am still talking at a national level analysis – but the situation does not change for other regions. When you look at attacks targeting civilians, these have gone especially to the hotels, and they are very clear when they target the hotels: what they are telling the people is that they are only targeting those who are high-handed, who can afford these hotels and, for this very reason, they are affiliated to the “infidels” – that is how they call us. By their narrative, those are the enemies, while the rest of the people who are not in those places are by the terrorists’ side. Another type of attacks has been the targeting of security forces within the region and, in the Somali case, against AMISOM³.

Furthermore, they have had a good strategy in terms of radicalization, but I do not want to go there, since Senator Benchehida has already mentioned it, in terms of playing with those well-known, real or perceived, grievances – be they religious, political or socio-economic: they are able to exploit them very well.

Let me get to the second level of analysis, the regional level. Al-Shabaab has continued to aspire to be a hegemonic regional terrorist group within our region. It has continued to expand in terms of its recruitment and in terms of its operation, in order to demonstrate that it is a regional terrorist group. It has also demonstrated that by attacking us, striking major attacks in neighbouring countries and even beyond. It did this with the Kampala attacks of 2010, in Uganda; it did this with Westgate shopping mall attack in 2013 – which I must say that was one of the most complex terror attacks carried out by al-Shabaab, using what the military perhaps would call an infantry group of about five well-trained units, who, in 2015, went also to the Garissa University and did the same; it has then tried several attempts in Ethiopia and it was able to succeed once in Djibouti: it has really tried to demonstrate itself as a regional terrorist hegemonic organisation.

That brings me to the second way by which it has tried to show itself as regional organisation: the use of the language that is more common in the region. Nowadays, one will find much of the recruitment being conducted in Swahili, for instance; they adopt the language of where they think they need to recruit people and they use the propaganda videos in that way.

3 Started in 2007, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations.

Even within its military operation, it has divided itself into two kinds of military sections: one is what we call Jayshul Ayman, which targets Kenya and Uganda; the other one, Jaysh Yassin, targets mostly Ethiopia and Djibouti. With AMISOM ongoing and being pressed, it has also decentralised its operations and it has now small groups everywhere: there is Al Hijra, which operates in parts of Kenya, and within every other country I could go on citing groups, trying to show how they have decentralised themselves.

At the international level of analysis, al-Shabaab has predicted itself also to be internationally influent, by trying to affiliate itself with terrorist groups like al-Qaeda – and therefore speaking the language of Al-Qaeda as well as pledging loyalty and affiliation to it. We also know that a small section of it has affiliated itself to ISIL. I think that what we are going to see when the war in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq will be over, is that most of the groups fighting there, especially those who have travelled there, will be coming back to the African region, which is going to be the next hot bed of terrorist activity, especially if we will not be able to stabilise Somalia.

Having said that, let me give you a few suggestions about what could be the way forward. Firstly, I think that we clearly need to come up with some good strategies on how to cooperate. Cooperation is critical and trying to build that cooperation and to support it should be mandatory. We are glad that Italy is a strong member of the European Union, but it was disheartening for us to hear that the EU will scale down its support to AMISOM: that means that when al-Shabaab will hear such news, they will be very excited and motivated to attack. We need to rethink about certain choices. In this regard, we, as IGAD, have developed an original strategy, which is very comprehensive in terms of the approaches that need to be undertaken in order to deal with terrorist groups. This is a very comprehensive strategy that we developed through a very inclusive consultative process and that has key recommendations about the things that are happening in the region.

But let me say other two things before I conclude. One is that the more we face these challenges, the little we know about them. We have not invested in serious research analysis on the problem and we still have very generalised and simplistic explanations; we too easily say that people get into this criminal cycle because they are poor. We need to engage into deeper analysis and, in this regard, I really think that we need to empower more the researchers from the region, so that they are able to do research on the field; we need to let them do this research critically. We have not invested in helping both the region governments and their development partners; we have not invested in empowering our researchers within the region.

The next challenge that we need to tackle is about us having a problem of state: African state capacity is very weak. We have vast lands that are completely ungoverned and these same lands are indeed becoming the sites where the ter-

rorists are using their influence. As the next step, we need to put in place clear mechanisms in order to sustain state-building activities: we have vast lands where the majority of people do not even pay taxes, do not even know anything about the government – it is like they do not even belong to their country, they do not feel a part of it. We have to figure out programs that could let us see people being brought together as a whole within the state's framework: that means providing them with basic services like education, health security and all that.

Finally, there is the need to deal with those issues, which are deteriorating: for all the strategies we come up with, we need to develop a whole of society approach, a whole of government approach. Today, the threats we are facing concern everyone, both regionally and internationally. We are encouraging our governments in order to change the paradigm, to shift the way by which they have perceived an entity like civil society: we live in a region where civil society and governments are constantly fighting while they are meant to be working together. We want to change this paradigm and to see how civil society and governments can work together to deal with the threats of extremism and terrorism. Most of civil society's organisations, indeed, are on the ground working with the people and they could support governments' efforts.



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EAST AFRICA: ORGANISED CRIME, DRIVERS AND TERRORISM NEXUS

With regard to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), I have to say right at the outset that my presentation will be focused on the UNODC's mandate, on East Africa and on the criminal justice environment, not on the whole topic of security across Africa: if you do see a narrow focus, it is intentionally done. For what concerns East Africa and the drivers that we see in the context of organised crime and terrorism, there is nothing new and one can recognise a number of key drivers: lack of rule of law, corruption, ineffective governance, ideology, socio-economic issues, lack of opportunity. The point is that, regardless of the criminal justice, the rule of law, the crime prevention strategy, the national security strategy or the military strategy that may be followed, unless you address all the drivers in one way or another, you will be only treating symptoms. If you just go after terrorist organisations and organised crime without dealing with the underlying drivers, you will be merely addressing symptoms and you will continue to face the same problems.

Having said that, with regard to the persistent threats in the region, I am going to address generally the transnational organised crime and, then, without dwelling on terrorism in particular, I would rather deepen the *nexus* between the two.

Currently, in East Africa we see a number of transnational and organised crime activities occurring: again, this is not new to the region, but it is developing in an open flow, sometimes higher to one extent, sometimes lower to another. Maritime piracy is a good example: after having been eradicated to a large extent, it has been re-emerging and surging in the last couple of months; the same is happening with the smuggling of migrants, which is currently a key concern to the European Union, as part of the Khartoum Process¹.

¹ The Khartoum Process is a platform for political cooperation amongst the countries along the migration route between the Horn of Africa and Europe; it is so known as the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative.

Concerning the movement of people in and out of the region, I have to say immediately with a caveat that, considering all the drivers that I have mentioned initially, there certainly is a reason why people move, and, yet, it also represents an opportunity for those syndicates who move people to benefit, through criminality, of the people's misery. However, before I get to terrorism, it is important to mention that if we look at the spectrum of organised crime's activity in East Africa, none of these crimes happen in isolation; again, this is not unique to East Africa, but it is very pertinent to the region. In particular, when it relates to syndicates operating human trafficking, we see a number of converging crimes: the same syndicates who are moving opiates in and out of the region, are also moving arms and munitions out of the region, and, of course, the golden thread that runs through all of that is the illicit financial flow, with the money laundering, the cash couriers, the money moving in general in and out of the region – whether it is for profit or for ideology, moving to the side of terrorism.

That is the second point I want to tackle: we should not develop any kind of program or any kind countermeasure that purely and abstractly focuses on trafficking persons, or maritime crime, or illegal fishing within the maritime context, or drug trafficking, or small arms trafficking. There are very clear links between these criminal activities in the region, as well as very clear links between the syndicates involved. The one particularly interesting fact that we do see in the region, based on fairly real-time information at our disposal, is that, quite often, the syndicates implicated in the smuggling of migrants do not do anything else; they do not move drugs, small arms or munitions: they are specialised in moving people in and out of the region, foreign terrorist fighters coming back into the continent through the Horn of Africa included.

Then, there are other syndicates when it comes to the opiates coming out of Afghanistan, through the Makran coast²; when we deal with small arms and munitions coming into the region; or when blasting caps or commercial explosives are concerned: in all those crimes, quite often we see a conflation of the same syndicates. Hence, my second point is that we have to address all this in a holistic and pragmatic way, in opposition to the academic approach, which is only dealing with a single crime at a time.

Moving closer to the discussion that I am aiming to focus on, what happens when the underlying factors of money, ideology and corruption merge? We end up with a very dangerous situation where money is no longer the driven, but fuels the ultimate objective of ideology instead. In that regard, al-Shabaab is adopting the same syndicates' *modus operandi*: they are not profiting but funding themselves to achieve the objective of their particular organisation. Again, as I said, this is not

² The main heroin maritime trafficking route runs from the Makran Coast, a remote desert area that is primarily in Pakistan but also transects a part of the Iranian sea border, across the Indian Ocean to the Eastern seaboard of Africa, mainly to the coast of Tanzania.

unique to East Africa; there is ample evidence and research being done, both on a open source site and on a classified intelligence level, that clearly indicate that this is not exclusive to East Africa: we have seen it with al-Qaeda in the past, or, back in the Seventies, with some of the European syndicates and terrorist organisations who benefited from illegal trade.

Let me give you just a quick mention of the theory and practice of the African version – even though the evidence that we have in East Africa does not show any new trend itself and there is not any new huge emerging trend of a link between terrorism and organised crime *per se*. What we do see in the region, indeed, is a variety of confluences, interactions and behaviours that interact with each other or act like each other. It is important to state that process, because, quite often, and especially when it comes to fundraising, one tends to consider an emerging trend as a big threat – and particularly in East Africa.

Yet, that is not the case: we do not have evidence in that sense. It certainly is an emerging threat to a certain extent, but it is not the next big threat and the next big trend that we could see in the region. Based on a research that we have done between 2016 and 2017 – an unpublished and very tactical university research conducted within field operations around the Horn of Africa in particular –, what we do see is some coexistence, cooperation and convergence of behaviours that are related to al-Shabaab in particular. To a certain extent, al-Shabaab acts like a syndicate: they cooperate with other syndicates and there are certain convergences between the groups who are moving contraband into the region and working with al-Shabaab; according to the evidence that we have found in the region, this certainly occurs, even if it is not a new trend.

A number of indicators points out the behaviour of al-Shabaab in particular ways. The first point regards illicit taxes in relation to charcoal and sugar and it is well documented by the research of the United Nations Security Council's Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: al-Shabaab has allowed passage or trade of charcoal and sugar against Security Council resolutions to fund themselves; in some instances they would fund themselves, in some other instances they would allow others to trade those and tax that trade or safe passage – same as what most gangsters or syndicates would do, almost as a form of protection money.

We see a number of important illegal exports into the region and, purely from a business point of view, a number of front companies, of legitimate business people that are trading with some shady characters and organisations in the region, simply for the sake of money. Besides, that money and that contraband, especially if in the case of commercial explosives, blasting caps and related dual-use technology, quite often end up in the wrong people's hands – in many instances al-Shabaab's.

Without going into technical details, if we look at the al-Shabaab's *modus operandi* and at the construction of vehicle-bombs or explosives, including small arms, hand grenades and munitions, we see that all the equipment came from contraband that gets it into the region through commercial trade – apart from what is

taken, unfortunately, from AMISOM equipment. Some of the latest explosions we have seen in Kenya, and allegedly conducted by al-Shabaab, were clearly due to the use of commercial explosives and not to military ones.

Regarding small arms and munitions, an interesting fact that we have picked up in the region, as part of our research, is that AK-47 Kalashnikovs and other small arms circulate in abundance in the region. Furthermore, it is difficult to get a hold of what we do see as an increasing object of trade in the region: a 7,62 mm round ammunition and other particular munitions utilised in the region are coming into East Africa through various channels. Those munitions do represent an emerging threat at which we have to look very carefully: it is a continuous fuel to destabilisation in the Great Lakes area, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia.

Within this framework, I am not mentioning cybercrime as one of the current threats to the region, because we do not see it as an emerging priority at the moment. What we do see, though, is online radicalization and cyber-enabled crime: we are witnessing operations that are often carried out with cell phones or other technology; we observe intelligence collection and communication, as well as a variety of logistics activities happening, but we do not see cybercrime in the true sense of the word – identity theft, crypto-currency, block chain and others activities – as an immediate threat for East Africa. Even the latest reports on drugs indicate a minor percentage of drugs trade (0,05%) trade happening in the dark or deep web. However, cyber-enabled crime represents a certain concern, since the ability of governments to track and collect digital evidence, to analyse and utilize it, not only as intelligence data, but also as evidence to court, is still small and critical.

Another regional emerging trend, which is related to al-Shabaab, is the trafficking in persons: unlike Boko Haram, it does not seem to be recruiting people or forcefully taking people for the sake of radicalizing them as child soldiers or soldiers; yet, we do see them taking women and children for domestic servitude. They would take people to care for them, to cook for them, to marry them, and, awful as it is, we do not see the same trend that we see with Boko Haram in the Sahel, where it is about the radicalization and operationalization of these individuals.

There is a point, though, that I have to reiterate very carefully: the movement of people and migration itself have nothing to do with terrorism. Having said that, what we do however see is that those foreign terrorist fighters who are moving in and out of the Near East, the Horn of Africa and Europe, do utilise the same smuggling routes as migrants do – and unfortunately that is a point that we do have to consider very carefully, whether it is through vetting, or security clearances or other security operations. Foreign terrorist fighters are certainly detected on those routes.

Finally, let me mention another couple of points. One of the evidently emerging concerns that we are witnessing, as well as a number of questions that we are asked

about, are related to opiates and heroin coming out of Afghanistan into the Horn of Africa. We have no evidence to show that al-Shabaab is trading in heroin or in opiates; however, a working hypothesis is that, if they do allow safe passage of charcoal and sugar against taxation, then, quite likely, they would also allow safe passage of heroin coming into the region through the Somali coast: in that regard, they certainly indirectly benefit from the drug trade, same as the Taliban out of Afghanistan. This is definitely a matter we have to concern about. In fact, just as a side line, the opiates trade and the movement of heroin into East Africa, whether it flows through the maritime routes or through the land routes, are one of the greatest threats faced by the Horn of Africa: it needs an integrated cross-cutting approach.

We do not have to look just at terrorism and organised crime, or just at the rule of law and corruption: we must engage towards programming an approach that would address all of these entwined challenges as they are in real life; that would deal with criminal activities from a pragmatic point of view and that would do so through the regional organisation – like IGAD and others. We, as UNODC, work very closely with the African Union and three other regional organisation – the East Africa Community, the International Conference of the Great Lakes, and the Indian Ocean Commission, together with chiefs of police and, of course, all the other key stakeholders in the region.

I am going to conclude with the points that we have identified, from a strategic point of view, as the weaknesses that require intervention. The first is that, when it comes to the conversion of the links between terrorism and organised crime in the region, we are just not understanding the threat correctly: there is a whole of anecdotal reporting, speculation and quick-fixed comments or remarks on this, but, in order to better understand what we are trying to counter, we need proper empirical analysis and research from a number of points of view – from an academic point of view; from a comprehensive threats analysis and a threats assessment point of view; from a national security and intelligence point of view. Secondly, we have to promote adherence, ratification and/or accession to the international legal frameworks, both on the counterterrorism side and on the one of the nineteen conventions and protocols, as well as the various Security Council's resolutions and, certainly, the United Nation Convention against Transnational Organised Crime's protocols. Five to six out of the thirteen countries that we work in, still have not ratified most of those conventions: without a legal framework, it is difficult to talk about the rule of law and the human rights-based criminal justice response; the legal framework, as well as the promotion of adherence to that framework, is very critical.

Strengthening specific capacities: that is a message to donors, to the UN system, including the UNODC and other partners. It does not help to deal with pragmatic problems by addressing them academically; to solve real problems, we have to strengthen the operational capacity of member states, whether it is through set-

ting up specialised units, equipping those units, or providing them with hardware, software, skills, knowledge and mentoring – we have to deal with problems from a real-life pragmatic point of view. Moreover, funding programming has to be geared towards operational capacity building.

National coordination is an objective to achieve as well, considering that even in the countries with strong national security mechanisms, national coordination still does not occur: in most countries, we find that various security and law enforcement agencies do not even speak to each other. If we do not fix national coordination within member states, international cooperation is impossible; if you do not have national security, military, law enforcement agencies, crime intelligence prosecution and all the related agencies speaking to each other and strategizing together, operational implementation is impossible.

Finally, international cooperation. In our experience, when we deal with the transnational nature, whether it is money or contraband moving in and out of the region, that normally involves three extra jurisdictions. If you do not have the ability to fight them through a legal framework and a proper formal and informal co-operation mechanism – whether it is through central authorities, INTERPOL or other mechanisms, which could actually aid the sharing of intelligence in order to act in an effective manner and then to follow through the intelligence operations by an effective prosecution, well, we are again dealing with symptoms as opposed to trying to solve real problems.



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LA CRIMINALITÉ TRANSNATIONALE ORGANISÉE: LE NEXUS ENTRE CTO ET DÉVELOPPEMENT

Pour ma présentation, aujourd'hui, je vais essayer tout d'abord de reprendre quelque concepts ; en tant que représentante d'un institut de recherche, il est important pour moi de les définir, avant de pouvoir parler un peu plus en détail de certains aspects.

Avant tout, je vais d'abord définir ce que c'est la criminalité transnationale organisée ; ensuite, je vais essayer de vous présenter notre approche de la criminalité transnationale organisée à travers l'angle du développement, et non pas uniquement à partir de l'approche traditionnelle sécuritaire ; j'essayerai aussi de vous présenter rapidement quelle est notre réponse face à cela, quel est notre programme et quels sont nos travaux. Enfin, je vais essayer d'aborder quelque piste par rapport à ce fameux *nexus*, ou lien, qui existe ou qui existerait entre des groupes terroristes et de groupes liés à la criminalité organisée.

Comme vous le savez, la criminalité transnationale organisée a été consacrée à travers un instrument juridique international qu'est la Convention des Nations Unies Contre la Criminalité Transnationale Organisée (CNUCTO). Bien que cette Convention soit très importante, puisqu'elle a permis d'engager une grande partie de la communauté internationale vers un certain nombre d'objectifs globaux, il n'existe néanmoins pas de définition globalement admise de la criminalité transnationale organisée. Cela a certainement été volontaire, étant donné que c'est une notion qui peut regrouper beaucoup d'éléments, donc peut être que, pour éviter de manquer certains éléments, on a préféré ne pas la définir. Toutefois, dans la Convention, on a défini la notion de « groupe criminel organisé », qui nous permet d'avoir une définition des acteurs impliqués dans ce phénomène.

Avant de vous expliquer d'avantage en quoi consiste notre travail, je voudrais mentionner que nous avons opté pour une définition par typologies des crimes : en fonction de la littérature qui existait sur la question, nous avons repris une douzaine des crimes qui apparaissent comme étant aujourd'hui des menaces prioritaires pour l'Afrique. Il y en a beaucoup et cela passe par certains aspects connus,

tels que le trafic des migrants, la traite des personnes ou encore le trafic des drogues. Mais aussi, par ce qu'on appelle les crimes environnementaux, qui sont notamment très présents en Afrique Australe et en Afrique de l'Est, et qui aujourd'hui font l'objet de recherches et de publications. Évidemment il y en a aussi d'autres, comme les flux financiers illicites, qui sont un type de crime transversal à tous les autres, puisque sans argent ces groupes organisés ne peuvent pas opérer ; ou encore d'autres, comme ceux qui sont des menaces plus récents comme par exemple la cybercriminalité, qui est aujourd'hui de plus en plus utilisée par tous les différents groupes criminels organisés pour parvenir à leur fins.

Aujourd'hui, ce que je vais essayer de vous montrer c'est le lien qui existe finalement entre la criminalité transnationale organisée et le développement. Pourquoi parler de ce lien ? Parce que pendant longtemps, la question de la criminalité transnationale organisée n'était perçue qu'à travers l'angle traditionnel sécuritaire comme par exemple le renforcement du contrôle des frontières le renforcement des capacités des forces de sécurité. Toutefois, on s'est rendu compte que la criminalité transnationale organisée n'impacte pas uniquement la sécurité, au sens strict, de l'État, mais qu'elle défavorise le développement des États. Aujourd'hui, il existe un certain nombre de rapports – qu'il s'agisse des Nations Unies ou d'autres organismes, gouvernementaux ou non gouvernementaux – qui témoignent de certaines corrélations entre eux, par exemple, la hausse des taux de criminalité organisée en Afrique et les difficultés en matière de développement.

Lorsque l'on parle de développement, il est possible de se référer à plusieurs dimensions : au développement global, aux chiffres du développement humain dans un pays, ou bien à des questions plus locales, par rapport aux communautés ou aux sociétés. Désormais, donc, on se rend compte de l'insuffisance de l'approche des acteurs traditionnels de la sécurité : tous les acteurs aujourd'hui ont intérêt à prendre en compte cela dans la manière d'approcher certaines problématiques, notamment pour essayer d'avoir une approche beaucoup plus multidisciplinaire, transversal, qui s'avère aujourd'hui nécessaire.

On peut dire de manière plus précise que la question de la sécurité n'est plus simplement une question d'instabilité au niveau des frontières et de leur porosité. Au contraire, aujourd'hui il faut considérer aussi que la criminalité transnationale organisée est avant tout un phénomène qui alimente la corruption et le conflit et qui va à infirmer directement l'économie. Car par exemple, dans le cas du contrebande des biens illicites, il y a toute une frange de l'économie qui est passée sous silence et qui ne permet pas de savoir quelles sont les richesses réelles et comment se répartissent-elles. Évidemment, elle génère également des violences, que ce soit au niveau des communautés locales, que ce soit au niveau de la lutte pour le partage des richesses, ou pour la stabilité des communautés qui vivent près des frontières et qui présentent souvent une recrudescence de la criminalité transnationale. Il en résulte que cette criminalité organisée détourne les ressources qui pourraient être consacrées au développement, à la réduction de la pauvreté ou encore à l'amélio-

ration des services de base. C'est pour cela que finalement on se retrouve avec ces groupes qui proposent ces mêmes services à la place des États.

À partir de 2015, la question de la criminalité transnationale organisée a été consacrée au niveau des Objectifs de Développement Durable (ODD), qui concernent tous les acteurs engagés dans le développement : en ce sens, l'objectif 16.4 des ODD indique la nécessité, d'ici à 2030, de réduire les flux financiers illicites et le trafic d'armes ; de renforcer les activités de récupération et de restitution des biens volés ; de lutter contre toutes les formes de criminalité organisée. Ce ne sont pas juste des mots mais véritablement un cadre dans lequel les organisations essayent de s'inscrire pour avoir toujours, finalement, un objectif en vue.

La question, alors, ne touche plus uniquement l'aspect sécuritaire au sens strict. C'est finalement dans d'autres objectifs concernant le développement durable que l'on retrouve la question de la criminalité transnationale organisée. On la voit par exemple dans ce qui concerne l'objectif 15, relatif à l'amélioration de la vie terrestre, où on parle de la surpêche illicite et de la pêche non déclarée, qui aujourd'hui impactent énormément les communautés et l'environnement – et c'est pour cela que je vous disais tout à l'heure qu'on parle aussi de criminalité environnementale dans la criminalité organisée.

Il y a également, dans l'objectif 8, tout ce qui concerne l'esclavage moderne, le travail forcé, tout ce qui est mis en œuvre par des groupes liés à la criminalité organisée ; ou encore, dans l'objectif 15.7, le braconnage des espèces végétales et animales. Par conséquent, si l'on veut aujourd'hui essayer de répondre à la question de la criminalité organisée, il est vraiment important de l'approcher à travers une approche globale, holistique, qui prenne en compte les différentes implications évoquées précédemment sans se limiter à l'angle sécuritaire. C'est quelque chose qu'il est important de souligner, puisque la communauté internationale s'est rendue compte que finalement les réponses uniquement sécuritaires n'ont pas permis d'aboutir aux objectifs évoqués précédemment.

Enfin, j'en viens à vous parler de notre programme ENACT. ENACT est un projet financé par l'Union Européenne implémenté par un consortium de trois organisations : l'Institut d'Études de Sécurité (ISS) que je représente, INTERPOL et le Global Initiative against Organised Crime (GI), basée à Genève. Pourquoi un consortium de trois organisations ? Parce que on a réalisé que, en plus de l'approche multisectorielle et holistique à la criminalité organisée, il était aussi important d'avoir une approche multidisciplinaire : aujourd'hui INTERPOL travaille sur ces questions avec les agents d'application de la loi ; le GI est un réseau d'experts sur la question de la criminalité organisée qui offre une approche très globale, très stratégique, très pointue sur cette question.

En ce qui nous concerne, à l'Institut d'Études de Sécurité, on essaye de faire le lien entre, je dirais, l'académique et l'opérationnel, en essayant aussi, peut-être, de vulgariser les questions de la criminalité qui souvent peut être assez complexe ; au-delà de la vulgarisation, toutefois, il s'agit aussi d'apporter des réponses

concrètes, pratiques aux *policy-makers*, à ces personnes qui travaillent sur les programmes étatiques. Ce programme essaye d'offrir et de pratiquer une approche multidisciplinaire, mais aussi multisectoriel : je pense qu'aujourd'hui c'est quelque chose d'unique en Afrique, considérant en plus que nous sommes présents sur tout le continent Africain.

Quel est l'objectif global d'ENACT ? Notre but, finalement, c'est d'atténuer l'impact de la criminalité transnationale organisée sur le développement, sur les aspects liés à la gouvernance, à l'état de droit – donc à la sécurité : encore une fois, cela montre en quoi toutes ces notions sont intimement liées. Comment est-ce qu'on pense d'y arriver ? Notre objectif c'est d'être un apport en termes d'analyse, de suggestion, afin de guider l'élaboration des politiques publiques et d'améliorer la coopération au niveau régional et continental. À propos de la nécessité de renforcer la coopération, nous insistons sur le besoin de fortifier la coopération sud-sud, la coopération intra-régionale et intra-africaine. Puisque il y beaucoup de choses à apprendre aussi entre nous, entre africains : la proximité régionale et culturelle faciliterait beaucoup l'échange d'idées, de stratégies et de moyens – ceci est une nécessité à laquelle nous tenons énormément.

Évidemment, de toutes ces recherches et de tous ces dispositifs dont je peux vous parler plus en détails plus tard, l'objectif est avant tout de renforcer les compétences des acteurs locaux, comprenant aussi bien les acteurs gouvernementaux que non gouvernementaux. Aujourd'hui, il est urgent de renforcer les capacités des chercheurs en Afrique. Car ils sont sur le terrain et comprennent mieux que quiconque les enjeux. Aussi je crois que il est très important de souligner que nous sommes une organisation avec des compétences africaines et qu'on cherche de renforcer les compétences de nos collègues africains.

À propos de nos dispositifs, ENACT travaille à travers cinq observatoires régionaux qui sont basés en Afrique du Nord, Afrique Australe, Afrique de l'Est, Afrique de l'Ouest et Afrique Centrale. De manière générale, on essaye de produire un certain nombre d'analyses, qu'elles soient continentales ou régionales, sur les questions liées à la criminalité organisée ; on fait des rapports, des recherches thématiques, mais aussi ce qu'on appelle des *policy papers*, sur des choses beaucoup plus concrètes. De plus, nous avons développé ce qu'on appelle un « modèle d'évaluation de la vulnérabilité à la criminalité organisée », qui sera bientôt disponible. Il s'agit d'un index permettant d'évaluer la vulnérabilité des États à la criminalité organisée, par rapport à un certain nombre des critères concernant, notamment, la capacité de réponse de l'État mais aussi la volonté politique de l'État. Enfin, nous proposons aussi des cycles de formation pour renforcer les capacités des acteurs locaux.

Pour finir, j'en arrive au lien, au *nexus* qui existe ou existerait entre la criminalité transnationale organisée et le terrorisme en Afrique du Nord. Pourquoi le conditionnel ? Parce que, contrairement à toutes les études et toutes les recherches qu'ont été faites en Afghanistan, en Colombie ou en Afrique de l'Est, en Afrique

du Nord, à propos de la question de la criminalité organisée et du terrorisme, il n'y a pas encore de données suffisantes à définir des contours clairs ou à dire de manière globale « voici les principales tendances ». On est plutôt enclin aujourd'hui à dire qu'il y a des spécificités en fonction des sous-régions, des autres concernant des groupes terroristes, des autres encore concernant des individus au sein des mêmes groupes terroristes. On peut dire qu'il y a des liens d'opportunité entre les groupes terroristes et les groupes plus classiques de la criminalité organisée, c'est-à-dire que les uns vont utiliser les autres pour arriver à leurs fins. Il faut faire attention à ne pas forcément penser lorsqu'on parle de ce *nexus*, que les deux types de groupes vont se réunir, se concerter et discuter sur une stratégie globale pour parvenir à leurs fins. Je pense qu'aujourd'hui en Afrique du Nord ce n'est pas vraiment le cas. On est plutôt sur des liens d'opportunité, sur des choses éparpillées qui arrivent de part et d'autre : ce qui se passe en Afrique du Nord est différent de ce qui se passe au Sahel, en Afrique de l'Est ou de l'Ouest même s'il existe également un certain nombre de similarités. On retrouve également quelques similarités avec ce qui se passe au Moyen Orient, forcément et surtout pour la proximité culturelle entre les deux régions.

Tout ça pour dire que, aujourd'hui, je n'ai pas vraiment vocation à vous donner des réponses. Parce que, encore une fois, en tant que représentante d'un institut de recherche je ne peux pas m'engager sur des choses qui sont encore à l'état d'étude et d'approfondissement : parfois il nous faut, en tant que chercheurs qui travaillons sur ces questions complexes, prendre le temps de travailler sur ces questions qui sont très complexes.

Ce que je peux vous dire, néanmoins, c'est que on a un certain nombre de pistes aujourd'hui en Afrique du Nord : la traite des êtres humains est évidemment présente et on commence à la voir comme un outil potentiel des groupes terroristes, afin de bénéficier du passage par certaines routes ; la question du trafic des biens culturels est également en train de devenir une autre piste, un autre lien de connexion entre la criminalité organisée et le terrorisme ; le contrebande des cigarettes, de drogue et des armes, évidemment, ne fait pas exception, ainsi que les enlèvements contre rançons.

Session II

TOWARDS AN AFRICAN-LED CRISIS MANAGEMENT



Clay mosque in Djenné, Mali.





YOUSSEF AMRANI
Senior officer, The Royal Cabinet, Rabat

THE CHAIR'S PERSPECTIVE

Today we have an opportunity to discuss on the way of addressing the many challenges in Africa, on which kind of approach do we need, on which kind of tools. We know that we have the necessary tools – United Nations, Africa Union, European Union, and NATO -, but which approach do we need to face these crises? Earlier we talked about an holistic and global approach: security, intelligence, military, they are all important tools to address these different threats; yet, I think we are forgetting that, in order to defeat Daesh, Boko Haram and so on, we should not only fight them militarily, but also work on the mindset: we should figure out how to deconstruct the jihadist narrative – because Islam has been hijacked by a minority. Then, besides facing and deconstructing, we should work on the proposition of an alternative narrative to fight these groups.

Today we are facing a lot of crises in our region, in Africa: not only the political crises, but also climate change, migration and other issues. Do they need a political solution? Yes. A military solution? Yes. An exchange of intelligence? Yes. Nevertheless, the most urgent challenge, today, in our region, concerns how to respond to the expectations of young generations demanding jobs creation and promotion of growth; how much jobs you create in our region is what really matters: it is important to promote growth and sustainable development.

Moreover, regional integration is fundamental too. We do not have to be just stuck in these challenges: we are forced to face these challenges, and we have the instruments to do that. We have the UN, the African Union, the European Union. Sometimes, though, we, as Africans, are short sighted because of the lack of coherence in the area: who is leading? The African Union or the regional organisations – that indeed are important in managing some crises?

The Libyan case is important, we were able to build something there, but when it came to implement it, it was difficult to achieve some results. Hence, we certainly need to address these issues, to respond to these questions and we should work together to do so. I think that there are three essential elements to speak

about. Currently, we need leadership, we need commitment and we need vision: which kind of vision do we want for Africa today? Many crises are in need of a response, but should this response be collective?

For all these reasons, I think that we need not only to sit and plan together, but also to achieve a common vision by which address all these threats: no state, no matter how strong it is, can face all these challenges alone. We have the example – it was mentioned earlier – of the Sahel. Today, because of the indivisibility of security, we could not divide or tackle issues differently: the Sahel is linked to Maghreb, the Maghreb is linked to Sahel, and Sahel is linked to the Middle East. Therefore, when we talk about the challenges, about how to fight terror, we should also have this in mind.



YOUSSEF CHERIF

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CAN AFRICA SOLVE ITS CONFLICTS BY ITSELF?

The African Union (AU) is largely modelled on the United Nations (UN). It has its own Security Council – the Peace and Security Council – and its security tool – the African Standby Force (ASF). ASF works on conflict prevention and peace keeping in Africa, somewhat like the UN’s Blue Helmets. The AU, moreover, cooperates with the UN to solve crises in Africa and the world. In fact, as of 2017, six African countries were in the top 10 UN military contributors: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Egypt, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Ghana (around 26.000 total, between troops, police, military experts and staff)¹.

And although they are still struggling to work in full capacity, AU forces joined or led a number of major missions in Africa, often with UN support and backing: Central African Republic (MISCA), Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS), Comoros (AMISEC), Somalia (AMISOM), etc. The latter is the most enduring example, as AU forces have occasioned more than a 1.000 casualties since they entered Somalia in 2007.

In September 2017, the UN Security Council discussed a deepening security partnership with the AU². Moreover, there is a tendency in the West to encourage local forces in conflict zones to be in charge of their own problems. The role of Western armies would then be limited to training and other forms of cooperation that do not involve deployment on the ground. Crisis management in Africa is hence witnessing a transition from the international community to the AU. Such scenario is needed and possible. But it raises four major questions.

First of all, would the UN hegemons give up their zones of influence and allow African countries to replace them? If the UN mandates the AU to work in, say, a French zone of influence. Would France totally withdraw and allow the Africans to work with each other without interference? The same goes for Italy, the United

1 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2017/jun17_2.pdf.

2 <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/09/african-union-united-nations-peacekeeping/>.

Kingdom, China, the United States, etc. That is very doubtful. An example of the West's unwillingness to give up is Mali, where France overshadows AU forces. Another example is Libya, where the AU tried to mediate a way out of the 2011 crisis before finding itself eclipsed by Western capitals. Libya is the largest open conflict in Africa today, but the AU is left out.

The issue of external forces' meddling in African affairs was regularly pointed out by Libya's former dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Indeed, his bloody manners, mercurial nature and corrupt way of doing politics are what most of the world remembers today, but he was very sensitive regarding the African Union's postcolonial mission. This helps explain why he remains fondly remembered in sub-Saharan Africa.

Western nations use a patronizing tone when dealing with Africans and any consent they give to the AU would be under their control. China, India and Russia, the other meddlers in African politics, claim to be different. Yet this would be tested once their interests are threatened. They would probably not be different from the traditional powers.

The second question pending is not to be dissociated from the first. Would the UN, especially its Western hegemons, cooperate with the AU in order to protect Africa, or rather to defend their economic interests and national security?

Some would argue that both go hand in hand, minimizing the Eurocentric nature of such mandate and stressing on the benefits that it may offer to African countries. They point to the economic and technological bonanzas that a deal of this kind would provide. However, if the ultimate goal is the West's protection, this optimistic view would be contradicted. Because then a UN go-ahead to the AU would simply be another neo-colonialist project. The AU would end up serving as the West's policeman and Africa's interests would come second.

The third question is whether pure inter-African cooperation would not harm the fragile democratic institutions that are gradually taking roots all over the continent³. Many African regimes are repressive dictatorships where democracy, human rights and rule of law are mere slogans. How can they contribute in establishing peace or restoring democracy in other African states?

Due to notorious human rights abuses in some of these countries, a full mandate by the UN would mean expanding violence beyond borders. Moreover, dictatorships do not cooperate only for the sake of their country's national security. If they do, it is first of all for the survival of their regimes and clans. That is often done to the detriment of their populations' rights and their countries' national interests. Consequently, a permit-to-kill that does not take into consideration the nature of the regimes cleared would contribute in widening violence instead of decreasing it.

A fourth and last point is how much African countries are willing to cooperate. Cross border disputes and ethnic tensions are still alive. The legacy of colonialism

3 <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/08/20/the-march-of-democracy-slows>.

and the Cold War has not vanished neither. Moreover, recent years have witnessed the arrival (or return) of different international players, namely China, the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, Russia, India, Iran and Israel. They have their allies and enemies in Africa, whose alliances are delimited by these fault lines.

In North Africa for instance, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt have a common initiative on Libya. Morocco has one that does not bode well with Algeria. Algeria also conducted a separate initiative in the past, and so did Egypt. Besides, in the case of the common Cairo-Tunis-Algiers initiative, there are basic disagreements: Cairo, supported by non-North African countries (mainly Saudi Arabia and UAE) has backed a military solution in Libya. Algiers and Tunis, both wary about their borders' stability and fearing the arrival of new hegemonic forces (Egypt and the UAE) in the region, have opted for status quo and dialogue. Thus, while this trioka has had bi-annual meetings, they have different priorities and policies on the ground, where their cooperation is minimal.

Therefore, while a UN mandate to the AU is desirable, its application remains challenging, mainly because of the diverging interests of the international community. But the blame is not only on foreign actors as African countries take their share of responsibility. To move on, the African Union member states need to come together and decide of common African positions that take them away from the game of international politics. On the other hand, a mechanism to defend democracy, rule of law and human rights should be established by the AU. Once these basic steps are taken, the AU can claim to defend its space and be responsible of its own problems.



THIERRY TARDY
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NATO AND AFRICA: SIX STARTING POINTS

I have six points that I would like to very briefly look at.

Firstly, I would like to underline the fact that in 2018, non-African actors such as the United States, the European Union or NATO, have to recognise that Africans, as well as the African Union and the sub regional institutions in Africa, have achieved a lot in terms of tackling by themselves the conflicts that characterise the African continent. Let us consider the extent to which African countries contribute to the United Nations' peacekeeping operations: thirteen out of twenty top troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations are Africans – and it was a very different picture ten, or even five years ago. Then, the African Union has carried out between ten and twelve peace-support operations – the largest, most ambitious and most difficult one being in Somalia, with AMISOM, with heavy losses.

This means that the time when African problems or conflicts were handled predominantly by external actors is probably over. I am not saying that those external actors are no longer playing a role, but it is evident that the local African actors are now playing an essential role, which was not the case ten years ago. Therefore, African security governance has become an African-led activity, and this is something that the EU, NATO, and in general non-African states need to understand. This leads also to a kind of burden sharing between different actors, rather than a kind of top-down activity.

Secondly, having said that, we also need to recognise the fact that the African Union and Africa in general are still hugely dependent on others, both financially and at the operational level – the others being the EU, NATO, France, or the United States.

Financially, none of the AU-led peace-support operations have been funded by the African Union alone, and the percentage of its self-financing is usually lower than 5% of what AU-led operations cost. In this regard, we know that the EU plays an important role through the African Peace Facility, and the UN also plays

a role, through the financing of the so-called logistical package of AMISOM in Somalia. Furthermore, in the Central African Republic and in Mali, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) were involved in some of the crisis management, and yet, their assertion as central security actors was contested; that partly explained the UN take over both in Mali, in 2013, and in the Central African Republic, the year after.

That dependency can be interpreted as a plea for some cooperation with external actors, still absolutely necessary; but it also means that today, and most likely in the coming years, the relationship between the Africans and other actors is likely to remain asymmetrical. Actually, maybe one should reconsider the very idea of “partnerships”: “relationship” might be a better term to qualify an interaction that is very asymmetrical, while “partnership” insinuates that one is talking about partners that are allegedly on a par – and I am not sure that is the case.

Nonetheless, my third point is that there are indeed some relationships or partnerships that have been developed between Africans and others, in particular the United Nations and the European Union. There are many examples: I have already mentioned the financial dimension; in operational terms, the EU and the UN come in support of African-led operations; and there is the example of the only hybrid joint UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Hence, examples and models of interaction do exist.

And in that picture, I would say that NATO has remained marginal for, I think, good reasons; still, there is an existing architecture in which probably NATO is not as much associated to African security governance activity as the UN, the EU, or other European states can be.

My fourth point is that, in all fairness, from a NATO’s perspective, a partnership with the African Union might not be the most urgent priority: nowadays, there are other priorities for NATO, as a defence and security institution and they are pretty well identified: they have to do with Russia, with terrorism, and with a bunch of issues that may have a link to Africa too. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that a partnership with the African Union is a priority. In terms of partnership, for NATO, organisations such as the EU or the UN represent a more important priority than the African Union. In addition, the market is already a bit crowded in terms of institutional actors present in Africa – I have already mentioned both the UN and the EU. Therefore, for the Alliance, it is potentially difficult to get shares of a market that is already occupied by others.

My fifth point is that part of NATO’s mandate concerns projecting stability, to the South in particular: that naturally leads the Alliance to explore how to cooperate better with actors from the South – and African actors, as well as the African Union, belong to that category. For this reason, NATO is currently cooperating with the African Union at different levels: operational support to AMISOM; capacity building to the African Union and to the Headquarters in Addis Ababa

in particular; support to the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Standby Force (ASF).

Hence, there are indeed things that are being done and, beyond this, possibilities for further cooperation include maritime security, where NATO is positioning itself; information sharing and exchange on lessons learnt in the field of counter-terrorism and migration control, where the two institutions presumably have some expertise that can benefit the other; the Southern Hub, that has been recently established by NATO, could be a point of contact; and there is also a NATO delegation in Addis Ababa.

Finally, my sixth point is that, from a NATO's perspective, the mindset is actually evolving towards developing cooperation with African actors, and the African Union in particular: the basis, again, is a mutually beneficial cooperation, in full cooperation with local actors. The intention is not to impose on those actors anything that they would be reluctant to accept: local ownership is one of the key principles of NATO's vision towards the South and NATO's role when cooperating with African actors.

Session III

THE TWIN CHALLENGE OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND REGIONAL CO-OPERATIONS



The Braamfontein Railway Yards with their colorful cars under the Nelson Mandela Bridge, Johannesburg, South Africa.





MAHMOUD GEBRIL

Former Prime Minister of the State of Libya

THE CHAIR'S PERSPECTIVE

The discussion yesterday was very rich and I thought that I could start this session by injecting some few remarks into the debate. First of all, I have always thought that demography would be the name of the game for the 21st century – and the topic of demography was missing from yesterday's discussion. The world population will increase by 33% by the year 2050, which means we will have more than 2,4 billion people to be added to the world population by the year 2050; out of this number, 1,3 billion will be in Africa. According to the United Nations' statistics, no less than 359 million young Africans will be marching north, looking for jobs by the same year. Therefore, if you count just on your Coast Guard to stop this flood, you better count your bullets. Demography is to be taken into consideration within a strategic context, especially if we look at the fact that Europe, by the year 2050, will be shrinking from 740 million inhabitants to 523,7 according to sources mentioned by Newsweek: the Romanian population, for instance, will decrease from 20 million to just 14 million. These are facts: this will be the most crucial driver of history of the 21st century.

Secondly, the question of partnership should be devoid of any psychological legacy. Nowadays, Africa is not the same continent of 100 years ago: when we look at it, we find a population which is more educated, more aware of world's politics and states' affairs; a population well interlinked through the phenomenon of connectivity, which is the core of globalisation today – it is well connected to the world. They dream like the dreams of any young person from any spot in the world and they all have the same expectations. This has to be taken into consideration: today Africa is not the same Africa of a century ago; we are looking at a completely different generation.

My third remark to underline is that, if we do not look at the African-European relationship from a strategic point of view, both continents will be losing. I am not exaggerating if I say that the destiny of our civilisation, starting from 2050 until the end of the century, will rest mainly on the future of Africa: it will represent

a case of “make it or break it”. We just have to think about the fact that, by year 2050, none of the European countries, with the exception of Germany, will be among the ten biggest economies of the world; these will be completely non-European economies: among others, there will be China, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, India. All of this means that Europe should really rethink the whole paradigm of the African-European relationship; the Mediterranean will be either the sea connecting two civilisations, or it is going to be a sea dividing them, the place of “the sinking of the Titanic”. For this reason, I would like to urge our distinguished panellists and their presentations to look at the African-European context from a strategic point of view.

Finally, one last point. I would like to say to the Africans themselves that it is probably about time that we stop looking north: maybe we should look at each other. Today we have some successful stories, such as the economic growth in Ethiopia and in Rwanda: these are cases of success, especially the case of Rwanda, which came out of a civil war and, today, is one of the most promising economies in the continent. Therefore, Africans are not a liability for world’s civilisation; they have a lot to offer to today’s civilisation and, again, we should better revisit the whole paradigm of the Africa-European relationship. The issues of illegal immigration, of human trafficking, are just the symptoms of a much deeper problem into which we should really dig deeper and look.



MEHARI TADDELE MARU

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A FUTURE FOR THE AFRICAN UNION

When I read the title of this meeting, “Africa in action”, I first misread it as “Africa in transition”.

In my sincere opinion, Africa is indeed in transition, facing a dichotomy of despair and hope, between African pessimism and African optimism. Transitions are often characterised by unpredictability and volatility: the intervention from both from within and from outside Africa will determine the course of this transition.

Let me limit myself to three major current transitional issues, as to why I think Africa is importantly and determinately in transition. The three major transitional trends are: the recent changes in the African developmental governance; the African Union’s reforms and its promises; and the emerging and new strategic competition in the continent between global and regional powers.

Let me start with the third major issue. The global and regional powers are now back into the global strategy competition occurring in Africa: China has spread its tentacles all over the continent, including the African Union and the regional economic communities; the European Union is struggling on how to sort out its partnerships with Africa to catch up with other competitors mainly China; the USA just woke up, attempting to unseat and deter China’s expansion in the continent; NATO aims to mend relations with the AU after the political differences experienced during its military intervention in Libya. Significant others powers, such as Russia, Japan, India, Iran, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, are trying as well to establish political and economic alliances within Africa, some have already making use of their military and financial capabilities at their disposal.

For example, maritime domains such as the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea Strait, including Yemen, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, are becoming the battleground of this strategic global competition among high powers and significant others. Military camps are being established in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and

the Western African countries: they are so many that Djibouti, for instance, is now considered the military “real estate” of big and small competing powers purchasing lands adjacent to each other.

This looks similar to the strategic interventions of global forces in Africa during the Cold War; the difference, though, is rather clear: nowadays, there are many “networks” of global actors, not only the two Western and Eastern blocks fighting each other. Moreover, the two most significant ones are not fighting solely for ideological dominance; it is rather the struggle for the economic dominance, potentially with diplomatic and military implications, that could affect the global order. Most importantly, unlike Russia, China is not attempting to remove the ladder that the Second World War has established: it wants to be at top of that same ladder.

Needless to say, the threats to peace and security in Africa have local manifestations as well as global implications, and megatrends. Trade investments show that Africa has become increasingly attractive, with expanding opportunities for foreign actors: the existing and future changes in the structure of global power is already bringing, and will increasingly bring, Africa’s economic and political governance to the forefront. Another example is, again, the rise of China with its economic and diplomatic influence: the attack of liberal democracies in Western African countries has brought in the political and economic dominance of some powers in Africa. Structural changes are expected to bring significant changes in Africa, particularly through the availability of affordable African labour and market. It is clear that the global change will play an equal, if not a bigger, role in the continent’s transformation.

This takes me to the second point, regarding the ongoing continental reforms of the African Union. Africa has had several opportune times for reform: with the end of the Cold war, the antagonistic global and strategic interests of world’s powers were withdrawn from Africa for a while. Even if short-lived, the withdrawal offered to the African leaders an opportunity to seek and to institutionalise some African solutions to the variety of African problems. In this regard, the Constitutive Act of the African Union¹ shifted the mission and the vision of the AU, mainly from the organisation of anticolonial and antiapartheid solidarity to a more interventionist and integrationist approach.

Speaking about reforms, the President Paul Kagame, during his acceptance speech as the elected chairperson of the African Union in January 2018, said: “we are running out of time, we must act now to save Africa from permanent deprivation. Scale is essential: we must create a single continental market, integrate our infrastructure and infuse economies with technology. We have to be functional, we have to stay together”. This quote encapsulates the need for focus and the need

¹ The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted in 2000 at the Lomé Summit, in Togo, and entered into force in 2001.

for reforms concerning the African Union; it also has three key messages, which should be the core of the reforms.

First, the urgency to save Africa from permanent deprivation; second, the relevance and the functionality of the African Union, as well as its need for organisational reforms, particularly when it comes to the AU Commission; third, the necessity of a pan-African scale of economic integration and of continental attractiveness for external markets. For the AU reforms to set the continent out of deprivation, these are indeed fundamental improvements to be put in place; in order to fulfil them, though, the African states must be at the centre of the reformation process, with the aim of assuring delivery, inclusivity, legitimacy, security and resource mobilisation – which are critical.

In this regard, the African Union has initiated a self-financing process, which is crucial for the reform to succeed: currently 23 members states have already started contributing to the AU budget and the self-financing is hoped to change the partnerships and the dynamics that exist between the European Union, the African Union, the United Nations, NATO and the other partners that will come to the continent. Consequently, the AU reforms' agenda should transform these partnerships: recognising the increase of partnering in the region, the African Union has indeed developed a particular formula, which differentiates and aims to guide all partnerships in Africa. Moreover, the AU Commission has established the Partnership Management and Coordination Division (PMCD), under the Bureau of the Chairperson. In the eyes of the AU, the ultimate aim of such partnerships is self-reliance, to be achieved by building capability for Africa to provide peace and development for and by itself; for the same reason, these partnerships need to avoid the capacity substitution which exists now, and to provide aid following the principle of mandates' mutual respect.

This leads me to talk about the third change that Africa is facing nowadays. At the national level, it has been facing significant political and economic changes in the past few years, and most of them are still happening within the framework of what we call "dominant developmental parties": we saw changes of leadership within the ruling parties of the African National Congress (ANC), of South Africa, of Zimbabwe and of Ethiopia, and they all happened without any legal problems or illicit processes; they are rather outcomes of intra-parties struggles, influences' shifts and, in some cases, they were demanded by popular and populist movements.

Changes have happened also in Angola, even through elections. Similar demands for change may occur in other countries such as Nigeria, Algeria, South Sudan and Sudan, and yet, while these changes are received euphorically by many, it is far from clear if they will last long and bring significant departure from the past. Fast changes of cabinets have forced some of us to consider if the Italian type of unpredictable coalitions' politics is setting in Africa: the challenge of such government volatility is happening without the required strong democratic institu-

tions and culture of coalition politics, risking state's instability. Such long drawn-out internal struggle between governments and political parties, in the end, may undermine the single-minded focus that governments require in order to achieve the fast-paced delivery that is necessary to maintain velocity and to escape permanent poverty.

To make the continent more stable, African transformations need to outpace crisis, but, in the meantime, the states' capabilities required to prevent, respond and adapt to transformational challenges are yet to be fully developed; in addition, countries obviously require effective and stable governments.

Even though the presence of more than 110.000 UN and AU peacekeeping troops in Africa, as well as the thousands of military forces dispatched in different parts of the continent, well illustrate the peace and security challenges that are currently being faced in Africa, all the problems, in the end, are fundamentally linked to two main factors: poverty and bad governance. Some crises could always require rapid military intervention, but there is no crisis in the region, which would be permanently resolved through intervention or peacekeeping: ultimately, socio-economic development and good governance constitute the most human and the most effective tools to prevent conflicts.

Finally, reforms of the African Union, changes at the national level and international partnerships cannot succeed without capable African states in the continent – such a scenario being fully dependent on other factors, including national political mobilisation, economic forces and international partners. Hence, the focus should be both at national politics, developmental economics and global partnerships: the AU reforms' agenda, hopefully, will deliver all those, but only with the help of partners like NATO, EU and Italy.



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MAJOR CHANGES IN AFRICAN GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMY

I must say that when I have received the invitation I was a little bit trepidatious because I am actually an economist and I am addressing a forum that is dominated by security specialists: I thought for a moment if this was the right place to be; then, of course, I looked at the topic and it really talks about what is relevant and important today in the African context.

I work for the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), an independent foreign policy think-tank based at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, which operates towards the common and, I think, aspirational goal of a well governed, peaceful, economically sustainable and globally engaged Africa. We have four key research areas: mainly, Africa's foreign policy, its economic diplomacy, governance and sustainable development.


When we look at the intersection between economic development, progress and governance in Africa, I think we are well beyond the framing of a human security approach. In fact, I think it is important to adopt a normative framing that goes beyond the idea of freedom from want and freedom from fear, to one of a broader inspiration of sustainable economic prosperity in Africa. That has been indeed one of the key tenants of the South African government's approach to its engagement in the region, through the prism of its African agenda; it is also very well captured in the context of former President Nelson Mandela's words: «South Africa cannot prosper in a sea of poverty» (1997), as well as broadly encapsulated in the UN approach by which «there can be no peace without development, no development without peace» (2015).

Let's look at what was our starting point, Africa's past, through a graphic that shows, literally in one snapshot, what some of the key problems and challenges have been in Africa.

If you look at the top line, it shows the production of oil and its very rapid increase in Angola over the period 1991-1999. At the same time, the lower line is an indication of the Human Development Index (HDI) in Angola, which tells us a

very important story: in that period, life expectancy at birth was 42 years old and, if I look at the room that we have here today, it would mean that literally two-thirds of the people would not be here – this was the situation in Angola.

Angola: Intersect between Oil Income and Human Development



Source: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2001

Since the country achieved the independence in 1975, we have had civil war, a temporary ceasefire in 1991, war resumed in 1992 and, only in 2002, after the death of Jonas Savimbi¹, a peace agreement was signed. And today, where is Angola? It is Africa's third largest economy and it is very interesting to look at what happened with the human development indicators.

Firstly, concerning the life expectancy at birth, one would expect that it would have increased very significantly, but in fact life expectancy at birth in Angola today is 42.7 years; therefore, over the last eighteen years or less, this is the improvement that we have seen in the human development indicator. Differently, adult literacy has increased substantially, from 42,1% to 71,1%, and per capita income did the same, being today \$6.900 per year – even though massive inequality still remains in the country.

So, how did the picture change in Africa? At the end of the Cold War, and this is really coming to the governance context, only three out of the fifty-three African countries were democracies; by 2013, only four did not have multi-party constitutions, and they were Swaziland, Libya, Eritrea and Somalia; by 2018, there is a very tentative hope that we will move to multi-party elections in Libya in 2019, but there is also concern about what that will mean. In fact, we understand

¹ Jonas Malheiro Savimbi was an Angolan political and military leader who founded and led the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

that today, in Africa, elections do not necessarily solve governments' problems; elections can actually cause greater instability in many African countries. For what concerns Somalia, at the end of last year, they started the process of beginning to register political parties with the view to hold elections in 2020. Consequently, today in Africa there are only two countries that are one-party systems: Swaziland and Eritrea.

But what happened in the governance landscape? At the end of the Cold War, we had the introduction of multi-parties democracy in Africa and literally a wave of change swept through the continent. In 1994, for instance, we had the transition to full democracy in South Africa, but it was also a period where there was an enormous instability in Africa. In 1994, the Rwandan genocide occurred, just as the very violent breakup in Yugoslavia happened, and that led to two things in the global normative framework around governance. First of all, the introduction of the principle concerning the responsibility to protect, and then the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC); the latter in particular was very important because, for the first time, that court directly addressed impunity and unacceptable behaviour of heads of state. In the same period, we also saw the Organization for African Unity reformed into the African Union, and the outright rejection of violent change of government or coups: that was a very fundamental shift in the African context.

Around the millennium, we then witnessed one of the best examples of inter-regional cooperation in the continent with the formulation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), a process that was led by Thabo Mbeki, Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Olusegun Obasanjo², and that basically tried to completely redefine how Africa engages with itself and with the rest of the world.

During the same years, we saw as well the very important introduction of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a self-monitoring process developed by African governments: it is a voluntary process which assesses governance in Africa and taking a very broad perspective that goes from political and corporate governance to socio-economic governance – in many respects actually a precursor of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

So, does this really mean a great and wonderful picture in Africa? In effect, it does not. As I mentioned earlier, the consolidation of democracy in the continent is very difficult to achieve, and if you look for example at Freedom House's assessment, we still have major challenges in the region: governance in Africa is a meandering road now rather than a rocket that has taken off. In particular, looking at the Mo Ibrahim's Index of Governance, one of the big concerns is that, in the timeframe spanning from 2007 to 2016, we have seen improvements in sustainable economic opportunities, in participation, in human rights and in

2 At that time, they were, respectively, the President of South Africa, the President of Algeria and the President of Nigeria.

human development, but the one single trend line that has gone down is the one concerning safety and the rule of law. Well, if we just think about what was happening at that time in the Central African Republic, in Burundi, in Libya or in the Democratic Republic of Congo, they might serve a very sound reason for why that was the case.

Let's look very briefly at the economic outlook: two things really converged in changing fundamentally the way by which the economy has grown in Africa.

First of all, with the political changes that swept through the continent, we also had the introduction of many more economically minded leaders; we saw the liberalization of the economy as well the crowding of investments throughout and into the region – and all of this represented a very positive story. Traditional Western investors started moving into the continent, but I think that the big single issue that fundamentally changed the way by which Africa positioned itself in the global economy was the Chinese demand for commodities and that has really spurred enormous growth in the region. Furthermore, over the last twenty years, the Sub-Saharan Africa's economy quintupled, from \$300 billion to \$1,6 trillion, and it is expected to increase to \$2 trillion over the next two years. But, what is wrong with this picture? Even though we have seen an enormous economic growth in the region, we have also seen rising inequality and poverty, as well as the phenomenon of “jobless growth”, which means that we are not producing enough jobs to absorb especially young people joining the employment ranks.

Having said that, I would like to conclude referring to two main issues: what are the most important concerns for Europe? And what can be done to address them?

The rankings show that the main concerns respectively are immigration, terrorism, the economic situation, the state of public memories finances and unemployment. Consequently, my sense is that there are three standout recommendations that I would propose to strengthen European Union-NATO-Africa cooperation:

- 1) Confidence-building measures and trust-building efforts: there is no doubt in my mind that there is a significant trust deficit (which I would argue is not solely restricted to engagement with the former AUC Chair, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma following the NATO-led Libya intervention). The ramifications of this have been huge – not only for how NATO is viewed in Africa, but I would argue the entire value foundation or proposition for NATO-EU-Africa peace and security cooperation. In the African context we have seen a call for a mass retreat from the International Criminal Court as a direct result of it, as well as a deep questioning of the responsibility to protect principle and, in addition, materially shaking confidence in the principles underpinning the work of the UN Security Council and the entire peace and security agenda of the UN. One could argue that confidence and trust are built through a shared understanding of principles and values and then action that backs those principles and values – or externalises them. I do not think there are quick fixes

here, rather there is a need for a laborious and painstaking rebuilding of trust and this should begin with a broad-based discussion that tries to find common ground amongst government, civil society, defence and private sector actors across Africa, Europe and further afield.

- 2) This relates to the second point which is to work with and to support African peace-building and peacekeeping efforts: Africa has an enormously ambitious peace-building agenda as it is encapsulated in Agenda 2063 (which includes the aim to silence all guns on the continent by 2020). South Africa's efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo are a testament of both the cost of peace-building efforts in the region and the nature of it: it does not stop when the guns stop; rather, peace-building entails on-going state-building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts that stretch well beyond military operations or the means of a single actor. Reversals in peace should also be expected, hence it requires concerted action over years, often decades (as we have seen in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere) to stabilise and build peace and society. This means that peace-building efforts also cannot be devoid of economic consolidation, growth and opportunity. To stabilise and grow African societies and states means that there is a need for real economic trade-offs, such as significant EU-Africa economic integration underpinned by EU market access and investment.
- 3) This brings me to the third point. I find it deeply ironic that the entire AU project is built on the EU model and has been infused by the values and the principles that underpin the EU integration model. However, now, at a point where economic growth can take off in Africa or it can spiral into an abyss of poverty and violence fuelled by its projected unprecedented youth demographic combined with a lack of economic opportunity and unemployment, the approach to Africa is one of containment through a narrow migration lens. It is also the time that another actor, China, is deeply active in Africa and on the whole it is seeking to align its engagement with the continent i.e. with African concerns, needs and aspirations. Of course, this relationship is not uncontroversial or problem free, but I believe it highlights two important signals for NATO and broader EU cooperation with Africa: first, other actors will step in if there is a vacuum, and second, this also creates an opportunity for concerted cooperation with China in support of African objectives and aspirations. This was touched on very briefly at the conference. While a Compact for Africa is being discussed at the G20 level, my sense is that what Africa wants and needs are responsible long-term partners that recognise that a shared future is possible only if it is built on true partnership. The definition of partnership needs to be unpacked very carefully. Yes, because on the one hand we are talking about unequal partners, but on the other hand, it is possible to transcend this

inequality if there is a sense of a shared vision and concerted effort to work towards a mutually beneficial relationship.

Finally, there is much that can be done in the immediate short-term, such as assisting Africa with disaster management efforts related to climate change, managing the scourge of illicit trafficking, poaching and illegal fishing, responsibly cooperating on combatting terrorism and radicalisation through joint intelligence sharing, providing training and conducting joint military exercises. But if this is where the major effort is focused, without an overarching vision of the type of Africa that the world needs in the future, there is no prospect of building a stable and prosperous neighbour. It means that Europe will find itself constantly on the defence and the prospects of partnership based on shared values remote, as well as the very clear possibility that Africa will be pivoting East and would direct its key foreign policy and economic engagement efforts there. That might not be such a bad thing for Africa, but the question is whether it would also be good for Europe.



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NATO-AU CO-OPERATION: A SOLID WORK IN PROGRESS

This is a very timely conference, not only because Africa is now on top of the international community's agenda, but also in the NATO context, as the organization has woken up to the complex and often transnational challenges presented in our southern neighbourhood. This conference will hopefully serve as a catalyst for further discussion and action.

Through the endorsement of its Framework for the South at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO is working on integrating and streamlining its approach to better tackle challenges from its southern neighbourhood. Likewise, this framework focuses on improved capabilities for the Alliance, enhancing anticipation and response as well as enhancement of NATO's regional partnership and capacity building efforts. Understanding that when NATO neighbours are more stable, NATO is more secure, Allies launched Projecting Stability, a new vision to cooperate with countries beyond NATO territory. This vision placed a particular focus on enhancing regional understanding and situational awareness, and developing a more strategic, more coherent and more effective approach to partnerships. At the Warsaw Summit, Heads of State and Government of NATO nations also made a commitment to "strengthen and enhance our political and practical partnership with the African Union, which allows the organisations to be better able to respond to common threats and challenges".

As to common threats, while waves of uncontrolled migration have placed institutions, governments, and societies under tremendous strain in Europe, this too has been the case across Africa. Likewise, the transnational threat of terrorism, and the presence of violent extremist groups persists as deadly attacks impact societies in Member States of both NATO and the African Union. As NATO has signalled a new strategy to engage outside of its territory through projecting stability, developed a framework for tackling these challenges, and has also noted the importance of cooperation with the African Union, we now need to connect the dots between these lines of effort. Now is the time to see where synergies

can be found between NATO and the African Union. In doing so, we need to take account of NATO-African Union cooperation to date. At present NATO's relationship with the African Union is 13 years old and began under the African Union's initial request for assistance by NATO during the Darfur crisis. Since then, NATO, at African Union request, has provided strategic air and maritime lift, operational and capacity building support, and tailored assistance in the context of the African Union Mission in Somalia. This is a relationship which has gradually grown over the years.

A milestone in our relationship was the signing of the technical agreement in 2014, which has since served as the formal basis for our cooperation. This agreement has been instrumental in facilitating a modest NATO presence in Addis Ababa through the Office of our Senior Military Liaison Officer. Likewise, this has allowed the staff of the Senior Military Liaison Officer to include Subject Matter Experts who work as embedded personnel in the African Union's Peace and Security Department. In addition, military to military staff talks have taken place on a regular basis.

Our demand-driven cooperation with the African Union can be divided into three main categories:

- Firstly, it includes strategic air and sealift and planning support. Similarly, it outlines the provision of these Subject Matter Experts in various fields, including for the planning staff within the African Union's Peace and Security Department concerned with the African Union Mission in Somalia.
- Secondly, our cooperation encompasses capacity building support. Examples of this include personnel of the African Union attending courses at NATO Training and Education Facilities. NATO Mobile Training Teams have also been dispatched to Addis Ababa to deliver courses, focusing primarily on operational exercises, planning and logistics.
- Thirdly, cooperation is also built on the support for the operationalization of the African Standby Force. In this regard, NATO is specifically engaged on the provision of support to bring the Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, to full operational capacity. Also, NATO has lent its planning expertise to African Union-led workshops designed to develop ASF concepts.

Each of these work strands have demonstrated what NATO and the African Union can accomplish together. Against this backdrop the Alliance wants to strengthen and enhance our interaction at the practical and political level as agreed by NATO Heads of State and Government at the Warsaw Summit. Unfortunately, in past years further progress at the political level was stalled due to the previous African Union Chairperson's reluctance to engage with NATO. However, the new Chairperson of the African Union, Mr. Faki, with a strong background in peacekeeping, has placed peace and security at the forefront of the African Union's agenda.

The convergence of these two factors; political impetus from the Warsaw Summit, and new leadership of the African Union, can provide a new window of opportunity to reinvigorate our relationship in the spirit of a pragmatic and demand-driven cooperation. Already, a new momentum is visible between our organisations, which, is particularly evident in the exchanges of high-level representatives over the past couple of months.

In February, NATO paid a high-level visit the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, the first visit of its kind since 2010. During this visit, the NATO delegation met with African Union Deputy Chairperson Quartey and other high-level African Union officials from various African Union departments who all reconfirmed their willingness to re-engage with NATO. As a follow-up in April 2018, the NATO Defence College hosted a seminar here in Rome which convened officials from both NATO and the African Union. The African Union delegation was led by the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, Ms. Bineta Diop, also representing the Chairperson and the African Union Peace and Security Council. Such high-level representation was another evidence of the African Union's renewed commitment to work with NATO.

The objective of the seminar was to develop a series of pragmatic proposals to further cooperation such as:

- Support to African Union Peace Support Operation;
- Proposals for enhanced support for the operationalization and sustaining readiness of the African Standby Force;
- Enhanced support in Counter Terrorism;
- Enhanced support for countering improvised explosive devices;
- Collaboration on Building Integrity and Women Peace and Security.

These proposals should form a solid basis to further enhance NATO-African Union cooperation in the coming months.

On the political side, NATO has invited African Union Peace and Security Commissioner Chergui to address the North Atlantic Council later this year. This continues the trend of high-level exchanges that will be key to advancing our relationship.

Thus far we have achieved many milestones that show the NATO-African Union relationship works and can develop win-win solutions for both organisations. Today, it is important to seize the window of opportunity and capitalize on newfound momentum. However, we also need to look towards tomorrow, and the next steps for NATO-African Union cooperation. For instance, as we reflect on the recent experience of tackling challenges such as terrorism and uncontrolled migration, it has become evident that no single state, or single multilateral organization is able to address the transnational challenges we face in today's world. Cooperation, and a mutually beneficial approach will be vital to not only manage crises, but achieve our common goal of peace and security.

Our organisations are unique, but the challenges we have faced share many similar characteristics. In the context of security operations, each of our largest missions, the International Security Assistance Force and subsequently the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan for NATO, and the Support Mission to Somalia for the African Union, are both confronted daily with asymmetric warfare techniques and violent extremist groups. Likewise, these operations highlight challenges of supporting a central government, and delivering capacity building and training programs to build a nation's armed forces and resilient institutions. Sharing these lessons, experiences and best practices can enrich each of our organisations and enhance our respective abilities to respond to upcoming security challenges both in field operations and at the level of headquarters. At present, this invaluable knowledge is untapped potential that could bring our engagement to the next level.

This particular example highlights just one of many untapped elements we can use to bring out the best in each other's organisations. Increasing the engagement of our representatives, and making concrete progress such as the joint-list of proposals to enhance NATO-African Union cooperation identified at the April Rome seminar, will be important to identifying and exploring further areas for cooperation. Though cooperation and support will remain pragmatic and demand-driven, the premise for future engagement should be a two-way street cooperation where we promote and exchange of information, best practices, and value-added to our respective programs of work. This kind of relationship, built on opportunities to learn from each other will be important to fostering better political-level cooperation.

Already, NATO and the African Union have built a strong relationship over the past years, but today, this already strong foundation has the opportunity to become broader, deeper, and develop even more win-win deliverables. The past months in particular have been especially productive and optimistic in this new chapter of cooperative security. Of course, NATO is not the key international actor vis-à-vis Africa but it can bring added value in its niches of excellence. The point is not to duplicate other efforts but to bring NATO's experience to the table. Through continued engagement, and exploring of how we can complement each other's work, we can take the next steps in the NATO-African Union's relationship.

On this note I will conclude. Thank you for your time and attention.



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HORN OF AFRICA: STATE AND SOCIETAL SECURITY

The topic that was given to me is about security and safe state in the Horn of Africa, but I am not going to discuss these issues conceptually, asking for example: what is security? Definitely, when I say security, I am talking about the state's security and the societal security: most of the conflicts that we are witnessing in the Horn of Africa are not coming from outside; they are mostly internal and, therefore, it is good to include the internal issues, such as the political and economic ones or others, within the security issues' category.

I will be focusing on the challenges that are being faced in the Horn of Africa in terms of the need of ensuring security and having a safe state in that particular regional; then I will be looking at the Horn's strategic importance – to Europe, to the Gulf and, of course, beyond; finally, I am going to discuss about what can be done to, at least, rectify some of the security challenges faced in ensuring safe state in the Horn of Africa.

Some people used to call the region we are talking about “the greater Horn of Africa”, in order to include some countries: if traditionally it only comprises Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, the “greater Horn” would also include Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda; when I will speak about this region, I will be referring to the eight countries.

For the sake of time, I will not go into details or into the history of the Horn; instead, I will directly address the security challenges in the region. If you look at the Horn of Africa, it is full of diversity in terms of its geography, cultures, population, history and politics. This regional diversified characteristic feature is considered as one of the major factors because of which this particular region is a hotbed for conflicts; moreover, due to that same diversity, it also opens up a room for other external actors to play around or to practice proxy politics.

If you look at the nature of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, especially within that scope that I defined, there are three main types of conflicts. The first one is intrastate conflict, within society, within one state; the second phase is interstate,

between one country and another one or more; then, there is also the international external intervention – and, as a result of that external intervention, beyond the Horn of Africa, there is another level of conflict.

I will not be dealing with the details of intrastate, interstate or externally affected conflicts, but I will be going straight to explain what are the problems of intra-state or interstate conflicts. One is poor governance: if you have a poorly governed country, it means that there is no room for a participatory democracy or a participatory government and, therefore, most of the times, the options are coercion, the use of force, marginalisation of some communities and consequent discontent, as opposed to persuasion and deliberation towards democracy. In the end, as a result, there will be the growth and expansion of armed insurgent groups challenging the central government's authority: that is in fact one very characteristic feature of the Horn of Africa's countries.

This leads to another problem, mutual destabilisation. If you look at the Horn of Africa focussing, for instance, on the centre of the region, and if you look then to the whole 360-degree border area, you will find that on the other side of the centre's perimeter there are similar communities who speak the same language and have a similar face, as well as frontiers that are not controlled by central governments: marginalised communities straddle boundaries without any limits, leading to a situation in which, if there is a problem in Ethiopia, then it will represent, due to loose integration, an opportunity for the neighbouring countries to take advantage.

This, for its part, opens up a further room, where the external forces can implement what I have called "proxy politics", fulfilling their interests.

Let us think about what is happening now in the Horn of Africa: we have about seven countries that are building, or already have, ports, ports' projects and military bases; this is very important when it comes to the issues of this particular region. What are these challenges? One concerns the creation of a sense of national identity: if one does not complete the nation-building process, it will be very difficult to bring about a safe state whereby there are regional integration and regional market integration in particular. To complete this unfinished job is indeed a great challenge that has been faced largely in the Horn of Africa. Establishing regional integration and regional market integration itself is another challenge, followed by the importance of ensuring regional interests through developing the negotiation and persuasion power of that particular area.

Having said that, let us talk about the Horn's strategic importance especially to Europe, the Gulf and beyond – by the way, the Horn of Africa is located south of the fractured neighbourhood of Europe and that also tells us something. Despite the weak standing of the countries in the region, their location controls the passage from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean: the political control of these countries exercised by other external countries or actors permits logistical access to other countries in both North and

Central Africa, as well as to the Arabian peninsula and the Middle East. One of the major sea-lanes of communication and choke points in the world is also located in the area: 20% of the world's trade routes happens through the Horn of Africa, because of its strategic location (Bab el-Mandeb strait). As Europeans, for instance, going via Cape Town it would add 74% more distance and, in terms of cost, millions more.

Finally, how do you cope with these challenges? I may have a little different suggestion about that. If you look at the Horn of Africa, the main actors in terms of conflicts are both Ethiopia and Eritrea: in my opinion, we have to start from the regional sublevel to bring about cessation of hostilities and then, only after, the required security cooperation and market integration. The first step should be avoiding hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, even if it is very difficult to discuss how and when it should be done [note of the Editor, the 10th of July Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed on a joint declaration of peace and friendship]; this is a priority for both Ethiopians and Eritreans, as well as for the region as a whole, whether it is tackled by regional cooperation or international cooperation with the EU, NATO, the AU. In addition, there is also an extension to that: the Nile issue. That should be also solved, because disputes, proxies, both internal or cross border conflicts are evolving around this issues; even the power alliances of the Gulf states and beyond are doing the same.

Session

CONCLUDING REMARKS



Local Red Sea style architecture street in central Massawa, Eritrea.





MAMADOU DIALLO BATHIA
*Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic
of Mauritania*

CONCLUDING REMARKS

C'est toujours avec plaisir que nous venons ici pour discuter avec vous des questions très importantes qui interpellent tous ces qui aiment l'Afrique et les relations entre l'Afrique et l'Europe de façon particulière. Je pense que les différentes interventions que nous avons écouté ce matin et hier veulent poser très clairement la problématique de la démographie et les enjeux par rapport à la nécessité de repenser, de façon pragmatique et intelligent, la coopération entre les pays européens et les pays africains. Tout ça en vue d'une meilleure intégration et, naturellement, d'une grande mobilisation face aux problèmes communs aujourd'hui – concernant l'immigration et la sécurité de façon générale.

Je pense aussi que vous comprendriez bien que, en tant que Ministre de la Défense, je sois préoccupé au quotidien par les problèmes de sécurité et de défense et que, naturellement, la meilleure contribution que je peux modestement faire c'est de vous parler un peu de la région de laquelle je viens, de ce que nous sommes en train de faire : cela pourra enrichir tout ce que vous avez dit par rapport à comment améliorer l'intégration et la coopération entre différents pays.

Moi, je viens de la Mauritanie, un pays qui se situe dans la bande du Sahel et qui, pendant les années 2002-2009, a connu une situation sécuritaire extrêmement difficile. Je pense que les forces terroristes, dans leur planifications, ont décidé que le Sahel va être non seulement une zone dans la quelle ils vont opérer, mais même que cela devra être un refuge pour eux : à chaque fois qu'ils ont été sévèrement attaqués, par ailleurs, c'est là où ils essayent de retrouver leur forces – ce qui fait que s'ils ne sont pas combattus que à ce niveau, on va jamais régler définitivement ces problèmes de sécurité.

En 2009, ils ont attaqué très fortement notre pays et nous avons connu beaucoup de situations difficiles, on a perdu des militaires, il y avait des terroristes dans les différentes zones du pays et même dans les zones urbaines : tout ça a amené la Mauritanie à réagir de façon évidente, parce que tout simplement il y en allait de la disparition du pays et de l'installation de forces terroristes à son niveau. Par

conséquence, depuis 2009, nous avons procédé par une démarche très simple et qui aujourd'hui a donné des résultats dont nous sommes absolument fiers.

Cette démarche a reposé essentiellement sur trois points, et je pense que cela peut servir aussi pour les autres. Le premier de ces points c'est de compter sur nous mêmes : il est clair qu'on ne peut pas défendre un pays ou lui assurer la sécurité sans compter sur notre propre force ; il n'y a aucune force étrangère qui, malgré toute sa bonne volonté, ne peut venir à bout d'une situation sécuritaire dans un pays, si les enfants et le peuple de ce pays ne prennent pas en charge sa destinée. Naturellement, compter sur soi-même ne veut pas dire qu'on a pas besoin de coopération : on coopère avec tous les pays amis qui nous aident dans ce cadre, et nous avons une coopération aussi bien bilatérale que multilatérale avec tous les pays voisins – d'abord les pays européens, les différentes organisations internationales, l'Union Africaine, l'OTAN. Mais en tout cas la philosophie de notre démarche a été de compter sur nous mêmes et cela nous a demandé un grand effort, aussi bien sur le plan militaire que sur le plan humain. Aujourd'hui, toutefois, nous défendons nos frontières et assurons la sécurité de notre pays sans aucune troupe étrangère, et ça c'est quelque chose qui nous a beaucoup aidé dans la mise en œuvre de notre politique sécuritaire.

En plus de compter sur soi-même, nous avons aussi investi beaucoup dans le contrôle et l'observation de notre territoire : nous avons un territoire de plus d'un million de kilomètres carrés, qui était un lieu où les bandes de trafiquants de drogues et de tous genres passaient et qui aujourd'hui, avec l'investissement qui nous avons fait sur le plan de l'observation, est devenu un site à propos duquel nous sommes capable de savoir, en temps réel, ce qui se passe sur chaque mètre carré. Ceci explique, aujourd'hui, comment on a pu dérouter régulièrement les bandes de trafiquants et comment on a pu intervenir à chaque fois qu'il y avait une menace : un élément très important dans la stratégie sécuritaire que nous avons mis en place.

Le troisième élément de notre stratégie, c'était la réorganisation de notre armée pour pouvoir s'adapter à la nouvelle situation et aux nouvelles menaces : ce qui explique que nous avons beaucoup investi dans sa mobilité et sa disposition dans les différents points de passage – un progrès très important.

Aujourd'hui, notre pays est donc en sécurité et cela fait sept ans que nous n'avons pas une seule attaque terroriste en Mauritanie, et qu'il n'y a pas eu une seule attaque terroriste qui est partie de Mauritanie pour attaquer un autre pays. Naturellement, c'est une situation fragile qui demande que nous nous souvenons que nous ne sommes jamais à l'abri, mais en tout cas c'est une chose dont nous sommes satisfaits et qui a été l'objet de la politique qui a été mise en place dans notre pays ces dix dernières années.

Toutefois, malgré tout, nous restons dans une région extrêmement fragile, où il y a des énormes menaces : la situation en Libye est de grande préoccupation, en tant qu'elle n'est pas réglée, et elle influe sur la situation dans le Sahel, en Europe

et en Méditerranée ; la situation au Mali reste aussi très préoccupante, car après plusieurs années d'effort, il n'y a pas encore une issue au terrorisme, une issue pour le retour à une situation normale – et vous savez tous que chaque jour on continue malheureusement d'enregistrer des attaques aussi bien au nord du Mali qu'au centre de Mali, et cela ne touche plus seulement les forces maliennes, mais aussi les forces des Nations Unies qui sont stationnées au Mali.

Cette situation se développe aussi au sud, à tel point qu'elle impacte le Niger, le Burkina Faso et le Tchad – l'adjonction se faisant, certes, au niveau du Tchad, avec les terroristes du Boko Haram. Ça fait que c'est une situation régionale, dans le Sahel, très préoccupante et qui, si elle n'est pas prise en charge et réglée le plus rapidement possible, va continuer également d'influencer aussi bien la Mauritanie, que le Maghreb et la Méditerranée : ce qui fait que beaucoup d'efforts doivent être versés à ce niveau.

C'est justement pour répondre à cette situation que, au niveau de la Mauritanie, nous avons développé une très grande coopération avec les pays voisins : d'abord une coopération bilatérale qui est extrêmement poussée avec le Sénégal ou le Mali – pays avec lesquels nous avons des manœuvres communes, des projets communes ; mais aussi une coopération multilatérale, dans la mesure où il faut intervenir au niveau de l'ensemble des pays de la zone.

C'est cela qui nous amène au dernier point dont je veux vous parler : la création du G5 Sahel. Le G5 Sahel est une création pragmatique des États du Sahel ; l'idée bien sûr est née en Mauritanie il y a quelques années et nous avons donc pu convaincre nos amis du Mali, du Burkina Faso, du Niger et du Tchad de contribuer à mutualiser les efforts pour pouvoir, de façon durable, combattre le terrorisme au niveau de toute la zone et chercher à l'éradiquer définitivement au niveau du nord Mali. C'est une jeune organisation qui a eu un développement remarquable et, si vous suivez l'actualité, vous savez que c'est l'une des rares organisations qui a engagé les Nations Unies et l'Union Européenne ; il y a déjà eu plusieurs réunions à niveau de New York et de Bruxelles pour l'appuyer et la France aussi joue un rôle important dans le soutien à cette organisation.

Elle est en train de s'implanter, de monter en puissance, et aujourd'hui les différents bataillons qui la composent dans les différents pays sont constitués et sont pratiquement opérationnels. Naturellement cela demande beaucoup d'aide et d'équipement qui sont en train d'être mobilisés : vous savez que les promesses ne sont pas aussi rapides entre la parole et la réalisation, ce qui fait qu'il y a eu un peu de retard par là, mais, en tout cas, dans l'avenir, je pense que nous serons en mesure de mobiliser une force qui comprendra les militaires de différents États, qui va intervenir de façon ponctuelle pour la sécurisation des zones du centre et de l'ouest du Mali, pour pouvoir s'engager plus vigoureusement contre le terrorisme.

C'est un peu cette philosophie de base, de compter sur nous-mêmes, qui a fait la politique au niveau de la Mauritanie et qui est aussi à l'origine de la création de cette force. En plus de cela, le G5 Sahel, qui est une organisation sous-régio-

nale, coopère naturellement beaucoup avec l'Union Africaine et notamment avec le Conseil de Paix et Sécurité – elle opère aujourd'hui dans le cadre de résolution bien approuvé par le Conseil de Sécurité.

Voilà à peu près la situation, qui reste difficile et préoccupante, mais je pense que, avec l'aide de tout le monde, nous arriverons à pouvoir passer à une meilleure situation. En vue de cela, nous coopérons bien sûr dans le cadre des Nations Unies et la Mauritanie, malgré qu'elle ne soit pas un grand pays ni une grande armée, a envoyé quand même ses militaires en Centrafrique dans le cadre des forces de paix et de sécurité.

Voilà ce que je voulais partager avec vous et, tout en réitérant les engagements et les recommandations que vous avez donné ici, il faut vraiment qu'on repense l'avenir de la relation entre l'Europe, l'Afrique et l'Union Africaine : les différentes difficultés que l'on va rencontrer, les différentes sensibilités des différents pays, ne doivent pas s'opposer à cette volonté de combattre ce fléau commun, parce que si on y arrive pas, on va beaucoup retarder le développement des pays.

SPEAKERS' BIOGRAPHIES

FOREWORD

Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo

President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

A strong focus on strategic outlook in complex issues. High level contacts and negotiations. Special attention on countries of strategic relevance i.e. the Gulf region. Frequent Public Diplomacy activities to discuss policies and open issues. He held the position of Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic-political-industrial area, in relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean. He is the author of the books: “The road to Kabul” (Il Mulino-Arel, 2009); “A political journey without maps, diversity and future in the Greater Middle East” (Rubbettino, 2013); “NATO and the Middle East: The Making of a Partnership” (New Academia Publishing, 2018).

POLITICAL SUMMARY

Alessandro Politi

Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

Alessandro Politi is the director of the NATO Defense College Foundation, the only NATO-affiliated NGO think tank. A political and strategic analyst with 30 years of experience, he was political advisor of two KFOR Commanders. He was senior researcher for the Italian MoD (CeMiSS-Centre for Military and Strategic Studies) responsible for the strategic monitoring of Latin America. He also created and has led the Global Outlook project within CeMiSS, published in Italian and English (third edition, 2015). He has contributed to the Italian Defence White. He has directed the CEMRES research on CBMs in the framework of the 5+5 Defence Initiative, presenting the conclusions to the Ministers in Granada.

He teaches geopolitics and intelligence at the SIOI. He teaches conflict management, crisis, peace-making and analysis at different governmental centres. He has been acting director of the School of Intelligence Analysis at a private establishment in Rome. He has been advisor in Italy and abroad to four Defence ministers (among which the actual President of the Italian Republic, Hon. Mattarella), one National Armaments Director, one Intelligence Co-ordinator, one Chairman of the Oversight Intelligence Committee, one Head of the Italian delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (actually EU HR, on. Federica Mogherini). Born in Germany, lives in Rome. He has published as author or co-author 25 books on strategic and security matters. His most recent publications will be on the Belt and Road Initiative.

WELCOME REMARKS

Thierry Tardy

Director, Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome

Starting from May 2018, Dr Thierry Tardy is the new Director of Research Division at NATO Defense College. From 2013 to 2018, Tardy served as Senior Analyst to the European Union Institute for Security Studies and, before that, he was Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He has researched and published extensively on military and civilian crisis management with a particular focus on the United Nations, the European Union and inter-institutional cooperation in security governance. His latest research has also focused on crisis management in Africa, the financing of CSDP operations and the EU maritime operation in the south Mediterranean Sea. Dr Tardy teaches on European Security and Crisis Management at Sciences Po, La Sorbonne and European Security and Defense College, among other universities.

Giuseppe Mistretta

*Director, Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic*

Minister Plenipotentiary Giuseppe Mistretta is currently the Director for Africa at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has a keen knowledge on the African continent and a vast experience developed on the field: he first served as Ambassador of Italy in Angola and then became Ambassador of Italy in Ethiopia in 2008, being accredited also to Djibouti and South Sudan. In 2014, Mistretta took up the post of Ambassador to the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Starting from 2016, he is Commander of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic.

OPENING REMARKS

Hafida Benchehida

Senator, Foreign Affairs Committee, People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

Hafida Benchehida is a Senator of the Algerian Parliament and sits in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Throughout her career as an international interpreter and consultant for international seminars, she has attended major regional summits and workshops. She is the founder and executive officer of the Algerian Women Parliamentary Network.

SESSION I

Alain Juillet

President of the Club des Directeurs de Sécurité des Entreprises and of the Académie de l'Intelligence Economique, Paris

Alain Juillet started his career serving as a Colonel of the French airborne troops in the Service Action of the External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service (SDECE). After he left the army, Dr Juillet has been an executive of several French companies such as Ricard, Jacobs Suchard and Marks&Spencer, until he was appointed Director of Intelligence at the Directorate-General of External Security (DGSE) - a role covered from 2002 to 2003. He then held the position of Senior Official of French business intelligence to the Prime Minister's Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security. Currently, Dr Juillet is the President of the Club des Directeurs de Sécurité des Entreprises and of the Académie de l'Intelligence Economique, as well as a Senior Advisor in geopolitics, crisis management and security for Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.

Simon K. Nyambura

Ph.D, Director, IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violence Extremism, Djibouti

Formerly the Head of Counter Terrorism Pillar of the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), Dr Simon K. Nyambura is now the Director of the IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE), located in Djibouti city. He has a vast experience in security affairs, state-building and peace-keeping processes, fostered also by his PhD from Kansas State University on post-conflict reconstruction in Africa and his work as a Senior Associate at the African Policy Institute (API).

Johan Kruger

Head of Transnational Organised Crime, Illicit Trafficking and Terrorism, Eastern Africa United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Nairobi

Currently the Head of Transnational Organised Crime, Illicit Trafficking and Terrorism Programmes for Eastern Africa at UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Dr Johan Kruger previously served as Regional Project Coordinator & Legal Advisor for Southern Africa at the same organisation, as well as Director of the Centre for Constitutional Rights at the FW de Klerk Foundation. As an advocate and a consultant in Public International Law, Dr Kruger was also Cabinet Liaison Officer to the South African Minister of Defence, Legal Advisor in the South African Department of Defence and Public Prosecutor at the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa. He is an expert in policy and strategy development, corporate governance, legal and strategic advice, international relations, risk management, government liaison and resource mobilisation.

Jihane Ben Yahia

Coordinator Regional organised crime observatory - North Africa, Enhancing Africa's response to transnational organised crime, Tunis

Dr Jihane Ben Yahia joined the Institute for Security Studies for the Enhancing Africa's response to transnational organised crime program (ENACT), in February 2018. Prior to that, she consulted for the UNODC on economics crimes and corruption related issues in Africa and the MENA region, the Danish Institute Against Torture, the American University in Cairo and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, among others. Ben Yahia co-funded an NGO on youth public engagement, Jeunes Independants Democratizes, and has provided several training to young Tunisian leaders on the elaboration of inclusive public policies. Her current areas of interest include rule of law and governance, crime prevention and criminal justice, financial crimes and corruption as well as inclusive citizenship and citizens' participation.

SESSION II

Youssef Amrani

Senior officer, The Royal Cabinet, Rabat

Prior to his designation in the Cabinet of His Majesty in October 2013, Youssef Amrani was Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation since January 2012 and Secretary General of the Mediterranean Union in July 2011. From 2003-2008, he served as Ambassador and Director general of bilateral relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. He was the head of office of the Secretary of State for the Arab Maghreb Union from 1989-1992. Afterwards, he was appointed Consul General in Barcelona.

Youssef Cherif

Deputy Director, Columbia Global Center, Tunis

Dr Youssef Cherif is currently the Deputy Director of the Columbia Global Center of Tunis, a regional hub covering North and West Africa. From 2014, he has also been working at the Institut Tunisien des Études Stratégiques as a researcher, regularly producing briefing-papers for the President of the Republic or longer reports on US-Arab affairs and national or regional security issues. Dr Cherif expertise has a strong focus on Libya and Tunisia: as a freelance political analyst he consulted for the Institut Arabe des Chef D'Enterprise, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the UN, among others. Moreover, Cherif's contributions often appear in media outlets such as Al Jazeera International, Majalla Asharq Al-Awsat, The Huffington Post, France 24, CNN, BBC.

SESSION III**Mahmoud Gebril**

Former Prime Minister of the State of Libya

When the Libyan uprising began in February 2011, Mahmoud Gebril helped starting what is now known as the National Transitional Council (NTC). Mr. Gebril served as the interim Prime Minister of Libya during that time and also served as head of international affairs, playing a leading role in securing the recognition of the international community. Prior to the revolution, in 2007, he was appointed the Security General of the National Planning Council in Libya. During that period, he also led the National Economic Development Board.

Mehari Taddele Maru

Lead Member, African Union High Advisory Group, Mogadishu

Lead Member of the African Union High Advisory Group, Dr Mehari Taddele Maru is also Chief Strategist for Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and a freelance strategist on the main topics of his expertise: human rights and humanitarian law, public policy, migration and peace and security related issues. Among others, his clients are the AU, IGAD, UN, African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), the West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP), the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and other European organisations. Prior to this, Dr Taddele Maru was an Official of the AU, Programme Head of Institute for Security Studies, Director at Addis Ababa University.

Neuma Grobbelaar

Research Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg

Neuma Grobbelaar is a foreign policy and development expert with 28 years of specialist research, project management, fundraising and policy practitioner experience. A former South African diplomat, she is currently the Research Director of the South

African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). With a wide scope of knowledge of South Africa's foreign policy, her areas of specialisation include the intersection between foreign policy, regional integration and human development, the role of the private sector in African development initiatives and South Africa's role as an emerging development partner in the region. Dr Grobbelaar also contributed as a key consultant to several international research programmes evaluating and conceptualising the Southern African region's most pressing challenges concerning security, economy and politics.

Michel Soula

Head of the Operations Section in the Operations Division, NATO HQ, Brussels

Michel Soula deals with NATO's current Operations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, namely maritime operations and Kosovo. He also dealt with NATO's operation in Libya. Beforehand, he held the position of Deputy Director in the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, working with Javier Solana and Lord Robertson. A French civil servant, Michel Soula was seconded to the French Foreign Service where he held various positions, in particular on chemical and biological warfare.

Kidane Kiros Bitsue

Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa

Dr Kidane Kiros is the Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS). Previously, his career path was mostly related to teaching, research, and educational administration, starting from the achievement of a PhD in Development Studies. From 2003 to 2014, he taught in various Addis Ababa University faculties and served as Acting Director of the Institute of Federal Studies as well as Senior Administrator and Finance Head for Continuing and Distance Education at the AAU. He has also cooperated with humanitarian organisations including the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (as member of the Eastern Africa regional working group on food security) and the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (as a member of the national working group on Food Security).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mamadou Diallo Bhatia

Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

Mamadou Diallo Bhatia was Councilor for Administrative Affairs in the Office of the Prime Minister from 2009 to 2014. Until 2014 he was active in the academics as a Professor at École Nationale d'Administration of Nouakchott. Previously he served as a Principal Advisor to the President of the Republic with Rank of Minister. From 1992 until 1997 he worked for the Office of the Prime Minister Councilor for the Sovereignty Sector. Between the period of 1986-1989 he served as the Director of Local Government in the Ministry of the Interior. Before that, he was the Advisor to the Minister of the Interior.



NATO Foundation
Defense College



AFRICA IN ACTION:

TAILORING SECURITY TO REAL NEEDS AND THREATS

CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY

the NATO Defense College Foundation
in co-operation with the NATO Defense College

ROME, 8TH – 9TH MAY 2018

Venue: Centro Congressi Roma Eventi – Piazza di Spagna, Via Alibert, 5/a, Rome

THURSDAY, 8TH MAY 2018

- 14,00-15,00 Arrival of participants – Registration
15,00 **Welcome remarks**
- Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
 - Thierry Tardy, Director, Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome
 - Giuseppe Mistretta, Director, Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic

Session I

EXISTING THREATS VERSUS REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

As in other regions, several initiatives have sprung up in Africa in order to fight against a variable mix of political instability, illegal trafficking fuelling organised criminal groups and facilitating more or less structured terrorist groups. African capabilities unfortunately are still insufficient and external powers have often very narrowly focused objectives often insufficiently harmonised by international organisations.

- 15,30-17,00 Chair: Alain Juillet, President of the Club des Directeurs de Sécurité des Entreprises and of the Académie de l'Intelligence Economique, Paris
- Simon K. Nyambura, Ph.D, Director, IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violence Extremism, Djibouti
 - Johan Kruger, Head of Transnational Organized Crime, Illicit Trafficking and Terrorism, Eastern Africa United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Nairobi
 - Jihane Ben Yahia, Coordinator Regional organised crime observatory – North Africa, Enhancing Africa's response to transnational organised crime, Tunis

Q&A

Session II

TOWARDS AN AFRICAN-LED CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The watershed for African wars and crisis management has been the end of the Cold War and of the intervention of superpowers in international conflicts. The following decade witnessed a host of local conflicts led mainly by African entities, starting from the Somalia conflict in 2006. The number of peacekeepers in the continent has increased substantially, with a renewed foreign presence and international involvement (i.e. UN, EU, NATO). A natural evolution would be the progressive transition from foreign intervention to a more effective African Union direction in managing crises, a transition to be supported by the international community.

17,30-19,00 Chair: Youssef Amrani, Senior Officer, The Royal Cabinet,
Rabat

- Youssef Cherif, Deputy Director, Columbia University, Columbia Global Centers, Tunis
- Thierry Tardy, Director, Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome

Q&A

FRIDAY, 9TH WEDNESDAY 2018

Session III

THE TWIN CHALLENGE OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND REGIONAL CO-OPERATIONS

Africa has undoubtedly benefited from a strong economic growth supported mainly by commodities and a parallel series of positive developments concerning peace restoration and the relative strengthening of democracy. These positive evolutions can nevertheless still be jeopardised by negative internal (corruption, weak rule of laws i.e.) and regional factors (cross border criminal operations and armed conflicts, terrorist networks). Despite its evident limitations the international community can still improve its actions and programmes, but one should also explore the opportunities offered by the co-operation between private and public sector to increase positive synergies.

10,00-11,30 Chair: Mahmoud Gebril, Former Prime Minister of the State of Libya

- Mehari Taddele Maru, Lead Member, African Union High Advisory Group, Addis Ababa
- Neuma Grobbelaar, Research Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg
- Michel Soula, Head of the Operations Section, Operations Division, NATO HQ, Brussels
- Kidane Kiros Bitsie, Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa


Q&A

11,30-11,45 **Concluding Remarks**

- Mamadou Diallo Bathia, Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania



Interior of the Great Mosque of Touba in Senegal.




The conference was first of all significant per se: after 25 years, the strategic debate within a key NATO and EU country confronted Africa not as an issue of (under)development, poverty and migration, but as an emerging geopolitical subject. It has been the logical extension of the past 2017 conference “Deep Maghreb: (In)security and stability – North Africa and its Sahel dimension”, where for the first time an African strategic and security dimension was broached by the Foundation.

Acknowledging the urge of an in depth analysis which would really detect and discuss the main threats and opportunities characterizing the continent nowadays, the NATO Defense College Foundation has gathered a short list of high-level specialists, regional practitioners and international organisations’ representatives to discuss such themes in terms of security and governance.

The economic growth of the continent in the last decade, together with a gradual political consciousness and empowerment of national elites, well documented by the remarkable progress made by an embattled African Union, has opened the opportunity to a strategic shift from external assistance to tentative partnerships with great and medium external actors and among African countries. The security situation has also vastly improved in the past twenty years.

Beyond a purely military framework, a promising answer and step forward resides in international cooperation, which has to be revised and implemented in a more dynamic and multidimensional way: both African states and international actors should invest in education, capacity building, exchange of intelligence and lessons learnt - starting from recognising and empowering the role of regional organisations.



Africa is often misunderstood by external perceptions scarcely connected with the reality of an emerging continent. The message of the actual chairman of the African Union shows other priorities instead: youth unemployment and empowerment; civic engagement and political participation; engaging the corporate sector in on job training and philanthropy; harnessing the demographic dividend; migrants and voluntary repatriation; gender empowerment; regional integration; the negative connection between corruption, socio-economic progress and security.

In other words, security is in the picture, but not as a stand-alone precondition vis-à-vis other fundamentals, but concretely as ancillary and tailored facilitator for parallel positive processes.

Between 2016 and 2017 a conflict map shows only two highly lethal conflicts (Tunisia and RDC, over 1.000 casualties) while lower casualties conflicts are disseminated across the continent but rather localised. The rest is made by less visible criminal networks and banditry hotspots that contribute much more than terrorism in hampering the development of the continent.

In this picture dominated by non-traditional conflicts, major potential military capability providers are (in order) Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Angola, Ethiopia, South Africa and Nigeria, but top five troop contributors to African peace support operations are Ethiopia, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya.

This indicates at a continental level a mismatch in interests and contributions because a common vision of Africa security is still fledgeling in the African Union on the backdrop of three capitals that are still considered possible Africa-wide leaders, i.e. Cairo, Abuja and Pretoria.

Adding to this already complex backdrop the interventions of external countries and/or international organisations it appears clear that a shared re-definition of peace support operations is conceptually needed to maximise the impact on conflict containment and resolution.

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