NATO AT 70°
REFOCUSING FOR CHANGE?

The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College. Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network.

The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of cooperation with NATO.

Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings.

The Foundation was born eight years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staff. Actually the Foundation is active in three areas: high-level events, strategic trend research and specialised decision makers' training and education. Since it is a body with considerable freedom of action, transnational reach and cultural openness, the Foundation is developing a wider scientific and events programme.

Time has come to update the Strategic Concept of 2010, taking into account the present international environment. This renewal has process will require time since consensus among the allies have to be built again.

The continuing external criticism and pressures (like the threat posed by Russia, trade wars and migrations) and the vulnerabilities of the European member states, challenged by internal fissures (Brexit and democratic rule of law), have eroded the trust among the nations, questionin the robustness of the Organisation.

However, despite those turbulences, that still exist and are more real than ever, the Alliance demonstrated to be more resilient than expected by its critics. Its strength rests on the three core tasks identified during the Summit in Lisbon (2010): collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

Collective defence is not just money and percentages. It is the specific contribution that each member brings to the collective preservation of security and well-being in the North Atlantic area. With this in mind, burden sharing is not a mere estimation of military spending, but counts men, means, modernisation and innovation – and even the guaranteeing of economic collaboration (art. 2, Washington Treaty) – to reinforce NATO's security responses to current and emerging threats.

Crisis management is now oriented both to the North and to the South. NATO has to be an insurance for its Eastern members towards Russian potential attacks. Nevertheless this goes hand by hand with the present risks and threats in the Southern region, itself undermined by internecine wars and constant external interference.

Co-operative security means the reinforcement of the current partnerships - the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Partnership for Peace – and the commitment to launch new collaborations in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The aim of these partnerships is the projection of stability not imposing but passing on the Alliance's legacy, good practices and experiences.

70 years after its constitution, these elements and virtues still make NATO the main global security provider.
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NATO AT 70: REFOCUSING FOR CHANGE?

Organised by the
NATO Defense College Foundation

In co-operation with the Atlantic Council
Philip Morris International
Leonardo S.p.A., MBDA
the NATO Defense College
and the National Defense University
April 4, 1949: 12 nations signed the Washington Treaty, creating NATO.
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Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this event focussed on NATO, for a special anniversary, the current state of affairs and a future perspective. I am really delighted to be here at the Atlantic Council among friends and very competent people trying to offer the best possible frame for discussion. I wish to warmly thank the Council for the hospitality, cooperation and assistance. A warm welcome to the speakers, the moderators and of course to you the public for being with us here.

Why today and why on this subject? We are accustomed to anniversaries but this one seems to be a little special to us. The Atlantic Alliance was born exactly 70 years ago, the initial Treaty being signed here in this city, Washington, in 1949 by 12 founding countries. The project had from the beginning a historical dimension: to put together North America and Europe, what was called the free world, the most relevant democracies, to defend common values and shared interests against Communism and the threat of the Soviet Union.

I draw your attention on the ambition of this endeavour. The preamble of the Treaty says that the Alliance was established to promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area and its people.

NATO is still there and the fact itself means something. It has 29 members and has survived successfully through many crucibles: a Cold War that lasted for two generations, Bosnia, Kosovo, 9/11, Afghanistan; just to mention some important dates.

In all instances the transatlantic bond worked successfully: Americans, Canadians and Europeans acting hand in hand and becoming fully interoperable. That is why we use to say that it is the most successful political–military Alliance in history. Seven decades have proved that the United States and Europe are a winning ticket.

After saying that, it is clear that the world is changing fast, perhaps too fast, and that we cannot live on past glories. The international environment has become
increasingly difficult, more actors are emerging, and we have to reflect on the kind of change and adaptation that appears to be necessary. Fragmentation is dangerous; we need security providers more than ever and in some way to project security around us.

It is a good reason to reflect on those issues and to discuss them seriously, because they are not easy and this is what we are going to do today.

We all thought that we should not lose the occasion of the anniversary to reflect on the current state of affairs of the Alliance and to foresee some guidelines for the future.

We have two very engaging panels with the best possible speakers, the first one chaired by the Dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome, Stephen Mariano, will develop issues linked to the present international environment. The second panel, moderated by Ian Brzezinski, is going to focus on possible future strategies.

We have the honour to have Secretary Madeleine Albright for the concluding remarks.

We should profit from this occasion. What kind of future NATO? Keeping the fundamentals? A NATO with world partners? How to reconcile strategies with threats? How to keep alive and strong the transatlantic bond?

I wish to conclude thanking all those who made this event possible. In the first place the Atlantic Council with its experience and generosity.

NATO is the most successful political-military alliance in history, and yet it is time to focus once again on the purpose of the transatlantic relationship that is at risk of whittling due to inertia and complacency. NATO’s old quip “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” today is evidently out of touch with reality. Russia is considered by some a potentially interesting partner; a part of the US public is not sure about staying in NATO; and after reunification, Germany has long since overcome its initial minority status.

From its inception until recently, NATO was an integral part of a rather coherent project centred on democracy, free market, and international cooperation up to the point of agreeing to an extensive body of international laws. The strong reference to the United Nations Charter has been, for good or for bad, a strong political lynchpin for an international rules-based order.

Part of these laws consisted of arms and proliferation control and disarmament treaties that, even if bilateral, had significant impact at a global level. While the enforcing mechanisms for these agreements are still around, the disregard for treaties seems to have become a convenient political and diplomatic tool in the eyes of different governments.

Moreover, NATO made impossible any great power violent confrontation in the space from San Francisco to Vladivostok, leaving indirect belligerence confined outside the area covered by the Mutually Assured Destruction deterrence practice and doctrine. Today, the discourse is seemingly returning to great power competition within NATO’s area and near its borders. For the time being, article V contingencies are excluded, but hybrid and violent conflicts are occurring even inside Europe, and the lines separating deterrence from war are not always clear, especially vis-à-vis emerged regional and global powers (although China is never mentioned officially in major documents).

If one compares the political tenets of the 2010 Strategic Concept with the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, a few points are clear. Firstly, there is a more
nuanced will to closely cooperate with the UN and the EU. Secondly, both the commitment by NATO to create conditions for a nuclear-free world and to keep a credible NATO deterrent are considerably diluted. Thirdly, shared values within the community of the Alliance are upheld in principle, but not always applied in practice.

Interestingly, even 10 years ago, the Strategic Concept captured effectively many strategic trends that are still present: common defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. The latest Summit Declaration adds to the broad picture: non-state actors, irregular migrations, hybrid attacks. But it also shifts the attention from technologies like laser, electronic warfare and space denial weapons to improvised explosive devices and NBCR diffusion and terrorist misuse or on the diffusion of cruise missile and UAV technologies.

On the other hand, the 2010 Strategic Concept stressed the importance of key environmental and resource constraints (health, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs), while in 2018, most of these concerns are muted, with the exception of political or coercive manipulation through energy supplies.

Notably, in the Brussels Summit Declaration cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. While an important development, in its political determination, this seems to overlook the possibility of entangling cyber security with nuclear deterrence, a concern that has been voiced at least by one major NATO member.

In conclusion, the Alliance needs more than incremental and ad hoc adaptation; it needs to reassess in depth its raison d’être in terms of transatlantic relationship and the probable strategic consequences of specific political choices. It should remain as the most important security provider in this fragmented and potentially dangerous environment. The transatlantic bond has proven on several occasions through seven decades to be a formidable added value to project security and stability.
On behalf of the Atlantic Council, it is my distinct pleasure to welcome you all to this important event NATO at 70: Refocusing for Change?

We are so delighted to be co-hosting this in partnership with the NATO Defense College Foundation under Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo’s leadership.

I would like to thank as well our partners at the NATO Defense College, represented today by its Dean Dr Stephen Mariano; and at the National Defense University, represented today by Dr Richard Hooker; and at MBDA.

We are also very grateful to Leonardo S.p.A. for their support to the Atlantic Council and to this important event. Specifically, I would like to give a special salute to William Lynn, Chief Executive Officer of Leonardo North America and Atlantic Council Board Member, for his steadfast support. He is represented here today by Joe Militano, Senior Vice President for Public Affairs and Communications.

I am glad you are all able to join us for what will be a fascinating conversation on the importance of NATO and its ongoing adaptation for the challenges of today and tomorrow.

In light of NATO’s seventieth anniversary this year, today marks an opportunity to not only celebrate NATO’s achievements over the last seven decades, but also to readdress fundamental questions about the Alliance purpose in today’s world and to highlight its enduring mission going forward.

It is also a chance to make the case that, in today’s troubling security environment, a reinvigorated NATO Alliance – one with a strong US leadership and transatlantic commitment to its mission – is a cornerstone of peace and security in Europe and beyond.

In 1961 we founded small clubs in support of NATO. Then Secretary of State Dean Rusk urged those clubs to come together to deal with what was considered an inflection point in history because of our military and nuclear monopoly loss, an
ideological challenge test across the developing world and the Berlin crisis. Now it is another defining moment. We face a new major powers competition between authoritarian capitalism and democratic free-market capitalism; and questions about the future US role in the world and how it will be executed, and about the very nature of the global system institutions and practices.

This past April, on the margins of the NATO foreign ministerial and official State Department-led commemoration in Washington, we hosted our signature NATO Engages town hall event.

There, we were joined by foreign ministers from allied nations, as well as Vice President Mike Pence, and a range of experts and next-generation leaders to discuss why NATO matters – yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

Leading up to and building upon this effort, we also launched a digital media campaign to gather public perspectives and increase awareness about NATO that kickstarted a lively debate with a wider American audience.

Today, we have a fantastic line-up of speakers that will help us tackle tough questions about the transatlantic state of play and how the Alliance must adapt to overcome the evolving threats we all face. Many thanks to all our panelists for making the time to join us.

Before we dive in, I would like to thank again Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo.

Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo is the president of the NATO Defense College Foundation and previously served as Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2001 to 2007.

As Deputy Secretary General, he focused strongly on adapting the strategic direction of the NATO Alliance, a fitting mission for today. He worked to expand the Alliance and build partnerships throughout Europe and the wider region.

Once again, I would like to thank all of you for being with us for what will be a captivating conversation.
Session I

FROM ORDER TO DISORDER
July 2, 2017: Line of NATO Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS radar planes on the runway of Geilenkirchen airbase
July 2, 2017: Line of NATO Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS radar planes on the runway of Geilenkirchen airbase
The common view of the West Wing – certainly in the United States and also France and Germany – is to consider the probability of conflict with the Russian Federation on NATO’s territories as very low. I would describe this as conventional wisdom.

On the website of President Vladimir Putin figures a speech he held in 2014 in front of the Ambassadors and Representatives of The Commonwealth of Independent States\(^1\), right after the crisis in Ukraine erupted. He said “let me be clear, we will defend our bothers abroad with all available means”. The following year, in 2015, the State Prosecutor, certainly at Putin’s directions, formally challenged the legality of the State Council’s decision in the early 90s to recognise the independence of the Baltic States.

If you look at what President Putin tells to the Duma, if you look at what his closest advisors have told us in the West, and if you look at the transcripts of any number of our track two interactions, or track one-and-a-half engagements, where former diplomats and military officers meet with Russian counterparts, they get a unified line that comes back which is: not strengthening in any way the defensive or deterrent posture in NATO’s Eastern Flank – the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania – otherwise you have to expect a very strong reaction.

There are four factors we ought to consider:
* Scholars generally agree that the one thing President Putin fears and detests more than any other is the presence of colour revolutions, successful economically viable Western integrated democratic countries on his doorstep and even

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\(^{1}\) The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed when the former Soviet Union totally dissolved in 1991. At its conception it consisted of ten former Soviet Republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
more in the former Soviet territories. He has four of them in his periphery now (Poland and the Baltic States);
• We know that strategic depth has always concerned Russian leaders and military planners. After the experiences of the invasion of Charles XII of Sweden in 1708, Napoleon, the conflicts with Poland and the Nazi Germany, the question of strategic depth absorbs the Russians and they lost much of it after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Newt Gingrich pointed out during the 2016 American Presidential Campaign, Estonia and NATO’s territories are perceived as suburbs of St. Petersburg;
• Putin talks a lot about Russia greatness. This represents not only a desire but the need of restoring Russia to its former place of greatness on the world stage. The reincorporation or the re-extension of influence over these former Russian territories constitutes a huge part of that narrative;
• Finally, we are all aware that if there was a reasonably low-cost way to fracture NATO, President Putin would certainly take advantage of that.

This is my analysis. Furthermore, I personally put the chances of Russia aggression on NATO territories – probably the Baltic region – in the next five or ten years at 33% to 50% which means not a very low probability or non-existent.

From our side, what is the state of NATO’s deterrence right now? I will pose three questions:
• Would President Putin be deterred by the possibility that NATO or the core members of the Alliance could use nuclear weapons in defense of NATO territories? I have not found many experts saying that NATO member states would threat of using nuclear weapons if Estonia was attacked, for instance;
• Would be the Alliance able to defend itself through already deployed forces? Every major think tanks in Washington D.C. and Europe arrives at the same conclusion, which is that the forces deployed on the Eastern Flank are not sufficient for defensive purposes even for a limited period of time;
• Would NATO be able to mobilise and retake any territory that Russia may occupy? Again, NATO readiness to cross the boarders is not a good new story. The French, the Germans, the British would take a minimum of three or four months to put a single division into place in order to participate to a similar campaign. As well, the United States have limited forces in place: a small airborne brigade in Italy, a Stryker brigade in Germany – far from the scene of the action –, and a heavy brigade in Poland.

The 30-30-30 Initiative, or NATO Readiness Initiative, that was touted last year on the occasion of NATO Ministers of Defence Meeting, 7-8 June 2018, in Brussels, was a great step into the right direction. However, if we are concerned about the state of deterrence today in the Alliance with respect to the Russian
Federation, we have to conclude that there is a lot of work to be done. Russia’s ability to project its military power far from its boarders it is not good, but Russia’s ability to carry out military operations along its periphery in Eastern Europe is actually quite formidable.

This speech represents a personal point of view and not the interests of the United States Department of Defense.
THE 2% PARAMETER IS USELESS: TIME FOR OUTPUT BASED MEASURES

Today we are trapped in a burden-sharing debate over goals which not only do not make any sense, but that are actively destructive and mathematically absurd. The goals I refer to are spending 2% of each member country’s GDP on defense and 20% of its defense budget on equipment.

If you look at these goals on a country-by-country basis, they are remarkably counterproductive and call for NATO to spend vastly more than Russia. There are no public official intelligence estimates of what Russian military expenditures are today. But, I think that most of the American intelligence community would agree on what The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said about this issue: officially somewhere around $62 billion a year and probably, in purchasing power, somewhere closer to $68 billion.

Before we focus on spending as a percentage of GDP, regardless of what each country actually needs, we should consider what NATO is already spending. If you look at the NATO figures the Secretary General issued in his 2018 posture statement, the European member states of NATO alone are spending about $282 billion dollars a year. This is some 4.5 times what Russia is spending. If you remember that Finland and Sweden contribute forces on the Northern Flank, NATO Europe’s ratio of superiority is much higher.

NATO’s spending estimates for the United States are too low. NATO, for some reasons, does not seem to believe we spend money on nuclear weapons and does not believe in US outlay reporting. Its figures for US spending are about 85 billion dollars lower than our actual national defence budget. However, even if we do use NATO figures for both European and the United States military expenditures, NATO as a whole spends some 14 times what Russia and Belarus spend. Accordingly, either all our estimates of Russian spending are incredibly wrong, or we have problems with the ways in which we use our existing resources that has very little to do with making massive increases in national expenditures.

We also need to remember that we are not dealing with the Soviet Union. The
Secretary General’s Report states that NATO already spends close to what it spent in 1989 in constant dollars. In contrast, the breakup of the Soviet Union has reduced Russia spending to about a half or less of what it spent at the end of the Cold War.

The picture is very different, however, if we focus on the NATO goals in percentage terms. If one makes a country-by-country analysis of the NATO data, most countries in NATO’s central region do not spend close to 2% of their GDP. Moreover, even if they did spend 2% on the same forces, they could not possibly sustain and modernise their force posture. This is clear if you examine a country that did spend more than 2%. Great Britain is spending 2.2% of its GDP. However, it now has: 227 active tanks versus 870 active tanks at the end of the Cold War. The Royal Air Force has about 38% of its combat air strength in 1989 and the British Navy is about a half. At the same time, a number of other countries have significantly increased their defence expenditure over the last four years. They do fall short of 2%, but they get no credit for these increases, and no one seems to pay attention to resulting size and mission capabilities of their forces.

There also are some absurdities to the way NATO is forced to assess the burden each country bears. When NATO assesses burden-sharing, the Alliance is forced to count US defence spending as if our entire budget somehow contributed to NATO and, while European allies spend some 70% of their defense expenditures on the Alliance, the USA actually spend much less. In fact, the USA now only deploy a small fraction of the forces for NATO that it did at the time of the Cold War, and even then the Department of Defense reported a percentage of around 37% to the Congress.

Where do we stand as Americans?

We Americans do have ongoing wars, but we still have the lowest active levels of personnel deployed overseas since 1957. The Department of Defense reports that the USA only deployed 14% of its active forces overseas in March 2019, and only 3% were forward deployed in NATO Europe on a permanent basis. If you think that this kind of burden constitutes a real reason for the USA to consider leaving the Alliance, you have a real problem with math.

As for the goal of spending 20% of national defense budgets on equipment, this goal has no relation to what a country needs to spend to create effective forces and develop an effective level of defense and deterrence. Once again, meeting the goal says nothing about capability. In the Secretary General’s Report, Luxemburg is the most successful equipment spender in the Alliance. Moreover, spending more can waste money on the wrong forces. If you look at what many countries are actually spending on over time, you do not see any major move towards more interoperability, any standardization or coherent effort in modernisation; particularly in most of the NATO countries closest to the borders of Russia.
What do we have to do?

We need to focus on Alliance-wide force planning goals that are based on a clear net assessment of the threat and comparisons of our efforts with those of Russia. We need to have clear mission priorities for spending tailored to the current forces in each country focusing on creating the best possible collective defense efforts. Rather than percentage goals, we need to revive the NATO force planning exercise of the 1960s, and the attention we had in dealing with the SS-20 and in shaping CFE.

This can be somewhat embarrassing. I worked on that NATO force planning effort. It collapsed in the end for several reasons. One was that was the United States starting to lie about its contribution to the Alliance because of shifts of personnel and equipment to Vietnam. Second, no one wanted a serious debate on what individual countries were doing was right and wrong. The Defense Planning Committee simply accepted whatever countries reported to NATO, and Ministerial policy decisions were made irrelevant since they did not affect meaningfully any aspect of the strategic planning.

So what do we really need?

There are three clear priorities that should shape the goals we set and determine the kind of spending we really need:
- Realistic assessment of the threats;
- Effective force planning;
- Honest effort to coordinate countries in pooling their resources together.

Most importantly, on the American side, we need to stop this mindless bullying exercise in burden-sharing and get back to the core values which built up NATO as a meaningful Alliance.

For the extended version of the intervention: Burden-sharing’ and the 2 percent of GDP Solution: A Study in Military Absurdity, https://www.csis.org/analysis/burden-sharing-and-2-percent-gdp-solution-study-military-absurdity
We are witnessing the erosion of the world order established in the wake of World War Two. This erosion of rules and norms has led to significant implications for the future of international relations and NATO itself.

But, what if we consider another side of the prism of this strategic landscape? What if we are not witnessing an erosion per se but our adversaries using our norms, institutions and values against us in ways we had not necessarily envisaged? What if our adversaries are using our international and domestic institutional hardware trying to run new software on them?

China, for instance, seems to be translating its economic influence into a growing geopolitical power and, as a consequence, recipients of the Belt and Road Initiative funding are beginning to derecognise Taiwan as a state. One more example, China is trying to use international bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union, to promote its own standards of cyber governance; as The Atlantic wrote, they are trying to create “the first competitive alternative to open Internet, a model that is steadily proliferating around the world.” Another possible example, China established a UN Peacekeeping academy which increases its understanding and access to foreign military apparatus, and finally China is using our same arguments during the war on terrorism to justify its oppression of weaker communities and the replacement of these communities into re-education camps.

Turning to Russia, it also appears to use our democratic norms and values of free speech against us. Peter Singer tells us as how Russian online trolls are finding and exploiting existing themes in our public, such as the anti-vaxxers debate. They have been exploiting disinformation and local dissent to create pretexts for the “little green men.”
What all this means for NATO?

What do we do when confronting with political warfare or comprehensive coercion - which are terms to describe the use of a variety of instruments of national power - even in our own domestic and international institutions?

Could the past be instructive?

Article 2 of the Washington Treaty states “The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”

We talk a lot about NATO article three, four and five and we tend to think that NATO is a military alliance. Instead, article 2 is one of the pillars of the Organisation, and we have never mentioned it with the consequence that NATO does the military stuff and the other institution do the rest of it. Yet, looking at article 2, I can’t help but be struck that our predecessors thought about these issues in a more holistic way. To them the military was necessary but certainly not sufficient to win the emerging strategic competition with the Soviet Union. Today, one can’t help but wonder whether NATO is missing out on a critical role it could play in fostering article 2 collaboration amongst treaty allies.

In conclusion, if you agree with this analysis, a number of questions start to flow:
• How do we counter our international institutional hardware being taken over by malware by other actors?
• How do we build a common understanding between our business, trade and national security communication about the security challenges at hand and their implications?
• Might NATO itself play a role in fostering these conversations and strategies?
• Returning to the topic of this intervention, there has been a shift from conventional and nuclear to hybrid and cyber, or, it has it always been all at once but in different degrees?

This speech represents a personal point of view.
I agree with Robert Kagan definition of great powers competition: “The jungle is growing back”.

First, the last 70 years have been relatively a historical and we are witnessing great powers and other powers start to act geopolitically once again. This means a bit of friction in various regions and a lot of nationalism in Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East. We are going to see more of this and it is very different from what I have experienced in my entire lifetime; therefore, we have to think about it differently.

Second, we are at the very beginning of the digital age. It is still going to unfold in many ways, fundamentally affecting our society, economy, security, and geopolitics. This is something that great powers will be looking to leverage for opportunities, although there could be also darker applications of all the technologies that are unfolding and among the ones I am watching, the most I am interested and concern about is biotech.

Third, we are in a new information environment. We produce roughly 2,5 quintillion bytes of data every single day. There are 4 million Google searches every single minute but the problem is that this data is of highly uncertain quality and integrity. We have to come up with new mechanisms and approaches for authenticating what we are reading, what we are hearing and now, with the advent of deep fake videos, what we are seeing. Over the next two years and more, we will see the proliferation of artificial videos. Our competitors are weaponising these platforms against our interests and we need to get a handle on how to address that.

Fourth, as Matt Burrows (Director of the Foresight, Strategy and Risks Initiative at the Atlantic Council) projected, we are experiencing a domestic unravelling within our societies, an increased polarisation and disintegration.

Fifth, we do not know whether the end of the predominant US global role was August 2013 when President Obama chose not to strike 50 targets in Syria, but it may be the case. This is something we have agency over, so it is not final, it is...
reversible, but we will need to head in a very different direction if we want the United States to continue underwriting vast aspects of the global order as it did for so many years.

Those are the five elements of the order that I think we are in. Now, I will list five thoughts on what we can do about this situation.

1. The US. National Security Strategy and US National Defense Strategy have said that we are in a great power competition but they have not yet said what our goals are. Thus, we are in a race without knowing where the finish line is. The United States have to define goals working with its allies – working with NATO allies. What do we want from our relations with China and Russia? How those goals, once defined, will affect allies and alliances on achieving them?

2. There was a great article by Robert Kaplan in The National Interest about dealing with the coming Chinese Empire. His main point was that the United States had better start prioritising. We can’t do everything and he said China would like nothing more than for us to get involved in more messy wars in the Middle East. With limited resources the US and NATO strategists need to think about where to apply them in smart ways;

3. We have to deal with our domestic unravelling, to be more coherent and have more functional policies;

4. There is a critical geopolitical need for strengthening our alliances. In my opinion, the United States is going to need both NATO and Asian alliances very badly within the next five to eight years. We have to start building those at all levels from head of state downwards to the many operators and other people who are part of the alliances;

5. We need to stop regionalising. In other words, China is in Europe in many ways; Russia in in the Pacific. We need to get over our nice comfortable Cold War regional boundaries and put European allies and Asian allies together in a daily confrontation over the same challenges.

One more, NATO should offer a NATO-China Council to China. At this time China would not take the offer but just making this offer will have beneficial effects. This is going to happen at some point so we might as well get started because the top of the agendas that I have seen in many discussions with our European colleagues is China.

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Thinking about NATO’s 70th anniversary, the starting point for what I want to talk about is that progress is not inevitable. We began our conversation about a movement from order to disorder as we look out across the world today.

If you think about the last seven decades, it has been the United States, along with NATO allies, that has led the international order built on a foundation of democratic values, human dignity, and open markets. This delivered better lives for our citizens and for billions of people around the world. It is easy to take all this for granted. The purpose of today’s conversation is a caution not to do things that put the world, as we know it, at risk. Our task is to figure out how we forge a new transatlantic leadership in a dramatically changed world.

I graduated from high-school when the Berlin Wall was coming down; I had the chance to begin and pursue my career as NATO was going through an extraordinary historic adaptation of its own, out of area or out of business – the Alliance got involved in the Balkans. Very young, I was working at the State Department led by Secretary Madeleine Albright when we opened the door of the Alliance, so that former adversaries could become allies, creating as well a different kind of potential strategic partnership with Russia.

When I was born there were 29 democracies; by the time I was in College they were 77: the majority of the world, for the first time in history, was living in a democratic environment. When I went to work to NATO with Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo, we felt like we had the wind at our back; then things began to change: 9/11, the financial and economic crisis, various turmoil around the globe… we are at an inflection point whose outcome is still uncertain.

Here, at the Atlantic Council, we have framed a set of defining challenges that the world is facing right now: the potential major power competition, the doubts on the future of democracies and open markets, the threats to the international
system of rules and institutions, the new technologies which have disrupted our societies, and a real uncertainty about America’s role in the world.

For NATO this means that a revisionist Russia has continued its conventional and hybrid provocations in the East, while brazenly interfering in our democracies, and that China seeks to expand its influence and authoritarian ways on to its neighbours and Europe. Even the mounting war of words and actions between the United States and Iran constitutes an evidence that the international rules, values, and order is under challenge. We see also instability across the Middle East and North Africa, which is a real risk to our European allies.

These challenges both internal and external only serve to make us look more vulnerable to our enemies. Republicans and Democrats fighting, the United States divided from its allies... but these fault lines, I do not think tell the whole strategic story about where we are right now.

I argue that when you take a closer look at what is happening in the national security debate in this country, you see the Congress and the Executive Branch that, despite their dramatic differences, have a degree of commonality in the strategic outlook; in a sense that the United States is entering an era of great power competition whether declining Russia, that disrupts our interests, or rising China that risks displacing them.

In Secretary General Stoltenberg’s statement before the Congress there is a real sense of support for the Alliance and its role in safeguarding peace, justice and security in Europe, but also the democratic values that it is built on.

In our relation with Europe right now the harsh rhetoric has taken the transatlantic relationship down on a tumultuous path. A path that some say could fundamentally change this relationship. When I am in Europe now, I hear very serious conversations about how European can hedge in the future between the United States and China. That is a very different vision of the one we had when we have tried to build the idea of a transatlantic link institutionalised through the Alliance.

I fear that we could be on the wrong path.
I fear we might be getting off track.

I would argue that, despite some of these divisions, the United States and many of our allies are actually strategically aligned in grand strategy perhaps more than we have been since 9/11 or even 1989. Indeed, if you set aside some of the serious feuds between our leaders and political differences, the United States and our democratic allies in many respects acknowledge that the great challenge of the 21st century will be the competition between the free societies and authoritarian, corrupt, state-led capitalism.

The current issues that we have been debating, from burden-sharing to trade questions, should not overshadow the sense of potential strategic agreement in the future.

We should now reinvest in our sense of alliances, not thinking about divesting. We are here to commemorate the 70th anniversary of NATO, the most success-
ful alliance in history which ensured peace and security of its members in large part because of its ability to adapt, to change over time. Therefore, it is appropriate that we move into this conversation to focus on not the past but the future.

Our nations begin to prepare for what is probably a long period of strategic geopolitical competition. We need to avoid getting it backwards, we need to understand that in this context we have to put our alliances – and NATO in particular – at the core, not the periphery of our strategy and to make them more effective. This requires leadership as a key ingredient. Furthermore, we need to connect the dots that the USA are best served when Washington and its allies act together. Our allies are multipliers for our interests and values, particularly when we negotiate with Moscow or Beijing.

For NATO this means responding to Russia’s aggression today, while preparing for the challenge posed by China’s growing global reach in the future.

With regard to Russia, we have to continue the Alliance’s efforts to bolster its deterrence and defense in response to the revanchism of the Kremlin, seeking to threaten its neighbours and our allies. In my view, this requires continuing the US military presence in the Baltic States, in Poland, in the Black Sea, and in the Balkan region. The Russian challenge is likely to remain asymmetric and that is why we need to persist our support working with NATO and with the European Union in order to strengthen the resilience of our democratic societies whether it is energy, diversification, or democratic defense of disinformation.

At the same time, it is necessary a common approach on how to handle China’s and trade challenges. It is essential to set global standards, supporting our allies with foreign investments to concert a transatlantic strategy ensuring that the free world is able to harness new technologies together, such as secure 5G, before the authoritarians do.

In an era of great power competition, our goal should be to keep and expand our allies thought an alliance structure that provides the security necessary for democracies to face their own difficult issues at home. To this purpose, we should stand by NATO’s open door policy recognising that welcoming new members is about expanding the zone of security and the community willing to defend freedom. This is in our interest, not just in the interest of the aspirants.

The US Senate will have an opportunity to weigh in on NATO’s 30th member North Macedonia, that shows that our engagement is working and that Russia’s attempts to disrupt our efforts in the Balkans is not.

Today’s competition is global. Russia is back in the Middle East, Latin America witnessed China’s global reach. We have to recognise this reality to lead a more concerted effort to thicken the political bonds and operational ties between NATO and its global partners. Today these partnerships are under invested assets at NATO Headquarters.

We should start by focusing on the south where instability is an existential challenge for Europe. There we sort of have dropped the ball, and we need to raise
our level of ambition and how to forge meaningful partnerships in North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf. At the same time, we might consider formalising our links among us treaty allies in Europe and in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand). The aim is to build alliances with the United States at the centre to provide a more capable and international global democratic response to the authoritarian challenge.

Indeed, we have to face the budget expenditure on what is strategically important. The United States is right expecting its allies to do more but we need to remember that our own efforts are in our interest, they are not acts of charity.

In an era of geopolitical competition, America’s friends and allies are the United States comparative advantage. Viewing our allies that way would compel consistent policies that would lead our alliances towards united fronts and standing up to aggression. In addition, our defense strategy should inevitably drive Washington to bolster and expand its alliances.

Indeed, the Congress, the Administration, the American people could view our alliances as national strategic assets been built over time. As such, you could claim that each administration serves as a steward of these assets with the responsibility to defend, strengthen and lead them. US leadership after all will remain the decisive element in determining the success of NATO’s future.
Session II

TOWARDS A FUTURE
NATO’S STRATEGY
I will begin by offering what I hope will be an upbeat opening comment. We are here at the Atlantic Council to mark the 70th anniversary of the Washington Treaty. Ironically, we gather at a time when we are probably more anxious about the Atlantic relationship than any time since World War II. But I come out of the last couple of years struck by how resilient NATO has been in the face of both internal and external challenges.

To have an American president insulting allies and talking about withdrawing from the Alliance are serious developments. But I am uplifted by the degree to which supporters on both sides of the Atlantic have rallied to defend NATO. This leads me to believe that the political and strategic foundations of the Alliance are actually in very good shape.

The US House of Representatives and the Senate have been passing resolutions, one after another, in support of the Atlantic Alliance. The Secretary General of NATO was invited to give an address to a joint session of Congress; that was a statement to the President of the United States saying “Do not mess with this Alliance”. In addition, if you look at public opinion in the United States, the needle has not moved during Trump’s presidency. A recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey showed that 75% of the American public believes that the United States should either maintain or increase its support to NATO. It is exactly the same percentage of support that existed when Barack Obama was president.

Yes, there is a lot to worry about, but we should also see the last couple of years as a sign that the Alliance has an enormous amount of staying power on both sides of the Atlantic.

In terms of my wish list to align national priorities to make the next ten years a strong decade, the first would be to get Europe to actually turn the corner on defense and to ensure that the current push – whether you focus on PESCO, a European intervention force, the framework nation concept – produces real progress on building European military capability. This is the time for Europe to finally
make good on its longstanding interest in becoming a more capable actor on defense. The stronger the European pillar is, the stronger the Atlantic Alliance will be. Furthermore, I believe that the United States would value the Alliance further if it had a more capable European partner on the other side of the Atlantic.

It is not just President Trump who wants more from Europe. President Obama and those before him have encouraged Europe to be able to assume more defense responsibilities and acquire greater geopolitical heft. That has not really happened yet. There has been a lot of talk; now Europe really needs to make it happen. Also keep in mind that there will be times in the future, perhaps the not-too-distant future, when something bad happens in the European theatre and the United States is not in a position to come to the party, meaning Europe will need to act on its own. We all know this will happen; it might be in North Africa, in the Caucasus, in the Balkans. Europe cannot wait for that rainy day and find itself unprepared.

Second, I think that all NATO members need to be mindful that the Alliance is not just about the hardware, the strategy, the command structures, but it is also about values, about defending countries not just because they are of strategic importance but because of who they are, countries that stand by liberal democratic values. Today, I worry that we are passing through a historical moment in which NATO’s liberal democratic foundations are being tested: in Poland, Hungary, Italy, Turkey. And in the UK and the United States as well. Given what NATO stands for, it should be in the game of seeking to turn back the rising tide of illiberal politics on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the first instance, in the European context, it is the European Union that has been trying to defend liberal values and institutions, in particular by putting pressure on Poland and Hungary to redress some of the steps they have taken that are at odds with the rule of law. However, NATO should participate in this effort too because it is an institution that is about defending values and not just territories. How does it get into this game and play this role? I do not know. Perhaps there should be some kind of new political committee that assesses how member states are performing when it comes to the rule of law and democratic norms. That committee could call out member states that are backsliding. This issue of the welfare of liberal democracy should be on NATO’s agenda. That is what NATO is all about.

There are also additional issues that should be on the agenda of the Organisation that are not traditional ones. China’s Belt and Road Initiative should be discussed among the allies, as well as Nord Stream 2, cyber security, Russian interference in elections... these are core security issues for Europe and North America and should be part of the Alliance conversation.

Third, we need to find a mechanism for creating coalitions of the willing when it comes to NATO operations. I think we are moving into a world in which the main action of the Alliance is not going to be along the so-called “central front”. It has still a lot of business to do with Russia but if I had to guess where NATO will
be seeing action over the next years, it is not in the Baltics, it is not in Poland, it is in non-members states. Thus, I think NATO should begin to think about flexible mechanisms for creating coalitions of the willing when you cannot get full agreement from the member states. A kind of plug and play system that would allow a sub-group of NATO to act and that would open up opportunities for some of the partners to participate, just as they have done in Afghanistan.

Finally, I think that NATO has done a very good job of quietly getting ahead of the curve and sharing its good practises, knowledge, expertise, and experience with other regions. In the Middle East, NATO has made a difference through the Mediterranean Initiative. I think we should be very active with the African Union, with ASEAN, with the Gulf Cooperation Council, with other regional bodies. We are moving into a world in which the US and its NATO allies are not going to be the providers of last resort anymore. NATO has to help other regional organisations become more effective actors and backstop peace in their regions just as it has done in the North Atlantic.

The world is changing. NATO should lean into its partnership programmes around the world to pass on its own legacy, good practices and experience to other regions.
TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Strategic concepts have played a very large role in the history of the Alliance. I count seven through the seven decades that we are celebrating today. These strategic concepts have come at inflection point in the health of the Atlantic Alliance. They tend to shift the focus of the Organisation and build new consensus.

During the Cold War we had four strategic concepts. The two most important themes were agreement on the strategies of massive retaliation and flexible response. Indeed, during the Cold War, strategic concepts were primarily about hard defense, nuclear weapons, and nuclear deterrence.

After the Cold War, three other strategic concepts were issued. The first one came out at the Rome Summit, in 1991; the second at the Washington Summit, in 1999, and the third at the Lisbon Summit, in 2010.

Historically, each of these strategic concepts has created new consensus when the old consensus was withering. Today, we are at a new inflection point and we do need a new strategic concept. However, we are not politically ready right now; maybe in a year or two we will.

In the meantime, there are still some valid elements in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The most relevant are the three core tasks of NATO: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. The Alliance was able to use those three “buckets” to operate throughout the changing environment we have been in during the past decade. Other aspects of the 2010 strategic concept are also still valid: the open-door policy, the need for reforms and for military transformation.

Since 2010, there have been three key summits – each going beyond the Lisbon Summit – whose declarations have taken additional steps toward the modification of the 2010 Strategic Concept. Furthermore, we have recently had a new NATO Political Guidance (February 2019) and are reviewing the MC 404 Military Strategy. Each of these documents has adjusted the 2010 Strategic Concept in relation to the environment we are living in. I do think that these initiatives need to be
consolidated, but before this can happen, NATO nations need to trust each other. Right now, we lack this needed degree of trust and in the past this process took some 10 months.

What I remember most vividly about the 2009–2010 experience, working with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to prepare the 2010 Strategic Concept, is the importance of the process. We came out with a solid NATO consensus document, but the consultation process lasted ten months. We built a Group of Experts and went everywhere throughout the Alliance. By doing that we built trust. Hopefully, we can use a similar process again to rebuild that trust.

What I would like to see in the new strategic concept?

• *An articulation of a new consensus on the nature of the threats.* There is not a consensus on the Russian threat or on the Chinese challenge, or on what to do about Iran;
• *A restatement of the fundamental purpose of the Alliance.* It is about defense, but is also about values, maintaining democracy and the rule of law;
• *Additional steps to enhance deterrence.* We have made progress on the conventional side of deterrence and we need to do more, but we do not really have a NATO nuclear doctrine today and we need a new one;
• *A better understanding and clearer policy about hybrid war.* There is a hybrid war underway and we are losing it. Part of it deals with cyber, the other with the “little green men” problem. But from my perspective, the biggest problem is strategic communication. Social media are used to divide the Alliance and we are not adequately equipped to deal with it, so we have to figure out how to respond to that menace;
• *A better Southern Strategy.* We do not have a solid Southern Strategy within the Alliance. The Alliance has talked about “projecting stability” and about 360 degrees security but we really do not seem understanding the complex nature of the threats coming from the south. A main element is instability but also the interference of Russia and China;
• *Better management of grey zones.* As Russia continues to disrupt countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova with troops on their soil and constant social media attacks; NATO needs a better consensus on how to manage and reverse Russian gains in these areas;
• *A new decision-making process.* We talked before about operating in coalitions when it is not possible to make decisions within NATO. Besides, the consensus rule may not apply to everything. There might be cases where we have to go beyond that by finding new ways to make decisions especially in time of extreme crisis;
• *New approaches to burden-sharing.* We have to move from the current input measures – the 2% of GDP spent on defense and the 20% of total spending
dedicated to defense investments - to additional output measures which more accurately reflect contributions that nations make to the Alliance.

It is also true that the 2% issue is a historic heritage and politically useful to squeeze military resources from the allies. During the post-Cold War period the European allies showed a constant decline in expenditures from 2,5% to 1% of the GDP, while the USA showed a V curve after 9/11. In any case, all this money needs to support the 2+6 operational ambition of NATO and, in this new context, one has to split operations letting the European allies handle some by themselves.
In this intervention, I will touch upon some of the points that I think bring out the strength of the Alliance from a military perspective.

A few weeks ago, I was in Norway for the 75th anniversary of the D-Day and with some friends we discussed that NATO was really born on the beaches of Normandy. Since American troops entered the continent of Europe, along with the British, the Canadians and others allies, they have never left and Europe has experienced an unprecedented period of peace.

This highlights the importance and impact of NATO that I believe being the strongest and most effective alliance that the world has ever seen. I say that as a military professional and in terms of strength I refer to the combined gross domestic product; the population; the size of militaries and the defence budgets.

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is at the core of NATO collective defense. As an American I want to restate it: article 5 was invoked to come to our aid and our allies came to our assistance after we were attacked. They came to Afghanistan and they are still there, 18 years later, providing 1/3 of the boots on the ground.

As a soldier, I will never forget that.

One of the impact of this has been that the relationships among the senior commanders of the military forces of NATO have never been better. The cohesion is tight because we have worked very close together for years and this has created a sort of intellectual and personal bond which enables us to deal with challenges as they come forward – no matter what they are.

Coalitions have never been easy and always take work. However, from my point of view, the legitimacy that comes from our operating as an alliance cannot be bought by money. When you look at what has been a very long and challenging time in Afghanistan, our legitimacy has not been questioned because it is based on the United Nations, NATO and these nations that continue to step forward and demonstrate their legitimacy with their own presence.

For the United States, even though from time to time we need the capability to
act unilaterally, I think going into the future acting as a member of the Alliance is essential to our success.

Making alliances work requires qualities that you do not normally find on a list of military virtues such as patience and humility; emotional intelligence and stamina. Again, the experience within NATO has improved these qualities among military leaderships. These qualities enable us to attain a unity of effort and interoperability.

Interoperability is critical because our ability to operate quickly and responsively as an alliance provides options to our policy makers short of war. Still, interoperability costs money in terms of readiness, modernisation, and training. We are still missing the marker.

My biggest concern going forward – as a Senior Commander within NATO – is the lack of dialogue with the Russians. After the retirement I joined a group run by Harvard University called the Eva group and as we prepared for a recent meeting in Reykjavík, it was striking to me how little dialogue is occurring between the United States and Russia.

From a military standpoint this could create a situation where a miscalculation, or a mistake leads to a confrontation which could create dangerous circumstances. Therefore, figuring out how we should dialogue and open those communication channels is essential.

Internally, the future is focusing on our cohesion and interoperability; externally, on dialogue, communication, engagement and trying to deter future conflicts before they turn into actual ones.
THE PROGRESS OF EU-NATO COOPERATION

The European Union is essentially a peace project started from the remnants of World War II. It has its origins in a group of nations coming together to form the European Coal and Steel Community that gradually expanded geographically and in terms of its competences as the world changed.

The European Union is now constituted by 28 sovereign nations, who understand that in order to address current challenges they need to work together. This principle extends also outside of the EU in terms of working with third partners in a whole range of areas, including security and defence. 22 EU member states are also members of NATO, and we need to continue to work together to defend our shared goals and values.

Regarding defence spending, European countries have been focused on moving towards the 2% goal. Considerable progress has been made in recent years in this respect; indeed, the figures from 2018 show that the European allies are now spending more on defence than ever before, although there is still a long way to go to achieve the NATO target. In terms of other areas necessary to ensure security, the European Union can play a complementary role to NATO. We have developed the so-called integrated approach which focuses increasingly on combining various foreign policy tools to promote security and stability in our partner countries. This includes the possibility to deploy civilian and military missions overseas but also a range of other tools such as development cooperation, diplomacy, trade promotion support for security sector reform, the rule of law and governance.

This is the approach we have taken inter alia with the Western Balkans countries, trying to help them to achieve higher democratic standards and undertake important security sector reforms. Furthermore, we work closely with our Eastern partners, such as Georgia and Ukraine, across a wide range of areas, including on security assistance and the rule of law. This is what the European Union can contribute in terms of soft power.

Concerning EU-NATO cooperation, we have come an extraordinary distance
since 2016 when the first EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed in Warsaw. The second Joint Declaration was signed during the Brussels summit in July 2018. Work is now ongoing on 74 agreed actions of cooperation, from cyber to counterterrorism, the operations in the Mediterranean and so on. There is also close political dialogue at all levels, including regular meetings at the Ministerial level, joint meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council as well as close cooperation between the staff at the working level. This progress and the extent of cooperation are not always understood.

In recent years, considerable progress has been made on developing European security and defense initiatives. This arises from a recognition at the European level that we need to be able to take more responsibility for our own security, increase our contribution to burden sharing and do more to develop European capabilities. This includes the creation of the European Defence Fund that will have at its disposal 13 billion euros from the next EU multiannual budget starting in 2021. While this is not a huge amount of money in the context of overall defence spending, it is intended to support and encourage Member States to undertake more collaborative defence projects. This is also intended to help reduce the existing duplication and fragmentation in European defence markets and thus lead to more efficient spending over time. Member States not only need to spend more, they need to spend better. The combined defense budgets of EU Member States are not insignificant, worth approximately 227 billion euros, but it is not spent in the most inefficient way because each of the 28 countries spend separately. As the capabilities developed with the co-funding of the European Defence Fund will continue to be owned by the individual Member States, they will also reinforce the European pillar of NATO.

Finally, military mobility represents an example of very practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. The EU can bring substantial value added in terms of facilitating the regulatory side of cross border movement of dual-used goods between the Member States. 6.5 billion euros has been earmarked under the next multiannual EU budget (2021-2017) that can be used to co-fund the necessary upgrades of transport infrastructure in Europe.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, as Vice President Mike Pence and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi look on, addresses a joint meeting of Congress on Capitol Hill in Washington, Wednesday, April 3, 2019. (Patrick Semansky/AP)
CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the past few months it seems as though NATO has celebrated every anniversary in his history and I have to say that has kept me quite busy. In March, I traveled to Warsaw where I had the opportunity to give a speech in honor of my former professor and boss Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Then I went to Prague and I was able celebrate there. Throughout the trip I stressed the importance of fidelity to NATO’s founding principles and his alliance of democracies.

Just a few weeks later, I watched as Secretary General Stoltenberg delivered that historic address to a joint session of Congress in honor of the Alliance’s 70th birthday. Later that day, thanks to the Atlantic Council and its partners, it was organized the NATO Engages conference and I got to perform at the Anthem, which is the most fashionable place in Washington D.C. now.

You may think that this was the end of celebrations, but in fact it was more of a midway point because I went to the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, to meet I have to say my favorite group of former foreign ministers. The official name of the group is The Aspen Ministers Forum.

We went there because is where I signed the accession of Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to the Atlantic Alliance on a table that Harry Truman himself had used. It was really a wonderful time.

A couple of weeks ago, I traveled with President Bill Clinton to Pristina to commemorate 20 years since the end of NATO’s successful air campaign. There, after a large ceremony, we laid a wreath at the KFOR memorial in honor of all the NATO personnel who contributed to the peace and security of Kosovo. I have to say that it was truly a spectacular experience to walk through the streets of the city with thousands of people welcoming us and standing on balconies, and on rooftops waving the flags of NATO member states with signs saying “Thank you NATO” and “Thank you USA”. This reaffirmed to me that our Alliance did
the right thing by acting in Kosovo, no matter what you hear from the American newspapers.

Speaking of the Russians, I have to say that my visit to Prague and Warsaw, and the discussions at the Truman Library strengthened my conviction that we made the right decision by admitting qualified new members to NATO, rather than leaving a vacuum in the heart of Europe for Russia.

I think that one of the things not enough people have been aware of is that we were actually very careful about making sure that those that were coming in were prepared. When I was ambassador at the United Nations in 1994, I was asked to go with General John Shalikashvili (who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time) to the various countries in order to explain what our process was going to be.

Thus, we first went to Warsaw and they were not very happy with the message that they were not going to get in right away. Thus, I started out by saying it is an accident of history that two of the five members of the principal committee of the USA decision-making process were born not very far from there. General Shalikashvili in Poland, and I in Prague. General Shalikashvili said that one day they would be able to come to NATO Headquarters and to have a telephone, and a filing cabinet.

We were able to persuade them all on that, and then we had to go to all the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We ended up in Prague and we really worked very hard thinking about how the countries would come in. Indeed, NATO Partnership for Peace process continues to be a stepping stone of the accession of new member states. We also made very clear to everybody that NATO was not a charitable organization: you had to pay your way.

I did grow up in Eastern Europe, my father was the Czechoslovakia ambassador to Yugoslavia, and I watched what was going on with the “salami tactics” that Russia was using throughout Eastern Europe in order to acquire its colonial empire. What really happened was that the USA was not paying much attention at the time till the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 which was the reason to begin NATO. Therefore, I have always felt very close to the whole operation and I studied how it worked.

From then until the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO defended freedom in the West while preserving hope in Europe’s East. As a daughter of Prague living in America, I have one foot on each side.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has remained open to qualified members, and it has responded to threats both inside and outside the North Atlantic region. In addition, it has begun with other partners to counter global challenges, including proliferation, terrorism and cyber-attacks.

I think it is also important what we are doing with Russia. I can assure you that, as we were expanding NATO, we spent a lot of time talking with the Russians. I personally met with President Boris Yeltsin and made clear that we were open to
the fact that, if Russia was in a position, it might ultimately become member itself. He said that we would not need NATO because the Soviet Union did not exist anymore. I answered that NATO was not against them.

We signed a NATO–Russia Founding Act, we did all kind of things to respect Russia and to make clear that this was not against them.

Nowadays I think we have a lot of things to do, but we need to remember the advantages and the things that have happened. In the Balkans people were living in fear because ethnic cleansing was taking place. Not everything has been settled but it is certainly better. We have tried very hard as we have expanded to make sure that the Baltics were part of it, and we are careful about what is going on in the northern seas.

*What about the Strategic Concept?*

I remember the leaders of various countries were meeting in Strasburg to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance and Anders Fogh Rasmussen was named Secretary General. On this occasion, it was decided that there would be experts to advise him. Every country named an expert – Secretary General Rasmussen established that only 12 members out of 28 would have experts – and I was named by the United States. Then, Secretary General Rasmussen asked me to chair them.

This was one of the most difficult things that we had to do. We spent a lot of time on consultations and there were two things that came out: *whether a cyber-attack was an article 5 attack*, and *what about Russia*. Concerning the cyber-attack, we decided we were not prepared to consider it as an article 5 attack because it was hard to find the genesis of it. So, we decided it would be an article 4 that needed to be discussed.

As for Russia, we went there and we met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. I remind that from the beginning they acted as if everything we were doing was against them. We need to remember that we are not the provokers; they are.

The other part about the strategic concept that is very interesting is that the majority of all the activities of NATO had been out of area. There were experiences from the Balkans and Afghanistan, and we started talking about what the role of the Alliance would be if there were going more and more operations out of area. We also discussed about the fact that NATO has more partners than members, so we began to figure out what would have been the relation with the partners.

However, the bottom line is that everything changed and all of a sudden we are now in area; NATO troops are in various places in Poland. This is an example of having flexibility in this institution.

At that time, we had also a hard time with the European Union when we went to consult. I also remember spending an inordinate amount of time when I was Secretary to make clear that there should not be any duplication with NATO.
There was a real issue about the identity of European defense force, if should have been one. The other question was Turkey.

I think there is a lesson: that people and institutions at age 70 must have a little refurbishing, and we have to look at which are the real issues NATO has to deal with: 2% is important but 100% for democracy is more.

If you read article 2 of the Washington Treaty, it talks about the relevance of democratic institutions and we have not stressed that enough. The Declaration of Principles is basic to the Alliance and we need to refurbish this document too. When I talked to Secretary General Stoltenberg, he said that the Alliance does not have an internal system good enough to deal with the democratic questions. Something to work on.
FOREWORD

Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo
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A strong focus on strategic outlook in complex issues. High level contacts and negotiations. Special attention on countries of strategic relevance, i.e. MENA and Gulf region. Frequent Public Diplomacy activities to discuss policies and open issues. He held the position of Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic political industrial area, in relation with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean. He is the author of the books: “The road to Kabul” (Il Mulino Arel, 2009); “A political journey without maps, diversity and future in the Greater Middle East” (Rubbettino, 2013); “NATO and the Middle East: The Making of a Partnership” (New Academia Publishing, 2018).

BACKGROUND POLICY PAPER

Alessandro Politi
*Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome*

Alessandro Politi is the director of the NATO Defense College Foundation, the only NATO-affiliated NGO think tank. A political and strategic analyst with 30 years of experience, he was political advisor of two KFOR Commanders. He was senior researcher for the Italian MoD (CeMiSS-Centre for Military and Strategic Studies) responsible for the strategic monitoring of Latin America. He also created and has led the Global Outlook project within CeMiSS, published in Italian and English (third edition, 2015). He has contributed to the Italian Defence White. He has directed the CEMRES research on CBMs in the framework of the 5+5 Defence Initiative, presenting the conclusions to the Ministers in Granada. He teaches geopolitics and intelligence at the SIOI. He teaches conflict management,
crisis, peace-making and analysis at different governmental centres. He has been acting director of the School of Intelligence Analysis at a private establishment in Rome. He has been advisor in Italy and abroad to four Defence ministers (among which the actual President of the Italian Republic, Hon. Mattarella), one National Armaments Director, one Intelligence Co-ordinator, one Chairman of the Oversight Intelligence Committee, one Head of the Italian delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (actually EU HR, on. Federica Mogherini). Born in Germany, lives in Rome. He has published as author or co-author 37 books on strategic and security matters. His most recent publications will be on the Belt and Road Initiative. His most recent book is the NDCF Shaping Security Horizons - Strategic Trends 2012-2019 volume, a global predictive analysis tailored to the needs of decision shapers.

WELCOME REMARKS

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.
Frederick Kempe is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council. Before joining the Council, Kempe was a prize-winning editor and reporter at The Wall Street Journal for more than twenty-five years. In New York, he served as assistant managing editor and columnist. Prior to that, he has been the longest-serving editor and associate publisher ever for the European section, running the global The Wall Street Journal’s editorial operations in Europe and the Middle East. At The Wall Street Journal, he also served as a roving correspondent based out of London; as a Vienna Bureau Chief covering Eastern Europe and East-West Affairs; as Chief Diplomatic Correspondent in Washington, DC; and as the paper’s first Berlin Bureau Chief following the unification of Germany and collapse of the Soviet Union. He is the author of four books. The most recent, "Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth", (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2011) was a New York Times and a National Best Seller.

SESSION 1

Stephen Mariano
Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome
Stephen J. Mariano was appointed Dean of the NATO Defense College in January 2019. Prior he was Professor of National Security Studies at the National Defense University's National War College. Dr. Mariano taught military strategy and comparative military systems at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, as well as politics and U.S. foreign policy at the Royal Military College of Canada. Formerly, he was U.S. Army War College Visiting Defense Fellow at Queen’s University’s Center for International Relations, U.S. Army’s Senior Fellow at
Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and M.I.T. Seminar XXI Fellow. He acted as Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans, and Assessments at the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq, where he liaised with the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, and as Military Advisor to NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. He also served as Strategic Plans and Policy Officer within NATO’s International Military Staff in Brussels and at the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart.

Richard Hooker
Professor, National Security Strategy, National War College, Washington D.C.
Richard Hooker is currently Professor at the National War College, within the National Defense University (NDU). Moreover, he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Previously, Dr Hooker has been the Director for Research and Strategic Support at NDU and Director at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). From 2010 to 2013, he was Deputy Commandant and Dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome. Dr Hooker taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and held the Chief of Staff of the Army Chair at the National War College. He also served with the Office of National Service, the White House under President George H.W. Bush, the Arms Control and Defense Directorate, the National Security Council (NSC) during the Clinton Administration, and the NSC Office for Iraq and Afghanistan during the administration of George W. Bush. He held the position of Senior Director for NATO/Europe, Russia, and Europe Directorate at the NSC.

Anthony Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.
Anthony H. Cordesman is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). During his time at CSIS, Mr. Cordesman has been – among other things – Director of the Middle East Net Assessment Project, as well as principal investigator of the CSIS Homeland Defense Project. Cordesman formerly acted as National Security Assistant to Senator John McCain, as Director of Intelligence Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as civilian assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He has served in numerous other government positions, including as a consultant to the Departments of State and Defense during the Afghan and Iraqi wars, and within the NATO International Staff. He is a former adjunct Professor of national security studies at Georgetown University, and has twice been a Wilson Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He is the author of more than fifty books and a wide range of studies on U.S. security policy, energy policy, and Middle East policy.
Kathleen McInnis

*International Security Analyst, Congressional Research Service; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Washington D.C.*

Kathleen J. McInnis is a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She currently serves as an international security analyst for the Congressional Research Service, writing on U.S. defense policy and strategy issues. Prior to that, she was a research consultant at Chatham House in London, working on NATO and transatlantic security matters. In 2010, she co-founded Caerus Associates, a strategic design consulting firm, and acted as its Chief Operating Officer until 2011. Dr. McInnis also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, working on NATO-Afghanistan matters and stability operations capability development. In that capacity, she helped formulate and support U.S. policy for two NATO summits, eight NATO Defense Ministerial meetings, and four Regional Command-South Ministerial meetings. Kathleen McInnis also spent several years at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analysing U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, strategic capabilities, NATO, European security and transatlantic relations.

Barry Pavel

*Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.*

Barry Pavel is Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, where he focuses on emerging security challenges, defense strategies and capabilities, and key European and global defense issues. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, he was a career member of the Senior Executive Service in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for almost eighteen years. From 2008 to 2010, he acted as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Strategy at the National Security Council, serving both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Between 1993 and 2006, Barry Pavel led a broad range of security strategy and planning initiatives for both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, such as the defense planning for the first round of NATO enlargement.

SPECIAL INTERVENTION

Damon Wilson

*Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.*

Damon Wilson is Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council. His areas of expertise include NATO, Transatlantic relations, Central and Eastern Europe, and national security issues. From 2007 to 2009, he acted as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European affairs at the National Security
Council. Previously, he served at the US Embassy in Baghdad as Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff and as Director for Central, Eastern, and Northern European affairs at the National Security Council (2004-2006). Between 2001 and 2004, Damon Wilson held the position of Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, assisting Lord George Robertson in his drive to transform the Alliance by enlarging NATO membership, conducting operations beyond Europe, and adapting Allied capabilities to face modern threats. Prior to serving in Brussels, he worked in the US Department of State's Office of European Security and Political Affairs, in the State Department's China desk, and at the US Embassy in Beijing as a presidential management fellow.

SESSION 2

Ian Brzezinski
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.

Ian Brzezinski is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center on Strategy and Security. Between 2001 and 2005, he acted as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy. His lead responsibilities included NATO expansion, Alliance force planning and transformation, and NATO operations in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Mr. Brzezinski served for seven years on Capitol Hill, first as a Legislative Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee (1995-2000) and then as a Senior Professional Staff Member on the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations between 2000 and 2001. As the Staff Coordinator of the Senate NATO Observer Group, he facilitated coordination and communication between the U.S. Senate and the executive branch on NATO enlargement, NATO operations in the Balkans, and Alliance force modernisation among other issues. He also served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of Defense (1991-1993), and as a Consultant to the Center for Naval Analysis (1991-1992).

Charles Kupchan
Senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

Charles Kupchan is Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is also Professor of international affairs in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University. From 2014 to 2017, Dr. Kupchan served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs within the staff of the National Security Council (NSC). During the first Clinton administration, he was Director for European Affairs at the NSC. Previous to this position, he worked in the U.S. Department of State on the Policy Planning Staff. He served as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University’s Center for

Hans Binnendijk

**Distinguished Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Washington D.C.**

Hans Binnendijk is Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation. Until 2012, he was the Vice President for Research and Applied Learning at the National Defense University, the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy. He previously acted as Senior Director for Defense Policy at the National Security Council. He has also served as Acting Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and as Legislative Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In academia, Dr. Binnendijk was Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and Director of Studies at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies. Moreover, he held the position of Vice Chairman of the Board of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Chairman of the Board of Humanity in Action. His most recent books are “A Transatlantic Pivot to Asia” (SAIS, 2014), “Blinders, Blunders and Wars” (RAND, 2014), and “Friends, Foes, and Future Directions” (RAND, 2016).

John Nicholson

**Former Commander, Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan, Washington D.C.**

General John Nicholson is the longest-serving commander of the Afghan War, having led the 41-nation NATO-led Resolute Support Mission and United States Forces-Afghanistan for two and a half years. He commanded 22,000 Coalition forces and closely advised the 330,000-member Afghan National Security Forces. He has commanded units at all levels to include the 82nd Airborne Division and NATO’s Allied Land Command in Izmir, Turkey. His decorations include two awards of the Combat Infantryman’s Badge, and numerous other American and international awards, among them France’s Legion D’Honneur, Germany’s Knight Commander’s Cross, Great Cross with Star, and Afghanistan’s highest award given to non-Afghans, the Amir Amanullah Khan Award. Following retirement from active duty in November 2018, General Nicholson became the President of the PENFED Foundation, which supports veterans, service members, and their families. He is an Adjunct Faculty member of the Harvard Kennedy School and of Harvard’s Belfer Center Elbe Group, which sustains a Track Two dialogue between retired American and Russian senior officials in the military and intelligence fields.
Dearbhla Doyle  
*Minister-Counsellor and Head of the Political, Security and Development Section, EU Delegation, Washington D.C.*

Dearbhla Doyle joined the EU Delegation in September 2018. An experienced diplomat, she has spent most of her career to date working for the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland. As an Irish Diplomat, she has worked in a range of policy areas including Press, Anglo-Irish, Political and European Affairs. She served as Vice Consul at the Consulate - General of Ireland in Shanghai from 2000 to 2003, and as Political Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Ireland in Rome from 2008 to 2011. She worked as the Irish European Correspondent from 2011 to 2014, where she headed the Political Secretariat and coordinated Ireland’s positions with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Ms. Doyle joined the European External Action Service in 2014 where she worked in the Department for Europe and Central Asia on the EU’s Eastern Partnership and Arctic policies, and on Strategic Communications. Most recently, she served as Political Assistant to the Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia from 2016 to 2018. She has a degree in International and Italian Commerce from University College Dublin, and spent a year on Erasmus at the Università degli Studi, Bologna. She has a Master of Business Studies from the U.C.D. Smurfit Graduate School of Business.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

**Madeleine Albright**  
*Former United States Secretary of State, Washington D.C.*

Madeleine K. Albright is Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group and of Albright Capital Management LLC. In 1997, Ms Albright was named the first female Secretary of State. From 1993 to 1997, she served as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and was a member of the President’s Cabinet. From 1989 to 1992, she acted as President of the Center for National Policy. Previously, she was a member of President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Council and White House staff. Ms Albright is a Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. She chairs the National Democratic Institute and serves as President of the Truman Scholarship Foundation. She also serves on the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Policy Board. Madeleine Albright received the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honour, from President Obama on the 29th of May 2012.
NATO AT 70:
REFOCUSING FOR CHANGE?

Organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation
in co-operation with the Atlantic Council, Leonardo S.p.A., MBDA,
the NATO Defense College, and the National Defense University

WASHINGTON D.C., 27TH OF JUNE 2019

Venue: Atlantic Council, 1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor Washington D.C., USA
Session I

FROM ORDER TO DISORDER
The end of the bipolar order and increasing confrontation have left important issues outstanding. Is the management of the Russian threat through deterrence and dialogue still a foundation for tackling other challenges? Do hybrid threats require a different approach to burden sharing in a multipolar and disorderly world? Where are other instruments as useful as military ones? Does NATO guarantee collective security just in the North Atlantic theatre, or does the Alliance have an increasingly important role in a wider Euro-Asiatic space, where partnerships are ever more important?

Chair: Stephen Mariano, Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome

- Richard Hooker, Professor, National Security Strategy, National War College, Washington D.C.
- Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.
- Kathleen McInnis, International Security Analyst, Congressional Research Service; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Washington D.C.
- Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.

16,25-16,30 Special Intervention – The Importance of Allies in an Era of Great Power Competition
- Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.
Session II
TOWARDS A FUTURE NATO'S STRATEGY

Since the release of NATO’s last strategic concept in 2010, the Euro-Atlantic environment has drastically changed, warranting an update in NATO’s strategy. How should the Alliance conceptualize its core tasks of today, as they relate to issues of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security? Within the Washington Treaty, how can NATO adapt its mandate, tools, partnerships, and decision-making processes to make it even more effective and relevant at this critical juncture in transatlantic relations.

Chair: Ian Brzezinski, Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.

- Charles Kupchan, Senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.
- Dearbhla Doyle, Minister-Counsellor and Head, Political, Security and Development Section of the EU Delegation, Washington D.C.

18,00-18,15 Concluding Remarks
- Madeleine Albright, Former United States Secretary of State, Washington D.C.

Q&A
Remarks by Donald Trump, President of the United States at the unveiling of the 9/11-Article 5 Memorial
NATO AT 70: Refocusing for Change?

Remarks by Donald Trump, President of the United States at the unveiling of the 9/11-Article 5 Memorial
Time has come to update the Strategic Concept of 2010, taking into account the present international environment. This renewal has process will require time since consensus among the allies have to be built again. The continuing external criticism and pressures (like the threat posed by Russia, trade wars and migrations) and the vulnerabilities of the European member states, challenged by internal fissures (Brexit and democratic rule of law), have eroded the trust among the nations, questioning the robustness of the Organisation. However, despite those turbulences, that still exist and are more real than ever, the Alliance demonstrated to be more resilient than expected by its critics. Its strength rests on the three core tasks identified during the Summit in Lisbon (2010): collective defence, crisis management and co-operative security.

Collective defence is not just money and percentages. It is the specific contribution that each member brings to the collective preservation of security and well-being in the North Atlantic area. With this in mind, burden sharing is not a mere estimation of military spending, but counts men, means, modernisation and innovation – and even the guaranteeing of economic collaboration (art. 2, Washington Treaty) – to reinforce NATO’s security responses to current and emerging threats.

Crisis management is now oriented both to the North and to the South. NATO has to be an insurance for its Eastern members towards Russian potential attacks. Nevertheless, this goes hand in hand with the present risks and threats in the Southern region, itself undermined by internecine wars and constant external interference.

Co-operative security means the reinforcement of the current partnerships – the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Partnership for Peace – and the commitment to launch new collaborations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The aim of these partnerships is the projection of stability not imposing but passing on the Alliance’s legacy, good practices and experiences.

70th years after its constitution, these elements and virtues still make NATO the main global security provider.
NATO AT 70

REFOCUSING FOR CHANGE?

The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College. Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network.

The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of cooperation with NATO. Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings.

The Foundation was born eight years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staff. Actually the Foundation is active in three areas: high-level events, strategic trend research and specialised decision makers' training and education. Since it is a body with considerable freedom of action, transnational reach and cultural openness, the Foundation is developing a wider scientific and events programme.

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