Royal-politik

Six months after US President Donald Trump’s visit to Riyadh, the first diplomatic engagement of his presidential term, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman al-Saud (commonly referred to as MbS) reciprocated, travelling to Washington on 18 November 2025. While reaffirming the strong relationship between the two countries, which has been rooted in historic ties dating back to the end of the Second World War, the visit was quite significant.

The diplomatic hurdles that marked the bilateral relationship during Joe Biden’s presidency, due to the Kashoggi affair, have been removed with the return of Trump. The tycoon dismissed the findings of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which implicated MbS in orchestrating Khashoggi’s murder. This shift, already underway during the previous administration, is driven by Realpolitik.

With concerns over energy supplies in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia to US policies has once again been reaffirmed, prompting a reassessment. This means a significant correction since the 1973 first Arab oil embargo and the successive creation of the International Energy Agency under the auspices of Kissinger in 1974 (a de facto counterweight to OPEC, Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries).

In fact, the subsequent consequential US energy supply policy has been to constantly diminish the importance of Gulf supplies in favour of West Hemispheric supplies both national and imported (Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela). In 2024 Canada’s crude oil and petroleum products accounted for 55% of US sectoral imports, while the rest of the world 30% and OPEC countries only 15%. Overall, US imports just 17% of its energy supplies, while 83% is produced at national level, a trend begun in 2006 and culminating in the 2021-2024 period where the USA are a net energy exporter (30% of the produce). In 2024 the EU was importing 44% of its LNG needs from Washington and 15,4% of its oil in the same year. Despite US exports, the Trump administration feels that it has to secure a strategic energy diversification,

The war in Gaza, following Hamas’ attack on Israel in October 2023, significantly constrained the momentum of the Saudi-US realignment. Despite lobbying from Washington, MbS’ full endorsement of the Abraham Accords faced a major obstacle, preventing Riyadh from formally joining Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the UAE in normalising relations with Israel. The prospect of normalisation has since been postponed, becoming a bargaining chip for Saudi Arabia to secure further concessions from the US. On the other hand a partnership with NATO, either individually or in the Gulf Cooperation Council framework is difficult, but more feasible in principle.

During the visit, announcements regarding the sale of F-35 fighter jets, a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, and the designation of Saudi Arabia as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) allowed MbS to check off most of the items on his wish list, without yielding to US diplomatic pressure. More important, the two countries have signed a “strategic artificial intelligence partnership” opening the path to a momentous private Humain-Nvidia partnership agreement. It is the first time that an Arab country has become so prominent in the high-tech arena.

However, the agreements fell short of a formal normalisation of relations with Israel, raising further doubts about the viability of Trump’s 20-point peace plan for Gaza and a credible path to Palestinian statehood, a key condition set by MbS for joining the Abraham Accords. Moreover, pledges to increase Saudi investments in the US to $1 trillion come at a time of significant financial constraints, which are forcing Saudi Arabia to scale back some of its mega-projects, such as NEOM.

For the Crown Prince, the glass is rather full because, under the Chinese competition and with the need to secure energy source diversification, the USA have been induced to offer significant advantages, that will help Saudi Arabia maintain a competitive edge over regional rivals and friends, like Iran and Pakistan, for instance.