The Brussels Summit promised initially to be an implementation summit, it unfolded as a highly mediatised one, but it ended demonstrating that NATO is capable to adapt and evolve even in very complex strategic situations, thanks to an intense diplomatic preparation.

The NATO Defense College Foundation intended to convene a select group of high-level practitioners and specialists to cover three main themes: collective defence and deterrence, the transitioning of the strategic landscape and the Open Door Policy especially vis-à-vis the Balkans.

In the first panel the speakers offered key frameworks in which one can critically set fundamental themes like the political nature of NATO, defence spending targets and their implications on defence, deterrence and counter-terrorism in an evolving relationship with the EU.

The second panel tried to explore the need for a strategic coherence of the Alliance's missions in a volatile, blurred and fast changing strategic landscape. Important missions like counterterrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, resilience in the MENA region, KFOR have evolved very much from the initial assumptions of a decade ago.

In the last session has been examined the Open Door Policy, considering especially the Balkans: a region that has shown remarkable progress since the tensions of seven years ago, but that is now entering a critical transition towards a new degree of stability involving difficult choices in the internal politics of all countries. Decision makers and influencers of different types tend to take the Balkans for granted, so that it is relevant to show them both national and NATO interests at play.

The conference continues the tradition since 2016 of focusing on NATO Summits one month before in order to anticipate and shape the debate on the one hand and to have a reality check after the official documents on the other. In this way the book touches upon the most relevant topics of the Alliance outside the strictures of official positions.

In the last few months, a new transatlantic divide risks to emerge and to affect the stability of the Alliance, as underlined forcefully by the Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg. The final declaration is reassuring in this respect, but the doubts regarding the foundations of collective defence continue to echo, undermining the transatlantic bond.

A volatile security environment requires NATO's further adaptation, while hybrid and cyber malicious activities are not easy to define and to pinpoint: they have the potential of undermining the Alliance capability to work properly and to protect the integrity of governments and territories.

In addition, challenges coming from the East and from the South affect the strategic landscape. Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and support to rebel entities are a destabilising factor of the international system and need a firm twin-track response by the Alliance; the instability in the Middle East and North Africa countries demands a stronger and more coherent commitment to partner nations.

The conference conveys the message that NATO must remain a strong collective political and military organisation and an essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies.
The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College. Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network.

The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of co-operation with NATO. Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings.

The Foundation was born seven years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staffs. Actually the Foundation is active in three areas: high events, strategic trend research and specialised decision makers’ training and education. Since it is a body with considerable freedom of action, transnational reach and cultural openness, the Foundation is developing a wider scientific and events programme.
NATO VERSUS
THE NEW
GLOBAL
THREATS

Co-organised by the
NATO Defense College Foundation
and the Balkan Trust for Democracy
The Queen’s conference hall in the Chamber of Deputies, Rome.
The Queen's conference hall in the Chamber of Deputies, Rome.
NATO on the map: an official NATO chart with member and partner countries. The pen symbol indicates the seat of the two main co-operating organisations: EU and OSCE. Practical collaboration with Russia has been suspended, exception made for high level political talks.
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FOREWORD

This book is the result of our annual international conference, since 2016, on NATO Summits. Our aim is to convene the most distinguished available speakers to discuss the main issues within the Atlantic Alliance.

We are facing a dangerous, unpredictable and fluid international environment, a constant challenge, and NATO has to find ways to respond to security threats. New menaces are emerging from many directions: from state and non-state actors to terrorists, cyber-, and hybrid attacks.

On the eastern flank, Russia’s illegal behaviour has made the Euro-Atlantic security environment less stable. NATO defence and deterrence posture had been strengthened at the borders of the Alliance and we are working to improve the military readiness, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of our forces within Europe.

The cooperation between NATO and the EU has significantly developed in order to face the common security challenges in our shared eastern and southern neighbourhoods. Therefore, the European Union remains a unique and indispensable partner for the Alliance, not only to facilitate the mobility of forces on the field. Furthermore, NATO engagement in the Balkans continues through the Alliance’s Open Door Policy, a visible great success. Montenegro’s accession last year and the invitation to FYROM (soon to be renamed North Macedonia) are a tangible expression of this commitment.

On the southern flank, the instability across the Middle East and North Africa is fuelling terrorism, irregular migration and human trafficking. At the Summit, the Allies have drafted a Package on the South, which includes a variety of political and practical cooperation initiatives towards a more coherent approach towards the region, whose challenges affect directly our own security. This is a welcome improvement.

Among new threats, the hybrid and cyber ones require a never ending adaptation. We have to continue to implement cyberspace as a domain of operations, in-
creasing the capability of each member state to operate in an autonomous manner.

In these circumstances, Allies must reinforce the transatlantic link and their soli-
idarity, continue to pursue a 360-degree approach, keeping in mind the achieve-
ment of the fundamental tasks of the Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis
management and cooperative security.

In conclusion NATO is visibly showing a capacity to adapt which remains un-
paralleled. It still is the most remarkable example in history of a political-military
alliance capable to reinvent itself through seven decades of interoperability and
common objectives.

This book is not meant to be only the record of a good discussion that took place
in the Parliament of Italy before a large and qualified audience. The Foundation
hopes that it can be the basis for further reflection and debate on the key strategic
issues concerning the Alliance and the international security environment.
POLITICAL SUMMARY

A fter the Summit, it is worthwhile to compare the suggestions and discussions voiced during the Foundation’s conference with the text of the Brussels Summit Declaration to carry out a reality check. Agreed documents matter much more that media uproars, but unsolved are bound to come back despite political papering.

The Strategic Concept of 2010 is mentioned only once in the first paragraph concerning the Alliance’s main mission and its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. As our speakers stressed several times during the conference, there should be a new strategic concept simply because in eight years the situation has deeply changed, notwithstanding NATO’s constant adaptation. A strategic concept is not a thing that interests the militaries only, it forces decision makers to translate vague and open-ended wording based on compromise into concrete connections between threats, priorities and strategic/pol-mil responses.

Is there an interest to restart the exercise after eight years? Yes, if you look at practitioners; “no” if you hear decision-makers because they know and feel that, unless the burden sharing issue is somehow put to rest and solved and the sentiment of several public opinions starts again to appreciate the value of the Alliance, such an undertaking would be premature and risk to produce a still-born document.

Projecting stability is mentioned only twice (para 10. NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism is an integral part of the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence and projecting stability; as such, it contributes to all three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security; para 50. Based on a broad and strengthened deterrence and defence posture, the Alliance seeks to contribute to projecting stability and strengthening security outside its territory, thereby contributing to Alliance security overall.) and the ambiguity of its use is rather evident. This has been very clearly pointed out in the conference and it remains an important undefined issue.
Operationally it seems to be on par with deterrence and defence and on the other it is a derivative of a stronger deterrence and defence posture, albeit covered by the all-encompassing 360° approach. The political question, behind an operational doctrine dispute, is direct: projecting stability is in the end a core task between crisis management and cooperative security or a nice have for the overall security of the Alliance? In other words, NATO is just transatlantic or has to have a wider scope in an interconnected world? The past political responses have been oscillating between the resurrection of old fashioned coalitions and invoking NATO when more staying power and coherence was politically and strategically indispensable.

During the accelerated negotiations that preceded the approved draft of the final communique, there was at a certain moment the risk that projecting stability in the South could be considered a less relevant task than deterrence in the East, as if deterrence and stability could be decoupled. The final declaration on this account strengthened the relationship, avoiding unhelpful geographical differentiations. Finally concerning nuclear deterrence, the conceptual clarity of it as experienced during the whole Cold War, seems to be rather blurred in the paragraphs dedicated to the deterrence and defence posture (paras 12-19). As also underlined by some speaker at the conference, some countries feel the need for more robust forces in order to face aggressive intents on the border by Russian superior forces. This creates three orders of problems. First, Russian conventional forces are considerably inferior to NATO ones, the exact reversal of the situation during the Cold War where Soviets had an overwhelming numerical superiority. Secondly, nuclear deterrence is integral part of the overall deterrence precisely because a conventional imbalance could be created by adversaries at local level, but in the text deterrence as such appears much later (para 34. *an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities*). Thirdly, current shared intelligence estimates deem rather improbable a Baltic variant of the Crimean scenario, while hybrid operations in the political, social, economic and cyber domains are considered much more feasible and probable.

It promised to be a rather dull implementation summit and structurally its outcome reflects the success in the further adaptation of the Alliance in a challenging strategic environment.
I am very honoured to participate to our meeting with the NATO Defense College Foundation (NDCF); an event which has been customary for many years now and usually is held one month before the annual NATO Summit. Therefore, I would like to extend my warmest congratulations to the President and to the Director of the NDCF, respectively Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo and dr Alessandro Politi, for their great political and institutional awareness in organising this event.

Nowadays, NATO is undergoing a complex phase in deciding its own future. In particular, the discussion in Italy focusses on how much we must take part in the Alliance’s projects. I think it is very important that in this institutional context, such as the Chamber of Deputies, there must be the ability and willingness to plan periodically a discussion on the future of NATO and what it should do.

For me it is a moral commitment and I would like to try to explain why, starting from the title of this initiative: NATO versus the new global challenges.

Currently we are experiencing impressive changes regarding the type of security threats. Strategic confrontation – in some cases even deterrence – is re-emerging between great clusters and great powers. In addition this tension happens also at a very micro level, e.g. cybernetic or hybrid threats, changing the nature of confrontation. Everything is different. Due to the asymmetry of the threat and the use of high-tech tools, we live in a “David versus Goliath” global scenario, a contest where smaller actors are able to threaten much bigger and stronger adversaries, putting them in dire straits.

As a military historian, I think at the transition from medieval to modern warfare, because that phase changed everybody’s life. Today it happens the same if we keep in mind the cyberattacks that occurred in Tallin, or the media frenzy changing the threat perception, making even this perception almost more dangerous than the threat itself. This happens, for instance, with terrorism, with which I have dealt for many years. The perceived risk of terrorism, closely linked to the security
sentiment, has modified the way people live and even their electoral choices.

After these events, it is impossible for politicians not to realize that working on being part of NATO and making NATO is not just a detail but the crux of protecting our citizens who will feel these changes to their marrow.

As these are my last months as Head of the Italian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I am very proud of the work done so far and of the contribution that our country has given on how to redesign the Alliance, as shown in the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué.

I cannot leave office with a clean conscience if I would not put in this short greeting also the legacy to those who will come after me. Siding with this alliance is not only a problem of political choice, but an issue of values. There is one thing I would say to the Alliance: if in these years the consensus is dwindling, it is also because those values once were much more rooted than now in the new generations. Indeed, Atlantic values should not be nurtured only by technical or financial decisions, but also by a convincing soft power.

NATO’s great challenge with the new generations is to invigorate the idea of joining the Atlantic project. In fact, NATO and Atlanticism are not a detail, but the heart of a country like ours, and need to be fostered each day.
NATO SG Stoltenberg in Skopje with Defence Minister Sekerinska, NATO source.
Opening ceremony of the Brussels Summit, 2018. NATO source.
Session I

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
AND DETERRENCE
NATO Agenda: Achievements and Variables

I will not hide to you that this is a sensitive moment in transatlantic relations. A number of tensions have emerged in different areas, namely climate policy, the status of Jerusalem, the Iranian nuclear deal and so on. Of course, we have been there before. I am old enough to remember controversies inside the Alliance and across the Atlantic over Russian pipelines in the 1960s and 1970s; and to remember the public disputes over the war in Iraq. However, never before have we experienced such a configuration – with our main ally on the one side and, virtually, the rest of the West on the other. Will international stability be affected long-term or only temporarily?

So far, NATO has been relatively shielded from these tensions, and the conclusions of the Summit, on July 11-12, will give us an idea of future developments. On the Summit agenda are the most relevant topics for the Alliance today. We are all aware that there will be a discussion on the so-called “burden-sharing”, linked to the amount of public expenditure Allies devolve to defence. It is normally defined by the criteria of the three “c”: cash, capabilities and contributions. Metrics agreed among the Allies established how to calculate to what extent they meet the criteria of the Defence Pledge launched in Wales in 2014. Indeed, over the past four years, all NATO nations have increased defence expenditure as a percentage of their GDP. The trouble is that this particular issue is now conflating with other issues, such as tariffs and trade – but we trust our leaders to be able to find a mutually acceptable position on the occasion of the Summit.

The forthcoming Summit will deal also with NATO adaptation, as we call it in the Alliance’s jargon. This concept refers to the fact that the organisation as such is equipping itself to face the challenges of the 21st century more effectively. First of all, there will be the implementation of NATO’s new Command Structure, which includes a staff increase at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) and the gradual establishment of a new cyber operational command (CyOC) within it. In addition, until a few weeks ago the expectation was that the Summit
would launch a fully-fledged mission in Iraq, starting from the capacity-building activities already under way as NATO’s contribution to the Global Coalition against ISIS – but political uncertainties following the recent Iraqi political elections are making it more difficult to proceed as planned.

At this NATO Summit, the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub, based in Naples, will also be declared fully operational – full operational capability (FOC) is the term that we use.

Hybrid threats will be also part of the discussion next month – ‘hybrid’ being, by nature and definition, a combination of different types of hostile activities that contribute to undermine the Alliance as a whole or individual Allies. It is just the beginning of the conversation and we are still trying to define what ‘hybrid’ means exactly – and where lies the comparative advantage in engaging NATO in fighting hybrid threats, hopefully in close consultation and cooperation with the EU.

Cyber is the domain I am directly responsible for at NATO HQ. There has been a significant increase of hostile actions – we call them malicious cyber activities – against single countries, national and international organisations and private companies coming from different directions. Very often it is difficult to identify quickly the instigator(s) of such actions, that are clearly aimed at undermining our ability to function properly as societies, economies and security establishments. In July 2016, the Alliance launched the Cyber Defense Pledge, a voluntary national exercise carried out under the supervision of NATO in order to increase national capabilities in that field.

The good news is that in the cyber domain, over the past few years, all NATO nations have increased their investments in human resources, technological resources and political attention. Therefore, there is a shared interest across NATO countries to be more resilient against this kind of threats. In this particular respect, increasing cyber defence spending seems to be more popular (and easier to carry out) than increasing conventional defence spending – especially in Europe.

The last point on the agenda of the Summit will be European Union–NATO cooperation. We have seen a spectacular rise in bilateral cooperation and initiatives over the past couple of years. We have 74 action points that we are implementing together, representing our common deliverables.

An example is military mobility. It is an initiative that is taking place primarily within the European Union, both among the military staff of the member States and in the so-called PESCO framework. It is aimed at lowering the barriers and difficulties that are still hampering the free movement of military personnel and equipment across and beyond the European territory. In this area, not just the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Defence are involved but also the Ministries of Transport and some regional administrations. Some regulations are to be implemented by the European Commission, at first, and then different specialized agencies must cooperate inside the EU framework. However, NATO military requirements also need to be considered, especially when it comes to using bridges,
airports and highways, or moving helicopters and tanks across the continent. Military mobility will not materialize in one month or even in one year. The important thing is that we all have started working concretely in that direction.

Finally, from 2020 onwards, the European Commission will launch its dedicated European Defence Fund – and I imagine (and personally hope) that in a couple of years these extra funds will become part of the discussion on burden sharing. This money will not be disbursed directly by National Defence Ministries in NATO, but will still represent an additional European contribution to research, development and building capabilities in that field. Discussions are still underway regarding the involvement of non-EU allies – those countries that are members of NATO but not of the European Union, from the United States itself to Turkey, from Norway and to the UK.

While this is the expected agenda for the Summit, there are still a few known unknowns, including the forthcoming elections in Turkey, the European Council in late June (probably responding to the recent US initiatives on trade), and possibly also the football World Cup in Russia, with its global impact and implicit political symbolism...
The focus of my intervention will be on how we are doing in defence and deterrence. Coming from Warsaw, we are certainly focused on the threats from the East, although President Andrzej Duda, recently speaking on the country priorities for the NATO Brussels Summit, emphasises the 360º security approach.

Over the last years, NATO made a great progress – through the Wales Summit (2014), the Warsaw Summit (2016) and now in the run-up to the Brussels Summit. NATO has truly moved from the position to reassuring Eastern members allies to the position of deterring the threats from the East. At the Wales Summit was launched the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) which represents the most significant reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence since the Cold War; this plan of actions has been incremented at the Summit in Warsaw with the enhancing of NATO’s military forces on the Eastern flank, the presence of the US Armoured Brigade Combat Team, additional money from the European Deterrence Initiative and so on and so forth.

Indeed, the most important thing is that we have changed our thinking. We no longer just hope that Russia comes to our side, we recognize that, beside dialogue, we need initial forces to be able to deal with potential threats from the East.

From the military point of view, how we take the initial presence and how we will be able to bring additional forces if needed? Right now, we have four battalions in three Baltic states and in Poland. The battalions can fight but they will not resist if something larger is going on; this is a tripwire strategy but they are not sufficient to engage if there is a real need.

When it comes to the effectiveness of deterrence, my first point is the political unity of the Alliance, that makes us in Warsaw very worried. We are also concerned of the reactions in Western Europe, maybe too emotional, which could lead us to a European divide – other than a Transatlantic divide. Indeed, European countries are reacting in very different ways; some countries are talking about
strategic autonomy from the United States. Whether this is a plausible proposal, or not, President Trump actions brought many thinking that Europe needs to be able to deal with security and defence by itself. Other countries believe this is just a moment in time and that the Alliance will go back to the past. After all, the United States needs its allies to compete with its biggest adversaries and it is just needed strategic patience.

However, among Eastern countries there is a third option. Facts are very different from what President Trump is saying: there has been an increasing of US forces on the ground, defence and military spending has gone up with regard to the East, strategic political decisions have been made supporting Ukraine… especially, governmental officials say that only the United States have the defence capacities to protect NATO’s territory.

The main objective at the NATO Summit in Brussels will be to manage these issues and to patch up these differences.

Indeed, Russia would reach its objective to divide the Alliance. Therefore, to deploy a realistic deterrence approach, we have to reinforce our military forces. A couple of elements are necessary to close the reinforcement gap:

- **Mobility.** We have to be able to move faster both in the NATO and in the European framework – the so-called military Schengen. It takes weeks upon weeks to move forces from Western Europe, to Germany through Poland to the Suwalki gap.

- **Readiness.** Forces need to be able to move on short notice. One of the initiatives endorsed by the Defence Minister of Poland, Antoni Macierewicz, is the “Four Thirties” initiative by US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis. This allows good size of forces to be ready within 30 days.

If we move forces quickly, then my question is whether we could also make decisions quickly enough. Decisions have to be taken at the pace of relevance. Both the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) have to decide faster. In particular, SACEUR should have a greater flexibility and the possibility to move forces – even without the full consensus of NAC – when the situation so required. Thus the command structure has to be reformed; i.e. there will be a new Command led by the US and there will be a new logistical Command in Germany.

In the East, we have also to consider our partners, Georgia, Ukraine, Finland and Sweden, which contribute to all this security aspects.
In the last few weeks, we saw several important moves from the new administration in Washington, which are impacting the transatlantic relationship. To name a few: the withdrawal of Washington from the Iranian nuclear deal, the controversy involving Jerusalem recognized as capital of Israel, the criticism by President Trump of the Paris climate deal, the way Washington has newly challenged the European Union as such.

Historians may, in the future, consider that this is has simply been a rough patch to cross and that those difficulties are only of a temporary nature. However, it is difficult for the Europeans to rely simply on expectations about the next American elections. Therefore the concept of a European strategic autonomy, expressed by the Chancellor Angela Merkel, – however ill defined it could be – is becoming a new element for rebuilding the transatlantic relationship.

At the NATO Brussels Summit in July, there will be a lot of “elephants in the room” which have lead to fear of a toxic Summit. The principal focus on the burden sharing is, in fact a NATO hardy perennial, a very old issue within NATO, even since 1947. The NATO Secretary General observed that a real increase of European defense expenditures has been registered since three years: this has been due in part to the reaction to the Russian aggression in Crimea and to the end of the international economic crisis, but also to a new willingness on the allies not to be only “security consumers”. However, as in President Trump view, the burden sharing is linked to economics and the individual balance of trade of the allies with the US, this linkage makes things much more difficult. Yet one has to remember that already Henry Kissinger raised the issue at the time of the so-called “year of Europe”.

The issue is where and how this problem should be discussed. Some will consider that it is simply linked to Trump’s personality, but others wonder if, maybe, it exemplifies a real shift of the strategic landscape and of the US priorities. The fact is that trade balance and burden sharing are not the only preoccupations of the
U.S. public opinion. For example polls show that it is getting fed-up with external operations – even if 47% of the American population thinks that the United States should continue their active foreign policy. One may consider therefore to what degree the US public opinion is not simply returning to isolationist tendencies but also to what has been called a Jacksonian approach.

More than the Atlantic connection, Americans are now much more worried by the rise of China and about a new world international balance, which will depend on the triangle China-Russia-United States. This is widely considered as a new context calling therefore for a new strategy.

Considering the European security partnership with the US, we have also to deal, non-only to those geopolitical shifts, but also to new types of threats.

First, a long-term security issue is now represented by non-kinetic threats. They are not attributable: how do you react if you do not know exactly from where they are from? They are non-geographic and the response is mostly national. NATO has been responding quite successfully to traditional security challenges but what about new ones like cyber attacks? Of course the Alliance has already taken steps. I was at the first NATO Cyber Defense Pledge in Paris last May. The main message was however that the first line of defense is to build a strong national resilience strategy. In this case, NATO can help but not be a substitute.

Another long-term issue is, of course, migration for the next twenty years. Migration will not involve just refugees and economic migrants but also climate migrants. This last issue has not been considered yet and it is rather EU who may have the tools to address it more than NATO.

We should mention also the growing pace of nuclear proliferation. We do not know how the Iran nuclear programme will develop, in absence of the US support for the JPOA, but we know that possibly Saudi Arabia and, maybe Egypt, could be one day interested in having nuclear weapons, perhaps with the assistance of Pakistan. The India-Pakistan nuclear balance is also moving, as both countries are modernising their arsenals. North Korea is also another problem. As for now, the agreement in principle reached by the United States and North Korea in Singapore does not solve the issue of the denuclearisation of North Korea. It has also sent a very worrying message to Japan, which in the current diplomatic process has been left aside. Therefore Tokyo has manifested its concerns about the United States’ extended deterrence strategy, upon which Japan has been relying up to now.

Finally NATO should found the way to incorporate in its strategic vision the new main trends in the security landscape.

- The cooperation between the European Union and NATO should be considered as a priority as the mentalities are changing. See, for instance, cyber defence, or military mobility. The European member States are now ready to pay NATO military mobility through Europe. This was impossible to imagine just a few years ago.
- The vulnerability of space asset is increasingly worrying. If you cannot correctly
manage the IT communications continuity, it will create immense problems. Simply look at the management of air traffic: in the next ten years, it will be completely automated and relying on space assets. And we might have cyber attacks whose effect will be much worse than those experienced till now.

In this context, Europe is now taking four important steps:

- The European Defence Fund which allocates half a billion Euros yearly to defence R&D. The United States Permanent Representative to NATO said that this initiative could be however considered as European defense protectionism, but it is simply not fair to think that European taxpayers should mainly buy American products!
- The United Kingdom has confirmed that London is eager to continue cooperation on security issues with the European Union, beside Brexit, although on still very unclear terms.
- The Framework Nation Concept', a German proposal to help Berlin geographically close allies to improve their military capacities through mutualisation has been working quite well.
- The France initiative to bolster cooperation, training and exchange experiences at operational level should lead to practical steps for European interventions in coalition.
- But the agenda for the transatlantic security relationship extends also beyond the issues of the NATO-EU relationship and the burden sharing issue of expenditures.

It related also to solving current issue where the allies’ discussions still continue in search for a common approach. Just to name a few:

- The implementation of a NATO South strategy remains still insufficiently implemented, if only because of the fear from some eastern allies that it will affect what they see as the key NATO priority: to be prepared against a Moscow move. For the time being, this southern flank strategy has been only half developed due to this political resistance. However it is difficult to challenge the fact that the political and strategic evolution of European southern flank is as important for the Alliance as the East. The Middle East, the Sahel and Libya could reserve bad surprises in the next years. What if we have had an Islamic revolution in the Maghreb, an area that remains an integral part of our Europe southern borders? The NATO and EU strategy towards the South should have also an impact on overall economic and political stability of those countries because it is crucial for our security.

1 Within NATO, the so-called “Framework Nations Concept” is currently one of the driving paradigms of multinational defense cooperation. All nations retain full sovereignty, and no “European army” is in sight. This opens the concept to non-member states. In essence the common defence policy is organised around multinational clusters led by a framework nation in order to maximise synergies among reduced militaries.
Maintaining a nuclear deterrence culture within NATO is also a key element for the future of the Alliance. Since the beginning of NATO’s existence there has been the insistence of also a nuclear burden sharing. This means exercises, dual-capable aircrafts and so on. Now the 7 NATO allies are directly concerned will face the challenge of modernising their dual capable aircrafts and the challenges of the new Russian A2/AD anti-aircraft advanced defences.

NATO and US have also to consider the implications of Russia violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) for the continuation of arm control strategic talks. The US Congress has asked that, if this issue is not solved, the administration should consider to have some new nuclear deployments in Europe.

Last but not least, we have still the problem of defining what could be the future of a NATO relationship with Russia. There the Ukrainian issue looms large.

Contacts between NATO and Russia were frozen after the aggression of Ukraine. In retrospect may be the Alliance made a mistake in suspending military-to-military contacts. Anyway, the crisis of Ukraine and Crimea will remains indeed the key factor for any evolution of NATO-Russia relations.

Do we want to reinvent for Ukraine the Austrian State Treaty of 1955? And, how Kiev wants to deal finally with the Donbass secession? Does it want to get back forcibly the secessionist region, or alternatively to find an arrangement for some kind of autonomy, while maintaining Kiev sovereignty, as it has been mentioned in the Minsk diplomatic dialogue? There are elections in Ukraine next year, so we could hope it will allow for new approaches and break the present impasse.

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2 Signed in 1955, the Austrian State Treaty was designed to re-establish Austria as a separate, independent state. To attain this goal, representatives of the governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, and France agreed that in exchange for the restoration of Austrian national sovereignty and political independence, the Austrian Republic would declare its total and unconditional neutrality. Here the sticking point is of course Crimea.
NATO naval exercise in the Baltic Sea with Danish and Japanese partner ships NATO source.
North Atlantic Council session during the Brussels 2018 summit. NATO source.
Session II

A TRANSITIONING STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE
THE NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

I think we really are to an inflexion point in the issues we have discussed about security and the role that NATO can play on the international scene. I would like to repeat what the economist John Maynard Keynes said in 1947: “We tend to believe that the present and the future will be repeating themselves like the past and, even if we accept that the future will be different from the past, we do not abandon the old belief.” Thus, although we are saying that the strategic landscape is changing irreparably, we are still thinking using the same structures of the past and here is where the problem lays.

I will quote three events of the recent past that will help me to explain these considerations.

Last June, on the very same date, on June 9th, there has been held the 44th G7 summit, in La Malbaie, Quebec and the 18th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in Qingdao, China. In addition, a few days later, the US President Donald Trump met with the North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un at the so-called Singapore summit.

These three events are telling us:
- The fragmentation of the West.
- The consolidation and reinforcement of the East around the main role of China.
- The denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula – for the first time after seventy years.

Nevertheless these represent dramatic shifts in the geopolitical scenery, while NATO allies are still discussing among themselves about trade, Russian threats, migration and so on and so forth. However, the issues which emerge in this new security context have to be discussed in the next NATO Summits and, maybe, be codified in a new NATO Strategic Concept. Indeed, the NATO Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, in 2010, does not reflect the new strategic reality to be addressed.
There are four main points we have to deal with:

- The relation with Russia.
- The dilemma of the South.
- The relationship with the European Union.
- The restatement of the Western liberal values which are the essence of the Alliance.

This latter point is the most important. NATO and the European Union need to share with each other their values and concerns in order to strengthen their solidarity. We have a double solidarity issue: a European divide and a trans-Atlantic divide and both of these must be overcome.

In particular, the Southern allies need to be reassured for the concerns related to the South instability. As we made in the past with the Eastern allies, implementing a new long-term deterrence attitude towards Russia and defence capabilities on NATO Eastern flank. Nonetheless, nowadays the Southern flank is facing more complex circumstances and it requires more intellectual and political efforts before being operational.

Of course, we have still to find a way forward to have a relation with Russia that does not involve necessarily a confrontation. This is a serious issue to have a vision on how to deal with the country; not just a dialogue which is subordinated to the reach of specific conditions. President Putin will continue to behave the same way and in the past we have already had to deal with a Soviet Union that was probably worse.

This approach requires NATO and the European Union to be not just complementary but to become strategic partners. We had a strategic partnership with Russia and we believe to be just complementary with the EU; this does not make any sense. We need to go well beyond complementarity and coordination; of course this is a step-by-step approach and there are issues that are still unsolved (i.e. the dispute between Turkey and Greece) but we are two brothers and not external actors.

The United States as well expect Europeans to increment their burden sharing to improve their defence capabilities for themselves. Indeed, the way to increase the burden sharing is through the European Union, because many European leaders will be more able to deal with this issue within the European framework and those decisions would affect also NATO members’ capabilities to reach defence requirements.

These are the key points to be integrated in NATO Strategic Concept. The Strategic Concept is a vision document that should be the lighthouse for guiding and promoting the adaptation of the Alliance in this new strategic environment.
NATO: FUNDAMENTAL MISSIONS AND NEW ONES

I will not be speculating whether NATO will have a new strategic concept, but it will be the starting point of my discussion. The strategic concept is important because it reaffirms that even though there are disagreements – difficulties regarding foreign policy issues among the member States – there is one fundamental shared premise, that is our interlinked security across the Atlantic. This means that NATO is not only a community of shared values, but also of fundamental shared strategic interests.

The main tool to understand NATO strategic environment is the Strategic Concept launched in 2010. Which element has to be changed? How do we have to adapt?

Three are the main points:
- What are the new trends that were not in the Strategic Concept of 2010?
- How NATO is responding and adapting to the new challenges?
- What should the future hold?

The most relevant point of the Strategic Concept is that NATO has three main tasks: defence and deterrence, cooperative security and crisis management. This has been an important shift in NATO’s mission, because since the 90s it just did defence and deterrence but now we have a 360 degrees picture. However, the strategic landscape has not suffered just a transition but a real shock, many times over. One point we have underestimated is the return of great States power politics – the rise of potential peer competitors.

The rude awakening for the Alliance has been in 2014 Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Indeed, it was Russia that changed the rules of the game. The fact that NATO stood fast on a deterrence and dialogue posture is that Russia’s behaviour destabilises the international community – i.e. the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. Thus, it is not just about a “piece of land” but it is about the rules we want to play and the defence of the liberal world order.
On the southern flank the main challenge of NATO is dealing with long-term turbulences and emergencies in the region: this is a generational challenge. When we look at the South, we notice an endemic instability among all the States. States’ crisis and instability take various manifestations, such as in Yemen, Syria or Libya. This prolonged instability makes NATO being more responsive in crisis intervention, in humanitarian emergencies, such as the migration refugees crisis, and in the confrontation with other competitors – being armed groups, insurgents and terrorists – which will try to exploit States’ weakness. In the last few years, the defeating of ISIS has been very encouraging and now 98% of their territories have been reconquered; nevertheless, this is not the end. This is probably the end of the first stage, but not the end of instability.

Last but not least, cyber and hybrid threats are evolving in a more sophisticated and fast paced way we expected. The international community suffers for a great technological gap. Keeping up with the pace of technology in the defence field is a very difficult challenge.

Fundamentally, NATO has been adapting to these new threats. If you think about defence and deterrence there has been a profound transformation over the last five or six years. At this Summit you will see important decisions to be taken concerning the adaptation of the NATO Command Structure in order not to provide just deterrence but also readiness in case there is a need for that.

Another area of adaptation includes unconventional threats, terrorism and instability in the neighbourhood. Regarding this, NATO posture is not to be compartmentalised regarding our own security needs. We think about a 360 degrees security approach and this means that there is no pre-eminence between North and South but the need to have a global vision of what security means.

Therefore, for a conventional defence organisation it is not easy to meet the challenge of instability, which is unconventional. Stabilisation is a largely a non-kinetic set of processes, meaning there is a fundamental role of counter-terrorism and capacity building which goes beyond the military toolkit.

Moreover, to deal with these cross-border challenges, NATO has enhanced its partnerships in the South region – from the Mediterranean Dialogue to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. There have been identified some key countries, specifically Jordan and Tunisia that will receive enhanced capacity building packages. This will allow NATO to work with those governments providing them special training courses that will help these countries to be first responder in defending their own society.

The Summit will see also the participation of the European Union. Instability is one of the areas where is worthwhile to co-operate because NATO and the European Union are strategic partners and have different areas of expertise. If you think of stabilisation as a truly economic, social and political kinetic and non-kinetic set of elements and processes, this is where working with the European Union, being in Tunisia, in Jordan or in Iraq in the future, will lead to a win-win situation.
At the same time, we should not forget that NATO main contribution on the ground remains in Afghanistan. The mission in Afghanistan is considered to be a counterterrorism and stabilisation mission; it is not a combat training mission to help the Afghani government to make sure that the country will not become a safe haven for terrorism anymore. It is long and complicated but we learnt that security and stability in Central Asia affect security in Europe.

NATO continues to have a fundamental mission to defend the Euro-Atlantic environment. Although foreign policies differences exist, it is important to have a forum like NATO which allows us to have defence and security discussions. In addition, after Brexit, NATO will remain the only place where the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Turkey will be together to share their values and security interests.
I would like to have a look at the concept of projecting stability; what it means, what it implies for NATO, what it is its operational dimension and which are its political consequences.

First of all, I want to make a plea for the concept of projecting stability itself. It has been contested, it has been criticised but there is a rationale for having a concept that is called projecting stability. This is because NATO has different operational activities and it is necessary to categorise them. The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 used to divide operational activities into:

- Collective defence,
- Crisis management,
- Cooperative security.

In practice, collective defence has become, by and large, deterrence and defence; while the merge of crisis management and cooperative security has led to projecting stability. It is helpful to signify by this concept that what NATO does not do in the field of collective defence – deterrence and defence – related to article V of the Washington Treaty, is trying to project stability whenever it is needed.

The concept also reflects the Ukrainian situation. This means that after the Ukraine crisis there has been a focus on deterrence and defence, but also the necessity to put some light on other activities – as in the conclusions of the NATO Warsaw Summit, in 2016, when projecting stability was defined, or, at least, mentioned for the first time.

Nevertheless, it is not sure what the Alliance means by this concept since still remains at different levels of ambiguity. The main ambiguity concerns the term stability; what do we mean by having a stable situation?

If we unpack a bit the concept, it probably comes from a kind of intervention fatigue after the operations started in Afghanistan and Libya which brought home the need of a more modest approach. Therefore, we want to provide some stability
within the regions where it is needed but not necessarily through operations that promote democracy values.

We assume, saying projecting stability, that we have a surplus of stability and we are going to export it. Of course, we could debate whether NATO member States and NATO, as an institution, are in such a situation, and we could also wonder whether in some cases the Alliance has not exported instability instead – Libya probably would be an example.

The second level of ambiguity, conceptually, is the contrast between some kind of clarity of the deterrence and defence pillar regarding what NATO is doing in identifying the threats – on the Eastern flank – and the difficulty in understanding the challenges out there, which often are transnational, non-state based and non-military.

Given the difficulty in understanding the nature of the threats, what do we want to do with projecting stability?

At the operational level, we should distinguish between four different questions:
- What to do?
- Where?
- With whom?
- With what kind of impact?

The first question what to do? has to do with the fundamental military nature of the Alliance which poses some difficulties when the threats have not a military nature. For instance, organised crime, environment, migration that are all transnational challenges. This raises the question of the added value of NATO in dealing with these issues. One of the objectives of the Alliance is to add value where it can have a comparative advantage; as said in some official documents, projecting stability and the role of NATO is more in the contribution to projecting stability rather than in doing it all.

Regarding the where issue, it is understood that now we are talking about a 360 degrees approach. Theoretically speaking, there is no an exclusive area where NATO is supposed to intervene – Afghanistan is part of this picture, although it probably does not prefigure anymore the kind of future operations that NATO wants to conduct.

Kosovo as well is part of the projecting stability strategy, even if projecting stability refers principally to the South.

With whom to collaborate in projecting stability does not only refers to the partnerships in the region, but also to which extent the Alliance is able to involve local actors in understanding what is its role. Local ownership is at the centre of the concept of projecting stability and it is well defined in all the official policy documents. However, the necessity to involve local actors encounters many difficulties because they are often reluctant partners, due to the anti-NATO sentiment in many of the countries that are the objects of stabilisation.
Instead, looking at partnerships, we consider for example the United Nations and the African Union.

The last point regards which impact has projecting stability. There is a conflict prevention dimension of projecting stability since the main objective is to prevent developments that might undermine our own security. Indeed, it is not only a kind of post-conflict peace building activity and it is hard to assess its impact. We will never be sure whether unstable situations do not evolve precisely due to NATO’s presence or not and we cannot pinpoint a causality between what has been done and the effects visible in a particular condition.

From a political point of view, we do not have the luxury to choose. We are doomed to do at the same time deterrence and defence and projecting stability, collective defence and crisis management and cooperative security. However, these statements are ambitious and theoretical, in reality there is the temptation to put the focus on the deterrence and defence pillar which provokes tensions among the member States – where should we go? What the priorities should be? Which resources should be allocated?

Furthermore, we cannot see a clear push of the member States on projecting stability, apart from a tiny few. Some of the member States do not consider the Alliance the main institutional channel to go towards South. This leads to the distinction between the willing among the allies to tackle the menaces out there and doing it through NATO and those who are not prepared to do so.
British armoured infantry during an exercise in Estonia, NATO source.
British armoured infantry during an exercise in Estonia, NATO source.
Session III

THE OPEN DOOR POLICY
MONTENEGRO’S FIRST STEPS IN THE ALLIANCE

Dear ladies and gentlemen, respectable colleagues,

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude and pleasure for the today’s opportunity to discuss the situation in the Western Balkans, with the special regards to the “open door policy” and to the Montenegrin contribution to NATO in the next five years. Being here together with such a distinguished political leaders and professionals is indeed an honour and a privilege. I am particularly pleased for being invited to give to you the view of Montenegro, a Western Balkan country and the youngest NATO member, on such a significant topic as “open door policy” and to present the prospective of our contribution to the Alliance in the forthcoming period.

As you are well aware, on the 5th of June 2017 Montenegro has become full-fledged member of NATO, after the 11-year long journey of the Euro-Atlantic integration, during which we have gone through a complex process of transformation.

In 2006 Montenegro regained its statehood, which was a prerequisite for making independent foreign policy decisions. By December 2006, we had already signed the Framework document for Partnership for Peace, which formally confirmed our intention to become one of the NATO member countries. In a practical sense, this meant that we had to completely overhaul our armed forces, in order to get small, compact and capable professional troops. Also our equipment was old and non-functioning, so we had to modernise it step by step within our budgetary capacities. All of the aforementioned had to be done carefully and requested a certain amount of time.

Consequently, the membership to NATO confirmed that the choices we have made were the right ones and that all of our efforts were not in vain. The Alliance recognised throughout our integration process that Montenegro would be an reliable ally, ready to share burden and contribute to peace and stability of Western Balkans and beyond.
Speaking of the Balkans, in light of its turbulent history with plenty of conflicts, we can certainly say that it is a very specific and versatile region, consisting of many diversities being religious, national or cultural, which are a result of Balkan’s geo-strategic position. By the aforementioned I am primarily thinking of the Balkans as of a crossroads where throughout history many powers clashed, ruled, or at least passed through, leaving their bits of influence.

Bearing that in mind, our main contribution to the Alliance will be better understanding of the complexity of Western Balkans. In addition, we will continue to play the role of stability factor in the region by encouraging good neighbourly relations, fostering regional cohesion and promoting democratic values of Euro-Atlantic societies. Montenegro as a full-fledged member is ready to share its experiences and knowledge with aspirants from our region, being convinced that future of Western Balkans is within Euro Atlantic zone.

Our experience in the past and recent years has thought us that regional cooperation has no alternative, and that the peace and prosperity of this Region is highly dependent on our collaboration and good neighbourly relations, but not only on that. As a credible Ally, Montenegro will continue to be proactive stability factor in the Region and to use its good relations with regional countries in order to be a link between NATO and the Western Balkans, because we deeply believe that the future of our Region lies within the Alliance.

As you are well aware, Balkan is the region with the most NATO aspirant countries, that are in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, each at its own pace, and we are also ready to share our experiences with all interested partners for the purpose of accelerating their integration processes. Related to that, as we expected our decision to join the Alliance to be respected, we also respect the right of every country to decide upon its own security policies and arrangements. However, we also have the right to promote our own opinions based on the experiences gained, having in mind not only Montenegro’s safety and security, but of the whole Balkan region and beyond.

To that end, we are and will continue to use every possible occasion to point out the importance of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Western Balkans, and to promote NATO’s “Open Door Policy” to our neighbours, bearing in mind our deep belief that membership in NATO guarantees not only peace and stability, but is also one of the prerequisites for economic advancement and prosperity and the further overall civilization advancement of each Western Balkan country. On the other hand, Montenegro will insist on reaching the certain criteria and conducting reforms for an aspirant country to meet NATO requirements and become a full-fledged member of the Alliance. My personal opinion is that this itself is the best recommendation for joining the Alliance.

Membership to NATO is a privilege for us, but at a same time a great responsibility, bearing in mind the principle of solidarity and our dedication to contribute to the system of collective security even more, better and stronger in the future,
following the policies and priorities from the NATO agenda. To that end, we are ready to contribute to the three core tasks of the Alliance, and also to take responsibility related to burden sharing.

Speaking of the burden sharing, Montenegro is committed to fulfilment of the Defence Investment Pledge and therefore we have adopted the National Defence Investment Plan in which it is stated that by 2024 the 2% of the GDP for the overall defence budget will be reached and over 20% of the defence budget will be allocated for the modernization.

When it comes to our contribution to the collective defence, Montenegro is ready to deploy its troops to the Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia, under the command of Canada and to send one staff element to the Battle Group HQ. All of the aforementioned efforts are being made in order to maximise our contribution to EFP and to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, by this deployment we want to demonstrate that Montenegro is not passively importing peace, but actively taking responsibility for preserving stable environment of the Euro-Atlantic region, at the same time aiming at strengthening the transatlantic bond with our allies.

In terms of projecting stability we must certainly emphasize the importance of our participation in Afghanistan, firstly in ISAF, and then in the “Resolute Support” mission, where namely 22% of our armed forces have participated. This is an ongoing contribution which started in 2010 and will more intensely continue in future.

Moreover, we will deploy two staff officers in the KFOR mission, one in the Liaison office in Skopje and another one in KFOR HQ in Priština. Furthermore, as I have already stated, we will continue our contribution to the Western Balkans stability throughout our proactive and neighbourly oriented policy.

I must also note that we have contributed to NATO’s trust funds in the past, in 2018 and will continue in future. Precisely, in 2018 we have contributed the Defence Capacity Building Fund in Iraq as well as to the Ukrainian NATO Trust Fund for the development of the EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) and C-IED (Counter Improvised Explosive Devices) capacities.

Taking into consideration the fact that Montenegro is one of the smallest Allies and the newest one, I believe we can all agree that our contribution to NATO agenda and the overall stability and security is neither small nor invisible, but it is rather relevant and very significant when compared to our size and capacities.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Western Balkans has historically been a turbulent region. The events that marked the end of the last century, still put the security of this area to the test. Therefore, I am more than convinced that each of the actors in this region should act responsibly in relation to the region’s prosperity and choose wisely what kind of future they want for their countries and societies. Montenegro chose to develop prosperity and security through membership in the NATO and the EU.
In this context, Montenegro takes every opportunity to, through its own example, promote the idea of integrating the entire Western Balkans region into the family of democratic and prosperous countries gathered in Brussels. However, Montenegro also uses its position to constantly remind that the NATO and the European Union must not leave this area in a “status quo” position, but rather assist Western Balkan countries in following the well-known path. In this way, the stability of this area is further enhanced and the doors are really open for the Western Balkan countries to enter. In the end, I can state with certainty that Montenegro will remain firmly on the European course and more importantly remain the reliable ally to NATO which is the most powerful military-political organization in the world.
FYROM: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A PROSPECTIVE NATO ALLY

My country was included in the Membership Action Plan process at the Washington summit in 1999 and, since then remained in the waiting room of the Alliance. Meanwhile, the enthusiasm of the people and elites has not declined. In reality, the country has never been in high need for a comprehensive PR campaign in order to bring the core of the Alliance and its values closer to the common people. In the first two post-independence decades, the popular support for NATO membership was persistently above 90% and, only slightly lower during the deep political crises we have been through in the period 2015–2016.

The strongest bond with the Alliance was forged in the period between 1999 and 2001. During the NATO air campaign both sides cooperated in the KFOR Rear HQ in Skopje, and in 2001, the government issued an invitation to NATO in order to be a honest broker during the internal conflict. The ensuing three military missions immensely contributed for calming down the tensions and created the right environment for the implementation of peace. As a result, the country rebounded quickly and instead of importer became the net exporter of security. The continuous involvement in mission in Afghanistan since 2002 speaks volumes on the army’s professional credentials, but, even more about democratic consolidation of the country.

Regrettably, after our membership bid was vetoed during the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, democracy started to deteriorate and the country was classified as a hybrid regime and a captured state. But in the end, the powerful Colourful Revolution brought down the autocratic regime and put the country back on the Euro-Atlantic route. Unlike some other candidates, FYROM’s aspiration for NATO has always been able to gather strong support by all ethnic communities, which in turn sustained the internal cohesion of a heterogeneous society, considering it a precondition for prosperity.

The new reformist Government has made a strategic opening to all five neigh-
bours as a contribution to the stability of the region. In the very first months of being in power, the bilateral Agreement on Friendship, good-neighbourly relations and cooperation with Bulgaria was signed which eased the tensions between the two states and solidified the strategic Corridor 8 running from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. In the same time, after years of inactivity, the negotiation process with Greece on the name dispute was revitalised by the government in Skopje that displayed a previously unseen flexibility and constructive approach [note of the Editor: the Prespa Agreement (17/6/2018) features the consent by Athens and Skopje to end the name dispute adopting the name of Republic of North Macedonia. It has been ratified twice by Skopje’s parliament but only after the entailed FYROM constitutional revision, the Greek parliament should ratify it. The revision should be completed by end 2018 at best].

Basically, the FYROM in the last year has been through a brief second transition towards democracy and effectively fulfilled all the additional criteria assigned to us in 2016 by the Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Even more, we have dedicated 20% more soldiers in Mission Resolute Support in Afghanistan and decided to reach the long-standing NATO standard of allocating 2% of the GDP for the military by 2022, despite the demanding economic situation.

The geopolitical competition in the region was practically not visible up to 2014 (annexation of Crimea), but since then illiberal models of democracy and autocratic leaders acted more aggressively. However, they stood slight chances to make significant inroads into the country’s political realm. Why? First, the political elites in power and in the opposition have not changed their declared strategic goals; second, and more important, the massive and persistent support for Euro-Atlantic integration by the citizens who are not ready to contemplate alternative options.

The frequently asked question is: what we should get from NATO membership in an era when the traditional territorial threats are largely absent from the horizon? As the territorial wars are slowly, but, steadily going down to the archives of history, terrorism, religious extremism, illegal migration, cyber-attacks and, in general, hybrid wars, are here to stay. The politicians and the citizens, as well, are aware that the most effective way to counter the non-traditional security threats, that figure prominently on the NATO agenda, is to confront them together.

The latest tangible threat is coming from the Balkan nationals fighting in Syria, bringing their military experience back to their counties or transferring it to the West. The profile of this challenge is cross border by default, so the effective response should not be individual. Official records reveal that in the last 18 months there have been two cases when the threats to facilities on FYROM territory were avoided due to intelligence-sharing with our partners from NATO and one case when a terrorist threat to Western Europe was thwarted following an initial intelligence lead from Skopje.

The new global phenomenon of fake news urges imminent common response, as well. If the disinformation campaigns were able to inflict damage on the elections
in big countries, their potential to do harm to small countries is much bigger. In this regard, I would like to single out the statement of Marc Zuckerberg that in 2017 during the special election for the Senate seat in Alabama, Facebook “found a lot of different accounts coming from Macedonia” [note of the Editor i.e. FYROM]. According to the reliable sources, in the last three years the effect of this propaganda is visible not only via dissemination of the fake news on the domestic soil, but, through “dirty money” from suspicious tax havens financing dozens of internet portals.

When debating mutual benefits from a strategic point of view, the last but not least important task for NATO and FYROM is to complete the enlargement on the south flank of NATO, a bridgehead towards the key regions of Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

During all the crucial junctures after our independence, the Alliance as a whole and its key countries have been instrumental in sustaining FYROM’s integrity and stability. In particular, the Framework Agreement in 2001 in a large part was possible due to the personal efforts by the than Secretary General of NATO, George Robertson. Lord Robertson has recently visited Skopje for the first time since 2001 and issued the statement that the country is transformed beyond recognition. The vast majority of our citizens are more than ready to uphold his observation since they are waiting for so long to see their country being transformed from the “frontline state” (as former US State Secretary John Kerry described them) to the 30th member of the Alliance.

At the end, allow me to say a few (and final) words on the situation in the region and NATO activities. My colleagues will have something to say, of course, but, from my perspective, the mere presence of NATO (in different forms) is preventing some of the remaining local conflicts from escalating. Here, I have in mind the still unsolved dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, the relations between Banja Luka and Sarajevo, the low-profile tensions between Serbia and Croatia and, until recently, the inability to ratify the Agreement on demarcation of the border between Montenegro and Kosovo [note of the Editor: the 21st of March 2018 the Kosovar Assembly ratified the long awaited Border Demarcation Agreement].

It is true that for most of these issues there is not a final resolution in sight, but in my view the presence of NATO or key members of the Alliance contributes to the dialogue between the sides, instead of using force.
SERBIA: MYTH AND REALITIES

S
ince one of our speakers could not come, I have to take the role of Serbia in this panel. Trying to impersonate Serbia among the Balkans six is rather easy. You are the biggest; you are the best, or, at least, you pretend to be the best; you have more foreign direct investments; you are the linchpin of the region; you are opening and closing a lot of EU accession chapters. This is the rosy side.

Then, let us see the newest development. I would first stress the attention on an actor which is not very visible in the strategic debate, but it is very present in the country and in the region: China. Have a look at Belgrade and you will see a direct link between the Serbian capital and Beijing: banks, steel mills bought massively by China, the Budapest-Belgrade railway funded by the Chinese and lot more has to come. As well as some small and discreet military assistance, very low level.

There is nothing bad in trade and expending transnational links, but China is also leading the 16+1 exercise which involves our friends in Central and Eastern Europe plus the Balkans six and it is better to have the eyes open. It is political and strategic prudence.

After China, comes Russia the usual suspect. We know a lot about Russia and there is much more to be said concerning its influence in the region. However, one must have a closer look at Serbian history and present before crying wolf, because it is an ambiguous relationship the one that goes between Belgrade and Moscow since the time of Ilija Garašanin and his Načertanije, in 1844. It this secret memorandum written by this great statesman (Interior Minister and Prime Minister 1861–1867), who tried to build up Serbia and the Serbian kingdom across the former Yugoslavia, he was advising his government to keep an arm’s-length relationship with Russia. That is why Russia was too big to be easily manage and it is the same today.

If you look a bit closely at what is really happening beyond the rhetoric of the Russia-Serbia relationship and the Serbian tabloids (that are important in forging local opinion), you see that Russia did not make favourable deals vis-à-vis the Ser-
bian government; look at the sale of the NIS (Nafta Industrija Srbije). Arms sales are also a useful indicator: the systems sold are not terribly modern and the price is not at discount. In addition, they need to be heavily refurbished and the quantity is clearly symbolic. It makes a big effect to say that you have 12 MiG-29 combat fighters but, in real military life, it means that just 3-4 are flying and their design dates back to the Soviet Union.

Concerning the omnipresent Russian influence, we continue to speak about the usual tools: Gazprom, diplomats, spies, fake news. I would like, also from what I have seen in my experience as Chief Political Advisor at NATO KFOR in Pristina, to underline the new frontier of Russian influence. It is in the grey zone of opaque economic dealings. The grey zone among politics, lobbying and economic trade. Although it is not visible, this kind of influence is much more effective than spectacular actions. We have seen that constantly across all borders, not only of the Balkans but also of “respectable” allies: for instance, the Laundromat scandal shows the consequences of this sort of economic plus political influence. It was probably the biggest money-laundering operation in Eastern Europe and you can be sure that money stuck to different and influential local hands.

By the way, the former head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Nikolai Patrushev, comes from SVR’s Directorate for Economic Security and has a clear idea of how to use this instrument. This instrument goes directly to another problem of the area which is the linkage between politics, organized crime and illegal trafficking. It is something we cannot avoid and must be changed. This connection opens the road for trafficking of arms, drugs, illegal tobacco, human beings that possibly finance terrorism.

The picture in Serbia and across the Balkans is very complex.

When it comes to NATO, all boil down to two issues:
- The normalization with Pristina and
- The relation with the Alliance.

Concerning the completion of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue completion, there are two key elements: one quite fictive (the exchange of territories); the other very concrete, the modification of the Preamble of the Serbian Constitution.

The exchange of territories has been many times mentioned between Serbia and Kosovo, but it seems to be quite unrealistic for the time being. No one is willing to modify his territory unless there are very favorable conditions. On the contrary it can be a red herring used by both local elites to perpetuate a provisional status that helps political cronism and organized crime.

Instead, getting Kosovo out of the Preamble of the Serbian Constitution is very important. It is worthwhile quoting the text:

“Considering the state tradition of the Serbian people and equality of all citizens and ethnic communities in Serbia,

Considering also that the Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the

...
territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations, the citizens of Serbia adopt”, Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 30 September 2006.

Getting this paragraph out of the constitution would allow further steps towards normalization. We expected to have concrete steps last April, but this did not happen. There are now movements in the Serbian political landscape, especially in the government, to press forward but there is a battle to be done by president Aleksandar Vučić both to win heart and mind of the public opinion and to secure a favorable deal. In this junction it is possible to expect a quite heavy Russian pressure due to influence instruments because it will be a crucial passage to normalization. In the meantime the dialogue is expected to restart by September 2018.

There have been a number of Serbo-Russian exercises, as we know, but there is also a flurry of NATO-Serbia activities. Serbia insists on neutrality, but this is not a problem: NATO has always worked with a lot of neutral countries: Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, right now in Kosovo. Therefore, I think we have to follow closely these countries and governments in order to get the best possible for the whole region.
SPEAKERS’ BIOGRAPHIES

FOREWORD

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A strong focus on strategic outlook in complex issues. High level contacts and negotiations. Special attention on countries of strategic relevance, i.e. the Gulf region. Frequent Public Diplomacy activities to discuss policies and open issues. He held the position of Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic-political-industrial area, in relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean. He is the author of the books: “The road to Kabul” (Il Mulino-Arel, 2009); “A political journey without maps, diversity and future in the Greater Middle East”. (Rubbettino, 2013); “NATO and the Middle East: The Making of a Partnership” (New Academia Publishing, 2018).

POLITICAL SUMMARY

Alessandro Politi
Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
Alessandro Politi is the director of the NATO Defense College Foundation, the only NATO-affiliated NGO think tank. A political and strategic analyst with 30 years of experience, he was political advisor of two KFOR Commanders. He was senior researcher for the Italian MoD (CeMiSS-Centre for Military and Strategic Studies) responsible for the strategic monitoring of Latin America. He also created and has led the Global Outlook project within CeMiSS, published in Italian and English (third edition, 2015). He has contributed to the Italian Defence White. He has directed the CEMRES research on CBMs in the framework of the 5+5 Defence Initiative, presenting the conclusions to the Ministers in Granada. He teaches geopolitics and intelligence at the SIOI. He teaches conflict management, crisis, peace-making and analysis at different governmental centres. He has
been acting director of the School of Intelligence Analysis at a private establishment in Rome. He has been advisor in Italy and abroad to four Defence ministers (among which the actual President of the Italian Republic, Hon. Mattarella), one National Armaments Director, one Intelligence Co-ordinator, one Chairman of the Oversight Intelligence Committee, one Head of the Italian delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (actually EU HR, on. Federica Mogherini). Born in Germany, lives in Rome. He has published as author or co-author 25 books on strategic and security matters. His most recent publications will be on the Belt and Road Initiative.

WELCOME REMARKS

Andrea Manciulli
President, Italian Delegation NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Rome

At the primary elections in October 2007 he was elected Secretary of the Democratic Party in Tuscany, and re-elected to this post at the primary elections in October 2009. After serving as Regional Councillor in Tuscany from 2000 until 2013, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies for the Democratic Party in the general elections of 24 and 25 February 2013. Currently he is Head of the Italian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly other than Rapporteur of the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and submitted the following reports: “Daesh: the challenge to regional and international security”; “The expansion of Daesh to Libya and the Western Mediterranean”; and “The Terrorist Threat to Europe and the Balkans”. In 2016 he was Rapporteur on the decree-law on Italian missions abroad and proposer of a new bill introducing measures to counter jihadist radicalisation, which is currently being discussed in Parliament.

SESSION I

Antonio Missiroli
Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, NATO HQ, Brussels

Prior to joining NATO as Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, Dr Antonio Missiroli was the Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris (2012-17). Previously, he was Adviser at the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) of the European Commission (2010-2012), Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre in Brussels (2005-2010), and Senior Research Fellow at the W/EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris (1998-2005). He was also Head of European Studies at CeSPI in Rome (1994-97) and a Visiting Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford (1996-97). As well as being a professional journalist, he has also taught at Bath and Trento as well as Boston University, SAIS/Johns Hopkins, at the College of Europe.
(Bruges) and Sciences Po (Paris). Dr Missiroli holds a PhD degree in Contemporary History from the Scuola Normale Superiore (Pisa) and a Master’s degree in International Public Policy from SAIS/Johns Hopkins University.

Michał Baranowski  
*Director, The German Marshall Fund of the United States Office, Warsaw*  
Michał Baranowski is the director of GMF’s Warsaw office, where he focuses on transatlantic relations, U.S. foreign policy, and the relations between the United States and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). He writes regularly for Polish and international media about European security challenges, transatlantic relations, and politics in CEE. Prior to launching the Warsaw office, he served at GMF’s headquarters in Washington, DC, where he developed GMF’s programming in Poland and CEE. Before that posting, Baranowski worked in GMF’s Brussels office, where he focused on EU and U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Georgia. He is a member of the Polish-German Reflection Group launched by President Duda and President Gauck. He holds a master’s of European public affairs from Maastricht University, and has studied at Mercer University in the United States and the University of Oxford.

Benoît d’Aboville  
*Vice-Président, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris*  
Vice-President of the “Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique” in Paris, former Ambassador, Permanent Representative to NATO (2000-2005) and Senior Auditor at the French National Audit Court (2005-2011). During his diplomatic career, he has been posted in Washington, Moscow, Geneva, Madrid (CSCE) and New York. Since 2014, he was member of the Board and Vice President of the “Institute of International Humanitarian Law” in San Remo and Geneva, and chairman of the editorial board of “Revue de la Défense Nationale”.

**SESSION II**

Stefano Silvestri  
*Vice President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome*  
He has been President of the International Affairs Institute from 2001 to 2013. He has been a lead writer for Il Sole 24 Ore since 1985. Between January 1995 and May 1996 he served as Under Secretary of State for Defence, having been an advisor to the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for European matters, in 1975, and a consultant to the Prime Minister’s Office under various Governments. He continues to act as a consultant to both for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Defence and Industry. He is currently a member of administrative council of the Italian Industries Federation for Aerospace, Defence and Security (AIAD), and of the Trilateral Commission.
Giampaolo Di Paola  
*Former Minister of Defence of the Republic of Italy, Rome*

After specializing at the Submarine School, from 1968 to 1974 Admiral Di Paola served on various missions on board the submarines “Gazzana” and “Piomarta”. Commander of the Submarine “Cappellini” in 1974/75 and the Submarine “Sau- ro” in 1980/81, he was also Commander of the Frigate “Grecale” in 1984/85; After being promoted to Captain of Vessel, he served as Commander on the “G. Garibaldi” Carrier in 1989/90. From 1994 to 1998 he served as the Head of the Military Policy Department of the Defence Staff. On November 1998, he was appointed Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Defence. From March 2001 to March 2004, he was Secretary General of Defence / National Armaments Director. In March 2004, Admiral Di Paola was appointed the Chief of Defence Staff. From November 2011 to April 2013 he was Minister of Defence of the Monti Government. Under his tenure the Italian Parliament approved the Law of reform and reorganization of the Italian Military.

Benedetta Berti  
*Head, Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary General NATO HQ, Brussels*

From August 2017, Dr Benedetta Berti is the new Head of Policy Planning at the office of NATO Secretary General. A policy adviser and consultant, as well as an Eisenhower Global Fellow and a TED Senior Fellow, she has held positions at Harvard University, West Point, the Institute for National Security Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, among others. In the past decade, Dr Berti has worked in NGOs and research institutes in Latin America, the Middle East, and the US, focusing on human rights, internal conflict, and political violence. Her areas of expertise include human security, internal conflict, integration of armed groups, post-conflict stabilization and peace-building, as well as violence prevention and reduction, crisis management and prevention. Dr Berti’s comments and interviews have been featured in *The New York Times*, *Time Magazine*, the *Wall Street Journal* and *al-Jazeera*, among others. She holds a PhD in International Relations from the Fletcher School (Tufts University) and two post-doctorates in International Relations and Political Science.

Thierry Tardy  
*Director, Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome*

Starting from May 2018, Dr Thierry Tardy is the new Director of Research Division at NATO Defense College. From 2013 to 2018, Dr Tardy served as Senior Analyst to the European Union Institute for Security Studies and, before that, he was Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He has researched and published extensively on military and civilian crisis management with a particular focus on the United Nations, the European Union and inter-institutional cooperation in security governance. His latest research has also focused on crisis
management in Africa, the financing of CSDP operations and the EU maritime operation in the south Mediterranean Sea. Dr Tardy teaches on European Security and Crisis Management at Sciences Po, La Sorbonne and European Security and Defence College, among other universities.

SESSION III

**Federica Favi**  
*Head, NATO Department, Strategic security and political-military affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy, Rome*

Minister Favi is an Italian diplomat who began her career as Consul in Egypt (2001-2005). Currently the Head of the NATO Department for Strategic security and political-military affairs at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she has held several positions at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: starting as Counsellor and Chief of Staff of the Director General for Asia, the Far East and the Pacific (2005-2008), she then became First Counsellor and Head of Humanitarian Affairs Department in the framework of the Italian Permanent Mission to the UN and the other International Organizations in Geneva (2008-2011). After that, she served as Ambassador of Italy to Georgia (2011-2015) and as the Coordinator for the EU cyber security policies in the Office of the Political Director, once back in Italy (2015-2016).

**Ivica Ivanović**  
*General Director for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of Montenegro, Podgorica*

Since March 2017, Mr Ivanovic is the General Director for Defence Policy at the Ministry of Defence of Montenegro. Prior to that, he was the General Director of the Directorate for Information Society Promotion at the Ministry for Information Society and Telecommunication (2016-2017). He has vast expertise in the fields of international relations, international cooperation, European policies and project management: among other positions held, he served as Head of Corporate Affairs Division at Telenor Montenegro (2013-2015), Legal and Personnel Manager at the Regional School of Public Administration (2011-2013), Programme Manager and Consultant at the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2008-2011) and Senior Advisor for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Defence of Montenegro (2007-2008).

**Stevo Pendarovski**  
*National Coordinator for preparation to NATO membership, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Skopje*

Stevo Pendarovski was appointed National Coordinator for NATO in November 2017. Since the general Parliamentary elections in 2016 he served as a Member of Parliament. In the past decade Pendarovski was an Associate Professor in In-
ternational Security and Foreign Affairs at the School of Political Sciences at the University American College in Skopje. In the 1990’s he had been an Assistant – Minister for Public Relations and Head of the Analytical and Research Department in the Ministry of Interior Affairs and between 2001-2004 and 2005-2009 had served as National Security and Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to two Presidents of the Republic of Macedonia (Note of the Editor, officially still FYROM). In 2004/5 was the Head of the State Election Commission.
NATO VERSUS THE NEW GLOBAL THREATS

Co-organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation and the Balkan Trust for Democracy

ROME, 15TH JUNE 2018
Venue: Chamber of Deputies, Sala della Regina, Piazza di Monte Citorio, 1, Rome
13,30-14,00 Arrival of participants – Registration
14,00-14,15 Welcome remarks
Andrea Manciulli, President, Italian Delegation NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Rome

Session I
COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE
Two years after the Warsaw Summit, open issues remain to be tackled. They regard the fundamental political nature of the Alliance, burden sharing, rethinking defence spending targets and their consequences on defence, deterrence and counter-terrorism. Moreover the Euro-Atlantic community is taking a new shape through increased relations with the EU.

15,30-17,00 Chair: Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

• Antonio Missiroli, Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, NATO HQ, Brussels
• Michał Baranowski, Director, The German Marshall Fund of the United States Office, Warsaw
• Benoît d’Aboville, Vice-President, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

Q&A
Session II

A TRANSITIONING STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

The Alliance is working on projecting stability in a wide range of theatres of operation. The fight against terrorism is carried out in the framework of the Global Coalition against the IS, but NATO has its own previous commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Enhancing resilience in the MENA region has to be synergised with the maritime security and regional stability engagements. KFOR is an excellent example of partnerships, but it has to respond to new political regional developments. All these issues need to find an overall strategic coherence because many of the starting assumptions are overtaken by events.

Chair: Stefano Silvestri, Vice President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

• Giampaolo Di Paola, Former Minister of Defence of the Republic of Italy, Rome
• Benedetta Berti, Head, Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary General NATO HQ, Brussels
• Thierry Tardy, Director, Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome

Q&A
15 th June 2018

15,30-16,45

Session III
THE OPEN DOOR POLICY
It is a founding principle of the Washington Treaty and is embodied by the success of passing from 12 founding members to 29 member states today. One of the centres of gravity are the Balkans by number of potential aspirants to membership and partnership in different degrees. What are the main obstacles and concrete needs to be fulfilled to develop new relationships?

10,00-11,30 Chair: Federica Favi, Head, NATO Department, Strategic security and political-military affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy, Rome

• Ivica Ivanović, General Director for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of Montenegro, Podgorica
• Stevo Pendarovski, National Coordinator for preparation to NATO membership, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Skopje
• Alessandro Politi, Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

Q&A
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko meeting the SG Jens Stoltenberg. NATO source.
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko meeting the SG Jens Stoltenberg. NATO source.
The conference continues the tradition since 2016 of focussing on NATO Summits one month before in order to anticipate and shape the debate on the one hand and to have a reality check after the official documents on the other. In this way the book touches upon the most relevant topics of the Alliance outside the strictures of official positions.

In the last few months, a new transatlantic divide risks to emerge and to affect the stability of the Alliance, as underlined forcefully by the Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg. The final declaration is reassuring in this respect, but the doubts regarding the foundations of collective defence continue to echo, undermining the transatlantic bond.

A volatile security environment requires NATO’s further adaptation, while hybrid and cyber malicious activities are not easy to define and to pinpoint: they have the potential of undermining the Alliance capability to work properly and to protect the integrity of governments and territories.

In addition, challenges coming from the East and from the South affect the strategic landscape. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and support to rebel entities are a destabilising factor of the international system and need a firm twin-track response by the Alliance; the instability in the Middle East and North Africa countries demands a stronger and more coherent commitment to partner nations.

The conference conveys the message that NATO must remain a strong collective political and military organisation and an essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies.
The Brussels Summit promised initially to be an implementation summit, it unfolded as a highly mediatised one, but it ended demonstrating that NATO is capable to adapt and evolve even in very complex strategic situations, thanks to a intense diplomatic preparation.

The NATO Defense College Foundation intended to convene a select group of high-level practitioners and specialists to cover three main themes: collective defence and deterrence, the transitioning of the strategic landscape and the Open Door Policy especially vis-à-vis the Balkans.

In the first panel the speakers offered key frameworks in which one can critically set fundamental themes like the political nature of NATO, defence spending targets and their implications on defence, deterrence and counter-terrorism in an evolving relationship with the EU.

The second panel tried to explore the need for a strategic coherence of the Alliance’s missions in a volatile, blurred and fast changing strategic landscape. Important missions like counterterrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, resilience in the MENA region, KFOR have evolved very much from the initial assumptions of a decade ago.

In the last session has been examined the Open Door Policy, considering especially the Balkans: a region that has shown remarkable progress since the tensions of seven years ago, but that is now entering a critical transition towards a new degree of stability involving difficult choices in the internal politics of all countries. Decision makers and influencers of different types tend to take the Balkans for granted, so that it is relevant to show them both national and NATO interests at play.