



NATO Foundation
Defense College

TARGETING THE DE-MATERIALISED “CALIPHATE”

**EXTREMISM, RADICALISATION
AND ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING**

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Extremism, radicalisation and illegal trafficking
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Organised by the
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Targeting the de-materialised "Caliphate": Extremism, radicalisation and illegal trafficking, Rome, 6 December 2018.



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AMBASSADOR MINUTO-RIZZO
President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

FOREWORD

The title of the conference may perhaps look ambitious. In substance we aimed at debating the issues of terrorism, extremism and illicit trade in connection to the vast area between the Arab region, Africa and the Balkans where Daesh and connected groups have and are being active.

We are dealing with a significant part of the world being affected today by a number of challenges but, at the same time, very relevant and with a great potential for future development.

Topics of good governance and the need to unite forces against illicit networks of various kinds came out in the discussion as significant factors, among others.

On the other hand, it is clear that we cannot continue to divide issues according to established traditions. There is a close connection among things that in the past looked far away from each other. I am thinking about diplomacy, trade, security, energy and politics. An interdisciplinary approach is needed.

Conflicts and crisis, acts of violence, organised crime are sometimes difficult to isolate from one another. They present themselves in new, interconnected and changing ways.

The number of actors has also greatly increased. Our habit is to look at governments as the legitimate players in the international community, but the world is showing a different reality where non-state entities, groups and also individuals are active and sometimes dominate the scene.

There is an unprecedented diffusion of power that makes international coordination more difficult and calls for new ways in counter-action. Here the title of conference comes back because we have to improve the ways of targeting our enemies. It is also clear that it is a mistake to resume in simplistic formulas such a vast universe with new forms of crime and extremism.

It is logical that in the present complex and challenging environment a good reading of facts, an in depth research and a clever analysis are needed. The NATO Foundation has this purpose in mind since its beginnings. We put together the

best existing expertise to discuss those questions and to give a specific focus to each of our panels.

The philosophy of our Foundation is also to give voice to men and women of the countries concerned, to listen to what is in their hearts and minds because in the end they are the actors and they know better than anybody about the issues at stake.

Our established methodology is to provide a framework for an open high level discussion from different points of view. Always in a scientific approach and with respect for the other.

The discussion will take place in three panels, whose titles speak for themselves around our current challenges and looking at the best integrated strategies in order to win this epochal battle.

I wish to thank the speakers and the moderators who made their presentations and those who have supported us: Philip Morris International in the first place, Al Arabiya our media partner, the NATO Defense College and Radio Radicale.



IAN HOPE
Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome

WELCOME REMARKS

On behalf of Lieutenant-General Whitecross, Commandant of the NATO Defense College, and Dr. Thierry Tardy, Director of the Research Division, it is indeed an honour to provide a welcome to the speakers, chairs and participants of this conference on “Targeting the de-materialised Caliphate”. The College remains happy to support the NDC Foundation in combined effort to provide high-level educational offerings on topics related to NATO, Trans-Atlantic security and broader security concerns. We are always impressed at the excellent organization of such events as these, under the superb stewardship of Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, and his incredible team. And this day I see that the Foundation has once again exceeded expectation, attracting a world class group of speakers and panelists to present us with current and relevant perspectives on the problem of addressing radicalism.

This gathering is timely.

Since August 2014 the US led coalition – under the name Operation *Inherent Resolve* – has steadily chinked away at the material targets of the territorial entity called the Islamic State, conducting 13.000 air strikes in Iraq and some 16.000 in Syria. Since September 2015, Russian aircraft working in support of Assad’s government have claimed to have flown 39.000 sorties hitting over 100.000 targets. Meanwhile US-led Syrian Democratic Forces and Kurd forces and Russian-backed Syrian government forces have succeeded in reclaiming territory. The combined effects have recaptured 99% of the territory held by Islamic State.

But the Islamic State’s danger is still ominous. Loss of territory has scattered many fighters. It is estimated that as many as 6.000 fighters have returned to their homes in some 30 countries, including large numbers in Turkey, Germany, France and the UK. Displaced fighters have further supported other Islamic State territorial claims in Libya and Afghanistan, while there is a growing presence in the Sinai, Somalia, Yemen, South-West Asia and the Sahel.

Now any re-establishment of a Caliphate in any remote territory is a very real threat and concern. The existence of the “material Caliphate” gives great credence and incentive to radical extremist movements around the world. That said, I will submit that these can be dealt with one by one in manners similar to that used against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

Of greater significance and concern is the emergence of the underground or virtual or cyber Caliphates. Following the model of al Qaeda, many of the characteristics of the material Caliphate are being replicated in a de-materialised form. The criteria for territorial space, land, is being superseded by the creation of a virtual space, within which fighters can be recruited from all parts of the globe. By using this space, there is no need to concentrate recruits physically in a traditional base of operations. Organizing, training and indoctrinating recruits can be decentralised in dispersed locations.

The virtual Caliphate – existing within the internet – can function as the ideological base of operations – the internet being used to transmit ideology through multi-media. This virtual base of operations assists in standardizing doctrine and training methodologies and in proselytising. Within the internet-based Caliphate, even without use of the Deep or Dark Web, the same economic activity that sustained the generation of capital within the Islamic State Caliphate can continue, albeit on a smaller, less concentrated scale. Both legitimate and illicit commodities can be bought or secured, traded, trafficked and sold. Humans beings, human organs, arms and ammunitions, drugs and antiquities can be traded across the virtual space with relative ease.

Combatting this threat is highly problematic. We cannot employ the instruments that worked against the material Caliphate. We cannot use aircraft or drone strikes, artillery or cruise missile strikes, or ground force attacks. Dismantling the de-materialized Caliphate can only occur through the use of multiple other sources of state power. The intelligence, communications and informational resources of states must be employed together to find and fix extremists web sites and communication nodes. State and international police and legal resources and judicial power must be employed to properly execute arrests, effectively prosecuting the Caliphate fighters to dissuade others, to incarcerate without making the jail system a breeding ground for radical ideology, and to rehabilitate wherever possible.

Panel 1 will examine how combatting the threat of the dematerialised or virtual Caliphate can only be effective through the use of non-military efforts of a coalition of agencies, organisations and governments all committed to the same end. This requires a commonality in threat perception, obtained most easily through shared information and intelligence.

Panel 2 will assist us in understanding how we might stifle the economic elements of the virtual Caliphate, or any emerging territorial Caliphates, targeting money flows. Indeed the use of the economic element of state power, together with diplomatic elements to sanction states and organisations supporting radi-

calism is essential to any possible success. State educational resources must also be mobilised to combat radicalism, through preventive deradicalisation and rehabilitation/re-integration programmes – a central theme for us today in the Panel 3 discussion. State labour and employment practices must also be reviewed to diminish the sense of disenfranchisement that often makes youth vulnerable to radicalization.

The combined effects of the dark side of globalisation and the phenomena of political fragmentation are providing space for the emergence of material caliphates in territories where governments have failed or are failing. These effects are also opening spaces for the non-material, or dematerialised or virtual Caliphate, which can exist in the midst of civil society via the internet and encrypted technologies.

Revealing and discussing how we might meet these challenges is our task today. Let me extend the warmest possible welcome to all participants. Thank you for giving us your time and wisdom. And let me add a heartfelt thanks to the Foundation for this wonderful opportunity to discuss and learn.



ALESSANDRO POLITI

Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

POLITICAL SUMMARY

In 1971 US President Richard M. Nixon declared the *War on drugs*, followed by a similar declaration of President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and George Herbert Bush in 1989. Victory has been declared several times, the most memorable being the one stated by Reagan in 1983. The *Global War on Terror* was declared after the 11th of September 2001, while in 2003 President George Walker Bush told “The War on Terror continues, yet it is not endless. We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide”. President Barack H. Obama announced on the 23rd of May 2013 that the Global War on Terror was over, replaced by more focussed operations. Victory over ISIS was declared the 20th of December 2018.

It is evident that after almost half a century, these problems have been more or less successfully tackled for a short time, but not solved because they are inherently stemming from a context that produces different forms of the same evil. The conference has clearly shown that whereas during the Cold War terrorism and organised crime were two different worlds with some linkages (Italy showed one of the most interesting precursor cases with the Magliana gang, 1975-1983), after the rise of al Qaeda the two ambits are increasingly interconnected. The key link is financing, because before states would dominate the support of armed groups, terrorist formations and guerrilla forces, while Osama bin Laden was the first to “liberalise” terrorism, by “privatising” it, i.e. by making terrorist financing almost self-sustainable through illegal trafficking and sometimes also legal front trade organizations.

To talk about a continuum is worthwhile exploring, but the terror-crime nexus, including all the nuances in operational situations, is an established and permanent feature with evolving “business” and operational models. This has profound implications in terms of national and multilateral security.

The first is that governments have to consider, vis-à-vis the body of experiences accumulated at least since 1989 (end of the Cold War), if the idea of waging a

“war” against these threats does make politically and operational sense. Politically waging a war reduces the space for negotiation with the political and social elements supporting these criminal activities and puts the onus on the government to “win” (i.e. decisively defeat) the opponent. If, as it often happens, the adversary survives, the confidence in the government and its military instrument is seriously eroded.

Operationally the use of military units and instruments increases the levels of warfare without necessarily bring to a swift conclusion: eradicating terrorism and organised crime (a much more difficult endeavour) requires much less firepower and much more constant law enforcement, intelligence, judiciary and socio-political engagement. Using military means puts a time (and a budget) pressure on governments that rarely can be sustained for the long years required. This is even truer when conventional military forces are engaged in a civil war scenario. Few armies can show convincing successes and even fewer of these victories were gained with limited deployments.

The second is that CRO or PKO (Crisis Response or Peace Keeping Operations) need to have a much more versatile command structure: today the military is a stove pipe having some liaisons with other civil, police, NGO etc. stovepipes. Taking into account all important factors, a comprehensive approach needs a much coherent arrangement, while safeguarding essentials as national interest and operational security.

Third and last implication, the usual approach “jail them or shoot them” is clearly limited in its concrete results: good for a media stunt, but blandly effective on the resilience of the threat. Together with the cutting-edge instruments, it is essential to use preventive, rehabilitative and immaterial tools in order to disintegrate recruitment, indoctrination, loyalty and financial links that allow organised crime and terrorism to exist and threaten for a long time.




MATTEO BRESSAN
STEFANO MARCUZZI
*Analysts, NATO Defense
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POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER

Although the Islamic State has lost nearly 98% of the territory it once controlled, the group is ripe for a comeback in Sunni-majority areas of Iraq and Syria. This resilience is explained by its capability to keep a substantial war chest; when it controlled territory, it amassed billions of dollars through extortion, taxation, robbery, and the sale of pilfered oil. At the height of its territorial control in 2015, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) generated over \$6 billion—the equivalent of the gross domestic product of Liechtenstein.

Now, despite the territorial loss, the organisation retains the skill at developing new streams of revenue, with the marginal advantage of a drastically reduced operating budget: ISIS goal is to sustain a prolonged terrorist and guerrilla campaign throughout Iraq and Syria. Some activities are old (extortion, robbery, trafficking



SUNNI VIOLENT EXTREMISTS' PRIMARY OPERATING AREAS AS OF 2018

Source: Trendsmap.com, Islamism map, elaborated by NDCF (28/11/2018):

<https://www.trendsmap.com/twitter/tweet/963686363366346752>

in antiquities – a revenue that was hidden in the media by the spectacular destructions in Palmyra and other old cities), others are relatively new in the portfolio like kidnapping for ransom theft, drug smuggling and other types of illegal trafficking.

Crime of course has its own risks, but much less than a terrorist attack: as of today there are still no security or police forces in Iraq or Syria capable of carrying out the type of policing that would deter widespread criminality or seriously disrupt trafficking networks.

At a strategic level one should avoid the error of underestimating and limiting radicalism's abilities and potential only to Syria and Iraq, because one has to include the more diffuse risk posed by home-grown radicalism. Indeed, although Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, respectively, are being actively searched by several security forces, they still manage to mobilize affiliates and allies from different armed groups in a wide zone extending from Morocco to Indonesia.

Fortunately, the six main areas of counterterrorism against ISIS and similar groups – Euro-Atlantic, SYRAQ, Yemen, ACPAK, Chad Lake and Horn of Africa – influence each other only indirectly from an operational point of view (including the circulation of foreign fighters from one area to another). Moreover, in the latter five areas ISIS's endeavour is less centred around global jihad and more focussed on national and regional civil wars, often fought by proxies.

In such areas, the foreign fighters still play a role, but are not decisive for the entrenchment of terrorism, because what counts are the interests of local groups, often involved in internal or regional struggles. This suggests that although jihadism gets an undue and inflated global significance when it affects the Euro-Atlantic zone, the key to eradicate ISIS from the other areas lays on regional policies.

This does not mean that there should be no global approach to defeat what remains of ISIS. Multilateral coalitions and international organizations such as NATO and the EU play a crucial role both on the ground – the former is committed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Jordan, while both organisations are present in Kosovo – and in the cyber domain, especially in protecting the communication space to prevent, debunk and neutralise the jihadi propaganda and recruitment. In this respect there is the need to examine and take stock from the most successful regional CVE examples.

The Aarhus model (Denmark) addresses the full-life cycle of radicalization to violence, from prevention, to intervention, to rehabilitation and reintegration; and the Gjilan/Gnjilane model (Kosovo), set up in coordination with UNDP, aims at preventing terrorist radicalisation by involving local stakeholders in counter-messaging and engaging in the community through debates, lectures and meetings. The apparent success rate of these programs is 8:10 and 7:9, respectively. Such experiences highlight the need to beat terrorists at the recruitment game and to invest in a long-term strategy.

Historical evidence shows that it can take up to three generations before toxic ideologies may be uprooted from societies. Exclusion, disenfranchisement, sectarianism, and oppressive government centralization are political problems that require political solutions supported by economic assistance, wealth redistribution and, where feasible, decentralization. Furthermore, in conflicts where transnational terrorists have embedded among local rebels with legitimate grievances, it is impossible to distinguish Counter Terrorism from Counter Insurgency – or to separate either strategy from the formidable task of government re-building.



AHMET O. EVVIN
Professor Emeritus, Sabanci University, Turkey

OPENING REMARKS

It is a great pleasure and an honour to address this high-level conference on a topic of vital importance. Extremism, radicalisation, and terrorism have become immediate threats to all of us, individually and collectively. They have changed, since the turn of the century, our sense of security, and have heightened our feeling of vulnerability, at home or in transit. This is a new category of potentially omnipresent dangers that humankind is now facing.

The end of the Caliphate, sad to say, will not mean the end of terrorism in Syria, and by extension, beyond Syria and even beyond the region. Once ISIS lost all its territory in Syria, it would go underground as it did in Iraq, General Frank McKenzie reminded us only the day before yesterday at his confirmation hearing in Washington. He also seemed to contradict our assumption that the Caliphate had completely disappeared, when he said, “*we are very close to the physical destruction of the caliphate*” which, according to the US military estimates, still has 2.000 fighters in a territory about 1% of the area that it once held.

But the threat of terrorism does not diminish after military victory; on the contrary, it rises, as we have witnessed over and over again in the past three decades. Today ISIS is still operating in Iraq, having gone underground.

Terrorism is now a more disruptive, more destructive, and more demoralising phenomenon than any other form of violence or conflict. This is so, because terrorists today are well equipped, well organised, and well trained, not only as fighters but as planners and organisers as well. They have at their disposal highly sophisticated means of communication and highly effective means for physical destruction.

It will be an arduous task to pursue and defeat a clandestine network of ideologically programmed fighters spread across a very broad geography, extending to countries beyond the Middle Eastern neighbourhood. This network has in the past penetrated into the heart of Western Europe; it was able to recruit not only persons of immigrant origins from there but also young persons of all nations and

descent. This network is sustained to a large extent by illicit money to support its activities and equipment, not to speak of its effective propaganda machinery through which it is able to find new recruits. It is thus a closely-knit community, essentially a male community, organised hierarchically with absolutely no room for any kind of individualism. A clandestine enemy of this kind poses a formidable threat to the civilised world.

This conference offers us a chance to hear the considered assessments of internationally renowned experts on radicalism and extremism. They will address, in the next session, the ways in which counterterrorism measures can be effectively implemented, and how optimum cooperation can be achieved among governments and NATO. In the following sessions, the question of trafficking will be taken up along with an explanation of effective instruments to prevent illicit money flows across borders.

The questions that will be addressed in the third session are of particular interest to me as a political scientist. Violent extremism is rightly said to “*begin as a low level, localized social and political problem*” before it attracts broad attention; but then, it is too late to contain it. In the framework of this conference the focus will be on antiterrorism measures.

There is another, vitally important, factor that should not be overlooked in this context: the socio-political and ideological factors that trigger and reinforce violent extremism. The framework of today’s conference will not permit a thorough consideration of those factors, but I would like to suggest that any consideration of extremism today must be informed by a keen sense awareness of ideological factors, particularly of ideological socialisation, that breed hatred and enmity towards universal values.

NATO versus ISIS seems to present a dire scenario that may well have derived from the late Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*. At the time of its publication, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the violent ethnic conflicts had engulfed the disintegrating Yugoslavia, Huntington’s thesis attracted serious criticism. For who could have predicted then that Huntington’s vision of a multipolar world polarised along cultural cleavages would become reality in the span of a single generation?

Who may have contributed knowingly or unwittingly, or simply as a result of a lack of foresight, to the making of this sorry state of affairs? There have been numerous scholarly accounts published in the last few years which convey an accurate picture of how some of the Western powers used religion as a bulwark against Communism during the Cold War, thus facilitating an Islamist ambience and foster political Islam. Hugh Wilford’s masterful history, *America’s Great Game: the CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East* is a scholarly account of how the US policy changed in the early years of the Eisenhower administration when the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles adopted containment as his number one priority. Under his brother Allen Dulles’ directorship, the CIA

stopped backing modernizers in the Arab world and began supporting observant traditionalists in the Middle East.

Another example is James Barr's recent book, *Lords of the Desert: the Battle between the United States and Great Britain for Supremacy in the Modern Middle East*, which provides an engaging account of how American and British rivalry in the region led to the support of rival confessional groups by these two powers.

Yet, it is not possible to claim that the Middle East was shaped solely by foreign actors according to their own priorities. Islamic radicalization had already begun by the time outside powers provided a catalyst for its further growth. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, was established in 1928, well before the Second World War. A recent doctoral thesis by Nadia Duvall at SOAS, soon to be published as a book by Gerlach Press in Berlin, powerfully conveys how Sayyid Qutb's vindictive hatred of the West has been echoed in the behaviour and rhetoric of ISIS. A pre-publication review of this book, *Islamist Occidentalism: Sayyid Qutb and the Western Other*, revealingly reads as follows:

Essentialist views are not the preserve of Orientalists in the Saidian sense. They are the bottom line of all brands of contempt for or hatred of the Other, when the latter is a collective identity, one side's essentialist rejection prompting the other side's counter rejection. There is no better illustration of this than Qutb, the firebrand martyr of jihadism, whose complex attitude towards the Western Other is closely examined in this fascinating book.

There is yet a third way of encouraging Occidentalist attitudes, by fully subscribing and actively propagating those attitudes. Not long ago I gave a lecture on "Muslims in Europe: Integration or Isolation?" at two campuses of the University of California. On the occasion I addressed the issue of increasing resistance to integration among European Muslims and criticised those members of Muslim communities and, particularly, some of their leaders who encouraged Muslims not to integrate into their host country societies. In doing so, they implicitly suggested that Muslim values were not reconcilable with European norms but respect for individual rights enshrined in European law would allow Muslims to perpetuate their separate existence in Europe. Muslims should therefore take advantage of European legal and social norms to resist integration into the societies of those very countries in which they had chosen to live. I said that I saw this particularistic rejection of common human values as a first step towards polarisation and radicalisation among Muslim communities in Europe as well as globally.

After one of these lectures I was taken to task by a senior faculty member not only for my critical comments regarding increasing resistance to integration but also for directing any kind of criticism at radical Muslims. I was accused of ethnic bias by this professor who, I learned much to my surprise, also taught American Constitutional Law at that venerable institution. Thinly veiled in that professor's

invective levelled at me was the implication that, because of their colonial experience, Muslim communities in Europe had the right to rebel and mobilise against the West.

Today we are still in the earlier stages of our fight against terrorism. Our task, I am afraid, will not have been finished even after radicalism and violence are contained. We will then have to turn to education before our task is completed. Only by rectifying the radicalised doctrinaire system adopted in an increased number of Muslim majority countries from the Indian Ocean to the MENA region we will be able to prevent resurgence of radicalism in the future.

The NATO Defense College Foundation has done a great service by organising this conference to address one of the key challenges of our time. We stand to learn a great deal at this conference today. I can only urge the College and the Foundation to take the lead and continue to address this enormous problem that still looms large ahead of us.

Session I

STRATEGIES AGAINST THE EVOLVING ARMED RADICALISM



Ancient ruin city of Palmyra in Syria, a UNESCO world heritage site of history.





LIESS BOUKRA

Managing Director, Institut National d'Études de Stratégie Globale, Algiers

THE CHAIR'S PERSPECTIVE

Many experts believe that the Islamic terrorism has come to an end. Is it true? I do not think so, we are entering into a new era, but terrorism will not decline automatically. We will face a new form of terrorism directed against tourism by two different transnational organisations: Daesh and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

What is the difference between them?

Today I read a report of an expert who said that we will see a new contradiction or struggle or big fight between these two movements. I do not think so, I mean the difference between AQIM and the Islamic State is the same difference we knew between Stalinism and Trotskyism. The first one considered Socialism in One Country the main element of the Bolshevik Revolution; the second one intended to lead a Permanent Revolution. For the time being, I think that there are enough resources for those terrorism groups to be legitimised and we will not see big struggles between them.

AQIM will establish itself in the Sahel area and in part of Africa. The Islamic State instead in the Middle East area, mainly between Jordan and Iraq.

It is important that, in dealing with these two organisations, we employ a different range of tools. I mean that the military tool should be less used than the ideological and political instrument. Indeed, it is not very difficult to combat against a political movement or a terrorist group, but it is extremely hard to struggle against ideas.

What can we do against ideas? What can we do against an ideology that considers the rest of the world as an enemy? What can we do against an ideology that thinks violence is legitimate against everybody?

It does not mean that the military solution is not necessary. The military solution is essential since we are facing a military organisation, but it is not enough to combat terrorism.

In that case, you will have to deal with the material roots of an ideology. What-

ever analysts say about the material roots of terrorism, poverty is one of the most important. I mean, if we are living in a society where the number of the losers is higher than the number of the winners, the loser will always ask for their part. Thus, poverty, inequality, lack of justice, unemployment and so on are the roots of jihadism.

First of all, the de-radicalisation has to deal with social questions and we have many examples on how to apply this strategy – i.e. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria – because if we do not reduce poverty and inequality, we will always be facing terrorism in one form or another.

Regarding ideology, it is made up by intellectuals to make legitimate the ideological structure of an organisation. Often, these intellectuals are financially supported by states.

It is imperative that we do not let these ideologies spread around our educational system at different levels. In some countries, the idea of a jihad against the *kāfir* – Muslims, Jews or Catholics and so on – is widespread in the books. We should also make a difference between de-radicalisation and the struggle against radicalisation.

The different experiences show that economic capacity is the essential element if we want to put into practice these anti-terrorism programmes. If we do not help weak states to have a de-radicalisation programme, we will never win this fight against this ideology. For some states, for instance the Sahelian ones, you will notice that they cannot sort the problem by themselves. In the last decade, we did a lot of progress but we still did not reach our objective. The important thing it is not fighting against terrorism but gain the hearts and minds of those who have been affected by this virus.



SIAN HUTCHINSON

*Programme Management Officer, the United Nations
Office of Counter-Terrorism, New York*

THE UN RESPONSE TO NEW TERRORIST CHALLENGES

The theme of this session is what counter-terrorism can achieve but also how governments and regional bodies can better cooperate on counter-terrorism. This also describes the role and the focus of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office and underlines one common and key challenge in order to have a tangible effect in this field.

My presentation today is focussing on three key elements. Firstly, I am going to briefly set up the current UN institutional architecture on counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism. I will focus on the role of my office – which is a kind of new body within the system –, then I am going to try bring you into a practical context looking at the operational impacts of the office in capacity building to have a look at the practical effects of this institutional architecture in action.

Basically, there are three key pieces of institutional architecture within the United Nations system:

- The global counter-terrorism strategy;
- The review process of that global counter-terrorism strategy;
- The UN preventing violent extremism (PVE) plan of action.

The global counter-terrorism strategy was adopted by the General Assembly by consensus in 2006, therefore it is almost out of date in the field of counter-terrorism and that is why they built a review process into the mechanism. This means that every two years this strategy is reviewed by the General Assembly, making it a living document.

We have just completed the sixth review of this strategy, in June 2018, and that review really focussed on strengthening international cooperation in the emerging areas of concern in global terrorism, i.e. managing the return of foreign fighters, countering terrorism exploitation of new technology and media, and looking at better ways to engage young people in PVE programmes.

The UN PVE plan of action embraces a comprehensive approach to ensure systematic preventive steps that address the conditions that drive individuals to radicalise and join violent extremist groups. It provides more than seventy prevention recommendations for member states and for the UN system itself. It directs actions to address the drivers of violent extremism, for instance socio-economic conditions, as well as conflict ones, and prison radicalisation with specific examples. It also looks at the radicalisation processes from the narrative to push and pull factors and provides seven priorities areas for action, from dialogue and conflict prevention to engaging communities, empowering youths through strategic communication on the internet and social media.

The UN global counter-terrorism strategy comprises four key pillars that are a kind of guidelines for all actions

Pillar I	Pillar II	Pillar III	Pillar IV
Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism	Measures to prevent and combat terrorism	Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard	Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism
PVE			PVE

Source: <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy>

Besides the three above-mentioned points, the fourth element of the UN institutional architecture, that is also the newest, is the Global Compact, signed in February 2018. It represents the largest coordination framework in the UN system, including 36 UN entities plus INTERPOL and the World Customs Organisation and it is really an important step towards the implementation of the principles of UN common action.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact:

- Represents political commitment by the heads of UN entities to strengthen coordination and coherence;
- Supports better implementation of the Global CT Strategy, including through joint projects;
- Looks at improving monitoring and evaluation and common resource mobilisation to increase effectiveness and support greater cohesion across the system.

It is supported by the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). UNOCT was established through the adoption of General Assembly resolution 71/291 the

15th of June 2017. Its establishment was the Secretary General's first reform initiative when he came into office and it was based on the mandate given by the Member States through the features of the global counter-terrorism strategy.

Mr. Vladimir Voronkov, from Russia, was appointed as Under-Secretary-General of the Office, on the 21st of June 2017. UNOCT has five key roles but there are three points that are more relevant to our discussion today.

- Provide leadership on the General Assembly CT mandates from across the UN system;
- Enhance coordination and coherence across the 38 Global Compact entities to ensure balanced implementations of the four pillars of the Global CT Strategy;
- Strengthen the delivery of UN CT capacity-building assistance.

All this is part of the UN Center for Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT) and I work in the capacity-building unit. We currently have over 30 active projects around the world that are related to a significant range of themes driven by operationalizing the elements of the PVE plan of actions and organizing as well the global PVE strategy combined with member states, regional organisations, civil society and industries. Following are some examples of our projects. At the moment, we have a very large project that looks at building capacities on using advanced passenger information and their name record data to detect, prevent and prosecute terrorists offenses and other serious crimes.

We have a global programme on countering-terrorism financing nations, also on a regional basis. We provide human rights training for border control and law enforcement officials. We are now looking at developing a global youth engagement strategy and the program that I run, i.e. preventing violent extremism through strategic communications.

Back to the purpose this of session, counter-terrorism through national and regional actions, what is the added-value of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office?

The capacity-building unit is really working hard to remain agile in response to the evolving threats by responding with iterative approaches. We are doing this through a close engagement with the Member States on their actual needs for capacity development but also using the UNOCT convening power to look for good practices, understanding the evidence-base and facilitating targetted capacity building.

Some examples of this iterative approach include the potential future consideration of issues such as capacity building on the needs of supporting the children of returned foreign terrorist fighters, better understanding the emerging threat from terrorism exploitation of new technologies and media. We are also working with the civil society organisations to better understand how the perspectives of civil society can be integrated in all levels of UNOCT work and consequently through the UN system. We want to do that looking at the strategic level but also at the practical level at the projects' delivery stage.

UNOCT has the advantage of working at the Headquarters level but it is also very much linked to practical CT and PVE work at the national and local level through the capacity-building unit. I found it interesting to present a couple of things we have learnt doing this work so far.

We found the states are often willing to engage with us. They are very collaborative to identify what the needs are in terms of building capacities. We also discovered that the most effective work is often partner's work grounded into local needs; in particular for PVE, as you all know, local context is absolutely critical for effective programming.



PETER NEUMANN

Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College, London

QUO VADIS ISIS?

I entitled my presentation “Quo vadis ISIS?” Where is it going to go? What is coming next with this particular organisation? You know, I cannot give you a definitive answer. I can, perhaps, point out some of the significant developments that, I believe, we need to consider.

There is a debate about what is going to happen with this organisation after the loss of its physical base in Syria and Iraq. There are some people, as Mr Hassan Hassan¹, who believe that ISIS would come back even within Syria and Iraq. Others believe, like Daveed Gartenstein-Ross², that there would be a relocation and ISIS would find another Caliphate in a different part of the world including, for example, North Africa. Moreover, there are people talking about the return of Al Qaeda, like Bruce Hoffman³, who believes that Al Qaeda would benefit from the crisis of legitimacy that ISIS is currently experiencing. These are very different predictions, but there is an emerging consensus about it.

First of all, DAESH and all its members are not going away. There are so many people that have joined this organisation during the past years that it is impossible to imagine that this ideology, the movement that it has created, would simply disappear. Secondly, the most important consensus to be considered now is that we are in a moment of profound change and, in 10, 20 or 30 years we will look back at this period as a period during which this movement has become something else. What it would become is currently to be decided. That is why it is so important to pay attention now on it, even though in Europe, for example, the number of terrorist attacks has somewhat declined.

Now, I would like to give three positive developments in addition to some more troubling ones in order to allow you to make up your own mind-set at the end of it.

1 Hassan Hassan (1982) is an American author and journalist of Syrian origin.

2 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross (1976) is an American counter-terrorism scholar and analyst.

3 Bruce Hoffman (1954) is a political analyst specializing in the study of terrorism and counterterrorism and insurgency and counter-insurgency.

Undoubtedly, the first positive development regards the fact that ISIS has lost 98% of the territory that it used to have in 2014; this region is now back in the hands of the Syrian, Iraqi and Kurdish governments. To sum up, it has lost its operational basis i.e. the place from where organizing terrorist attacks abroad.

Secondly, but equally important – I would say even more important, based upon what was said by other speakers – is that ISIS has not only lost a physical base, it has also lost its utopia. The reason why 5-6.000 young Western Europeans have gone to Syria and Iraq in order to fight was because they were told about a new state, a new society. Young men were told that in a thousand years people would still talk about the brave young Westerns who have recreated the Caliphate.

This illusion has now been defeated and we can already see that for the first time people are asking critical questions: is this the real Islamic State that we had been promised? And, if it is so, how is it possible that three years later it has already been destroyed? Moreover, we should consider that in the last years it has been observed that, since ISIS has been physically destroyed, we would expect, as a consequence, even more people populating the internet. This means that the physical Caliphate would have become a virtual Caliphate: but that has not happened. My colleague Charlie Winter⁴, in 2015, charted out and mapped all the media offices of the Islamic State. He counted 37 offices responsible of producing propaganda for the Islamic State or in its name. Comparing this data with 2018, out of those 37 media, only five of them survived. This does not mean that there is no ISIS propaganda on the internet, it has been only much reduced.

The third point is about terror plots, especially in Europe. I am talking from a European perspective because I am European. You can clearly see that, despite what people say and feel, the number of plots has not substantially declined.

Generally, small plots instead of big ones, a knife attack instead of a bomb explosion for example, are less connected to ISIS. We have in fact the so called “lone operator” who has never formally joined the organisation. We also know that the recruitment into the jihadist networks has slowed down and practically very few people in European countries are now joining the networks that support ISIS. To summarise, even if the number of plots is still relatively high, there are positive news within that development: the virtual Caliphate has not resisted; 98% of the ISIS territories has been taken away and recruitment has gone down. These are the good news, here come the bad news.

The first bad news is that no one knows exactly how the so-called “returnee threat” is going to play out. In the last five years, 40.000 people from 100 different countries have gone to Syria and Iraq, and the vast majority of them joined ISIS. Clearly, the largest European countries, such as United Kingdom, France and Germany, produced the largest number of foreign fighters. But interestingly,

⁴ Charlie Winter is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre on the Study of Radicalisation – King’s College, London.

smaller European countries produced in proportion a higher number of foreign fighters: for instance, Belgium – the most strongly affected country – but you could probably also mention Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and possibly, Austria. These are often countries that do not have a lot of experience with countering terrorism and have also small security agencies. They all face a significant challenge in moving forward.

If we now look at the returnees, some colleagues from the King's College in London, have put together all the official figures on how many Western Europeans that have gone to Syria, now came back⁵. Basically, without going into the detail, you can see that about a third of the people who have left for Syria and Iraq have already returned; about 20% of them have died on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq and the remaining 40% is still in the region being part of the ISIS. Over the next 5, 10 or 15 years they may return back into the Western society. Probably, some of them have disengaged from ISIS, while some others are still considered to be dangerous as they could represent the next generation of jihadist about which we have to worry about.

My prediction is that, as result of these returnees, we will not necessarily see more terrorist attacks in terms of quantity, but we will face a professionalisation of those attacks. Just before I mentioned a lot of very simple terrorist attacks, such as the knife attack example, carried out by lone attackers. If these experienced fighters are coming back, they will bring expertise and skills that would make terrorist plots bigger and more significant. I do not think that it was an accident that the largest terrorist attack that has happened in Europe in the last years, the Bataclan attack in Paris, was carried out almost exclusively by returned foreign fighters who had been trained in Syria and Iraq. In conclusion, I do not think that we will necessarily see more attacks, but the quality, the intensity of these attacks would increase.

A second concerning development is, of course, the continuous focus by ISIS on inciting terrorism. We still see that in the propaganda from ISIS – for example in Western countries – that people continue to be asked to join the Caliphate. This trend will continue, even with a reduced propaganda capability, because it is an indispensable component of the recruitment process. In conclusion, all the elements are in place to allow this brand of terrorism to continue even in uncertain conditions.

5 Joana Cook and Gina Vale, *From Daesh to 'Diaspora': Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State*, King's College, London, 2018.



ODED ERAN

Senior Researcher, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv

A MISSING COMMON PLATFORM FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM

I will continue the somehow gloomy predictions of Mr. Peter Neumann, who spoke before, saying that, although ISIS has been territorially defeated, it has not lost the ideology or the desire to continue the operations in the future. As Mr Liess Boukra said, the reservoir for hatred, the reservoir for resentment does not diminish. The growing number of disgruntled people in the world constitutes an enormous reservoir for terrorism.

I want to add something that has not been noted before.

Although it seems far from reach today, the means for terror will go through a modernisation. Today, if you want to kill one hundred people, you would need to bring the device by yourself. In the near future, the terrorists will master the technologies of cyber and the unconventional weapons and they will not need to move from their own room in order to destabilise societies. At the same time, the technology of UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) will be helping to combat terrorists by targeting them without people being directly on the ground.

Eventually, it is said that in about 20 or 30 years terrorists will be able to master nuclear, biological and chemical weapons that now are under the control of the states and para-states organisations, like Hezbollah, HAMAS and others. The question that is rising (which this panel was supposed to deal with) is the following: what can we do in order to face these problems whose existence is recognised by each of us?

The US secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, appeared the 4th of December at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels and said that we do not need to create new bureaucracies in order to fight terrorism. I am not so sure that he is right about the bureaucracies. Instead, the main issue is that the bureaucracies which are fighting the terrorism are not doing their job very well. I must say that I was very impressed by the presentation of Ms Sian Hutchinson but, in the meanwhile, I assure you that the states combatting against terrorism, in Syria and Iraq, did not use the United Nations as a platform to coordinate. Certainly on the military side, no

one would have gone to the United Nations with a piece of information that was needed, mostly coming from their intelligence.

Even though we have an international organisation dealing with world trade, the World Trade Organisation (WTO); an international organisation dealing with global education, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and an international organisation dealing with health, the World Health Organisation (WHO), there is no specific organisation fighting against terrorism. And I am not sure that the United Nations is really doing it.

This is not just a matter of intelligence and, although NATO is a starting point, it is not sufficient. Countries from the region can collaborate between them bilaterally; the next panels Chairmen are from Egypt and Jordan, Israel co-operates with these two states on intelligence and military issues. However, these are just three countries. Where is Turkey, for instance? It is a NATO member State and it has been involved in the past 5-6 years with terrorism since it was the country through which terrorists transited going to the Middle East. Where is it today in terms of co-operation?

Furthermore, if NATO is a possible base, where is Russia in the sharing of intelligence? Russia is present in Syria; is it sharing the intelligence information that is gathered on the ground with other countries? I doubt it, but, on the other side, would NATO or the other states co-operate with Russia on these issues? I do not think so.

There is also a serious question related to how creating a combination of military, intelligence, social and economic tools to cope not only with ISIS and the future terrorist movements, but also with the discontents' reservoir within societies.

I agree with Mr Neumann saying that those who survived will be the "stars" of their villages once back. Since I am in Italy, I will use a football metaphor, they are the Juventus stars – sorry for saying that in Rome. Thus, back to their villages, they will train the youngest perpetuating the knowledge that they have acquired working with ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, how is it possible to be engaged in fighting against all these aspects at the same time?

I think that the United Nations are not the right platform as I am not even sure that the different UN agencies co-operate among each other. Concluding, I believe that it is necessary to start from somewhere and that NATO could provide a basis for international military and intelligence collaboration.

Session II

TERRORIST FUNDING: A LYNCHPIN BETWEEN EXTREMISM AND ARMED OPERATIONS



Women enrolling their children and grandchildren at school in Qayyarah, where a group of teachers opened a school few weeks after the liberation from ISIS. Qayyarah (IQ)





MAHMOUD KAREM

Professor, British University and Former Ambassador to NATO and the EU and Commissioner Human Rights Council, Cairo

THE CHAIR'S PERSPECTIVE

Despite the most recent achievements on the ground against ISIS (and here I would like to say that ISIS is not Islamic in any way), I think that it is too early to lower the guard, rejoice or slip into a mandatory hibernation. We should remain vigilant and actually we need to increase cooperation on a much wider scale. The enemy is indeed changing clothes in order to look very much like us. Today the NATO Foundation has assembled a panel with highly distinguished experts who will speak from national and international experiences. But allow me, as Chairman of this session, to say a few introductory remarks.

In dealing with terrorism we should always track down the root causes and I would like to list some of them:

RELIGIOUS ROOT CAUSES

First of all, there are misconceptions and wrong interpretations of Islam, Quran, Sharia, Hadith¹ and the meaning of Jihad, leading to intellectual and religious beliefs' deviations. In Egypt now we are talking and acting vehemently on the correction of religious discourse. Some use these differences of interpretations to issue fatwas and inflame the scene. Some of these old inflammatory misinterpretations by Ibn Taymiyyah are being recalled and used today without appropriate rebuttal. I acknowledge that Al Azhar is doing its best. We should as well acknowledge the failure of state and religious institutions in facing jihadist ideology and propaganda. The fight for Minarets and Friday sermons in some Arab countries before the Friday prayer is leading to spreading factionalism and sectarianism. In Egypt, after witnessing the taking of control of mosques by certain religious Islamic groups,

¹ Hadith (Traditions as narrative and record) in Islam are the record of the words, actions and the silent approval or disapproval, of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Within Islam the authority of Hadith as a source for religious law and moral guidance ranks second only to that of the Quran.

the Ministry in charge (Ministry of Awkaf – Ministry of Religious Endowments), is now ensuring that imams who deliver the Friday sermon and prayer are taught by Al Azhar,² are moderate and will not use the mosques to inflame feelings and agitate mind-sets against fellow Coptic Christians.

It should not be forgotten that one of the first demands of the so-called ‘Political Islam’ during the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) one-year rule of Egypt that ended in 2013, was to appoint their MB members as ministers for Religious affairs and Education in order to mould public opinion. Thus, there is still a dire need to augment and support the role of Al Azhar as a beacon of Islamic compassion and moderation over more than thousand years. Any attempt to change Egypt’s historic compassionate national cultural identity has to be carefully stopped. The tendency to dismantle the state apparatus’ bodies and their authority in favour of a “Muslim Caliphate” that strives to rule the world remains an on-going trend everywhere by the MB. Main targets are the state-centric approach as a western invention, nationalism and its symbols such as the army, police, judiciary, flag, national anthem, etc.

We must dry out local and global sources of terrorism funding by augmenting state control over illegal financial dealings, money laundering, surreptitious use of voluntary or zakat³ money, charity funds, and similar. In this regard, a great deal on information sharing to detect and interdict these tacit surreptitious tactics and means is warranted and calls for immediate international cooperation.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATION

Old and traditional societies have not been - and still are - able to cope with the rapid and all-encompassing process of westernisation and modernisation; while inevitably confronting themselves with the West in a postcolonial setting, they are still fighting against the theories of the clash of civilisation and ruling paradigms.

ECONOMIC ROOT CAUSES

Economic malaise, poverty, unemployment and lack of social justice, are of course all facilitating the recruitment of people by terrorist groups.

2 Al Azhar is an Egyptian mosque in Islamic Cairo. Starting from around 1000 AD, the mosque slowly developed into what is today the second oldest continuously run university in the world. Al-Azhar University has long been regarded as the foremost institution in the Islamic world for the study of Sunni theology and sharia, or Islamic law. The university, integrated within the mosque as part of a mosque school since its inception, was nationalised and officially designated an independent university in 1961, following the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.

3 Zakat is a form of alms-giving treated in Islam as a religious obligation or tax, which, by Quranic ranking, is next after prayer in importance.

POLITICAL ROOT CAUSES

Speaking from a strictly political perspective, one should consider several sources of instability. Palestine is a classic case of injustice, and it is urgent to solve the Palestinian issue with a two-state solution. Then, we are witnessing Afghanistan's long-lasting conflict and the concrete threat of the returnees' phenomenon. We now have fear from the returnees from Syria as well. Who will straighten, rectify and place back on the good track the minds of 1.400 children born in Syria from European jihadists?

Moreover, at a national level, discrimination, racism and xenophobia are spreading internally, while propaganda and mass killing scenes are being constantly broadcasted on live TV. Not to mention the defamation of religions, as in the previous case of Denmark and France, under the pretext of freedom of expression.

EDUCATIONAL VOID

Poor education remains a major concern, especially in remote countryside areas where the role of the madrasah⁴ is stronger than the one of local schools. Well-known ideas sold to suicide bombers such as "*if you die you shall be met by 70 feminine angel brides in heaven*", are a classic example of poor education allowing and leading to mind control.

SOCIAL ROOT CAUSES

Youth accounting for more than 40% of the population in many Arab countries, is suffering from side-lining and lack of attention: governments need to involve them politically and to set up new labour-intensive economic projects, especially tailored for young people.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Persistent dictatorships, autocracies, tortures, abuses of human, political and civil rights, poor political participation and the lack of institutionalisation and good governance are all elements that have led to the so-called Arab Springs, and can still encourage instability.

TECHNOLOGICAL ROOT CAUSES

A main rising trend concerns the new cyber world and the advances in IT that are facilitating the spread of terrorism and internet recruitment. We need to in-

4 A madrasah is a school where the Islamic sciences are taught.

crease international cooperation to prevent malicious sites, social media from diffusing twisted ideologies and fundamentalist dogma around the world.

After having briefly resumed the root causes, I would like to talk shortly about two other relevant subjects: what we do against terrorism and the importance of the state in its fullest sense.

EGYPT'S WAR ON TERRORISM

"Comprehensive Operation – Sinai 2018" is the code name of a large counter-terrorism campaign conducted by the Egyptian Armed Forces and the Interior Ministry. The operation began the 9th of February 2018, and concentrated its effort on northern and central Sinai and parts of the Nile Delta. It mainly targeted terrorists, as well as "*other criminal activity that affects national security and stability*", according to the Armed Forces press statement that announced the start of the campaign.

The Al-Rawda mosque attack of late November 2017 – the deadliest of its kind in Egypt's modern history –, killed more than 300 innocent worshippers, men and children, leaving the whole village without one single male.

In May 2017 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Egypt's President Abdel Fattah El Sisi stated and I quote:

"First, talking about countering terrorism in a comprehensive manner means confronting all terrorist organisations without discrimination. Our battle is part and parcel of the global war against terrorism. We are committed to defeating terrorist organisations and extending a helping hand as well as partnership to all allies in the fight against these organisations everywhere.

Second, a comprehensive confrontation with terrorism necessitates a confrontation that addresses all dimensions of this phenomenon, including funding, arming, as well as political and ideological support. A terrorist is not only the one who carries arms, but a terrorist is also the one who trains, funds, arms and offers a political and ideological cover.

Let me speak frankly and ask: where are the safe havens that are offered for terrorist organisations to train their fighters, treat their wounded, and make changes and replacements of their equipment? Who buys from them the natural resources they control, like oil? Who is involved with them in the trade of antiquities and narcotics? Where do they receive the financial donations from? How are they offered media presence through media outlets that have accepted to become a propaganda platform for terrorist organisations?"

THE “STATE” IMPERATIVE

Last September 2018, in the General Assembly of the United Nations, Egypt cautioned against states failing in the Middle East and the attempts by terrorism to weaken and collapse state’s central authorities and institutions. A resolution was also presented before to the UNSC 2370 on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons. The outcome is the easy take over by terrorists of our region. Unfortunately, this is being done with the help of some who myopically fail to read the far and long-range disastrous outcomes of their acts.

Filling the vacuum in which terrorism grows and proliferates requires exerting every effort to restore and reinforce the unity, independence and efficiency of national state institutions in the Arab region.



LOUISE SHELLEY
*Director, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and
Corruption Center, and Professor, Schar School of Policy
and Government, George Mason University, Arlington*

THE CHANGING POST-IS GEO-ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM AND TRAFFICKING

The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center that I direct has just been awarded the contract to provide the statistical appendix for the US State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism. This has been done by another University before. As this is an important new activity for us, I am very eager to hear your inputs as we set out to start doing this in the new year. I can assure you, we are not going to be referring to people as insurgents when they are engaged in acts of terrorism. We are going to try and do our best and want to have people advise us in order to compile this database correctly.

The previous panel provided a wonderful introduction to what I am to talk about: the issue of terrorism funding. Both Ambassador Oded Eran and Mr Peter Neumann talked about the cyber world. This is where we need to be focussing more today because ISIS, when it had territories, could rely on extortion, it could smuggle oil that was on its territories, it could benefit enormously from taxing human smuggling. But now, that it has been deprived of its territories, it is going to be increasingly involved in raising money through the cyber world. One thing that we need to be thinking about is that ISIS follows many trends that we see in illicit finance generally. It has been using natural resources, oil, timber to finance itself a common practice among other terrorist groups. So ISIS is not unique, it operates in terms of the latest trends in illicit trade.

Terrorist groups have deliberately recruited among individuals with tech skills. If you think about the terrorists behind the Bali bombings¹, they were carrying out some of their business and their fundraising on the Internet. Part of the problem

¹ The 2002 Bali bombings occurred on the 12th of October 2002 in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali. The attack killed 202 people (including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, and people of more than 20 other nationalities). A further 209 people were injured. See Louise I. Shelley, *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime and Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 33-36. Various members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a violent Islamist group, were convicted in relation to the bombings, including three individuals who were sentenced to death.

in countering terrorist financing today is that the terrorists are using social media that are in most cases encrypted. Therefore, it is impossible to follow what they are doing. Peter Neumann mentioned some of the future challenges of terrorism. Clearly, the widespread use of new technology by terrorists means they do not need to leave their houses to have serious negative consequences on society.

To examine the trends in illicit trade that funds terrorism, I will discuss the research that the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center has done on following antiquities smuggling from Iraq and Syria. To do this analysis we employed a multilingual staff working in Arabic, Kurdish, Farsi, Turkish, trying to understand how this illicit trade operates.

You can go into sites, such as Reddit, a massive site on the web and find instructions on how to operate within the Darknet. So, we are finding links between the open surface web and the Darknet. What have we found on antiquities in our research that was funded by the US State Department?

We are not seeing a lot of this antiquities trade going on in the Dark Web. Why? Because it does not need to go on in the Dark Web when there are so many possibilities for outreach to customers on the Internet.

First of all, one of the problems that we have today is that it is hard to separate the licit and the illicit. This was the case with ISIS oil smuggling. It is hard to separate out the legal oil from the smuggled oil. The same can be said about the antiquities. Traders can combine coins that are smuggled with coins that have been in the West for a certain period of time. Therefore, without the provenance of the item it is not possible to determine whether this is an illegal commodity and it makes it easier to operate without detection. Very few people are numismatics professionals.

Apart from the blurring of the legal in the illegal, you have the extortion of looters and traders in the antiquities trade by terrorist groups as well as others. In Syria and in Iraq it is not just ISIS benefiting from the illegal antiquities trade but also officials of the Assad government. Everybody is engaged in looting for their own benefit; terrorists do not have a monopoly on this.

I had researched this illicit antiquities topic for my recently released book, *Dark Commerce*,² over the past several years. Our research team, consisting of archaeologists with all different kinds of experience as well as our specialists in crime and terrorism, achieved results independently from what I had done previously. Their in-depth analysis revealed results that were remarkably similar to what my independent research had concluded previously. Illicit trade, including in antiquities, helps fund the perpetuation of conflicts including terrorism.

There has been a profound transformation of the illicit antiques trade. Before the rise and mass use of the internet, the illicit trade was that of select items of high

2 Louise I. Shelley, *Dark Commerce, How a New Illicit Is Threatening our Future* (Princeton: Princeton, University Press, 2018).

value such as large-scale sculptures that would often be sold through high-end dealers in the West. But with the rise of web-based trade and the internet there has been a profound transformation. It has democratised and made illicit items more accessible.

Today the increasing number of illicit transactions involving antiquities benefits diverse actors in the Middle East. Individuals buy through websites, and use various payment forms including Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. They are also using credit cards and online bank transfers.

What our team found, working with some of the top numismatic and Mesopotamian specialist is that a large numbers of coins are sold with a provenance that is not clear and you do not know, whether they left the country before 1970. They can be illegally traded or they are mixed with other commodities. Through false documentation and subterfuge, key elements of illicit trade, the origins of antiquities can be obscured. Traders also manipulate the cuneiform writing to make it more marketable and command higher prices. They also deal in counterfeits. Terrorists and members of the Assad government deal in recently looted antiquities and, at the same time, sell counterfeits.

How do we know that both terrorists and Assad supporters are behind this illicit trade? This takes a little more digging online but, with a good team of cyber specialists, you can tease out relationships and networks. As Dr Peter Neumann highlighted in his remarks, understanding the networks and relationships is key to knowing who is benefiting from this trade. Through analysis of the networks online we learn that these antiques are being sold by people who are supporters of terrorists. The evidence for this are the pictures associated with their accounts. They are visible online. Facebook profiles of sellers reveal that sellers' friends supported Saddam Hussein or terrorists groups.

In looking at funding trends, there are certain things common to all terrorist groups. For example, one of the greatest increases in illicit trade has been in the trade of natural resources, discussed in my recent book *Dark Commerce*. This illicit trade in natural resources is undermining the sustainability of the planet. Therefore, the harm of the terrorists is not confined only to terrorist acts. But they are doing other things that undermine life on this planet. They are involved in illicit commerce in oil, minerals in Afghanistan and are also heavily involved in the illicit timber trade there. The same thing is going on with the FARC³; they are involved in the gold trade and, before the negotiations with the Colombian government, the FARC made more money from the trade in gold than from drugs. This transformation in funding sources for terrorism is occurring not only in one region of the world. Terrorists everywhere in the world are benefiting from the trade in natural resources because they are capitalising on this new target of opportunity.

3 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (Spanish: *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*, FARC-EP and FARC).

They, like the criminals, to which they are associated, can optimise their profits in “time sensitive industries” and we are living in what I call a “time-sensitive planet.”

The routes of the antiquities originating from Iraq and Syria trade are complex traversing Turkey, Lebanon, Bulgaria, Israel, UAE and even some of the traders have relocated to Thailand. Some of these illicitly trade antiquities figured in a prominent legal case in the United States. The family that owns Hoppy Lobby established a new Biblical museum in Washington DC. The owners of Hobby Lobby were fined millions by the US federal government because they did not listen to their legal counsel and proceeded to purchase illicitly obtained antiquities through suspect dealers in order to put objects in the Bible museum. The multi-million dollar fine was not significant for them. The museum founders were very happy to display stolen antiques that might support terrorism.

The Bible Museum case reveals the western market. There is also presumably a market for high-end Islamic antiques in the Middle East. But we know less about this trade because that proceeds through personal networks rather than through the cyberworld.

What is the significance of this finding? Terrorists are benefiting from new technology as are many others engaged in illicit trade. They are using not only the internet but also social media. Facebook has facilitated the weapons trade out of Libya. In *Dark Commerce*, I wrote about the diverse Libyan weaponry traded through Facebook. Social media also facilitates the illicit cigarette trade that supports terrorism as traders communicate through Facebook.

There has been a transformation in the use of technologies that has benefited terrorists. They have gone through the same transformation as have others using the new technology. First, sales occurred on eBay (which is an internet-based trade), and since the 2000s they have increasingly shifted to Facebook, Snapchat, WhatsApp, and Instagram.

Some of the facilitators are American owned corporations. When we talk about what states should do, we also need to think about what corporations need to do to stem threat finance. Even though, we have been cracking down on our corporations as supporters of terrorism, it is mostly in regards to hate speech and not into how they are facilitating the financing of terrorism. That is a key element of countering terrorism. But greater regulation of the internet and social media by companies is expensive. Therefore, pressure needs to be placed by the international community on the tech world by explaining that national and global security are more important than just making profits.

In our future efforts to cut off financing to terrorists, we need to understand the following: the relationships of terrorist supporters, understand the flows of information between the open net, the world wide web and the Dark web. What are the important trends? Unfortunately before 9/11 and especially since then, we see tech-savvy terrorists. They are part of the billions worldwide using encrypted social media, particularly WhatsApp. These communications are becoming harder

to penetrate. But this form of social media is also used to fund terrorists.

There is a need for changes in the US commercial code that will require companies to be responsible for what they offer on their platforms. American law prohibits platforms housing terrorist websites and facilitating hate speech. But they are not required to ensure that terrorists are not abusing their platforms for terrorist financing. Enhanced regulations are needed to ensure that terrorists are not financing themselves online and through social media.

In addition to expanding regulation, the international community must focus much more on public-private partnerships. Cyberspace in which the terrorist are operating today, are not territories controlled by states but territories controlled by corporations that are running social media and platforms. To achieve results in countering the funding of terrorism requires law enforcement and intelligence to work with the corporate world requiring them to be good corporate citizens.



ERNESTO SAVONA

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DE-MATERIALISATION AND NEW TERRORIST BUSINESS MODELS

The title of my presentation is in some way connected with Mr Peter Neumann also if we did not speak before. This means, my answer to the “*quod vadis?*” question is: we go towards a new business model. The topics of this presentation are de-materialisation, fiscal crisis and, with a very big question mark, are we going towards a new business model? I am developing these three concepts, explaining how these three key words are connecting one with the others. But also suggesting, if the hypothesis of this the new business is real, what we can do against.

Of course, the idea of de-materialisation comes when you see all these maps [at the of this article in *Appendix 1*].

But it means ISIL is losing territory. This is one of the components of the business model, the old one. And the business model of the existing ISIL was based on different sources, as the Financial Action Task Force is pointing out: abductions, external funding, and internal material revenues coming from extortion and taxes and others.

This is something we know perfectly. Which are the main components of the business model of ISIL for what we know today? How much do they spend? I found some figures that give you the amount of revenues and the amount of expenses and they show that the net income is lowering and lowering.

The components of this model are:

- territory (ISIL is one of the few terrorist groups that possessed a territory);
- different revenue sources;
- the imposition of taxes on the population (something unique in recent history);
- finally the expenditures towards the people - militaries and civilians.

These are the components of the old business model including also the Net which is very important, meaning technology.

The new business model, what it is going to be? My hypothesis is that ISIL is slowly moving towards a new model of transnational organised crime, following the history of all the terrorist groups that in the world have been moving from local terrorism to a much more stable organised crime structure. There is a general rule that will be following ISIL which is exploiting more opportunities in tandem with the fragility of the local states. This has been happening everywhere in the world. Somalia is an example. It is the case where the weakness of the state led to more organised crime activities. If you look to the territories where ISIL has haunted (Syria, Iraq, and the others, Libya included) this will explain you what the fragility of the states means.

Let me go more into details and say that social media are one of the assets of the new business model. Peter Neumann was saying that terrorists meet on Internet. It is exactly what we do, when we do teleconferencing. You remember, 10 years ago, we researchers were meeting physically; today we do 90% of our meetings on the internet. They do exactly the same thing which is cheap, fast and often anonymous. They have also limited personnel with professional experience. Many foreign fighters have gone back but some of them are there. It is a group of people that has a quite good experience and in a business model this is relevant in order to build something new, more effective, more efficient.

Changing the business model is also a key for surviving. Usually, when industries change their business model it is because they need to survive, otherwise they go bankrupt. They have now territories, \$400 millions of assets and a strong media capability. If you look at what they are doing in terms of extortion, or what they have been doing before and are still doing today, it is interesting that now they are extorting the construction companies rebuilding the liberated territories. Considering what big business is rebuilding territories destroyed by war, this will attract American and European firms with an interest in investing and working on the territory. Extortion will be against these companies and in this way, they will apply the same methodology of the past terrorist groups.

Revenues will be smaller but still present and extortion against construction companies is very familiar to those who are studying organised crime - we call it infiltration in the legitimate economy. It is exactly what organised crime in a second generation does: infiltrating in the legitimate economy. This is going to be a big business because these are the opportunities you find in the territory. Therefore, the mix of opportunities and fragility of state nurtures the development of organised crime.

What are the remedies we need to think about?

If ISIL will be moving toward a new model of business, which means a mix of transnational organised crime and a mix of terrorism, I think policies should be taking into account the best of both. First, stopping revenues through the reduction of opportunities of approach. No more criminal sanctions, or still criminal sanctions but you need to think about how to reduce the opportunities for traf-

ficking. Anything Ms Louise Shelley has been speaking about antiques, oil, everything which comes is an opportunity for these people to survive. Once again we go back to the old Leitmotiv of controlling terrorist financing. However, it looks like not working very well because, according to the Financial Action Task Force, this is not a very positive response, at least for the financial world.


Let me say something relevant in relations to what Ms Shelley said. Engaging customs authorities for trafficking could be a new relevant issue because these people could intercept a lot of trafficking that goes across the customs. Customs could become the pillar of the reduction of the opportunities of approach in different ways. Oil is there, antiques are there and many other things are going through customs. Which could be the remedies? The Financial Action Task Force and its regional-style bodies collect information about its ongoing initiatives to counter terrorist financing, implement the asset freeze and promote awareness of the ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Despite the significant work undertaken to date, the Task Force's mutual evaluation process revealed that such targeted financial sanctions are not being utilised in an effective manner and that further efforts must be undertaken

I am concluding, saying that monitoring illicit financial flows works - I do not know how much - but it could work more in the future. In addition, even the United Nations are including this approach within the social development programmes.


As the Caliphate disappears, much of the counter-ISIL mission should transit from military force to law enforcement. Intelligence will be essential for these forces to combat ISIL's renewed efforts to earn revenue through taxation and extortion.


De-materialisation of ISIL is changing the old business model into a new one that could help ISIL to survive at local level and, if achieved, tomorrow at international level. Assets are still available, trafficking, extortion, crimes, even if in a reduced scale, are still employed. Expert personnel are still available and media are still active. There are all the components for assuming that ISIL could move towards a new form of transnational organised crime with relevant infiltration in the legitimate economy. Not very different from the evolution of other criminal organisations.


Lessons learned from the today experience could be transformed in understanding the changes in new terrorism paradigms helping policy makers and practitioners to be effective and efficient in their fight.




The map above shows IS territorial control after a few months since its proclamation. Control zones are displayed in black, IS attack zones in red and IS support zones in brown. The green zones refer to Iraqi territories held by Iraqi Kurdistan forces. Source: http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2014/09/isis-sanctuary-map-september-10-2014_10.html









Source: Wallace B., Cafarella J., ISIS Second resurgence, Institute for the Study of War, 2 October 2018 (<http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/10/isis-second-resurgence.html>)



HAFIDA BENCHEHIDA
*Senator of the Algerian Parliament, Foreign Affairs
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ISIS AND ITS FINANCIAL FLOWS

Today I will talk about the funding of terrorist networks, and I will start with a very quick quotation: they called ISIS “*the richest terrorist organisation in the world*”.

The narrative started on a sunny day of June 2014, when ISIS militias capture a big city in Iraq, Mosul. Billions of dollars were looted since that day: when they were dominating the territory, not only they looted the Central Bank, but they immediately started selling oil and antiquities, ransacking houses that had been abandoned by their former owners, imposing taxes on transport and people. Why have they done that? They have done that to make people believe that they had a sort of legitimacy, as if there was a full-fledged state that could take taxes and provide also services. This is how their propaganda has attracted a lot of people.

Indeed, terrorist groups must cover at least two categories of expenses. They have direct costs to cover preparations, transports, arms, vehicles, safe hiding places, clandestine houses, counterfeit ID documents and food; they also have to give hope to all the fighters - be they women, men or youngsters - that they have attracted to their networks. Then, they have recurrent costs for recruitment, propaganda, high-tech technologies, financing dormant cells, and, of course, gathering intelligence from everybody.

Now, for all those expenses, there are two different types of funding: the endogenous - that means local - type of funding and the exogenous sources of funding.

Among the endogenous taxes, there are the direct taxes, just like one pays his taxes in his own country: they tax individuals as well as all kind of economic transactions. And they have done the same in Algeria. In fact, let me just add a parenthesis here. Nowadays everybody is talking about the funding of ISIS, but Algeria has gone through practically the same thing for more than 10-12 years: terrorist groups like the GIA¹ were doing exactly the same thing. Before me, his Excellency

1 From the French “*Groupe Islamique Armé*” - Armed Islamic Group. It was one of the two main Islamist

Ambassador Karem was talking about the funding of mosques. Well, it was the same in Algeria. Big part of that money did not go to the concrete build-up of state and infrastructure; it was used to train, fund, feed and cover terrorists instead.

Another example of what DAESH has been doing - just as the GIA in Algeria has done - was to control the traffic on the highways: they collect taxes through drivers. Again, there really is an equivalence: both used the qualitative aspect of the “prerogative of the State”.

Endogenous local funding comes also from *zakaat*². In all Muslim countries we are supposed to pay the *zakaat* as a sort of an every-year tax, but it can also easily go straight into terrorist groups’ cashiers.

Kidnapping too has always been a very important source of funding: the hostage is used as if it was traded in a stock exchange, being bargained from one group to another, while the ransom to be paid continues to increase. At the end of the day, the group that has kidnapped the hostage in the first place is never the one that collects the money for releasing it.

Then there is the connection between organised crime, petty crime and trafficking in counterfeit goods, medicines, IDs, cigarettes - and here I cannot not quote Mokhtar Belmokhtar, very famous in Southern Algeria, who is also called “Mr Marlboro” since he was the major gangster trafficking in counterfeit cigarettes. There is this superposition of the two types of funding: one is feeding the other. The petty crime feeds the terrorists; the terrorists recruit the criminals in different types of activities.

As it has already been said, they also leverage natural resources such as oil. We all know that ISIS, between 2014 and 2016, was selling oil daily between \$1 million to \$3 million, and that has been going on for few years.

Then there has been what I briefly mentioned at the beginning, the looting of the Mosul Central Bank in June 2014: in that occasion, between \$500 million and \$1 billion were taken by ISIS.

As long as ISIS had its own territorial capacity to collect taxes, to make people pay, either directly or indirectly, or to receive what it used to receive from abroad, from NGOs - be they local or foreign - they had a lot of money. Since 2015, when the Tidal Wave II Operation³ begun, things have started to change and, at the end of 2017, they had lost more than 62% of their territory, together with a lot of their funding.

To talk about the external sources of funding, I just would like to mention a book called “*Les dollars de la terreur : les États-Unis et les islamistes*”, written by a

insurgents groups that fought the Algerian government and army in the Algerian Civil War. The other was the MIA “*Mouvement Islamique Armé*”¹, Islamic Armed Movement.

2 *Zakat* is a form of alms-giving treated in Islam as a religious obligation or tax, that is an obligation next after prayer in importance, according to the Quran.

3 Operation Tidal Wave II is a US-led coalition military operation started in October 2015 against oil transport, refining and distribution facilities and infrastructure under the control of ISIL.

French expert, Richard Labévière, who lists all the funding coming from so-called “charities” from many Gulf countries. In addition to this phenomenon, there is also the funding from Muslim communities abroad: we have seen funds being transferred from England, Germany and even small countries such as Belgium, where a lot of money was collected in broad daylight during the market-day on Sunday, under the guise of humanitarian assistance for other people.

In conclusion, solving the issue of the financial flows to terrorism requires a lot of effort.

Yes, we know that the United Nations has already a mechanism that is monitoring financial transactions, but not all the transactions go through the formal banking system. There are several underground networks: among them, the *hawala* system⁴ is well known, especially with Al-Shabaab in Somalia, or in Kenya. Besides that, when terrorists kidnap someone, they are now asking to be paid not only in euros or dollars, but in Bitcoins. And this is just one of the very innovative activities that unfortunately we are witnessing. Another example of what can be a new source of funding is visible in African region of the Lake Chad. Nobody has talked a lot about it, but local populations are selling fish and the income is also transferred to terrorist groups.

4 *Hawala* is a popular and informal value transfer system based not on the movement of cash, or on telegraph or computer network wire transfers between banks, but instead on the performance and honour of a huge network of money brokers. Informal records are produced of individual transactions, and a running tally of the amount owed by one broker to another is kept. Settlements of debts between hawala brokers can take a variety of forms (such as goods, services, properties, transfers of employees, etc.), and do not need to be direct cash transactions.



MATTHEW LEVITT

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US FINANCIAL INTERDICTION POLICIES: RESULTS AND INTENTS OF THE CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION

The Islamic State faces battlefield defeat both in Iraq and Syria, and has lost more than 90 percent of its revenues since 2015. But despite these setbacks, the group and its affiliates continue to pose a significant and evolving threat around the world.

According to a UN report, “ISIL is now organized as a global network, with a flat hierarchy and less operational control over its affiliates.” In practice, this means that ISIL will become more reliant on individuals and small groups to carry out attacks, using social media and encrypted communication platforms to connect with its operatives and regional affiliates. “Frustrated travelers” – meaning individuals who attempted to travel to conflict zones but were unsuccessful and remain radicalized – as well as foreign terrorist fighter returnees and those fighters who relocate to other battlefields will also become more relevant as ISIL’s pool of recruits diminishes overtime.

But maintaining relationships with regional affiliates and supporting operatives and sympathizers around the world costs money. Despite losing access to massive oil income, the Islamic State continues to find ways to finance its insurgent and terrorist activities.

ISIL still moves money across the Middle East by means of the *awāla* system and cash couriers, as it did before the fall of its caliphate, and it still raises funds – in Syria and Iraq and in several of its so-called provinces, such as Libya – through extortion and controlling checkpoints, as well as imposing taxes on human smuggling and trafficking networks. The group also takes advantage of legitimate businesses, using them as fronts, as well as “clean” individuals through whom it can access the formal financial system.

As reconstruction efforts begin in territories liberated from the Islamic State, officials fear the group may be well placed to defraud international reconstruction efforts and investment in the local economy, especially through front companies in the construction and other industries. And the Islamic State still has access to

sufficient funds to invest in operations across the wider Middle East and beyond, far from the borders of Syria and Iraq. According to recent estimates, ISIL still has a budget of some \$300 million.

The group still provides some financing to its far-flung provinces. For example, ISIL core provided hundreds of thousands of dollars in financing for its affiliate in the Philippines – through a third country – in advance of the siege of Marawi City.

But supporting these provinces is becoming harder. For example, in Afghanistan, while ISIL continues to receive some funding from ISIL core, the local group has been encouraged to become self-sufficient. In Somalia, the past support from ISIL in Yemen is now considered to be limited and unreliable.

ISIL is likely to be financially resilient, however. Unlike al-Qaeda and other groups, ISIL was financially self-sufficient for about eight years as a terrorist and insurgent group before committing itself to running a proto-state. Remember that before it renamed itself the Islamic State, the group – then known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) – was financially independent by virtue of engaging in tremendously successful criminal activity enterprises domestically within Iraq.

According to a November 2006 U.S. government assessment cited in the New York Times, AQI and other groups had created a self-sustaining insurgency in Iraq, raising \$70 million to \$200 million a year from illegal activities alone. Documents from the Department of Defense's Harmony Database indicate that "outside donations amounted to only a tiny fraction – no more than 5 percent – of the group's operating budgets from 2005 until 2010, when Baghdadi took over after the deaths of two superiors."

The Islamic State still poses serious terrorist threats, but it is slowly becoming a more limited global threat as an organized institution and less reliable financial backer of its affiliates and operatives. That's the good news.

The bad news is that ISIL has pivoted from its organized, global model of terror operations to one that encourages small, cheap, and decentralized cells. In other words, the group's loss of revenues may not matter. Unlike large attacks orchestrated over time by large groups, lone offender and small group attacks can be carried out very quickly, with minimal funding and preparation. The result is that in some cases authorities could be denied both the lag time within which they can run an effective investigation and the benefit of key tripwires – like the ability to follow travel, communications, and financials trails – that in the past proved to be especially productive lines of investigative inquiry.

Terrorist attacks carried out by lone offenders or small groups are on the rise, especially coming on the heels of explicit calls by both Islamic State and al-Qaeda leaders for like-minded followers to carry out attacks in their home countries. ISIL has been pushing lone offender attacks for years now, and it understands these present real challenges for intelligence and law enforcement. In an online e-book

titled “How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide”¹, the group argued: “With less attacks in the West being group (networked) attacks and an increasing amount of lone-wolf attacks, it will be more difficult for intelligence agencies to stop an increasing amount of violence and chaos from spreading in the West.”

The terrorist threat from lone offenders or small groups is also magnified by the phenomenon of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Many of these battle-hardened fighters will move on to new battlefronts, some will die fighting, and others may return home disgruntled or disillusioned by what they saw in Syria and Iraq and prove no threat at home. But some will, and these could either act on their own or recruit a small group to carry out an attack.

According to a U.S. National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, authorities worry that the same way ISIL travelers fund most of their own travel to Syria and Iraq, the same type of simple self-funding could also underwrite attacks at home. The challenge is that by their very nature, lone offender and small-scale terrorist attacks are less vulnerable to many of the traditional tools in the counterterror finance toolkit.

Looking back at homegrown plots in the West – including both homegrown networks and lone offenders – several key patterns emerge:

Low-cost attacks. Lone offenders and small terror cells are able to keep costs low for their plots since they have few members to train and equip, rely on simple weapons, and in contrast to larger terrorist organizations, are not subject to the high and indirect costs of developing and maintaining a terrorist organization. Today, knives and cars are two commonly used weapons in small scale attacks. Both are unsophisticated, readily available, and often involve no costs at all since they are already in the possession of the attackers.

Self-financing. In many cases, lone offenders or small groups may self-finance their activities through legal means such as dipping into their own bank accounts or salaries, taking out a loan, receiving welfare payments, borrowing money from friends or family, engaging in petty crime, or working at a job to raise sufficient funds. They also generate funding through illegal activities. And, with fewer opportunities for error, and lacking the need to amass large amounts of money that could raise suspicions, self-financed attacks are actually more likely to be successfully carried out than attacks that receive external funding.

Though most lone offenders or small groups are self-funded, there are examples of lone offenders who have connections to terrorist organizations and receive external monetary support to carry out attacks abroad. In March 2018, U.S. investigators uncovered an ISIL financial network that was transferring money to an operative in the United States through false eBay transactions. The recipient, Mohammed El Shinawy, pretended to sell printers on eBay as a cover for the payments he was receiving through PayPal and Western Union for “operational

1 See: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/863.pdf>

purposes” in the United States. Transfer methods. According to UN reporting, ISIL core “sent money to places where it does not have affiliates...in an attempt to prepare for its eventual military defeat” in Syria and Iraq. In other words, not only is ISIL preparing to move funds to its other provinces, it is also moving funds to other places where newly inspired followers or returning FTFs can use ISIL funds to carry out attacks.

For example, according to an Australian report, “regional authorities are concerned by funds flowing into the region to support local terrorism networks.” The report notes that “given only small sums are required to stage a deadly attack, even modest amounts of funding from foreign terrorist groups pose a significant risk to the region’s security.

The challenges posed by lone offender and small group terrorism should not have come as a surprise to practitioners. Indeed, consider this statement included in the 9/11 Commission Report² which forecasted in 2004 many of the CFT challenges we face today: “Though progress has apparently been made, terrorists have shown considerable creativity in their methods of moving money. If al-Qaeda is replaced by smaller, decentralized terrorist groups, the premise behind the government’s efforts – that terrorists need a financial support network – may become outdated. Moreover, some terrorist operations do not rely on outside sources of money and may now be self-funding, either through legitimate employment or low-level criminal activity.”

² See: <https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>

Session III

THE OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION OF COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM TOOLS



A Kurdish refugee girl from Kobane.





AHMAD MASA'DEH

former Secretary General, the Union of the Mediterranean, Amman

THE CHAIR'S PERSPECTIVE

I would like to share with you some of my thoughts about the substantive issues that were asked to be raised during this panel. The subject of this panel is *The operational integration of countering violent extremism tools*. The de-radicalisation is the top issue on the agenda of stakeholder, donors and governments. Projects, speeches, conferences, and workshops are addressing this issue, trying to find the most workable solution. While theories and proposals are to be encouraged, it is important for us to start with the implementation of some of these initiatives and move from theory to practice.

The de-radicalisation is a process of change, so, as any other process, it should start with a comprehensive understanding of the underlying issues, objectives and outcomes. We must understand why de-radicalisation is required. The level of radicalism that we are facing today is a result of a process that has been progressing for a long time, a process that, on the whole, has blinded us. In order to learn from the past and move forward, we have to be honest about all aspects of this issue. We must understand and acknowledge that this is a complex problem, and we need innovative thinking of people with broad range of expertise.

The above-mentioned issue is not just religious. There are cultural and economic aspects connected to it and we need to bring people together, making them feel connected to each other and to the societies in order to appreciate their existence and their neighbours. We must promote dignity and respect and, at the same time, enable people to participate into the building of their own future becoming productive for the society. We cannot continue to theorise: we need to intervene with practical measures, concrete project, things that are more important than debate and conferences, with all due respect.

When we identify places with high levels of radicalisation through polls, surveys, and studies, we should intervene, for instance, with playgrounds, parks, cultural plans, and programmes which are due to promote and enable artistic endeavours, such as drawing, music, theatre, and movies. These are great ways to engage or,

otherwise, marginalise populations. We need also microeconomic projects to intervene and break the cycle of radicalisation as well as improving the quality of life, giving people hope for the future. This is why we need to involve people in creating this change, stopping them in relying so much on the narrative that moderate doctrines can address to radical Islamists.

Real change will come from cultural change: it is fundamental to implement real and practical programmes that enhance the concepts of pluralism, diversity and respect for others. We can only face radicalism by adopting a comprehensive multilateral strategy; in this perspective, the role of the state is essential. It has been demonstrated in fact – as we just heard during the previous panel – that the absence of an active role in providing services and social justice is part of what has forced to the evolution of radical thought. So, though we have failed during the past in accepting the signs of increasing radicalism, we must act.

Fundamentally, radicalisation presents itself as a sweeping change that usually adopts political radical views and sometimes makes these changes by force.

Even if radicalism does not allow any observer to predict the target that will be attacked or the style of attack, it allows to observe, on the contrary, all the signs and signals that are precursors to radicalism itself. In identifying risks, latent issues are the most difficult to predict: they are not on the surface. As a consequence, hiding and denying them increases not only the risk, but it makes more difficult to identify and tackle the underlying issue. In light of this, the risk of growing radicalisation must be addressed head-on and in public, it must be brought into the open and dealt with in the open debate.

Recently, radicalisation – that usually consists of an evolution process that includes four stages (pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadisation) – sped up dramatically in dynamic and innovative ways.

This acceleration and innovation has been allowed to occur as the first three stages do not necessarily involve illegal activities. I will give you some examples. In this context, we must be careful not to overestimate the fear of radicalisation, but, at the same time, it must not be underestimated. For example, several years ago, Al Arabiya TV channel broadcasted a series called *Factory of Death*, that highlighted key underlying factors. One of the episodes showed a Salafi wedding party in the north of Jordan. Soon after the broadcasting of that episode, two Salafi leaders shown in the footage were sentenced to 18 months in prison. Similar tactics are frequently used across Jordan and this raises the question whether sentencing people for their thoughts is really a practical and stable solution for such a fundamental threat.

Further, recent history has also provided an example with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. He grew up in a poor quarter of al-Zarqā city in Jordan, overlooking the dilapidated town cemetery through which he developed his fascination for death. It was in the cemetery that he dealt in drugs and hid gains of his crimes during his troublesome teenage years. Later he had his explosives and weapons as a terrorist.

He was a violent teenager, rebellious, undisciplined and always picking up a fight. His father arranged jobs for him but he never held onto them for long. He was uneducated. The area where he grew up remains to this day a poor area with one of the highest fertility rate in the country. There has not been any economic development, no improvement, no services, and not even a decent school, nor a park, or playground for kids. What is different today is a new initiative to convert an old house into a mosque, which is all what they got.

So, in the light of this, does radicalisation born from non-education? We have another example of a very well-educated terrorist. The city of al-Zarqā gave birth to another terrorist, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi. He was well-educated in his general secondary examination and he went to the medical school. In the light of this, the question concerning the influence of non-education on the radicalisation process finds an answer in this second example: Al Balawi started a new era in the Jordanian history of terrorism. He demonstrated in fact that radicalism does not need a lack of education to blossom.

It also demonstrates that the current education system is not capable of immunising all children from radicalism. It is clear that the politics of socio-economic marginalisation, denying the needs of the people, is the driving factor behind radicalisation and creates terrorists out of normal people. Our main anti-radicalisation strategies should focus on the institutional weakness of civil society. Rebuilding and strengthening these fundamental support services should be the priority of the elite, including, action groups, volunteer workers, NGOs (such as our conference organisers today), other civil society groups, and of course, eventually, governments. The time for talking and theorising is over. We must face the scourge with action and we must act now.



ANNE GIUDICELLI
President and founder, TERR(o)RISC, Paris

THE COUNTER-NARRATIVES EFFORT: TRIAL AND ERROR

I am going to be as practical as I can be, I will show you some of my experiences, speaking about counter-narratives, that is one of the favourite tools in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE). I will focus on the European case, by saying that since the 9/11 attacks (2001) Western countries have adopted a repressive approach in the fight against terrorism, including prevention policies. According to these decision makers, preventing means using surveillance, detection capabilities, intelligence capacities, with the aim of identifying terrorism threats and jeopardising terrorist plans.

The European Union and its member states have started addressing prevention, radicalisation and jihadist recruitment issues only since 2010. Still in 2014, during the Brussels European Council, they adopted the European Security Strategy, a document identifying these threats as priorities to be tackled. In addition, a dedicated forum, the International Security Forum (ISF), has been set up to ensure the effective implementation of these policies. These new steps were initiated after having acknowledged evidences that do not allow any European state any further denial of some few hard facts, emerging after a decade of fighting against terrorism in Europe.

Law enforcement policies and total security do not prevent terrorist actions. We have seen that in Madrid (2004) and then in London (2005): the terrorist threat has continuously hit European countries despite the security strengthening and an exponential inflation of counter-terrorists laws, including the addition of new terrorism charges. If we take the French example, we have got 14 new counter-terrorism laws in the past 15 years and eight in the last five years. However, this strategy is counterproductive because it exposes European territories and consequently makes fighting and avoiding threats always more challenging. Indeed, the more you build up security measures against terrorist organisations, the more you increase the risk of encouraging these networks to be more creative, with new *modus operandi*, new profiles, new targets, as we talked previously, finally making

obsolete those measures even before their implementation. These issues become more urgent than ever to be addressed, following the evolution of the war through Syria and Iraq and the increasing number of EU foreign fighters joining ISIS.

The concept of prevention has since then evolved into a further upstream approach with the aim of preventing radicalisation leading to terrorism. Thus, it has been dissociated from anticipation which falls into law enforcement measures with the mission to prevent terrorism plots. Countering the so-called Jihadi propaganda, as it emerges at the EU level, is the way to start with. The idea is to elaborate an alternative narrative capable of opposing arguments that radical organisations develop to be released to the European citizens and especially to the youths. Under political pressures and national obligations to deliver some results, member states have tried to quickly launch governmental counter-propaganda campaigns.

I will give you few significant cases that show how strategically limited is this approach in terms of results. Two weeks after the Charlie Hebdo shooting, followed by the Hypercacher kosher supermarket siege, in January 2015, the French government launched a 50 million euro online platform, being the first public tool, whose aim was to stop jihadism addressing home-grown radicalisation issues. This initiative was pretty similar to a previous US governmental programme called “Think Again, Turn Away”, launched in December 2013 by the United States Department of State. Part of that campaign has been developed online with videos as part of an effort to enter the war of ideas and win over hearts and minds of jihadists on social media. At the time, it was welcomed as a strong and innovative approach trying to play, graphically, by the enemies’ rules. Following this, the French social media campaign – a short video entitled “They tell you: Sacrifice yourself on our side, you’ll defend a just cause” – was launched. It was designed to exposing the lies of the ISIS propaganda campaign by showing pictures of the reality in order to dissuade young people to join them.

In both cases the initiatives have failed because jihadists and young European also exposed to ISIS propaganda would be more attracted by a non-ideal life alternative than by the fully-rejected European model. Moreover, would have adhered to such a narrative considered as official governmental propaganda? On the contrary, it could play a counterproductive role in reinforcing the Jihadi narrative and its impact on the targeted audience.

Here we arrive at the Paris attacks, in November 2015¹, that have been a wake-up call for the European states showing that nothing had been seriously done to tackle terrorism. Not even the victims’ funerals, broadcasted worldwide, would reduce the power of attraction of ISIS ideology to French nationals, especially to young people. Afterwards, European political decision-makers decided to change their direction. Given that either further countering jihadi arguments and publicly

1 The November 2015 Paris attacks were a series of coordinated terrorist attacks that took place on the 13th of November 2015 in Paris and the city’s northern suburb, Saint-Denis.

using counter-narrative did not work, the new approach relied on the so-called civil society doing the frontal job, financially and politically supervised by national governments acting behind the scenes.

The first European call, at the level of the European Commission, has been launched in 2017 with a budget of 6 million euros and a similar one has just been launched last October with a budget of 4 million euros. As for France, a budget of 30 million euros has been granted this year by the government to found associations and even private sector, like my firm, to work on the prevention of radicalisation projects, including online counter narrative campaigns.

However, instead of promoting the civil societies' associations and private sector natural creativity and freedom, public power has imposed behind the scenes its own red lines which still have not helped to reach the intended objectives. Each campaign has not to show too much violence and remains soft in challenging the ISIS model of society, promoting no other alternative model than Western societies.

In my view, the solution is not to promote our own propaganda, but trying to disrupt the communication of these organisations as we do from the military point of view. For instance, producing video content and graphic very similar to ISIS ones would introduce suspicion and doubt within the ranks of ISIS supporters: is it real? fake? That would push the audience to question the content and to distance itself from it, noting potential weaknesses or contradictions in the ISIS narrative – in addition to destabilising jihadi recruiters.



ALESSANDRA ROCCASALVO
*Deputy Resident Representative, United Nations
Development Programme, Pristina*

SETTING UP A COUNTER-VIOLENT EXTREMISM MECHANISM: THE PRISTINA CASE

Good evening and thank to the organizers for inviting me. This presentation is going to be a little bit different because I am not an academic: I am Head of the Mission for the United Nations Development Programme in Kosovo. With this presentation I will show you how and why we have started with three researches and have put these into practice¹.

Three years and half ago, since we were quite heavily engaged on small arms, light weapons, ammunitions, firearms etc., we have been asked by the Minister of Internal Affairs to deepen our research on radicalism taking into consideration also that we generally do not know how to deal with it. This is when and why we started to do research.

The first step was to generate some research and data in order to know what we were talking about. In this regard, the United Nations and their sister agencies were fundamental: among the plethora of information and studies, all the official data sources come from them.

Today, I will only cover two topics: the former is the generic and original research on foreign terrorist fighters; the latter is the referral mechanism and I am mentioning it because it was funded by Italy.

Starting from the research on foreign terrorist fighters' topic, it is important to analyse the current situation in Kosovo. Among the 2 million inhabitants, we have roughly 400 people joining foreign wars; a lot of individuals have passed away; concerning the circa 113-125 returnees, some have not been arrested, while others been arrested (around 120); a good number have been sent away and some others are still waiting trial – the place is not exactly famous for fast procedures in courts. We have had also 12 people that have to be released by the end of 2018.

¹ The United Nations Development Programme is supporting Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) in the territory of Kosovo via three areas: by undertaking independent research on the phenomenon of radicalisation; by piloting support mechanisms such as the referral mechanism and by supporting the Ministry of Education.

Concerning the general makeup of foreign terrorist fighters, we usually talk about people with lack of education, quite young, usually unemployed – “unemployed” in Kosovo can also mean that you do not have regular job. It has been also observed that 50% of male foreign terrorist fighters were married or already have criminal background.

I would now refer to an UNDP report titled *Understanding Push and Pull Factors in Kosovo: Primary Interviews with Returned Foreign Fighters and their Families*² that is an assessment on the returned foreign fighters currently serving their sentences either in prison or under house arrest, as well as their families. It helps to better understand the pull and push factors that make Kosovars join foreign terrorist groups, in order to support Kosovar institutions and stakeholders in developing better policies and programmes for the prevention of violent extremism. The methodology used to collect the material includes desk reviews, field work and analysis, and, since it was very complicated to get access to prisons, I must thank both the United States Government and the United States Embassy in Pristina for making it possible.

Once in prison to conduct the interviews, on 20 people available, some did not accept the idea or interrupted the interview; so in the end we were able to carry out 13 semi-structured interviews (6 persons serving prison sentences, 3 returned from Syria not facing an indictment, 1 in appeal trial, 3 family members). I have never been married, so talking with female family members who, in some cases, have been married more than once, let me think firstly whether the patchwork families are really popular in the Islamic culture, and then I thought that, if I would do this research again, I would certainly put more emphasis on these members.

The majority of the interviewees come mainly out of the Pristina area, not necessarily because they are more radical than others but because the capital is much bigger, it has more mosques and it is the only great urban centre in Kosovo. Unemployed and part-time job is quite high, but unfortunately there is no single pathway to radicalisation, and I cannot draw specific elements that radicalize people here. Each case was slightly different. We had an early radicalisation during the 2012-13 and 2014, other cases after 2016 and we are not aware of any official case in the 2017-18 period (it could have happened, but not through the established route and there was a couple of people intercepted, but obviously not part of the statistics).

We have also noticed that from 2014-15 onwards, there was also a lot of women travelling: we think that it might be a consequence of the establishment of the Caliphate, but we are not entirely sure because our data did not support this.

In the light of this assessment, as a general overall conclusion, we can assert that: even if the perception of limited opportunities and low-quality education may

² It is an independent report commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme and authored by Behar Xharra and Nita Gojani, November 2017.

have impacted on Kosovars and has made them more vulnerable to the propaganda of extremist groups (internet penetration in Kosovo is at 100% and organisations such as Al Nusra, Al Qaeda and also ISIS has published and still publishes on a multitude of communication channels in all languages), there is no direct correlation between poverty, unemployment and radicalisation;

The perception of Islamophobia appears to have added to the concept of Islam a narrative that has been tapped into by recruiters and this is something that was quite unexpected for me. People would say of being alienated because of their religious views, but you do not see this in public. I have never actually experienced this and for this reason I am very sceptical. I am just giving you what we were told, so take it as a grain of salt;

Even if a well-developed and organized recruitment network (consisting of charismatic imams, Kosovar foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, and grassroots-level coordinators) seemed active throughout Kosovo, I think that this is something that belongs to the past. The network via the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania is cut; there is no direct way anymore to fly away over the mountains and, also flights to Turkey are being monitored. Because of these difficulties, it is not as easy to get out. This difficulty of movement was strengthened also by the Ministry of Internal Affairs which changed the law and made it a crime going away to fight foreign wars. At the end, we are only talking about people today that are actually Kosovar and cannot be sent anywhere else. In these cases, having somebody in the community, who is a good speaker and can talk to the subject in a way that is enticing can make the difference;

Surprisingly, each person interviewed mentioned the empathy for the victims as a tool for recruiters: they tapped into the memory of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, making easier to recruit people from Kosovo because they relate to a war that they experienced;

Another pull factor to travel to Syria, especially for young Kosovars who live, for example, in small villages and have very little to do, is the romanticism of the conflict, the notions of the adventure of leaving home, travelling and fighting or supporting the fight, and foreign fighters' mission to defend a people and a community. It should be said that all the Albanians has such good strong fighters, second only to the Chechens, and people took a bit of pride in this. Nevertheless, we also know from the returnees that these people were actually not fighting: nobody who came back could prove that he killed people. They were in auxiliary units, very good in logistics, and quite good at making things happen.

Women's role in deciding to travel to Syria should not be denied. While some might have travelled to Syria due to the pressure from their partners or families, many others made this decision by themselves, often with the intention to reunite their family. The drivers appear similar to men but finding a better life and enjoying more religious freedoms was a strong motivation also among women. Nowadays, we have a lot of people being stuck between the Syrian-Turkish border

wanting and waiting to come back, an obvious and thorny issue. The other topic I would like to analyse concerns the referral mechanism. Some of you might have heard about this: it was a pilot project that we did in the municipality of Gjiilan and was funded by the government of Italy. It was a space where people could refer cases or self-refer cases and, if we were in the situation of early identification, those people received some support and an implicit and effective handling of the case. Anyway, we only had about two or three cases where we thought that they might have been on the road of radicalization; for most of the cases they were simple people going through normal adolescent, somewhere madly in love or with an identity crisis, for example.

That referral mechanism is not supported by UNDP anymore but, they are continuing with the support of Italy and the European Union. I just come from Brussels where we discussed about the importance of this project in helping the communities to refer cases: otherwise people in the community do not feel themselves secure and simply call the police on the base of their fears.



MAGNUS RANSTORP

Research Director, Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies, Swedish National Defence University, Stockholm

COUNTERTERRORISM AND DE-RADICALISATION: A SHIFTING BALANCE?

Today, there has been a lot of talk here concerning the fact that not enough has been done. I would sharply disagree. As Alessandra Roccasalvo has mentioned before with others, there is so much that has been done, that we have difficulty – those of us who work in the field – to keep us on it.

I also represent the European Union Radicalization Awareness Network: an overlapping network that stretches across the EU 5.000 practitioners, individuals and professionals, who work every single day within and outside the EU, bringing a gleam for optimism.

In terms of the challenge ahead, a very wise British civil servant, Sir Mark Allen, talking about Syria and the Middle East, observed that understanding the conflicts in the Middle East is like playing three-dimensional chess underwater, with all the pieces moving simultaneously¹. To summarise, we need to have interlocking analytical levels to understand what are the drivers, both on the structural level and on the social milieu of extremists.

Therefore I want to plug for a UNDP study called “Journey to extremism in Africa” (2016) which unpacks the causes and consequences of violent extremism. Particularly, I would like to underline three elements about this study that I support.²

The first one is that it contains some recommendations: it represents a shift from security alone measures as security-driven responses are counterproductive.

Secondly, it addresses to specific geographical areas, hotbeds of higher risks. In this regard, the Swedish National Defence University, using data from the Security Services, did a study on people who left Sweden for Syria and Iraq. It comes out that 80% of them came from four cities usually socio-economically deprived areas.

1 Sir Mark John Spurgeon Allen, (3 July 1950) is a British diplomat, intelligence officer and businessman.

2 Cf.: <https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf>

Finally, this study pointed out an important distinction between Preventing Violent Extremism-specific and Preventing Violent Extremism-relevant: they are not mutually exclusive, but one supports the other.

For many times, I have been talking to the Security Internal Services and I was told that we cannot solve this issue alone; we need cushions and we have to be intelligent about how we space those out. I invite all the Italians and everyone else to contact the Radicalization Awareness Network in relation to this. One strategy is to invest in exit paths and reintegration strategies [what Italy did with some members of the Red Brigades and affiliated groups; note of the Editor]

Right now, just in Europe we have 5.000 plus foreign terrorist fighters who went down; around 2.500 of those are still at large. We have prisoners waiting in SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) areas where Europeans cannot hold them forever, and some of them are going to other conflict areas. We also count around 1.400 kids born, or brought down into the Caliphate. We need to think about them, about how we manage our prisons, how do we manage people. I do not want to criticise any country, but there are some that have large prisons population without any reintegration system, not even the smallest social contact that would prevent these people to become radicalised. I am pleased to say that my country has small units of intelligence inside prisons; we know what is going on; we can also isolate different prisoners. If I were to venture outside, there is a lot of work to be done dealing with prisons management, exit strategies, children's conditions and security and there is a lot done by USAID or aid organisations of other countries. I am not so pessimistic in the sense that we do not have the tools in the tool box.

In conclusion, we also have to think about the scale of reconstruction. I do not think that Syria will be rebuilt – not in my lifetime. We have a lost generation of kids who never went at school or are displaced.

I do not want to delve too much into the issue of refugees, but they are instances of practical problems, not just extremism ones. We have people who apply for asylum and will have to be returned and this is an issue, particularly for Sweden and Germany. How do you physically and practically return individuals? And even if they do not do any terrorism but are only capable of it, they will affect the extremism environment since they will fuel the right and the left wing groups and are an easy prey for those who want to exploit people.

We need to think almost like a chess game, as Mark Ellen said, we need to think across all these different dimensions, so there is a lot of work still to be done.

SPEAKERS' BIOGRAPHIES

WELCOME REMARKS

Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo

President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

A strong focus on strategic outlook in complex issues. High-level contacts and negotiations. Special attention to countries of strategic relevance, i.e. the Gulf region. Frequent Public Diplomacy activities to discuss policies and open issues. He held the position of Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic-political-industrial area, in relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean. He is the author of the books: "The road to Kabul" (Il Mulino-Arel, 2009); "A political journey without maps, diversity and future in the Greater Middle East", (Rubbettino, 2013); "NATO and the Middle East: The Making of a Partnership" (New Academia Publishing, 2018).

Ian Hope

Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome

Colonel Hope has 36 years of service in uniform, involving 18 years in leadership roles with airborne and mechanised infantry battalions. His operational experiences include the first Gulf War, multiple tours in the Balkans, Africa, and Afghanistan, and domestic operations. He also has a Bachelor of History (Honours) from Acadia University, a Masters of Military Arts and Science, a Masters of Strategic Studies, and a PhD in History from Queen's University. He is the author of *A Scientific Way of War* (2015), *Dancing with the Dushman* (2008), *Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War* (2007), three monographs and a dozen articles and chapters on military history and strategic studies. Colonel Hope is now serving on faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome.

Alessandro Politi

Director, NATO Defense College Foundation

Alessandro Politi is a global political and strategic analyst with 30 years of experience. Director of the NATO Defense College Foundation, the only NATO-affiliated NGO think tank. He teaches geopolitics and intelligence at the SIOI. He teaches conflict management, crisis, peace-making and analysis at different governmental and private centres. Has been POLAD for two Commanders of the NATO Kosovo Force. He was senior researcher for the Italian MoD (CeMiSS-Centre for Military and Strategic Studies) regarding the strategic monitoring of Latin America and led the Global Outlook project, published in Italian and English. He has contributed to the Italian Defence White Paper and advised the IT MFA. He has directed the CEMRES research on CBMs in the framework of the 5+5 Defence Initiative, presenting the conclusions to the Ministers in Granada. He has been acting director of the School of Intelligence Analysis at a private university in Rome. He has been adviser to several senior Italian and foreign decision makers. Author, co-author or editor of 35 books on strategic and security matters.

Matteo Bressan

Emerging Challenges Analyst, NATO Defense College Foundation

Teacher and Scientific Coordinator at the Italian Society for the International Organisation (SIOI), he is author of various books concerning terrorism and focussed on Eurasia geopolitics, jihadism, Hezbollah and hybrid wars. International relations professor at LUMSA University. He is emerging challenges analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation.

Stefano Marcuzzi

Emerging Challenges Analyst, NATO Defense College Foundation

He holds a PhD in Military History at the University of Oxford, he is now a Marie – Curie Fellow at Carnegie Europe, Brussels, working on hybrid warfare and EU-NATO relations in the Mediterranean. He is emerging challenges analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation

OPENING REMARKS**Ahmet O. Evin**

Professor Emeritus, Sabancı University, Turkey

He had received his B.A. and PhD degrees at the Columbia University. He is currently founding Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and Professor Emeritus at Sabanci University, serving as Senior Scholar and Board Member of the Istanbul Policy Center. He has previously taught at Harvard, New York University, the University of Pennsylvania (where he was director of the Middle East

Center), the University of Hamburg and Bilkent University (heading the Political Science department). He has authored and edited several volumes on politics, culture, and development.

SESSION I

Liess Boukra

Managing Director, Institut National d'Études de Stratégie Globale, Algiers

Dr Liess Boukra is the Managing Director of the Institut National d'Études de Stratégie Globale (INESG) in Algiers since 2015. Previously, he was the Deputy Director of the Centre Africain d'Études et de Recherches sur le Terrorisme (CAERT). He is a sociologist with a strong expertise on ideology, Islam and Qa-edist and Jihadi terrorism, as evidenced by two of his main publications: “Algérie: La terreur sacrée” (Favre, 2002) and “Le djihadisme: L’Islam à l’épreuve de l’histoire” (Bachari, 2011). He has also been a professor at the University of Algiers for more than ten years.

Sian Hutchinson

Programme Management Officer, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office, New York

Ms Hutchinson joined the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism in 2018 to take the lead on the UN Centre for Counter-Terrorism’s global project on Preventing Violent Extremism through Strategic Communications. Prior to this, she served as a senior Countering Violent Extremism policy officer to the New South Wales Government Premier and Minister for Counter-Terrorism, working across CVE strategic communications, CSO engagement and intervention portfolios in the Department of Premier and Cabinet. She previously served with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, focusing on Counter-Terrorism, Counterinsurgency and counter people smuggling issues, where she was posted to Afghanistan and East Timor. Sian also served as the Director of Community Engagement for the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Australia’s largest commission of legal inquiry into sexual violence.

Peter Neumann

Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College, London

Peter Neumann is Professor of Security Studies at the Department of War Studies at the King’s College of London and has directed the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. He served as the OSCE Chairman’s Special Representative on Countering Violent Radicalisation. He taught courses on terrorism, counterterrorism, intelligence, radicalisation and counter-radicalization at King’s College of London and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington.

Oded Eran

Senior Researcher, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv

Dr Eran is currently Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and previously its Director (2008-2011). From 2002 to 2007, he was appointed as Israeli Ambassador to the European Union and NATO. Prior to this prestigious positions, he held the office of Head of Israel's Team of Negotiations with the Palestinians (1999-2000). He, served as Israel's Ambassador to Jordan (1997-2000), Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Israeli Foreign Affairs (1992-1997), Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington (1986-1990) and Secretary-General for the Knesset Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs.

SESSION II

Mahmoud Karem

Professor British University and former Ambassador to NATO and the EU and Commissioner Human Rights Council, Cairo

Ambassador Karem currently teaches at the British University in Egypt. He also holds the title of Special Advisor to the President of the University for International Relations and heads its Egypt and Middle East Centre (CEMES). He served as the Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Kingdom of Belgium, and the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, Head of Mission of Egypt to the European Communities, and Permanent Representative of Egypt to NATO, from 2005 till 2010. He was, therefore, a member of the Advisory Board of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Disarmament Matters. From 2010 to 2012 he was nominated for three consecutive times to the post of Secretary General of the Egyptian National Council for Human Rights (NCHR). In July 2017 the Foreign Minister of Japan announced the establishment for a group of eminent persons for substantive advancement of Nuclear disarmament, Ambassador Karem was chosen from the Middle East.

Louise Shelley

Director, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center and, Professor, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Arlington

Dr Shelley is the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Endowed Chair and a University Professor at Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University. She founded and directs the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC). Her most recent books are *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime and Terrorism* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective* (Cambridge, 2010) and *Dark Commerce: How a New Illicit Economy is Threatening our Future* (Princeton University Press, 2018). She served for six years on Global Agenda Councils of the World Economic Forum. Dr Shelley appears frequently in the media, lectures widely at universities and multinational

bodies and has testified repeatedly before Congress and foreign and multinational organisation on financial crime and illicit flows, illicit trade, human trafficking, and the crime-terror relationship. She is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.

Ernesto Savona

Director, Transcrime, Università Cattolica, Milan

Dr Savona, holder of a degree in Law and a PhD in Sociology and Social Research, is Director of TRANSCRIME at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and, since 2003, professor of Criminology at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan. From 1986 to 2002, he was professor of Criminology at the Faculty of Law at the Università degli Studi di Trento. From 1971 to 1986 he was associate professor at the Faculty of Statistical Sciences at the Università “La Sapienza” in Rome. He was also nominated President of the European Society of Criminology for the years 2003-2004. He has been a consultant to the United Nations, the Council of Europe (where he was appointed one of the seven members of the Scientific and Criminological Council in 1996), the European Union and various national governments. From 1990 to 1994, he was visiting fellow and project director at the National Institute of Justice, Research Centre of the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington D.C, where he was manager of two projects on organised crime and international money laundering.

Hafida Benchedida

Senator of the Algerian Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Algiers

Hafida Benchedida is a Senator of the Algerian Parliament and sits in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Throughout her career as an international interpreter and consultant for international seminars, she has attended major regional summits and workshops. She is a mediator at the Network of Mediterranean Women Mediators, a founding member of the Arab Women Parliamentarians and a member of the International Civil Action Network (ICAN) against violent extremism.

Matthew Levitt

Director, Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.

Dr Levitt is a writer on Islamist terrorism, a senior fellow and director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and professorial lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). From 2005 to early 2007 he was a deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. In that capacity, he served both as a senior official within the department's terrorism and financial intelligence branch and as deputy chief of the Office of Intelligence

and Analysis. From 2001 to 2005, Levitt served the Institute as founding director of its Terrorism Research Program, which was established in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Previously, he provided tactical and strategic analytical support for counter-terrorism operations at the FBI, focusing on fundraising and logistical support networks for Middle Eastern terrorist groups.

SESSION III

Ahmad Khalaf Masa'deh

Former Secretary-General, the Union for the Mediterranean, Amman

He served as a Minister, ambassador and chief of an international organisation. Today, Ahmad Masa'deh practices law and is the Managing Partner of Khalaf Masa'deh & Partners Ltd. Between 2006 and 2010, Dr Masa'deh was the 7th Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the European Union, Belgium, Norway and Luxembourg. He was also the Jordanian Coordinator to the Union for the Mediterranean and Jordan's Representative to NATO. In January 2010, Ahmad Masa'deh was elected Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean. From 2000 to 2005 he was an Assistant Professor of International Business Law at the University of Jordan where he also held the position of Assistant Dean for Development.

Anne Giudicelli

President and founder, TERR(o)RISC, Paris

As an Arab and Muslim world specialist, Anne Giudicelli, worked for eight years in the Middle East section of the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, in Paris as well as in other countries. She has studied Arabic and after 9/11 she has been in charge of the analysis and follow-up of subjects related to terrorism and Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2005, she started up her own consultancy firm, TERR(o)RISC and since then she has added the Sahel area as part of her expertise. She has lived in most Arab countries, with a particularly long stay in the UAE, first as a reporter then as a government representative. She has been a French investigative journalist and has written a book about violence in the French suburbs ("La Caillera", Jacques Bertoin, 1991) with an updated version in May 2006 after the November 2005 riots ("Caillera. Cette France qui a peur", Jean-Claude Gawsewitch). She has also published, in 2007, an essay on counter-terrorism policies in Europe ("Le risque antiterroriste", Le Seuil).

Alessandra Roccasalvo

Deputy Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme, Pristina

Alessandra Roccasalvo joined UNDP in 2005. She is currently Deputy Resident Representative for UNDP Kosovo. Prior to this, she served at UNDP headquarters for the Bureau of Management with the Management Consulting Team, during

that tenure she also served in Afghanistan for a brief period. She started her career with the UNDP in Indonesia, focusing on the post-tsunami recovery portfolio. Before joining UNDP, she worked for McKinsey & Company in Germany and India. Alessandra holds a MSc in Development Studies, from the London School of Economics, as well as a MA in Economics and History from the University of Tübingen, Germany and the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.

Magnus Ranstorp

Research Director, Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm

Dr Ranstorp has been researching counterterrorism and CVE issues for almost thirty years. Previously, he developed the world-renowned Centre for the Study of Terrorism & Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, which was founded in the mid-1990s. Dr Ranstorp was also the first author to seriously map out Lebanese Hezbollah movement and its connection to international terrorism and relationship with Iran and Syria. Before and after 9/11, he was consultant for CNN on terrorism issues. He was also invited to testify in the 9/11 Commission in its First Hearing in 2003. Currently, Dr Ranstorp is Research Director at the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish Defence University & Quality Manager of the EU Radicalization Awareness Network. He also led the Copenhagen Municipality Expert Group that developed the Anti-radicalization Action Plan in 2015. He also advises Stockholm City on CVE and the Swedish National CVE coordinator.



NATO Foundation
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TARGETING THE DE-MATERIALISED “CALIPHATE”

EXTREMISM, RADICALISATION AND ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING

CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY
the NATO Defense College Foundation
in co-operation with the NATO Defense College

ROME, THE 6TH OF DECEMBER 2018

Venue: Centro Congressi Roma Eventi - Piazza di Spagna, Via Alibert, 5/a, Rome

THURSDAY, 6TH DECEMBER 2018

- 14,00-15,00 Arrival of participants - Registration
15,00 **Welcome remarks**
- Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
 - Ian Hope, Researcher, NATO Defense College, Rome
- Opening remarks**
- Ahmet O. Evins, Professor Emeritus, Sabanci University, Turkey

Session I

STRATEGIES AGAINST THE EVOLVING ARMED RADICALISM

The Islamic State has been destroyed, but terrorism is still a distinctive feature from the deep Sahel belt to the Levant and the Gulf area. What can counterterrorism achieve? How can governments of this wide region and NATO better co-operate?

- 15,30-17,00 Chair: Liess Boukra, Managing Director, Institut National d'Études de Stratégie Globale, Algiers
- Sian Hutchinson, Programme Management Officer, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office, New York
 - Peter Neumann, Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College, London
 - Oded Eran, Senior Researcher, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv

Q&A

THURSDAY, 6TH DECEMBER 2018

Session II

TERRORIST FUNDING: A LYNCHPIN BETWEEN EXTREMISM AND ARMED OPERATIONS

One of the most elusive but rewarding targets in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism is the flow of money that is needed to carry out both propaganda, specific armed attacks and infiltration in the territories. Jihadist groups in transition from a territorial organisation towards loose networks need more than ever reliable financing networks. How can anti-trafficking instruments and the fight against grey money transfers be more effective?

17,30-19,00 Chair: Mahmoud Karem, Professor, British University and former Ambassador to NATO and the EU and Commissioner Human Rights Council, Cairo

- Louise Shelley, Director, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center and, Professor, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Arlington
- Ernesto Savona, Director, Transcrime, Università Cattolica, Milan
- Hafida Benchehida, Senator of the Algerian Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Algiers
- Matthew Levitt, Director, Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.

Q&A

THURSDAY, 6TH DECEMBER 2018

Session III

THE OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION OF COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM TOOLS

Violent extremism begins as a low level, localised social and political problem before catching media and political attention, when it is too late. The programmes of referral and de-radicalisation are a specific and effective targeted interdiction tool because they can be employed in a very cost effective way as preventive and mopping up actions in the fight for heart and minds. The panel broaches how integrating antiterrorism into the countering of violent extremism.

10,00-11,30 Chair: Ahmad Masa'deh, former Secretary General, the Union for the Mediterranean, Amman

- Anne Giudicelli, President and founder, TERR(o)RISC, Paris
- Alessandra Roccasalvo, Deputy Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme, Pristina
- Magnus Ranstorp, Research Director, Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies, Swedish National Defence University, Stockholm

Q&A



Syria / Atma Refugee Camp - January 2018 - Syrian refugee family and camp.






Bangladesh - Bengal students during class.







The Islamic State was deprived of 98% of its territories; nevertheless, this physical loss has not determined the end of the terrorist threat. These terrorist groups are nevertheless closing ranks and accentuating their transnational dimension.

The practice of online massive recruiting and continuous terrorist attacks against enemy citizens and institutions has been gradually replaced by new, diversified “business models” aiming at the sustainability of a virtual, dispersed “Caliphate”. They involve: illicit trafficking of weapons, antiques, drugs and natural resources, environmental and cyber-crime. Starting from the creation of a physical entity, Daesh was one of the wealthiest terrorist groups in history, and it intends to keep a considerable cash flow.

The methods to prevent this potential evolution of terrorism include intelligence, information sharing and law enforcement mechanisms. However, this should come together with the reinforcement of the public-private synergy to tackle the establishment of shadow economy networks that elude state control.

At the same time, part of ISIS surviving leadership is alleged to have invested about \$400 million in legitimate economic activities, i.e. hotels, hospitals, farms and car dealerships, in their countries of origins. The other returnees in their departure countries - almost 3.000 foreign fighters - represent a complex challenge for our societies. Most of them are disaffected, but a fraction has still hostile intentions and a better training. In this context, it is crucial to formulate effective prevention and reintegration policies to address the socio-political and ideological roots of radicalisation.

A comprehensive confrontation with terrorism must address all the dimensions of the phenomenon since the military approach is necessary but not sufficient. Counterterrorism and tools to counter violent extremism (CVE) have to be employed at all levels – local, regional and national – and global coordination must be continued by international actors (EU, UN, NATO, among others).

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