



NATO Foundation
Defense College

NATO 2021

**REBUILDING THE CONSENSUS
FOR A NEW ERA**

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NATO 2021
Rebuilding the consensus for a new era

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ALESSANDRO MINUTO-RIZZO
*President, NATO Defense College Foundation,
Rome*

FOREWORD

This is the 26th conference organized by the Foundation since it was founded 10 years ago. It is an achievement that we have a pleasure to share with you dear friends. Why today and on this subject? This is the first question for everybody. The answer is that international security is a matter of paramount importance in our era. Things are changing fast and new actors appear on the scene. Climate change, artificial intelligence and higher technologies, not to name pandemics are important challenges and we have to focus on how to deal with them.

In this scenario NATO is significant for various reasons. It has been, historically, the best security provider available to the international community. It was founded 72 years ago and it has grown from 12 to 30 members. It has been the hard core of the western security architecture, in a way more a covenant than an organisation. It is clear that at this point a renewal is necessary and we have to realign priorities and procedures. The basic element, the glue of NATO is the transatlantic bond. A ticket of North America and Europe. It is the engine that makes NATO work. On the other end we have a civilian-military practical organisation that has grown over the years and has provided its value in many occasions. The military part of NATO has adapted to emerging needs and remains unique in its capacity to coordinate dozens of countries working together on the ground. The new Summit taking place in Brussels in a few days has a special meaning in political terms because it should confirm the *raison d'être* of the Alliance. It should also underline that multilateralism is the best mechanism for international security.

This is relevant and the start of a process. A process that has been called “NATO 2030”.

Not completely defined, it involves an in-depth discussion among allies for a renewed Alliance starting with its political dimension and a definition of its priorities. This is not at all surprising because it is clear: priorities were clear during the cold war, but now, in a different landscape and with 30 members, views and

threat perceptions can easily differ. A Strategic Concept is also needed to replace the one adopted in 2010.

The Foundation is offering what we think is an interesting programme for today and tomorrow. The Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy of NATO is going to give the initial remarks. The first panel will discuss the priorities and the role of the Alliance in our time with distinguished personalities looking at the situation from different angles. It is difficult to align everything in a restricted amount of time. But they are the best possible speakers on those issues. It will be followed by a conversation between a distinguished journalist, the Vice President of the Atlantic Council and a senior professor.

I am sorry that not everything can be done in presence. This is the maximum that we could achieve, given the present anti-pandemic regulations. Tomorrow there is another interesting program and I invite you to remain with us. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of the Italian Parliament will close the conference. As always, we are promoting a scientific and respectful debate at high international level. The Foundation is recognized as the only think tank bearing the name of the Alliance, a good reason to work on strategic issues of relevance.

I conclude with special thanks to those who have supported us. First of all, PMI and the Compagnia di San Paolo. The NATO Public Diplomacy Division, MBDA, the NATO Defense College and Eventboost. The same goes to the entire staff of the Foundation for their good work and to our media partners Air Press, Formiche, and Euractiv.



OLIVIER RITTIMANN
Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome

WELCOME REMARKS

The title of the seminar itself suggests that the consensus no longer exists, that NATO is again accused of being irrelevant, not adapted, but it also suggests something much deeper, that there is an internal crisis to overcome that could harm deeply the Alliance. We are not talking here about a mere adaptation to a changing environment, as NATO has done in the past.

Because, indeed, NATO was obliged to adapt to its environment throughout its 72-year history. Time and again, it was accused of becoming irrelevant, but each time the Alliance managed to focus on a new purpose while keeping alive its core mission. This core mission was, and still is, collective defence, defined in the Article V of the Washington Treaty. It was the only mission during the Cold War, to deter and, if necessary, to defend against a Soviet Union attack. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union, many critics said it would also mean the end of NATO, as they argued the Alliance had lost its purpose. But very cleverly, nations decided to use NATO's expertise to build partnerships with the former Warsaw Pact countries, in order to bring them into the fold of Western democracies, gradually accepting them into the Alliance, and in parallel into the EU.

At the same time, as this joint venture between former enemies started, civil war broke out in then Yugoslavia, and after many unsuccessful attempts by Europe or the United Nations, NATO was called to the rescue and put an end to the war in Bosnia Herzegovina and subsequently in Kosovo.

This was the start of a new set of missions for NATO: Crisis Response Operations, which culminated with the expeditionary operation in Afghanistan, a twenty-year long struggle. The Alliance had again adapted but had also installed itself into this routine of pre-planned relief of troops, counter guerrilla warfare, low intensity despite high casualty, with no existential threat on the horizon. All efforts were directed to create light units able to respond to that type of threat, gradually losing sight of heavy forces, taking air superiority for granted, conduct-

ing expeditionary logistics without threats on our lines of communication.

However, the situation abruptly changed in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent civil war in Eastern Ukraine. A new threat had appeared in Europe without us really taking notice, despite the 2008 Russian invasion of parts of Georgia. But here we were, unprepared and struggling to re-invent the mechanisms that we used to master during the Cold War. The situation triggered yet another adaptation of the Alliance to refocus on Collective Defence, by deploying forward presence troops, by increasing the level of readiness of the forces, by having a hard look at military mobility inside Europe, in close coordination with the EU, but also military transatlantic reinforcements. As NATO was readapting to this new context, Russia proved very proactive in introducing new weaponry into its arsenal, resuming operational deployments in the Mediterranean, maintaining against all odds the dictatorship in Syria, thus successfully posturing itself as the crisis solver and the reliable friend of regional strong powers. All this happened in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, which ten years down the line, have very rarely delivered successful examples to follow.

On the contrary, the Southern flank seems more and more prone to unending crises, as in Libya or in the Sahel. Internal rifts between NATO members, or between NATO allies and EU members, are even worsening the instability in the Mediterranean, rather than helping solve the issues. The conflict in Libya has become a place where regional powers, or countries who have the ambition to become regional powers, come and support their own protégé. And it might happen that all NATO allies do not support the same side, which complicates the positioning of the Alliance in that conflict. Actually, taken separately these challenges seem quite easy to overcome. But it is the accumulation of them, in a political context where we witnessed a vacuum of leadership from the traditional leader of the Alliance, a tendency to prefer bilateral deals than multilateral agreements or frameworks, that really turned them into an existential questioning.

And this led to various declarations in the very recent years, questioning the relevance of Article V, or stating the brain death of NATO. The fact that this questioning was public on the social network or in interviews came as a shock and forced the Alliance to do some introspective work to assess what needs to be done regarding its relevance. This led to the work of the Expert Group, with recommendations to the Secretary General which will eventually lead to a new Strategic Concept, as will be discussed next week during the NATO Summit in Brussels. And we are very fortunate to have several of these experts with us today on the panel.

But the recommendations are not the end of it. Many of the proposals are controversial or at least complicated to agree on at 360 degrees. For instance, should NATO remain a regional defensive Alliance? Should it deal with non-military threats, for instance global warming, refugees, pandemics? Or should it go global, looking at the Indo-Pacific area? And what does global mean in a NATO context?

What new political impulse is needed, what new tools are required to perform at that level? How much cooperation will be achieved with the EU given the political context? And talking about cooperation, how does NATO revitalize its Partnerships, singularly those in the unstable Southern Flank? Is there a risk of fratricide with the EU in that field? There are therefore many open questions that nations might not even want to consider. But if they do, these questions will translate into priorities, budgets, engagement, resources, but most of all into a consensus on what needs to be done, on how much NATO involvement is required.



BAIBA BRAŽE

*Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy,
NATO HQ, Brussels*

INITIAL INTERVENTION

Many thanks for the invitation to address your distinguished audience a few days ahead of the Summit NATO will hold in Brussels next Monday. We are grateful to the NATO Defense College Foundation for the initiative to organise this very useful debate on the Alliance's priorities. On June 14, NATO leaders met at a pivotal moment for our Alliance, and for our collective security. We are in an age of global competition and we are taking action in response to the challenges of today and tomorrow.

These include Russia's pattern of aggressive behaviour; terrorism; cyber-attacks and disruptive technologies; China's challenge to the rule-based international order and the security implications of climate change. No country or continent can address these challenges alone. In a more unpredictable and competitive world, transatlantic unity and solidarity are vital to keep our nations safe. We now have an historic opportunity to strengthen the bond between Europe and North America, and prepare NATO for the future. This is why the NATO 2030 initiative to continue adapting our Alliance is at the heart of the Summit.

In December 2019, NATO leaders asked Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to lead a forward-looking reflection process to make NATO stronger politically and fit for the future. This is why the Secretary General launched NATO 2030. Over the last year, a group of independent experts as well as voices from civil society, youth and the private sector provided inputs to help shape the NATO 2030 agenda. On this basis, the Secretary General put forward concrete proposals for NATO leaders to endorse at the Summit. These proposals aim to reinforce NATO, to strengthen defence and deterrence, to broaden the Alliance's approach to security, and to preserve the rule-based international order.

First, we will reinforce our unity. This means consulting more on all issues that affect our security. NATO is a unique platform that brings Europe and North America together every day. Building on these strong transatlantic foundations, a renewed political commitment to consult more on all issues that affect Allies'

security and defence will reinforce unity and will strengthen our commitment to collective defence in a changing security environment. We will also agree to update NATO's Strategic Concept, an opportunity to recommit to our values, and chart a common course for the future.

Second, we will strengthen defence and deterrence. The Alliance has implemented the biggest reinforcement of its collective defence in a generation, including with more forces at higher readiness, and new deployments on Allied territory. At the Summit, NATO leaders will take decisions to further strengthen our deterrence and defence posture and to continue improving the readiness of our forces to meet current and future defence needs. At the same time, we also need to focus on resilience – including infrastructure, supply chains, and communications – as well as on keeping our technological edge. Resilience is NATO's first line of defence and is essential for the Alliance to successfully fulfil its three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

NATO must also set the standard for understanding and mitigating the security implications of climate change. In March, allies agreed a new Climate Change and Security Agenda and we expect an ambitious action plan on climate change to be endorsed at the Summit. Equally crucial, in a world of growing geopolitical competition, is to preserve our technological edge. As the indispensable forum for transatlantic cooperation on all security-related aspects of emerging and disruptive technologies, NATO is determined to foster technological cooperation among Allies, promote interoperability and encourage the development and adoption of technological solutions to address our military needs.

Third, we will safeguard the international rule-based order. Countries like Russia and China do not share the Alliance's values. They are at the forefront of a pushback against that order. Russia continues its pattern of dangerous behaviour, with its massive military build-up from the Arctic to Africa. It intimidates its neighbours, suppresses peaceful opposition at home, and carries out cyber and hybrid attacks across NATO countries.

China is asserting itself on the global stage. NATO does not see China as an adversary. There are opportunities to engage with Beijing on issues like trade, climate change and arms control. But we must be clear-eyed about the challenges China poses. Beijing does not share our values. China will soon have the largest economy in the world. It already has the second largest defence budget and the biggest navy. And it is seeking to control critical infrastructure in our countries and around the world. They crack down on peaceful dissent and religious minorities, threaten Taiwan, coerce their neighbours, and hamper freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

The challenges I just mentioned are very present in the South. Russia and China have substantially increased their presence and hybrid activities in South Eastern Europe, in the Middle East and in Africa. These activities affect the security of our Southern allies, including Italy. But they also affect the stability of our neighbour-

hood. Strengthening the capacity of our partners is of utmost importance.

We have developed a cooperative security approach providing partners training and technical assistance and capacity building in areas like counter-terrorism, stabilisation, counter-hybrid, crisis management, peacekeeping, and defence reform. The role of the Hub for the South based in Naples has been very crucial and we thank you. The South will continue being part of NATO's strategic priorities as multiple threats affecting our security emanate from the region. At the same time, NATO's partnerships will develop to include like-minded countries around the world, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In conclusion, NATO is a strong Alliance. A united Alliance. An Alliance that is ready to tackle security challenges. As we look to the future, we want our Alliance to be even stronger. Even more united. Even more prepared for the unexpected.



ALESSANDRO POLITI

Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

POLITICAL SUMMARY

Instead of looking at the sheer duration of NATO, it is much more useful to recognise that this alliance has managed the most varied missions and conflicts, especially in its last 32 years. From the deterrence and defence to peace-enforcing and -keeping, to protracted counterterrorism, crisis management, humanitarian tasks, continental medical assistance, training, partnerships at every level, air-land and aerial campaigns, to the whole gamut of naval missions (including the surveillance of criminal networks of human traffickers). Not only it went out of area, in order to remain relevant, but it continues trying to project stability in such diverse domains like terrorism, energy security, WMD proliferation, cyber threats, pandemics and hybrid warfare. Generally, this process has been called adaptation, while today several specialists and decision makers push for an outright transformation.

The conference has fully shown the delicate interplay between national interest and consensus building among allies on at least seven major subjects: China, Russia, democracy, Europe, NATO itself, Germany and the evolving South region.

The Pacific Ocean and China are clearly priorities for the Biden administration, receiving the torch from President Clinton's New Pacific Community (June 1993), the American Pacific Century of State Secretary Clinton (2011) and also from Trump's "China, China, China". President Biden wants to put America's house in order, the economy moving, the technology running because he wants clearly to compete with China, not only as an economic first-class actor, but fully accepting the paradigm of great power competition. This does not suppose a single-minded strategy, but a combination of elements of competition, elements of cooperation (climate, for instance, is where interests align) and the potential for real conflict.

Allies and partners, at this crucial and global inflection point, are considered front and centre of this strategy, because they are considered indispensable to take on China or Russia (or both) and also to work with them with clarity and strategic

purpose on convergent interests. The USA declare that this is not just an issue for certain countries but a challenge that democracies are facing from autocracies globally and have to take and win. That said, the recent long telephone call between Biden and Xi Jinping shows that dialogue is not only useful but indispensable to avoid a serious armed conflict.

Europe and NATO, often portrayed as silent competitors and acknowledged as bureaucracies cooperating rather reticently, were considered in the debate almost as two sides of the same coin. The big difference vis-à-vis the USA is that several European countries (with the exception of France and the UK) are still incapable and reluctant to understand the nature and scale of the strategic mutations undergoing. If NATO has to meet the challenges deriving from these mutations by 2030, it has to transform deeply.

In cleartext it means that, if a scenario of Chinese-Russian simultaneous crises become true, European countries have to be an effective deterrent first responder in and around the Old Continent, because the USA will be fully engaged and possibly over-stretched in the Indo-Pacific. Within Europe, Germany is considered a pivotal country, destined to have a leadership role. If this would not happen for whatever reason, this could create around the Alliance a Euro sphere organised around France and Germany and an Atlantic sphere organised around Five Eyes and naval/amphibious capabilities; something that would spell serious problems for NATO. On the other hand, a credible European deterrence can bolster a meaningful strategic dialogue with different counterparts aimed at reducing tensions and possibly at resolving fledgeling or frozen conflicts.

The Southern Region, often and wrongly considered less important and more intractable than the Eastern Region, is seen as reconfigured in two main areas. One is made up by the Mediterranean, North African, Sahel regional complex and the other lines up Red Sea, Levant, Middle East, and also the close periphery of the Gulf (Afghanistan and Pakistan).

The problem with this new subdivision is that, while the Western Mediterranean, North Africa and the Sahel are, de facto, a continuum with ramifications in the Red Sea, the concept of Middle East is today devoid of any strategic reality. Levant and Gulf are connected as every area can be in a globalised world, but they follow very divergent trajectories and interests, especially if taking into account Central Asia.

The existing partnerships (MD and ICI) are precious in a very fragmented environment, but they need vision, political commitment, structured approaches and resources. Interest from southern regional capitals in deepening the cooperation with NATO is considerably high, despite some wilful neglect from Brussels. On the other hand, it would be wise not only to complete the membership of these fora, but also to consider their prudent enlargement towards countries initially not included, especially if one wants to present a more solid regional front in future negotiations with Iran.

BACKGROUND POLICY PAPER

NATO is the most successful political-military alliance in history, and yet it is time to focus once again on the purpose of the transatlantic relationship. The Alliance was born as part of a rather coherent environment of international norms influenced by democracy, free market, and international cooperation, based on a relatively rule-based order. Today, rules are often considered less cogent by a number of democracies and authoritarian states, therefore trust and political consensus among Allies is a crucial necessity.

Political vagaries apart, the need to rebuild a consensus has been clearly identified in the reflection exercise *NATO 2030*. It started in December 2019 when political leaders asked the Secretary General (SG) to lead a reflection process to strengthen the Alliance. The 31st of March 2020, an independent expert group was appointed, while in June the SG established his priorities for *NATO 2030*. The report of the independent group was presented the 25th of November 2020, providing 138 recommendations.

The process continued with a food for thought paper of the SG, published the 11th of February 2021 in preparation of the discussion for the NATO Summit in Brussels (the 14th of June 2021) and with a short set of priorities, preceded by a short introduction. The focus is interestingly on China: *“The rise of China is shifting the global balance of power, challenging the rules-based international order and increasing geopolitical competition. China is not our adversary, but China’s rise presents risks to our security, our democracies and our way of life. This challenge is simply too big for any country to tackle alone.”*

Then are mentioned subjects like cyber and hybrid threats, emerging and disruptive technologies and the security implications of climate change, followed by existing threats like Russia and terrorism.

The eight priorities listed are:

- 1) Reinforce Unity, Cohesion and Solidarity: Increased Funding for Deterrence and Defence Activities;

- 2) Ensure a Common Level of Allied Resilience: Enhanced Focus on Resilience;
- 3) Preserve our Technological Edge: Greater Support for Transatlantic Defence Innovation and Interoperability;
- 4) Increase Political Consultation and Coordination among Allies in NATO: Renewed Political Commitment;
- 5) Take a more Global Approach: Defending the Rules-based International Order and Cooperating with Like-Minded Partners;
- 6) Contribute to the Security and Stability of our Neighbourhood: Strengthened Commitment to Training and Capacity Building;
- 7) Combat and Adapt to Climate Change: Enhanced Global Climate and Security Agenda;
- 8) Cement the Transatlantic bond: the 2022 Strategic Concept.

Particularly relevant is the issue of political consultation and coordination, because on the one hand it is a matter of more frequent meetings, but on the other, there is a need for a qualitative enhancement of the political engagement within the NAC and from the member countries (political directors' meeting are one component of this improvement).

The idea of periodic consultations of Ministers of Interior and National Security Advisors is quite interesting because it touches rather directly the issue of the closer collaboration with the European Union, whose Justice and Home Affairs sector is very developed and where the blending of terrorism, trafficking and organised crime is firmly in the agenda. Some of these aspects should be considered by the new Strategic Concept, foreseen for 2022.

In this respect, partnerships should be adequately developed since they are a very cost-effective instrument to bolster the security and stability of old and new neighbourhoods, provided that they are properly supported with means, staff and policies.

In conclusion, the Alliance needs more than an incremental and ad hoc adaptation. It needs to reassess in-depth its *raison d'être* in terms of transatlantic relationship and the probable strategic consequences of specific political choices. It should remain as the most important security provider in this fragmented and potentially dangerous environment. The transatlantic bond has proven on several occasions through seven decades to be a formidable added value to project security and stability, but bureaucratic complacency through cosmetic changes is not helpful. It is of course a very ambitious agenda and we hope that the member states will have the determination to enact real reforms for an Alliance kept abreast with times.

Session 1

HOW TO REFOCUS NATO?



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IAN LESSER

Vice President; Executive Director, Transatlantic Centre, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels

NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE AND THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Let me just make three points to you. The first is a very simple point, but I think it is the fundamental one: we need a more political NATO. Of course, NATO has had that as part of its mission since its founding, but this aspect is often overlooked. And as we have moved into a more competitive world where there are very big questions about the evolving geo-strategic scene, NATO needs to be the place where those questions are discussed. NATO may not be the vehicle for action in every case, especially outside Europe, but it needs to be a place where the big-picture issues of the day are debated. And of course, today there is probably no bigger-picture issue than the rise of China and its strategic implications. This will surely be behind much of what will be on the agenda for this Summit, even if it is implicit in most cases.

But this is a fundamental point for the future of the Alliance: more political. It is about more consultation. It is also, in a sense, about more warning, an awareness of what is coming over the horizon. Not just the intelligence-sharing aspect, which is important (and NATO is actually doing much better at this these days), but also the forecasting piece. Having more and more informed dialogue at senior levels is extremely important, and of course it also relates to global partnerships.

The second point I would make is that we need a more creative approach to burden sharing. This, of course, gets into the question of whether the Biden administration is going to be different from its predecessors. I think it will be very different stylistically and in many other meaningful ways. That we can say for sure. But I think this new American administration, like its predecessors, will want Europe to spend more and do more. But how do we measure it? Is it just about 2%, or is it about other things? I do not think we are going to move away from those investment pledges, but I do think we need to have a less orthodox approach to the measurement of burden-sharing. There are a lot of other contributions. There are risk-reduction contributions. There are contributions that are not normally counted in defence budgets that relate to things like counter terrorism and

maritime security, border security, particularly relevant to security looking South. Those should all count. My sense is that the new administration in Washington will be more flexible on the question of metrics, and it will have a very different style in putting this burden sharing argument forward. And therefore, there is an opportunity to be more creative and realistic as we look ahead.

The third point really relates directly to the Biden administration. I think there is a huge opportunity despite the continuing challenges in places like Afghanistan. President Biden is not only the most internationally-minded, but probably the most Atlanticist President we have had since George H. W. Bush. There are many public policy distractions in terms of health, in terms of the economy, in terms of political polarization and social cohesion. But I think we will find that this administration will be very easy to engage on international issues and, again, it is very Atlanticist in its orientation.

NATO, I think, is doing fairly well on the public diplomacy front, if I can say. Polling has been done on this very recently (including in GMF's most recent Transatlantic Trends), showing that on average about 65% of the public across the Alliance has a positive view of NATO as a contributor to their security. At a time of considerable mistrust in institutions, that is not bad at all, and it is something that one can build on.

In conclusion, I think there are some opportunities specifically related to EU-NATO cooperation looking South. The Mediterranean is going to offer some of the key tests for collaboration between the two institutions. This is a region with a host of security challenges that relate to what the EU does, where the EU has important capabilities -- and is already engaged. And the Biden administration will be very interested in seeing NATO pursue those opportunities. I think it will matter to NATO that the Biden administration takes the European Union seriously as an actor, and that will surely give this aspect of transatlantic cooperation a push.



TACAN ILDEM

*Former Assistant Secretary General for Public
Diplomacy of NATO, Ankara*

THE FUTURE OF NATO ACCORDING TO NATO 2030 AGENDA. THE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE

For the eight months of our work with the Experts' Group, one important thing we took into consideration was the principles and priorities that the Secretary General enumerated when launching this reflection process. The first was to make sure that NATO remains militarily strong. The second, to make NATO even stronger politically. Third, to ensure that NATO has a global approach. Perhaps I should focus on the third principle or priority, since you put the question to me how could NATO's role in the world be?

We have to recognize the fact that there are a number of new threats and challenges in the extremely competitive security environment we are facing nowadays, with a shift to global, systemic competition. Therefore, we need to see some of the new challenges that the Alliance should address. That is in fact the reason why, in our report, we thought that one of the most important deliverables could be to update the Strategic Concept.

The current Strategic Concept, dating back to 2010, does not address some of these threats and challenges, and namely one of them is China. China has to be assessed by the Alliance from the dual perspective of opportunities and challenges. It requires to invest more time, more resources to be able to understand the new capabilities of Beijing, its economic heft, military might and its related security implications. This is one important question to address.

Second one, related to China as well, is represented by emerging and disruptive technologies. We know that the technological advancement provides opportunities but at the same time also poses challenges, and NATO needs to keep the technological edge. We should not take for granted that this technological edge would be maintained forever. So, innovation should be at the heart of the work of NATO. It is good that the Alliance is thinking of establishing a Centre as a kind of innovation accelerator and is also trying to find out technological gaps among NATO Allies. Investing more on military technology transfer among nations would be an important priority.

Another question is terrorism. Terrorism does not recognize any boundaries or geographical location. It is recognized as an asymmetric and immediate threat to all NATO nations. Therefore, in our report, we make a strong recommendation that this cross-cutting issue should be more explicitly incorporated in the three core tasks of NATO.

A further point I would like to emphasize is, when talking about global challenges and threats, hybrid threats and a more systematic use of cyber-attacks. When we talk about hybrid means, we intend the use of political, economic, and military means to divide our societies or weaken our societies, creating detrimental impact on the security environment that we need to deal. We are talking about disinformation, for instance. We need to pay more attention in elevating resilience, with different requirements that Allies should be aware of, because it is a national responsibility to strengthen resilience. In any case, NATO can set benchmarks against which Allies could evaluate the way they are prepared to such challenges.

When we talk about making a NATO with global approach, it does not necessarily mean that NATO will become a world police or become a global organisation. It should remain a regional organization, but having a better understanding and developing capabilities in relation to emerging threats and challenges that do not recognise any geography or boundary.



MARTA DASSÙ

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NATO AND EU: PARTNERS OR NEIGHBOURS?

It is important to look beyond the technicalities on the NATO-EU relationship, including the assessment of the 74 common missions – from dealing with cyber threats to crisis management. The basic facts are well known: 21 NATO members are also EU members, but nine are not, including key countries like Turkey and the UK. How to involve them, avoiding paralysis, remains a crucial issue. It could be useful, for instance, to encourage NATO members to participate in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects: this has already happened for the US, Canada and Norway, which have recently joined PESCO's project on military mobility. Equally important is third party access to the European Defence Fund (EDF), which, by the way, is a collateral victim of the COVID-19 crisis. But I will focus on four strategic points, more than on the institutions.

First, with Joe Biden in the White House we are back to a situation in which the US states the obvious: from the American standpoint, the Alliance with Europe provides a comparative advantage in global power competition. American support for NATO will remain strong, out of self-interest if you wish. But even the most Atlanticist American president will ask Europe to sustain its part of a Transatlantic bargain fit for the present, not for the past. Since America's priorities are domestic renewal and competition with China, a Transatlantic bargain fit for the present has the following contours: NATO, with American support, will focus mainly on Europe and collective defence; at the same time, Europeans will support Washington in containing China, in diplomatic and economic terms.

If this is the case, the EU must avoid complacency, dispel ambiguities about its so-called "strategic autonomy" and keep its side of the bargain. More specifically, in front of US-China "extreme competition", to use Biden's formulation, Europe cannot remain neutral without paying a high price on the transatlantic front. To make this bargain functional, a more political NATO and a more globally wise NATO must emerge – and to be effective, both dimensions require a stronger NATO-EU link.

The reason is very simple: some of the solutions to common security challenges come from EU member states as the outcome of policy coordination at the EU level. Sanctions are a case in point, with their relevance in allied response to Russian behaviour, still seen by NATO countries as the main threat to Euro-Atlantic security. The same is true for many different dimensions of competition with China.

Second, the “how to deal with China” issue, which is so relevant in strategic terms, is not currently very relevant in purely military terms, since Washington is not asking the European allies to support the US militarily in Asia. Some individual allies are offering and will offer military contributions in the Indo-Pacific region, starting with the UK (the doubt here is whether Washington would prefer to see London even more focused on Euro-Atlantic security). NATO as a whole, however, is bound to remain a regional defence alliance. As a consequence, the challenge for NATO 2030 is how to adopt a globally wise perspective – if it does not, NATO could be side-lined, with a growing gap between European and US security perceptions – while preserving its core tasks of collective defence and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region. A more global NATO, as mentioned, will not engage militarily in the Asia-Pacific region.

Yet, it will have to discuss and confront the implications of China’s rise on Euro-Atlantic security. That means, for instance, reducing vulnerabilities in value chains in strategic sectors, monitoring strategic foreign investments, preserving technology edge, countering cyber-attacks and taking up the mission of building the resilience of democratic societies. This widening of the very concept of security – above all in functional terms – involves the EU, with its economic leverages, more than in the past. Thus, by definition, coherence between NATO and the EU is becoming a key factor for Transatlantic security. Risk assessment, from this point of view, has a crucial relevance. This is an important reason to keep the focus on drafting a new Strategic Concept for NATO 2030 and the EU’s strategic compass.

Third, as part of the new transatlantic deal, European NATO Allies will have to take on more defence responsibilities in Europe and especially around Europe – given a partial reassessment from the US of its own direct role in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans. In theory, NATO will lead on the Eastern front, with the EU’s support; while the EU will increase its projection in the Mediterranean. In fact, any serious concept of EU operational deployment needs to be selective, at least for a decade or so: where Europeans could realistically develop and deploy military missions – possibly taking advantage of NATO’s support – is in the Mediterranean basin, including the Western Balkans. Here, the Turkey factor will be critical.

Beyond this strictly geographical definition of its core interests, the EU is capable of developing a common cyber strategy, and of course an industrial policy designed to serve these goals. The question is: is the EU ready? So far, the answer has been no. EU member states, in fact, remain divided and uncertain on foreign

policy and security and Brexit, in geopolitical terms and military capabilities, has weakened the Union. Germany is living through a difficult internal transition; Italy is potentially an important player due to its unique geographical position (Libya, the East Med sub-region) and yet it will suffer resource constraints; France, looking to recent trends in the Sahel, is more ambitious than capable. Gaps in perceptions do persist in Europe between East and West. Meanwhile, tensions between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece prevent effective NATO-EU coordination on the Southern flank.

The current European dilemma, in security and defence, also depends on capabilities shortfalls: European capabilities are insufficient not only for missions that EU interests would call for autonomously, but even for the contribution to NATO that all allies are already committed to making. This is not healthy for the future of the Alliance.

It may be time to really change the debate: in the view of Washington, the only way to address Europe's defence shortfall is for European nations to spend more. However, this focus on national defence spending levels – embodied by the 2014 NATO Allies' commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence – simply has not worked. European defence today remains anaemic despite noticeable increases in spending. More integration at the EU level would help. On duplication, for instance, effectiveness needs integrated plans (from risk assessment to procurement, and all the way to operational planning), which means that any form of integration is better than no integration – including EU integration, which is not by itself a threat to NATO cohesion.

A possible step forward would be to focus European efforts on areas where the EU already has a critical role (for instance, countering disinformation, resilience, crisis management) and reinforce capabilities that already exist: clear cases are maritime capabilities and enabling technologies with dual-use potential (linked to hybrid and cyber threats). Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that EU leaders will manage to persuade their public opinion of the need for more spending related to increasing efforts in the defence field – but the key argument should really be for better spending in a coordinated context.

The fourth and final point is that a working NATO-EU relationship requires more clarity on the concept of “strategic autonomy”. This started as a debate on how to reinforce the European ability to act alone when needed and by the awareness of potential costs and risks connected to an overall dependency on others. In particular, the EU cannot just assume it can rely on the US as it once did. Still, this conceptual shift is not translating – as mentioned – into more ambitious EU security policies and better capabilities (as the very combination between the two elements is what would be a game changer). And it is clear that no amount of declaratory policy can substitute military and other operational capabilities. The entire edifice of CFSP and CSDP has become somewhat trapped in this incomplete dynamic.

My view, in any case, is that within the European debate the focus of strategic autonomy is already shifting from defence to other sectors – from health to energy. Since an important incentive to conceive strategic autonomy came from the declining trust in the US security guarantee, the opposite risk could emerge today: from over-ambition to complacency.

The only way out from this predicament, in my view, is taking note that outside NATO European defence is not credible, both today and when looking towards 2030. This means that the Alliance remains the major security organisation for Europe. Asymmetry in the defence sector will remain a structural feature of Transatlantic ties. However, for the reasons mentioned, the European contribution to NATO must consistently grow to preserve a working Alliance. This very shift – implying an important increase in the European contribution to NATO, combined with EU-led missions in neighbouring regions – will also gradually allow the EU to become a more credible defence and security actor in the future.

In a nutshell: we could clarify the terms of the recent debate, coming to the conclusion that a stronger EU dimension in security could more easily be built through cooperation with than in competition with NATO. This approach would possibly favour consensus among member states on the way ahead, and would help in solidifying trust between the two organisations. Trust, after all, is what will allow the 74 common missions to succeed.



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BURDEN SHARING AND STRATEGIC AUTONOMY: AN EFFECTIVE BALANCE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION AND BEYOND

At the eve of the Summit there are at least four questions in the minds of everybody. First, to what extent the Summit will achieve to repair the damage done by the Trump episode? It is obviously the main purpose of Biden visit to Brussels and also the priority for the Allies. Second, what could be the impact on NATO political course of the increasing Sino-American confrontation? Should the Allies be also part of it and to what extent? Third, how the Alliance's military capacities could be maintained in a post-COVID economy and what will be the impact of the new technological changes in the field of defence for the NATO defence posture? Fourth, what could be for the Europeans and NATO the implications of the return of the US and Russia at the table of the "New Start" negotiation, after the demise of INF Treaty. The new strategic concept to be written after the Summit would have to take these prospects into account.

The strength of the Alliance has always been its capacity to adapt to the changes of the international context, as we saw it at the end of the 90s at the time of the end of the Warsaw Pact or, more recently, in 2014, with the invasion of Ukraine and the reassurance given to the Baltic countries. We are now at another critical juncture for NATO, because of the shift of the geopolitical balance represented by the rise of China, the persistent threat of terrorism, and the instability in the Southern neighbourhood of Europe, and the mid-term implications of new defence technologies, from hypersonic and cyber ones to AI. The European Allies therefore are expecting several messages from the Summit. I will mention a few. We are confident that the new Biden administration, willing to repair NATO from the Trump episode, will refocus on alliances, international cooperation and the importance of Europe for the US.

However, we cannot completely forget about the risk of another possible return to isolationism and populism. It is part of the risks of democracies. Even in Eu-

rope we are not safe from those political trends. The Trump episode is therefore showing the importance of maintaining our values, whether supported by the new D-10 format or otherwise. There will be some talk about a new Conference on democracies, pushed by London. This is not a new idea, 20 years after the one held in Warsaw in June 2002 at the initiative of Bronislaw Geremek and Madeleine Albright. The New York Times described it at the time as “the picnic of democracies”. Hopefully it could be different.

We are aware of the willingness of the US to give an understandable priority to the improvement of its military capacities in the Indo-Pacific region, given China’s new competition. We understand also that, in order to compensate the new American military commitments in the Indo-Pacific, Europeans will have to undertake a greater role in the political and security burden sharing in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, and in Africa. Someone in Washington was hoping to disengage from the Middle East, but to no avail. In the Indo-Pacific area we consider that beyond the Quad (Australia, Japan, India, and the US) it is also important taking into account of the sensitivities of the ASEAN countries, four of which are already NATO Partners.

We French are already present in the area with our sovereign territories and citizens, 7.000 troops and new air and maritime capacities. We will support those actions undertaken to preserve the freedom of access to international sea and air lanes, which are so important for our own economy but also to maintain the international law. The paradox is that China, as a major exporter, has also a considerable stake in those international rules that Beijing is nevertheless flouting.

However, we still consider that NATO core function remains to deter Russia’s possible aggressive actions on the continent, both at the conventional and nuclear level, especially at a time when the perspectives of a post-Putin era remain uncertain at best and we have legitimate concerns about the present autocratic drift of the regime. But there is also the need for maintaining a delicate balance in our relations with a Russia that is indeed a potential threat, but remains a neighbour as well as an important international actor in the UN Security Council. NATO Allies will have thus to take two important decisions for the next years.

First, they will have to maintain and increase their capacities to share the burden, in spite of the uncertainties of the post-COVID economy. Second, the Summit will launch the process for a new strategic concept - but will not enter yet into the discussion. After the one of 2010, it should renew the pledge that NATO remains a nuclear as well as conventional alliance. But given the debates around the “sole purpose” ideas in Washington and the rise of the antinuclear movements in Europe, it will not be an easy task at a time when we consider that several European elections are scheduled, the existence of a mounting antinuclear pressure in some European countries as well as differences of views between the Americans themselves. The French have welcomed the new UK strategic review emphasis on nuclear and technologies, but we are not sure that all Allies are on the same line.

There have been calls for a “more political Alliance” by the Secretary General. What does it exactly mean beyond this buzz word? If it is to recall the importance of NATO as a crucial part of the transatlantic dialogue – but not the totality of a more complex and global relationship – it is not new and no Ally could object. However, if it results into a dilution of the Alliance tasks and ambitions into a spreading bureaucratic organization trying to do everything everywhere, we should begin to be concerned. The “wise men” report of NATO 2030 mentions 138 proposals, out of 67 pages. Of course, not all are at the same level, but some are clearly the expression of the natural tendency of any international organization to try to increase its role, and especially in the case of NATO, given its unspoken rivalry with the EU.

We worry about the costs of diverting money out of NATO’s priority tasks, which remain to bolster military capacities and readiness. Spreading more money on partnerships and having duplication of tasks already taken at the national or EU level is not an orientation that reinforces the Alliance. What could be the real added value of NATO posturing as an international actor in the debate about climate change, beyond considering the military impact of Arctic melting and pushing for an improvement of the energy use by tanks or fighters?

Some propositions are also raising serious concerns from many Allies, for example the call by the SG asking for the doubling to 20 billion, up to 2030, of the contributions for common funding, in order to finance as yet unspecified tasks and with a shaky governance process. Also, why the need to mimic the US DARPA in Brussels for the acquisition of new technologies when there are already 14 NATO agencies or Centre of Excellence and the ACT headquarters in charge of those issues? Before creating new institutions, NATO should first to look about reforming existing one.

Do the relations between NATO and EU should remain the proverbial hidden elephant in the room? In spite of the 74 areas of cooperation adopted between EU and NATO and the progress recognised, the relationship remains uneasy and unsatisfactory. In the 2030 report we barely see that the EU has become the main political partner of NATO. The military benefits to NATO from an increased role of the EU in the military domain have been underlined by President Biden himself at his first speech at the Munich Conference. But we don’t read very much of that now in Evere.

Maybe a new Secretary General of NATO could bring an improvement. There is one area where the EU should improve its commitment and work more closely with NATO: the Balkans, which are now becoming more problematic and subject to political and economic pressure of Russia and China, while the prospect of entering to the EU remains still far away. They have not solved their problems of corruption and of arms traffic yet. The role of their mafias is still felt in our cities. EU has thrown money at the problems but most decisive are the political issues, as we saw on the recent attempt to redefine the borders of Serbia and Kosovo. May-

be the only real solution is to bet on the change of generations, encouraging the fading out of politicians and militaries who were the actors of the wars of the 70s.

Final point, the post-INF, post-New-Start-II. The possible results of the bilateral American-Russian negotiations are supposed to be expected by the deadline of 2026. They will have to solve some challenging issues: the nuclear conventional capacities of modern systems, the hypersonic issue, the role of China in the strategic balance, the matter of nuclear weapons in Europe, the complex affair of new methodologies for verification. Those negotiations should be a real priority for the Europeans but they have yet to define and agree between themselves on their specific security interests, which exists if only because of geography and strategic realities. Thus, Europe has to be better prepared if it doesn't want to be the only spectator of the process and find ourselves outflanked. Facing all these challenges, improving the European strategic autonomy, without the fear of weakening NATO but with EU military capacities reinforcing the Alliance, is also the best way to reinforce our collective security in this very context.

Interview

THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES AND MULTILATERALISM



World leaders in the plenary room during the G7 Summit in Cornwall
Source: www.flickr.com



THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES AND MULTILATERALISM



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Hannah Roberts (HR)

Naturally all eyes are on President Biden, as he met NATO and the EU with the G7. Donald Trump's tenure damaged multilateral institutions. What does Biden need to do to reshape U.S. relationships within those institutions? I would like to start with Damon.

Damon Wilson (DW)

So, thank you, it is such a pleasure to be with the NATO Defense College Foundation on an important conversation and just as President Biden has headed to Europe. This is going to be a seat change, as President Biden sets down in Europe, a place he knows well, leaders he knows well. And with a message of clarity about the importance of American allies and partners to taking on the defining challenges of our time. And the whole premise of his administration, his strategy in this trip is, how does he help rally allies and partners in a global common cause? But at the same time, this is not a Biden who is just picking up from the past, when he was a champion of NATO enlargement with the Senate or served with President Barack Obama. This is a President Biden who really recognized during the campaign that this is about shaping the future. This is understanding, as Donald Trump did, the challenge that China would really pose not just to the United States, but what it represented in terms of a defining global inflection point of autocracies challeng-

ing democracies. And so you see a President Biden looking to harness all elements of national power, getting our act together at home, showing that democracy can deliver. Coming here just as the Senate passes a major investment in research and development, meant to help us compete more effectively and using the strategy of renewal of home as the basis upon which to go to the G7, to NATO, to EU, to unify our allies and rally our diplomatic partners in global common cause. And that is to shape a finally different future and adapt these institutions for the future.

HR

And Julian, can I ask you to follow on from that?

Julian Lindley-French (JLF)

Yes, Damon as ever eloquently put the US Position. I am not a diplomat, so I am not going to be diplomatic. I still hope that President Biden will bang some European heads together. Because there is a lot of Europeans hoping that President Biden will come over, and because he is anything but Trump president, fix what was a fairly turbulent few years ago. But the reality is that President Trump was uncomfortable in many ways, but he reflected the fundamentals of America's strategic dilemma, which Europeans have to grip.

The bottom line is, if Europeans do not do far more for their own defence, Americans will be unable to provide the security guarantee, given the over-stretch from which they are increasingly suffering, due to the rise of China and other issues. So, this hope that somehow we can go back to a status quo ante, which with due respect to my wonderful, distinguished friends and colleagues I heard earlier in this conference, there was an element of that. For example, I heard no mention of COVID. I heard no mention of debt and the impact on European choices and indeed on American choices.

Thus, Europeans, if they are hoping for an easier time, they might get a politer time, but I certainly hope they are not given an easier time by the Americans because we need this Alliance more than ever today.

HR

Will Biden keep up some of Trump's pressure on NATO allies, to increase their budgetary contributions? Germany and Italy are among the countries that are still below. Go ahead Damon.

DW

So sure, you will see a President Biden, who is enthusiastic about pushing allies to do more, to contribute to their security, but in a fundamentally different way than we saw over the past four years. I mean, in many respects, the test for President Biden is that he models a new form of American leadership, in which you have to welcome allies as more equal partners, precisely because we do want them to

do more. There are fiscal constraints, there are political constraints. That means we actually listen to their ideas, consult in advance, forge strategies together and have a sense of shared ownership for both the problems and solutions. And if that is what Europeans were prepared to do, that does require American support for some of their initiatives, but it requires their own investment in this cause. Therefore, you will see a very different President Biden in tone, underscoring the centrality of the Alliance, of Article 5, who just fundamentally recognizes that our allies are a force multiplier for American interests. And yes, as has been a consistent bi-partisan strain, is going to look to the European allies, especially those not spending their 2% GDP, to carry their fair weight, to carry their share and to be partners in this global common cause.

JLF

Yes. Let me follow on to that, Hannah. I fully agree with Damon, but take strategic autonomy as a strap line. I believe in strategic autonomy; it is about time Europeans should do an awful lot more than they do. But strategic autonomy is a function of power, not words.

The more power Europeans generate, the more influence they will have over US policy and indeed on their own defence. Look, we talk about Europeans, the real problem are the three leading Western European powers. They become extremely complacent in their own ways. Their attitude is weakened, a deterrence at the margins of the Alliance, where it really does matter. Britain because it is effectively disengaged from the land defence of Europe. France because it is disengaged too. Along this, we see kind of mercantilist foreign policy, in which it is almost a wilful refusal to play the responsible leadership role that a modern democratic Germany should. It is vital to my mind, that when we talk about Europeans, Americans have some very stern words with those three European powers.

HR

I am thinking of Libya in the Mediterranean, and the Sahel. Is that something that the Biden administration would welcome and support with the necessary logistics?

DW

Look you are going to see the Biden administration, and President Biden himself, lead with American support for a NATO as the fundamental defensive Alliance and the security Alliance across the Atlantic. Where there is support or the impetus of the European Union as a stronger actor and player, not in the sense of autonomy from the United States. I mean that today there is a recognition that we cannot have a Europe that hedges between the United States and China. The United States needs as many allies and partners on our side in a global competition between autocracies and democracies.

We need a stronger Europe, who is a stronger partner, not hedging between the United States and China, but by our side in grappling with countries like China and Russia. Whether it is for defence and deterrence purposes, or it is for greater leverage on international organisations or trade policies. And I think that is the tweak. Hence, you will see an ironclad commitment to the NATO Alliance, and support for a stronger Europe, but wanting to see one in which the allies are doing their part with us on helping to navigate the challenge that our President is trying to present, that is the new powers challenging democracies.

HR

Julian, I think you have got a view on this.

JLF

I do. I have worked for the EU. I wrote my PhD on ESDP. I was a young man when there were these wonderful ideas of the EU playing a global role. And I believed in them passionately, but I have become cynical over the years because of a lack of strategic culture. And so many times, and I remember meeting Tony Blinken in Washington years ago and talking about this. So many times an American administration comes in hoping that the EU is going to be that partner, and the EU should be that partner. But the EU fails fundamentally because it is more obsessed with maintaining balance within Europe, than exerting influence beyond Europe. And until it starts really developing that strategic culture, and frankly, until we get beyond Brexit, because there can be no serious collective or common European engagement in world affairs, unless the British are fully engaged in Europe's role in the world, then I'm afraid a lot of this is talk. And right now Britain, Germany, and France simply do not like each other, as you will see in the coming weeks as we move towards the next phase of the Brexit deal.

HR

Evidently, this division is surely a further obstacle to a potential a European military action in the future.

JLF

Certainly, PESCO is a wonderful thing. And anything that, to my mind, harmonizes European defence efforts, makes them more efficient, makes the industrial base more efficient, makes their forces more capable. But if you look at the 34 projects, they are tiny. I have just finished a major report, with Ben Hodges and Heiner Brauss, on military mobility. The EU projects simply bear no relation to the strategic challenge that we must face. And it is vital that the EU-NATO partnership looks at the world as it is, not as they would like it to be and start shaping their responses accordingly. That is the true test for me for this Summit. Not whether we can agree yet another draft communiqué that somehow everyone

agrees. The real challenge, for would it be the EU or NATO, is: can we maintain political cohesion and be credibly dealing with the expanding bandwidth of security and defence challenges we all are facing? My fear is that we will put maintaining some political cohesion above and at the expense of an effective response to emerging threats. And if we are doing that, it is a short road to a move towards coalitions and the gradual erosion of institutional security and defence in Europe.

HR

Thanks. If we can return to the Biden administration for a moment. Damon, how do you think that Biden would differ from his predecessors when it comes to co-opting allies with the help against the rise of China and aggression from Russia?

DW

Well, the remarkable thing that has happened in the United States, despite political differences and political division, which really accelerated during the Trump administration, was a recognition of the challenge that China poses. The acceptance of a sort of a paradigm of great power competition, but really the understanding that China, led by the Communist Party, was a force to be reckoned with. And so you see extraordinary support in the United States, first for getting our act in order at home, so that we are more competitive, more effective. Just look what the Senate passed, its major investment in this Competition and Innovation Act, which is about how we think about semiconductors, artificial intelligence. That is about getting the American economy moving but squarely motivated by competition with China. There is strong continuity that we see in the American strategy, of sharpening and recognizing the challenge that China presents, and understanding that we have an element of competition, an element of cooperation, where our interests align on issues like climate, and the potential for real conflict. The biggest change that you see with President Biden is really the tone and approach where he puts our allies and partners front and centre in understanding this strategy. That was the great defect of our previous strategy. You do not take on China, you do not take on Russia, without your friends and partners with you. And so that is what the administration, that is what the President is going to be looking for. Can we rally our allies and partners in common cause, where we can work with potential adversaries on Covid issues or economic recovery, but with clarity and strategic purpose? We are not playing small ball here but big ball, recognizing we were at a global inflection point.

The other big change that Biden has really captured, this in a way that the previous president did not, is an understanding that this is an inflection point of a challenge that democracies are facing from autocracies globally. And I think putting it in that context, helping to underscore what is at stake, from a modest person – a pragmatist over his years – is a pretty audacious ambitious agenda of renewal at

home, with extraordinary proposals, the likes of which we have not seen since FDR. With an ambition globally to help lead it in a way that is catalytic, and that brings more people with us to the table. And I think that is the real difference with the new approach.

JLF

I agree with that. I mean, this is big change. And then that should be the message from the President to his European allies on this trip, "This is a big change people and wake up and smell the coffee." You know, I have just finished a hundred-page report for the European parliament on the EU and Arctic security. And as I researched that report, what is happening in the Arctic is fundamental, including China's growing role. And I simply do not get the sense that most Europeans are woken up to the sheer scale of change, and the pace of change that is underway. And it is that almost psychological shift in the European mindset that has to be driven. We do not need NATO adaptation. We need NATO transformation. If by 2025 or 2030 at the latest, it has to meet the challenges that are implicit in the change that I have outlined. So yes, this is a big moment. Let's get a grip.

HR

Do you think Biden will be in this attempt to get Europe on board?

JLF

Yes. The paradox of the United States is, for all the frustrations with allies, and they are understandable frustrations, as each day goes past, the more they need allies. But they need capable allies. They do not need free riding allies.

You know, in the book, my nightmare that I wrote about was a situation in which there is a conflict that China and Russia engineered simultaneous crises in the Indo-Pacific in the Middle East and in Europe, including the Arctic. And Europe is suddenly faced with an America that is over-stretched busy elsewhere, and has to be an effective deterrent first responder in and around Europe. That is what Europe must become. That is the ambition that Europe must have, because given what is happening to America, the Americans simply cannot guarantee they can be there all the time, in strength in Europe for every emergency. This is what we are facing. So, wake up Europe let's do it.

HR

Are you saying that Europe because of its history has created these institutions, which essentially make conflict less likely, to protect from outside threats, but also from each other, and so it is no longer capable of *realpolitik*?

DW

Julian, let me say a word and you jump in as you like. Look, as an American

is watching it, we have seen an evolution of the debate that is very reassuring, that there has been a strategic awakening up of what is happening. That this is a fundamentally changing global environment. And you have seen this reflected in the European Union acknowledging China as a strategic competitor, a strategic adversary. You see this through NATO's deliberations itself about China. And I think you have seen many national parliaments just wake up as they have understood the measures that Russia has gone to; whether it has been to interfere in elections, or to effect assassinations or other attacks on the territory of NATO allies. And so, I think we see a Europe that is waking up to this.

But the Biden administration, Julian is right, will want to see that translating into action of how we can work together on very specific efforts to continue to deter Russia effectively in Europe, but be able to play a global game of understanding what is at stake in every multilateral institution, in every corner of the globe, as we see that competition from trying to rear its head.

JLF

I have got a three-word response, I fully agree with Damon: Nord Stream 2. Much will depend on Germany. In fact, the most important transatlantic relationship is the US-German relationship. I wonder how much German business will be comfortable with a Berlin administration in September, that takes a more assertive position against China. I wonder how, to what extent, Germany is willing to shift on its position on Nord Stream 2, given the dependence on energy, which that implies. If we cannot get Germany to play that leadership role, which those of us who believe in modern democratic Germany want Germany to play, then there is always going to be, I fear, a sense of disappointment in Washington. And we will get a creation of a kind of Atlantic sphere and a Euro sphere and I am seeing it already, which is a Euro sphere organised around France and Germany in the EU, and Atlantic sphere organise around Five Eyes, maritime amphibious, Britain's future Navy, all this kind of stuff. And I do not think that is a good future for the Alliance. The Alliance works best when we all sit down, look at the threats, agree on approach and adopt a policy over a decade of quietly preparing to enact it, to deter and defend. If we can do that, the Alliance has a future, but if political cohesion at any cost becomes so important, then I fear the Alliance will not be up to its core mission of deterrence into the future, given what is coming at us over the horizon. And it will.

HR

As we have heard earlier today, NATO's strategic concept was framed in 2010, I think you were involved Damon, and there was the talk about possible partnerships with Russia. It was written at a time when China had not begun its rise, before the annexation of Crimea. Do not we need to identify a new strategy for the Alliance?

DW

We have. Nobody is trapped by the language of 2010. Bless Jens Stoltenberg for having to lead this Alliance forward. So yes, does the paper need to catch up? It does, but the ideas come first, the strategy comes first, and then you follow up with bureaucrats who capture in writing all that kind of stuff in a strategic concept. Jens Stoltenberg has helped do this, just helped position the Alliance, first of all, to keep ignited during a very difficult period, and now he helps position it for the future in a way that I think is quite incredible. I hear Julian's warnings and I welcome them, because I welcomed pressure on all of our allies to do more, but I am actually quite optimistic. This is a time, this is a trip where you will see a sense of solidarity and unity. You will see the allies coming together with a common approach. It needs to be translated. The stakes are high, and that is where Julian is right. But the world is so fundamentally different. The way technology impacts with societies, the fact that a pandemic has been the biggest national security challenge we have. And there is an administration here that gets that. This is not about returning to the past.

They are very much laying out a strategy about how to adapt international institutions, modernize our historic partnerships and which helps shape the future rather than fall victim to it. And I think their expectation is that they will do that with allies and partners and by their side. And that is where there will be heightened expectations of common strategy coming from our European friends. But I admit, there are still places of concern. It is sad to me that it has been easier to cancel a pipeline from the United States to Canada, than it has been possible to cancel a pipeline from Russia.

JLF

Let me give you a specific example of an issue. There are two fundamental documents that the NATO staff is working on. The Defensive Deterrence Concept of the Euro-Atlantic area and the Military Strategy of 2019. Now these are good documents, they are the basis of a future strategic concept. But the NAC rejected the military strategy, which was a very good document, because it was not in line with the Summit declarations of Warsaw and Brussels, or not sufficiently in line. In other words, political bureaucracy overcame a military analysis of the fundamental duties and missions of the Alliance. As long as that goes on, we are not really adapting to the threat. We are putting political cohesion as a higher goal than future Alliance credibility in its core mission.

If we can overcome that, then I am an optimist. I will join Damon in the optimist camp, even though for a good old Yorkshireman optimism is a very great challenge. But it is that kind of bureaucratic nonsense that we have to overcome if we are going to move to a point where, not we believe in it, but the likes of General Gerasimov and Putin believe that the NATO deterrent is credible, that the Chinese believe that the Americans have allies sufficiently strong, that the Americans

will always be strong in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

That is the real test convincing our adversaries, that we are serious about our mission in the 21st century.

HR

Is defence going to continue to be the main mission in the 21st century? The Secretary General has also spoken about issues like climate change.

DW

I think the first mission is to show that democracy delivers for its people. And that is why you have seen a laser like focus from this administration on tackling the pandemic, getting that under control in the United States, getting the country open, the economy moving and helping to show the democracies can act and deliver. And that, yes, we have borne the brunt, we have been through a lot of challenges here, but it is precisely because of our democracy that we are self-correcting, that we are having the debate, that we are holding ourselves accountable. That ultimately becomes the challenge. This is President Biden. Why he talks about the power of our example? Because ultimately being able to show that democracy is the best way to deliver dignity, prosperity and security for individuals, that is the ultimate challenge to what we see from autocracies globally today.

JLF

What is NATO for? Go back to its original founding treaty in 1949. NATO is a defensive war fighting military Alliance. Its primary mission is to defend the peoples of the Euro-Atlantic area, by having a minimum level of sufficiently credible military power in support of other forms of influence to ensure the credibility of that defence. End of. Everything else beyond that becomes a kind of luxury. And too often to my mind, we have got into this NATO as a kind of military EU territory. NATO is not a military EU. It is a defensive military Alliance, and it must be clear about that core mission because every other mission that flows thereafter, Article 3, every other article of the treaty, flows from that fundamental military credibility mission. And I'm very much hoping... And that is implied by the way, the NATO 2030 document, that NATO has to go back to that to be credible. And for that, it needs a war fighting European force that could really pull its weight in the future Alliance.

HR

Well, I would like to ask you both, since Italy's troops formally withdrew from Afghanistan yesterday, what can we expect from Afghanistan in the next two years? And how will NATO be judged on that. Let us start with Damon, I think you were in Kabul. [by August 2021, the US and NATO have completed their retreat from the country, Ed.]

DW

Thank you. In fact, thank to Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, who is here at the NATO Defense College Foundation, and has been a great partner. Someone I worked for when he was at NATO headquarters. He and I went to Kabul for the historic Change of Command Ceremony, where NATO took command of ISAF for the first time. We were intimately involved at the beginning of that, really recognizing at the time that it was important for the United States to welcome its allies in this endeavour. It has been a tough slog, no doubt, and we would see where we have headed with the decision to withdraw, draw down forces. Thus, I think we have a pretty strong responsibility. And it is not just NATO, the institution, it is the Allies themselves with our partners, to think through how we provide the right kind of continued support and assistance to the people of Afghanistan, the investments in their defence capabilities, the investments in the rights that they have so hard fought for and gained over these years. Consequently, I think this is a real challenge. It is a moral challenge for the Alliance. How to do what is necessary to bring the forces home, without turning our backs on the people of Afghanistan. And I think NATO will have a moral responsibility. It will not lead on all of these, but it will have a moral responsibility working with the allies themselves and with the Afghan people, on how we can play a supportive role past September.

JLF

Yes. I fully agree with Damon. I have written three big reports on Afghanistan. One for the Rapid Reaction Corp, one for the European Parliament, and one for NATO. And they all come down to a sense that in fact, Afghanistan is also a problem for many of the major powers around its borders. And therefore, there is a common interest to an extent of ensuring some elements of stability within Afghanistan's borders. And that will require a multi-country, multi-agency approach. Security and counter terrorism cooperation will have to be more tailored, that will have to continue. Support for the Loya Jirga will be vital in that, because political cooperation with it is absolutely vital. The government building contract and the critical path towards the development of institutions, is again vital, like agricultural and rural development as well. There is a whole host of programmes that we should try to continue with countries in the region, that should not be derailed by the fact that we are taking our forces out.

Now I am under no illusion and having Damon being in Afghanistan, about the challenges that this situation poses. But if we walk away and turn our backs, which is implicit in much of the rhetoric, then we will have a problem. We have got to find a way through the international community, and perhaps use it as a positive stepping stone towards the likes of China and indeed Russia, to maintain some of the capacity building programs, which to my mind are crucial to a functioning Afghan government. If it becomes another Taliban enclave, then we are again in for a rocky road.

Special Intervention



NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg meet in Brussels the Italian Defence Ministry, Lorenzo Guerini
Source: www.nato.int





BENEDETTO DELLA VEDOVA

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SPECIAL INTERVENTION

I am particularly glad to deliver this opening intervention of the second session because I am convinced that this session, focused on NATO with global partners, gives us the opportunity to underscore the importance of increasing knowledge, awareness, cooperative security and of the significance of NATO's contribution in this regard.

In times of uncertainty, of unprecedented challenges, such as COVID-19 pandemic and of accelerating global geopolitical competition, it is of the utmost importance to reflect on what NATO can do to ensure homogeneity of approach to the issue of security that derives from our common belonging to the transatlantic community of values.

The Alliance must indeed stand as a force for peace, stability and predictability in a more and more disputed, uncertain and volatile security environment. Very difficult question is if NATO will be able to fully adapt to a new security environment, thus continuing to be a pillar of our security in the widest meaning of the word, not only for allies, but also for NATO's partners and for the public opinion. My answer is yes. It is yes, because despite differences and disagreements, we share the same underlying values and we work for a world where future generations will be able to enjoy the freedoms, the common heritage and civilizations of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. In light of this, the upcoming Brussels Summit is a crucial occasion to reaffirm the solidity of the transatlantic links and the Alliance unity and cohesion.

My best guess is, if I may borrow a fitting image used by a NATO country ambassador, that anyone interested in trains running on time will find the NATO Summit compelling, those more interested in trains that collide will be disappointed. The NATO 2030 recommendations built on the work done by the group of experts will be presented to the leaders during the Summit, hopefully paving the way to the update of the next strategic concept.

These recommendations are also a unique tool to reach two main goals. First of all, to strengthen the role of the Alliance's forum for political consultation, and secondly, to make it better equipped to tackle with the 360-degree approach, the security threats and challenges of a more competitive and disputed international landscape. A credible deterrence stance embodied in increased readiness, modernized capabilities, adequate investments and strengthened resilience remains the cornerstone of our collective security.

To achieve this, we must safeguard NATO's technological edge by boosting transatlantic cooperation on innovation. On top of that, it is undeniable that today climate change constitutes a serious threat multiplier, especially in consideration of heightened international and regional tensions that must be collectively addressed. At the same time, considering that stability is pivotal for security, we must work to uphold a rule-based international order, that encompasses the safeguard of human rights, civil liberties and gender equality, by deepening also partnerships, dialogue, and engagement that have an inherent value in supporting deterrence.

This leads me to emphasize Italy's effort to raise awareness on the threats and challenges stemming from all the strategic directions in particularly from the Southern Region. Indeed, security and stability within the Middle East and North Africa Region have deteriorated significantly in recent years, due to the wide range threats, terrorism, cyber-attacks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and challenges to energy security attributable to both state and non-state actors.

The Mediterranean Sea is essentially at the centre of this crossroad of instability and geo-strategic competition. In this context, Italy has long been active in contributing to project stability, but concretely engaging with different NATO partners. And also with the European Union, we have always underlined the need to leverage on existing partnership formats, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Moreover, we have supported new initiatives for a broader NATO engagement in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, we have always stressed the importance to achieve a full and swift implementation of the framework for the south by fully leveraging all the functions of the Southern Hub in JFCNP (Naples). We firmly think that the main strategic goal in the region should be to complete the strategic adaptation of NATO towards the south in line with the 360-degree approach. Further delays in implementing a theatre-wide approach would contradict the principle of the indivisibility of the Alliance security with immediate consequences on the Italian efforts toward all strategic directions.

In addition, we should also further enhance the defence of related security capacity building initiatives that not only reinforces NATO's commitment to partners, but are also projecting stability by providing support to nations requesting it.

Lastly, on the NATO-EU cooperation: I am convinced that the simultaneous development of the EU Strategic Compass and the update of the NATO's Strategic Concept offer a precious opportunity to announce complementarity between

the two organisations' common efforts. Clearly there might be a risk of increased competition for financial and human resources if we fail to coordinate and to ensure coherence on both sides.

While looking for ways to maximize synergies and avoid duplication, we should bear in mind that the EU and NATO have different vocations and comparative advantages. In this scenario, the NATO 2030 agenda is pivotal to securing common interest and building consensus and I can assure that Italy will remain committed to upholding and strengthening the values upon which NATO was founded. Therefore, I would like to conclude with a call to engage in a constructive reflection that will generate a platform of ideas for rebuilding consensus for a new era.

Session 2

NATO WITH GLOBAL PARTNERS



Royal Thai Navy and US Navy training at sea in CARAT 2019 exercise





RAJENDRA ABHYANKAR

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AN INDIAN OCEAN WITH INCREASED STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF ALLIES

The Indian Ocean is a vast theatre stretching in the East from the Strait of Malacca and the western coast of Australia to the Mozambique Channel in the West. It encompasses the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea in the North all the way down to the southern Indian Ocean. It is home to 2,7 billion people, and its key sub-regions being population-intensive are South Asia, the energy-rich Middle East, the active eastern coast of Africa and the islands dotting the ocean from Sri Lanka in the East to the Comoros archipelago in the West. This combination of attributes has a crucial impact on the global economy.

The region is a vital trading hub connecting the littoral states with Europe and the Americas. The sea lanes of the Indian Ocean play a significant role in the transit of commercial and energy traffic. Its geo-economic importance stems from the diversity and size of the countries grouped under the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) that are as politically and socially different as Australia, Indonesia, Iran and South Africa. The waters around the western Indian Ocean are getting very crowded with regional and extra-regional powers jostling for space. The result has been an arms race in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) with expansion of naval capacity particularly by the Chinese PLA Navy.

The area witnesses the continuing crisis in the Middle East that is drawing multiple state and non-state actors into the region, intersecting regional power competitions and active territorial water conflicts involving India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the continued flare-up of border between India and China that has emphasized their competing agendas.

At the heart of this geopolitical struggle is the ability to sustain a military presence near the key choke points connecting the ocean's trade routes protecting the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) to keep the IOR freedom of navigation. IOR is characterized by four choke points:

- the Malacca Straits between Malaysia, Singapore and the Indonesian island of

Sumatra, that connects Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean;

- the Strait of Hormuz, the only sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the IOR;
- the Bab al-Mandeb strait, flowing between Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and Yemen in the Arabian Peninsula;
- and the Mozambique Channel between Madagascar and Mozambique.

Adding to the complex security environment are: the US military base at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, the French overseas territory of Reunion and India's Andaman Islands. Naval facilities at Djibouti include those of the US, France, Japan and most recently China, an increasing assertive player in the IOR. In 2020 Russia also announced a naval base in Sudan for period of twenty-five years.

The presence near these choke-points is essential for a nation's antisubmarine warfare and surveillance missions and increasing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). A country with these assets becomes an instrumental partner for many IOR littoral states. While France and India are key regional players on security, the UK also plays an important role. Other countries involved in specific issues especially maritime piracy are China, India, Japan, the USA and its NATO Allies.

China's growing presence has become a source of shared anxiety for France, India, the USA and others. Strategic competition looming between Washington and Beijing has now come to the forefront of global conversation, strategy and policy. China seeks global leadership and is steadily working to create a new global order defined by its own set of rules, norms and values. It is also likely that the contestation would include maritime, cyberspace, information, space and economic competition.

The Belt and Road Initiative has become a tool for economic exploitation through incentives to and control of natural resources of fisheries, gas, energy and SLOC's to strengthen its position. Beijing's realization of the vital importance of sea power has been well summed up by Alfred Mahan's sea power theory: "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia". Its action and stances against international legitimacy in the South China sea is a case in point. China's "String of Pearls" supported by its Belt and Road initiative has seen it making remarkable strides in its relationships with the littoral states. United States' championing of the Indo-Pacific as a new framework has pushed the Indian Ocean into prominence with growing great and regional power competition to acquire assets like ports and enabling agreement. China's studied increase in its profile in the IORA has stepped up the possibility of military and strategic engagement with the growing number of powers with a presence in the region.

The evolving great power competition has the possibility of providing new opportunities for growth and expansion particularly to the IOR's small and medium

states. These states are not interested to choose between any two major powers, but would rather prefer to continue development and growth with assistance from multiple powers. Yet, the focus on Indo-Pacific also suggests new opportunities for cooperation based on shared interests and multilateral engagements in a continuing assertion of the rule-based order.

Much will depend on whether the USA will be inclined to reframe their leadership by leading ongoing regional efforts and promoting economic and technological cooperation, 5G, clean technology, climate change and humanitarian assistance in disaster response. It is hoped that under President Biden this will see an allotment of resources to strengthening free navigation of the IOR. It also needs to encourage increased Indo-Pacific connectivity to supplement China's BRI projects and promote MDA and information sharing. In this context, there is room for India to explore common ground with NATO in order to play a role in the Indo-Pacific. India's enthusiasm for the Quad is a recognition of the need to build coalitions.

While India has not been offered NATO membership nor is it interested in it, a sustained dialogue between New Delhi and NATO could make it easier for the country to deal with the military establishments of Allies. While Russia has not made secret of its allergy to the Quad and India's growing proximity to the US, putting NATO in the mix may not make much difference. In light of Russia's growing military interest in the Indo-Pacific, India's regular relationship with NATO could be seen as an asset even though the Kremlin has a growing adversarial relationship with NATO in Europe.



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EMERGING GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Political discussion within the North Atlantic Alliance is currently dominated by two catchwords: NATO 2030 and New Strategic Concept. Both indicate that NATO is fundamentally reassessing its roles and missions in a completely changed security environment. Such a strategic overhaul is long overdue as NATO's current strategic core document, the Strategic Concept 2010, has been approved more than a decade ago.

In the meantime, NATO had to face Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2014 and to survive the Trump years. Moreover, it had to deal with new challenges like cyber threats or a global pandemic, and it has to cope with a rising China that positions itself increasingly opposed to the values and interests of the transatlantic community of democratic nations. According to the results of the NATO Summit in June 2021, a reviewed and updated Strategic Concept is supposed to be finalized by July 2022.

Partnerships have been one of the three core missions defined in the 2010 Strategic Concept: territorial defence according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, crisis management beyond NATO's borders and cooperative security (partnerships) with those countries not willing or able to join the Alliance. Initially foreseen as a more regional effort to reach the former members of the bygone Warsaw Pact, NATO Partnerships evolved to a dense network of programs including countries from the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the Asian-Pacific region.

In the meantime, many of these partnership forums do not mirror the political realities any more. Russia or Belarus are no longer partners of NATO and partnership institutions in the South, like the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), have become self-blocked or almost irrelevant. On top of all this, the United States as the prime member of NATO is increasingly refocusing its strategic attention to the Asia-Pacific and tends to regard NATO Partnerships as a tool for hedging a potentially aggressive China. Not surprisingly, the positions of NATO Allies on the future direction, content and geographical range of partnerships differ.

The discussions in Brussels currently circle around three questions. First, are the three core missions of the Strategic Concept of 2010 all of the same relevance, or should there be a hierarchy with a priority on self-defence? Second, shall NATO

liaise only with politically like-minded countries, or should partnerships also include non-democratic states? If so, should there be different kinds of partnerships? Third, should partnerships focus more on NATO's immediate neighbourhood or should they be even more global as they already are – with a new emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region? These questions need to be openly and frankly discussed. From a German point of view, the forthcoming debates should be guided by the following considerations.

With respect to the three core missions of NATO (defence, crisis management and partnerships) Germany is convinced that they should be formally be regarded as equal, without an explicit prioritisation. In the political reality, however, there has always been a natural ranking depending on the concrete situation and the strategic requirements. After 2010, the military engagement of NATO in Afghanistan and Libya highlighted the crisis management function. From 2014 on, most resources went into the area of deterrence and defence, in order to cope with the challenges posed by a revanchist Russia. With NATO's full withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, crisis management might become even less relevant. Given the widespread "intervention fatigue" after the modest successes in Libya or Afghanistan, partnerships might now be regarded as more relevant than crisis management. Hence, there is no need to argue on an explicit hierarchy of core tasks – political developments will create priorities on their own.

With regard to the relation between partnerships and democratic values, Germany strongly favours the position that NATO is a democratic institution, based on Western values, which are actually universal values. Hence, partnerships with liberal democratic nations should come first. However, this should not preclude dialogue and cooperation with nations with other political systems.

In fact, Realpolitik and global challenges will always force NATO to cooperate with states that do not have an undoubted democratic record. Moreover, NATO – unfortunately – has members in its ranks that also raise doubts on their liberal democratic orientation. Hence, if NATO would follow a "League of Democracies" approach, i.e., the idea of a global alliance of democracies once prominently advanced by the US Senator John McCain or the former NATO Secretary Rasmussen, it might damage its own credibility. Concerning NATO's outreach to the Asia-Pacific, Germany fully supports the Alliance's efforts to expand its strategic horizon to the region. The rise of China and its increasingly aggressive way of pursuing its national interests in the region and beyond progressively affects the Alliance's security interests. The United States has already refocused its strategic attention to the Pacific region in order to prepare for a potential great power competition in Asia. Russia will hardly be a player in this great power competition as it is economically and politically falling behind. However, even a declining Russia remains a formidable threat particularly to the NATO members in Eastern Europe. Other NATO Allies, like Italy or Spain, are more concerned with the threats in their Southern neighbourhood. Hence, NATO as a Euro-Atlantic organisa-

tion cannot afford to pivot too much to Asia and thereby potentially neglect the challenges in Eastern Europe or South of the Mediterranean. Finding a balance that respects the security requirements of all 30 member states will always be the precondition for NATO's cohesion and thereby of NATO's success.

There are also practical impediments to an over-emphasis on global partnerships. There is no doubt that, given the fact that vital security threats are no longer regional but global, NATO needs to take on a 360-degree approach and has to have a global view on international security developments. This is why already years ago NATO outreached Global Partners – four of them in the Asia-Pacific: Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea.

However, the logic of global partnerships rests on two pillars: first, they have to advance the security interests of Partners and NATO Allies likewise. Partnership – like membership – is not a value in itself but has to be mutually beneficial. Second, global partnerships have to be credible particularly in the eyes of Partners. To be trustworthy, credible and mutually beneficial, partnerships require time, energy and resources, which implies that NATO has to have the capabilities to fill partnerships with content and concrete cooperation. In reality, though, only a few NATO members have the resources to operate globally with Partners or to get engage in military exercises in far distant regions. Budget constraints even limit the possibilities of NATO officers in the Headquarters in Brussels to travel regularly to distant Partners for consultations or common projects.

Therefore, NATO needs a realistic level of ambition on how many global partnerships and in which regions it wants and needs to sustain. This holds particularly true as the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic will further strain the budgets in all NATO member states.

Partnerships on a regional and global level have been a success story of NATO's ability to export stability far beyond its borders. They have to be adapted and extended according to future security requirements. At the same time, this adaptation process has to be pursued with a sense of proportion in order not to overload the Alliance. NATO remains the buttress of transatlantic security but it should not be misunderstood as the silver bullet for all international security problems.



ODED ERAN

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ARAB REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS AND THE POSSIBLE EVOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS

I am struck by the very meagre attention to the Eastern Mediterranean. I follow this for, by now, almost 20 years, and there are very short, curt references, and I am afraid that the upcoming Summit will not change the pattern. There are good reasons why NATO should pay attention to what happens in the Eastern Mediterranean, at least for three different reasons. One is the eating up of this area, think about Turkey, Libya, Russia and other actors.

I draw your attention to various papers, which came out recently pointing out Russia's growing presence and intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean. The second one has to do with my own little region. The recent round between Israel and Hamas has shown the explosive potential in the relations with the Palestinians generally, and the small indication to what could happen if the relative quiet in the Israel-Hezbollah front will dramatically change. And therefore, I think that we have to pay attention to this region in terms of NATO's awareness, monitoring, and – I dare say – even a more active policy. We certainly see the assertive, I would be less diplomatic than in the past and say even aggressive, policies of Turkey in this small region. And I know the sensitivities. Turkey is a member of NATO, a very important member, but there it is, in my view.

The second issue that we have to refer to is the heating up of the energy issue. We have a very short window (15–20 years) in which all owners of natural gas would have to first of all extract, use, and then sell as much natural gas as they are able. After that we are going to be, according to the Paris Protocol and the other documents, in a green economy. I think that the recent round in Gaza indicates that some decisions taken in the region, and I do not discern between this side or the other, are irrational. That is to say that they are unexpected, and with all the various thinking modes we employ we eventually fail, time after time, to find the reason for a flare-up, but there it is. Therefore, it is important, and I go back now to the Gaza issue, that we have a permanent arrangement in the area pertaining to economic, political, and security arrangements, and here I come to NATO.

I understand the sensitivities. I understand that NATO, if it is ready to be involved, it will be only based on the availability, the existence of a Security Council's mandate. But having said that, I think that NATO can have a very important role.

I attach to it also the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which pertains to the Gulf countries. The cooperation here (Mediterranean-Gulf-NATO) could be very, very positive in the overall arrangement pertaining to Gaza. I think that there is a potential there. I think that it is important to have readiness in NATO to consider this, with the possibility that this mandate can, later on, be expanded to other areas based on experience. I spoke about the potential insecurity of the East Mediterranean as far as gas is concerned. We are going to maybe have a pipeline stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to Southern Europe. This is going to be quite vulnerable. And so, Italy is involved; Greece and Cyprus are involved; Egypt and Israel are involved. This is something to which I recommend that in NATO, they begin to pay attention to these aspects, and if NATO comes in which, it could be a stabilizing factor in this situation and reality in the Eastern Mediterranean.



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A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING ARAB PARTNERSHIPS

Assessing the opportunity of developing NATO's Arab partnerships raises several conceptual challenges. First of all, is it still relevant to address partner nations in the Middle East and North Africa through a paradigm referring to an "Arab nation" that seems less and less salient? The Arab world as a coherent security regional complex had vanished with the major changes brought by the Arab Spring, superseded by other geopolitical constructs like the broader Middle-East, the MENA region, or NATO's South. They all signal a re-composition of the regional power relations and security dynamics around two main areas: on one hand, we see the emergence of a Maghreb-Sahel security complex, stretching up to the Mediterranean Basin; and, on the other side, the consolidation of a Grand Middle-Eastern security complex, ranging from the Red Sea to the close Asian periphery of the Gulf, through the Levant and the Middle-East. In that context, does it make sense for NATO to engage Arab nations as a whole group?

We need to take stock of these changes and their implications for our stability. The current strategic environment is completely different from the one described in NATO's last Strategic Concept; and the differences are even more striking if you consider the context in which the Mediterranean Dialogue was established in 1994, just after the Oslo Accords, or the geopolitical situation of 2004, when the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was launched. Nowadays, the MENA region is affected by an unprecedented level of fragmentation, due to the multiplication of conflicts and tensions among regional actors, the persistence of foreign interferences and the emergence of various non-state actors.

In addition, the normalization agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours, combined to the relative disengagement of the United States from the regional equation, tend to reshuffle the regional balance of power. A taboo has been broken, allowing the rise of a new strategic environment. All these elements are critical for revamping NATO's partnership policy in the MENA region. The experts group's report insisted on the need to reform this partnership policy to develop a more structured and consistent approach to the south.

The definition of the limitations of NATO's South remains an issue. Obvious-

ly, the borders of NATO's grand southern periphery go far beyond the limits of the so-called Arab world. There are not either limited to the MENA region. The South should certainly encompass the Sahel, given the impact of the Sahelian instability on the stability of both the Mediterranean Basin and North Africa. Against this backdrop, few points need to be carefully examined. In North Africa, the Libyan conflict remains highly problematic. If the Mediterranean Dialogue should be turned into a Grand Maghreb partnership framework, what would this framework mean without Libya? But it is still very early to predict what will happen in Libya over the coming months.

On another note, I think that to comprise Israel, Jordan, and even Iraq should be included in a broader Middle East partnership framework, turning the ICI framework into a more regional entity. As these countries have obviously the same security concerns. The Iranian regional ambitions pledge in favour of a rapprochement among these countries. However, can NATO and its partners in the Middle-East take steps forward to stabilize the region without establishing, more or less formally; a dialogue with Iran? This is very much looking to the future, but probably some NATO Allies are already considering this option.

All these elements pledge for a more geopolitical approach to the South for NATO. First of all, the Alliance may consider renewing and reviving the political dialogue with its Partners in the region. How to do that? Firstly, by taking into better consideration their security priorities. We have seen, over the last two decades, misunderstandings about the prioritization of security issues between NATO and its southern Partners; this is something that needs to be worked out. Secondly, how to identify the relevant Partners for NATO in the region? Are they local, national, or regional actors? What are the criteria to select Partners? Do values matter in that selection process?

Finally, on the practical side, I would say that NATO has a lot of instruments to engage with these Partners which to be streamlined. In such crowded environment like the South, NATO might identify it can add to the international efforts already in place; with that respect interoperability and professional military education are certainly domains where the Alliance has developed over the last 70 years an invaluable experience.

Special Intervention



The NATO banner at the Atomium in Brussels.
Source: www.nato.int





BENEDETTA BERTI

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SPECIAL INTERVENTION

First of all, thank you very much for inviting me, and thank you very much also to the NATO Defense College Foundation, of course, for organizing this conference, and to the NATO Defense College. I could not think of better time to have this meeting today because, as you know, we are only a few days away from the NATO Summit, which will take place on Monday. This will be when our 30 leaders come together to discuss the issues that affect our common security and defence. And the NATO Summit on Monday cannot come at a more important time, at a pivotal time for our Alliance.

As you know, this is an important historical moment for NATO. We are drawing down in Afghanistan, our largest military operation outside of our borders, and we are also stepping up and really increasing our response to a changing security environment. In the great panels today, I have already heard this changing security environment mentioned many times, and we know that one of the characteristics of this changing security environment is of course growing global competition.

We see Russia and China are at the forefront of a pushback against the rules-based international order, and this has an impact for our security, for our values and for our way of life. And of course, it is not just a more competitive world that defines our security environment: terrorism remains a pervasive and persistent threat to our security. We are also witnessing more sophisticated, more dangerous cyber and hybrid attacks, and we are seeing the security impact of climate change really affecting our Alliance.

So, when you take all these challenges together, it is really an important time for our leaders to meet in person. It is an important time to reaffirm the importance of the transatlantic bond, because I think, and this has come out very clearly out of these two days of discussions at this important event, that when you look at the magnitude and the number of security challenges ahead of us, the reality is, we can only face those challenges together. No country, even no continent is big enough to address the number of issues that we have on our plate, and this is why this

Summit is so important. It will be an opportunity for our Allies to strengthen their commitment to the transatlantic bond. And it will also be an opportunity to tangibly take steps to reinforce our unity, broaden our approach to security, and take a more active role when it comes to defending the rules-based international order.

What I just mentioned, this is, in a nutshell, the essence of NATO 2030, and NATO 2030 will be at the centre of the Summit agenda. Under the NATO 2030 agenda, our leaders will take a number of important decisions to ensure that we accelerate our adaptation militarily and politically, but also to ensure that we can prepare for what is truly a more complex, contested and unpredictable future. You will see the details of these important decisions of course only on Monday, but I think I can already give you a little preview by saying that, first of all, we are expecting our leaders to take concrete decisions to strengthen NATO's unity.

They will do that by taking a concrete commitment to increase our consultations, so to consult more often on a broader range of topics, and to make sure that we use NATO fully as the political-military Alliance it is to foster more transatlantic convergence, more coordination when it comes to responses, military and non-military, to our security challenges. So, there will be a strong political commitment coming out of the Summit.

Leaders will also agree to undertake the development of NATO's next Strategic Concept, which is a really important document setting the strategic course for the Alliance. It will be an important opportunity to reaffirm our values, to reflect on our adaptation and really to prepare for the future. And that is not all, of course. There will also be a number of very concrete decisions that will allow us to strengthen our deterrence and defense, which of course remains the core of this Alliance, but also to broaden our approach to security so that we can really take into account the fact that our security environment is very different from that of a few years ago. Now we need to deal with hybrid challenges, in the cyberspace, and we have to deal with the fact that our adversaries use more and more political, economic and military tools in an integrated way. So we must respond in a similarly coordinated and integrated way, and this is why we are going to take concrete decisions to strengthen our resilience and to enhance and protect our technological edge. For the first time, we are also going to have a substantial set of decisions to tackle the security impact of climate change; with the goal for NATO to really become the leading international organisation when it comes to adapting to, understanding and mitigating the security impact of climate change.

We just listened to a very eloquent set of interventions on NATO Partnerships. NATO 2030 is also about partnerships. Partnerships are one of NATO's key political tools. And so, in a more contested world, we want to use them even more strategically. We want to use our partnerships and work with our partners to protect and defend the rules-based international order. Therefore, we will take decisions to strengthen partnerships with like-minded countries and organizations. Thus, from the European Union to like-minded countries near and far, from

Sweden and Finland to Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Korea, really looking at partnerships as a key political tool.

There was an important discussion on NATO's southern neighborhood. That is also part of the discussions that we will have at the Summit, because we recognize that conflict, instability, terrorism in our neighborhood is a direct threat to our security. So we will also take decisions to strengthen our ability to train and build the capacity of our partners, because we have long learned that prevention is better than intervention. So we expect a significant investment in this area.

And finally, we are also having discussions, of course, on how to ensure that we have the right capabilities and resources to fully implement all these decisions on NATO 2030, and in general on our military and political adaptation. So we are also looking at a continued commitment to meet the 2014 Wales Defence Investment Pledge, because of course, given that our security environment is more complex, it is even more important for us to invest in our defense. And as part of this discussion, we are also looking at common funding for NATO as an effective way to pool our resources and provide more common security.

So I tried, very shortly, to give you a preview of the Summit. I think the key theme here is that we are meeting at a historical time for the Alliance, we have a very ambitious agenda, and very importantly, we are going to strengthen the Transatlantic Alliance not just by words, but also by deeds, by taking concrete decisions.

Concluding Remarks



PIERO FASSINO

President, Foreign Affairs Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Rome

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to thank the NATO Defense College Foundation, with which I have had long-standing working relations, for its kind invitation to conclude these two very full afternoons of discussion and debate. Rebuilding the global consensus around our principles and values of freedom and democracy is the main geopolitical issue of direct concern to us. An alliance such as NATO would not have been able to remain in place for over 70 years without the ongoing political, cultural and strategic reflection of which these two days are tangible proof. I believe this to be the rationale behind the comprehensive document entitled “NATO 2030. United for a New Era”, which was followed by Secretary General Stoltenberg’s proposal to draw up a New Strategic Concept by 2022, laying down the Alliance’s agenda for the decades that lie ahead of us.

The European Union and the United States have not always seen eye-to-eye in terms of analysis and choices. Differences still remain that it is only fair to mutually acknowledge. Yet saying “we share the same values, but not the same interests” is not the whole story. While it may describe the status quo, it fails to capture the dynamics of history. There are some world powers that are bent on actively seeking to split Europe apart, and weaken the transatlantic relationship. They perhaps do this by flattering individual states and offering them short-term rewards and opportunities. We must not fall for such blandishments. Our Alliance may sometimes be tiresome and difficult to sustain, but we must struggle to keep it alive. Let us try to adapt it to meet up with our expectations and our ambitions, while being mindful that in today’s world we have no alternative alliance to turn to. One simple truth can be inferred from these two days and the documents that have been drawn up in recent months: if it is difficult for the USA to stand alone, it is all the more so for Europe.

One particular example I would mention is the doctrine of European Union’s strategic autonomy. But strategic autonomy should not be construed as an alternative to the principles and objectives of the Atlantic Alliance, but rather as complementing them. And in this connection, the rebalancing of the Alliance’s running

costs, that are too heavily weighted towards the United States, is an issue that must find an appropriate and mutually satisfactory solution as soon as possible. In short, Europe and the United States must work together, as in the past but even more closely than ever before. They are the two lungs that allow the world to breathe freedom. When they have not worked as one, individual initiatives have produced dubious, when not negative, outcomes. Judging by the first measures adopted by the Biden Administration, it appears evident that there is a clear awareness of this in the White House.

In the second session of this Conference, the speakers immediately preceding me have mentioned the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, two multilateral initiatives both promoted by NATO, the first in 1994 and the second in 2004. The fact that the Mediterranean Sea is finally back among its strategic priorities is certainly good news for a country like Italy. For it is in the so-called “enlarged Mediterranean”, from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa and from the Persian Gulf to the Sahel, that the most serious crisis situations on the planet are concentrated. A whole region torn apart by proxy wars, terrorist insurgencies and unilateral initiatives by various regional powers.

So, it is good for NATO to be back in charge. Whereas 16 years ago, the four Gulf countries to which the Istanbul Initiative was addressed – the Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar – joined forces to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction together with Turkey. Now, this common front no longer exists. Today, more than fifteen years later, a worrying arms race is taking place across the entire Gulf region, and the Iranian nuclear threat is far from having been defused. The same reasoning applies to the Mediterranean Dialogues that preceded the Barcelona Process by one year. The Barcelona strategy dates back to 1995. The Helsinki agreements on collective security from 1975. Today the world is another and there is a need to rebuild a multilateral strategy.

Fully concerted action by Europe and America in the Mediterranean is crucially important. In this regard, we cannot ignore the case of Libya, where a government of national unity has been in place for a few months that will have to take the country to the elections in six months’ time. Italy, drawing on her history and experience, is ready to make a specific contribution, but needs the presence and cohesion of our allies. In this regard, we must not overlook the issue of how to manage migration. The Mediterranean is one of the most critical hot spots of this momentous phenomenon, which could break down and split the European front. Without going as far as the populist democracies of Eastern Europe, we need only mention the very recent Danish law on the right of asylum, which has led to protests and created dismay even at the United Nations.

Migration is a global geopolitical phenomenon. NATO can and must play a greater role in protecting the rights and dignity of migrants. Living conditions in the detention camps are inhuman. With its experience and technological capabilities, and true to the principles inspiring it, NATO can be a valuable tool for com-

bating the criminal traffic of human beings and restoring dignity and security to people in search of a better life. This is an area where the responsibility to protect could be effectively exercised.

Which brings me to my third and final point: China's growth and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Like the enlarged Mediterranean, the Indo-Pacific is a comparatively new geopolitical concept. They are the two most sensitive and decisive geographical areas for the destiny of the world. Furthermore, geographically speaking, they are fully contiguous. Tensions surrounding the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca and China-Taiwan relations, coupled with the recent suppressed protests in Hong Kong, the crisis and coup in Burma and more generally, China's hegemonic strategy, all underline the urgent need for an initiative to prevent the situation from escalating further. Japan, Australia and India will be the main partners in this effort, but a dialogue on defence and trade security has already been positively started with ASEAN, the only real and consolidated multilateral organisation in the region, that brings together, among others, countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, with which Italy and Western countries have a consolidated and structured relationship. Ensuring maritime security and effectively fighting against piracy in an area of transit for 25% of global trade must be considered an absolute priority.

With this in mind, I welcome the proposal put forward in February by Secretary General Stoltenberg to organise a NATO-Asia Pacific Summit in 2022. In short, the Indo-Pacific strategy is to date the most effective and structured doctrine, as an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative. My dear friends, let me close by reminding ourselves that someone had speculated that NATO could be dissolved in the aftermath of 1989 but, fortunately this was not the case. In 1991, with the end of the USSR, there began a decade of ethnic wars, in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and NATO made an essential contribution to overcoming them. In 2001, the attack on the Twin Towers heralded in a decade of the war on jihadist terrorism; in 2011, the Arab Spring and its collapse opened up a decade that would bring insecurity and instability across the enlarged Mediterranean; it was the decade of the crisis of multilateralism. In each of these phases, NATO has been invaluable in countering instability and risks to security and peace.

Today, in 2021, we might say that we are in yet another phase. The decade of the threats of pandemics and hybrid and cyber-attacks. It is therefore high time for Europe and the US to sing, once again, from the same song-sheet, and to confidently place our bets on NATO. It has been by acting together in the recent past that we have successfully fought off totalitarian ideologies, ethnic cleansing and terrorist attacks. Today, bolstered by the power of our high technology assets, we must work together to counter any non-conventional action to destabilise the international community, threaten the freedom of individuals, and undermine the principles of international law. In short, every nation will be safe, if the world is safer and NATO is the organisation that can make a decisive contribution to this goal.

BIOGRAPHIES

WEDNESDAY, 9TH OF JUNE 2021

FOREWORD

Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo

President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

After having served at the Italian Embassy in Washington D.C. and as Commercial Counsellor at the Embassy of Italy in Prague, Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo worked as Head of the External Relations Office of the EEC. In the following years, his career focused on Europe and Space Policy. In 1997 he was appointed Diplomatic Counsellor of the Minister of Defence Beniamino Andreatta, then of his successors Carlo Scognamiglio and Sergio Mattarella. In 2000, Minuto-Rizzo held the position of Italian Ambassador to the Western European Union and to the Political and Security Committee of the EU, of which he was among the founding members. He was Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic-political industrial area as far as the relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean were concerned. His most recent book was “NATO and the Middle East: The Making of a Partnership” (New Academia Publishing, 2018).

WELCOME REMARKS

Olivier Rittimann

Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome

Since July 2020, Lieutenant General Rittimann is the Commandant of the NATO Defense College in Rome. After graduating from the Military Academy of Saint Cyr and the Army Engineer School, he chose to serve with the Foreign Legion

and he took part to operations in Chad, Mayotte, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. After an operational tour at the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) in 1997, he was assigned to the Allied Forces North Headquarters in Brunssum in 1998. Then, he was posted to the Joint Staff in Paris, as Chief of the NATO branch. Promoted Brigadier General in 2010, he was deployed in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) from January 2011 to January 2012 as Chief of Operations and assigned as French Deputy Military Representative (MILREP) to NATO Headquarters. After that, Rittimann became the French National Military Representative to NATO's Allied Command Operations in Mons (Belgium) and in 2016 he was promoted to Major General.

INITIAL INTERVENTION

Baiba Braže

Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO HQ, Brussels

Ambassador Braže was appointed Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy in May 2020. She advises the NATO Secretary General on issues within her remit, oversees the coordination of all Strategic Communications activities across all NATO civilian and military bodies and commands, and also directs all public diplomacy activities. Ambassador Braže served most recently as Latvia's Ambassador to the United Kingdom, prior to which she was Director General Security Policy and International Organizations and Director General of the Communications Directorate at the Latvian Foreign Ministry in Riga. She previously served as Latvia's Ambassador to the Netherlands and Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

POLITICAL SUMMARY

Alessandro Politi

Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

Alessandro Politi is the director of the NATO Defense College Foundation, the only NATO-affiliated NGO think tank. A political and strategic analyst with 30 years of experience, he was political advisor of two KFOR Commanders. He was senior researcher for the Italian MoD (CeMiSS-Centre for Military and Strategic Studies) responsible for the strategic monitoring of Latin America. He also created and has led the Global Outlook project within CeMiSS, published in Italian and English (third edition, 2015). He has contributed to the Italian Defence White Paper. He has directed the CEMRES research on CBMs in the framework of the 5+5 Defence Initiative, presenting the conclusions to the Ministers in Granada. He teaches geopolitics and intelligence at the SIOI. He teaches conflict management, Crisis, peace-making and analysis at different governmental centres. He has

been acting director of the School of Intelligence Analysis at a private establishment in Rome. He has been advisor in Italy and abroad to four Defence ministers (among which the actual President of the Italian Republic, Hon. Mattarella), one National Armaments Director, one Intelligence Co-ordinator, one Chairman of the Oversight Intelligence Committee, one Head of the Italian delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Born in Germany, lives in Rome. He has published as author or co-author 39 books on strategic and security matters. His most recent publications are on the Belt and Road Initiative. His most recent book is the NDCF Shaping Security Horizons – Strategic Trends 2012-2019 volume, a global predictive analysis tailored to the needs of decision shapers.

SESSION 1

HOW TO REFOCUS NATO?

Ian Lesser

Vice President, Executive Director, Transatlantic Center, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels

Ian Lesser is Vice President at The German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States and a member of GMF's executive team, managing programs across the organisation. He also serves as Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center, the Brussels office of the GMF, and leads the GMF's work on the Mediterranean, Turkey, and the wider Atlantic. Prior to joining GMF, Dr Lesser was a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, as well as Vice President and Director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy. Dr Lesser is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Pacific Council on International Policy. He serves on the advisory boards of the Delphi Economic Forum, the Atlantic Dialogues, the NATO Defense College Foundation and the Turkish Policy Quarterly. A frequent commentator for international media, he has written extensively on foreign and security policy issues.

Tacan Ildem

Former Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy of NATO, Ankara

Ambassador Ildem, a member of NATO Experts Group that presented a report entitled "NATO 2030: United for a New Era", is a senior Turkish diplomat. Since the start of his long career in 1978 till February 2021 he held bilateral and multilateral positions including NATO Assistant Secretary General between 2016 to 2020. He served as the Turkish Ambassador to the Netherlands and Permanent Representative to NATO and the OSCE. He also served as Director General for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chief of Cabinet, Principal Foreign Policy Advisor and Spokesperson of the President of the Republic. His postings abroad also include those at the Embassies in Washington DC, Athens

and New Delhi. Ambassador Ildem is a graduate of Ankara University Faculty of Political Science. He is a recipient of the decoration of Grand Officer of the Order of the Star of Italian Solidarity and the Medal of Gratitude of Albania.

Marta Dassù

Senior Director of European Affairs; Editor-in-Chief, Aspenia, The Aspen Institute, Rome

A scholar of international politics, Dr Dassù was Director General of the international activities of Aspen Institute Italia, as well as Director of the foreign policy magazine *Aspenia*, published by the same institute. Between 1998 and 2001 she served as foreign policy advisor to the President of the Council of Ministers in different governments (D'Alema I, D'Alema II and Amato II). From 2006 to 2008 she led the Strategic Reflection Group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She was Director of the Center for International Political Studies and she is a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Affairs, of the Scientific Committee of Confindustria and of the Italy-USA Foundation. She is a leader writer for various newspapers and periodicals including *Corriere della Sera* and *Il Sole 24 Ore*, and also collaborates with both *La Stampa* and *Repubblica*. She is a member of NATO 2030 Experts Group.

Benoît d'Aboville

Associate fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

Benoît d'Aboville is a diplomat and former Ambassador, currently he is Associate fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and Associate Professor at Sciences Po/PSIA in Paris. During his diplomatic career Ambassador d'Aboville was assigned to Washington D.C., Moscow, Geneva and New York. He also was Ambassador in Prague, Warsaw and Brussels and served as French Permanent Representative to NATO (2000-2005). He is a contributor to the French Air Force research team as a reservist officer. From 2011 to 2013 he was a member of the Advisory Council of the French Foreign and European Ministry. He is a specialist in political-military affairs and former Vice President and member of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo and Geneva.

INTERVIEW: THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES AND MULTILATERALISM

Hannah Roberts

Freelance Journalist and POLITICO Correspondent, Rome

Hannah Roberts is an award-winning freelance journalist and producer based in Rome, reporting from the Mediterranean, including Italy and Southern Europe. She moved to Rome in 2013 and since then covered many of the major events that have buffeted the European continent, including terrorism and populism. She has reported extensively on the refugee crisis. In 2019 she was part of the *Financial Times* team that won the Press Award for the *Europopulists* series. She is a regular

contributor to the *Financial Times*, *POLITICO*, the *New European*, the *Independent*, the *Mail on Sunday* and other national and international titles.

Damon Wilson

Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.

Damon Wilson is Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council. He has worked for the NATO Secretary General, the National Security Council, the US Embassy in Baghdad before finally moving to the Atlantic Council. Dr Wilson has a long career in working on defense policy, NATO and US-European relations. Between 2001 and 2004, he held the position of Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, assisting Lord George Robertson of Port Ellen in his drive to transform the Alliance by enlarging NATO membership, conducting operations beyond Europe, and adapting Allied capabilities to face modern threats. From 2007 to 2009, he acted as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European affairs at the National Security Council. He worked also in the US Department of State's Office of European Security and Political Affairs, in the State Department's China desk, and at the US Embassy in Beijing.

Julian Lindley-French

Chairman, The Alphen Group, Rotterdam

Until 2017 Professor Lindley-French was Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Brussels. Currently, he is a Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. and Director of Europa Analytica in the Netherlands. He is also a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, as well as Visiting Programme Director at Wilton Park and founder of The Alphen Group. In 2015 Dr Lindley-French was appointed Honorary Member of the Anciens' Association of the NATO Defense College in Rome where he served as a member of the Academic Advisory Board. He is a member of the Strategic Advisory Panel of the British Chief of Defence Staff and was formerly the Head of the Commander's Initiative Group of NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Professor Lindley-French is currently also Senior Fellow at the Institute for Statecraft in London.

THURSDAY, 10TH OF JUNE 2021

SPECIAL INTERVENTION

Benedetto Della Vedova

Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome

Benedetto Della Vedova has been a Member of the Radical Party for 30 years. From January 2019 to March 2021 he was Secretary of +Europa, the movement he helped to build together with Emma Bonino. Dr Della Vedova was President of the Italian Radicals (2001-2003) and leader of the Liberal Reformers movement (2005-2009). Previously he was Member of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2004; Member of the Italian Parliament from 2006 to 2013; Senator from 2013 to 2018, and Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Renzi and Gentiloni governments. From the 1st of March 2021 he is Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in the Draghi Government.

SESSION 2

NATO WITH GLOBAL PARTNERS

Rajendra Abhyankar

Former Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs; Former Ambassador of India to the European Union

Ambassador Abhyankar is presently Visiting Professor at the College of Liberal Arts of Purdue University in Lafayette. He was in the Indian Foreign Service from 1968 to 2005. He was appointed Secretary at the Ministry of External Affairs from 2001 to 2004. Until 2009 Ambassador Abhyankar was Professor and Director of the Centre for West Asian Studies of Jamia Millia Islamia University in Delhi. He has been involved in a range of works for non-profit, corporate organisations and academics. From 2012 to 2019 he was Professor of Practice of Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs of Indiana University in Bloomington, USA. He has written seven books on Indian diplomacy and related issues, his latest publication being *Syria. The tragedy of a pivotal state*, published in 2020 by Palgrave Macmillan.

Karl-Heinz Kamp

Special Envoy of the Political Director, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin

Dr Kamp is the Special Envoy of the Political Director of the German Ministry of Defence. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of the German Armed Forces in Hamburg, with a dissertation on NATO's nuclear planning procedures. He started his career in 1986 at the German Council of Foreign Affairs in Bonn. In 1988, he has been Research Fellow at the Center for Science and International

Affairs, and at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of the Harvard University. From 1997 to 1998, Dr Kamp was on a temporary assignment with the Planning Staff of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From November 2007 to October 2013 he served as Research Director of the NATO Defense College in Rome to build up NATO's Research Division. In 2009, US Secretary Madeleine Albright selected him as one of the Advisors for the NATO Expert Group on the New Strategic Concept. In 2013, he joined the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin – first as Academic Director and later as the President of this institution. In 2019, he moved to the German Ministry of Defence.

Oded Eran

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv

Dr Eran, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, served as director of INSS from July 2008 to November 2011, following a long career in Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government positions. Before joining INSS, he served as the World Jewish Congress Representative in Israel and as the Secretary General of its Israel Branch. From 2002 to 2007, he served as Israel's Ambassador to the European Union, covering NATO as well. Prior to that, Dr Eran was Israeli Ambassador to Jordan, and head of Israel's negotiations team with the Palestinians. Other previous positions include Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Chief of the Israeli embassy in Washington. Between 2007 and 2013 he served as an advisor to the Knesset sub-committee on Foreign Affairs.

Chloe Berger

Faculty Adviser and Researcher, NATO Defense College, Rome

Dr Berger is Faculty Adviser and Researcher at the NATO Defense College. As a Researcher, her work focuses mainly on the broader MENA region and NATO's Agenda for the South (Projecting Stability, partnerships, etc.). As a Faculty Adviser, she oversees the Curriculum Planning of the NATO Regional Cooperation Course and the Senior Executive Regional Conference. Before joining the College, she held different positions in French educational institutions, public and private, in Syria and Egypt. She worked as a consultant for risks analysis and strategic monitoring on Middle-Eastern issues (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine). Dr Berger is a graduate from the Political Studies Institute of Paris (Sciences-Po Paris) and she received a Ph.D in Political Sciences from Paris II – Panthéon-Assas University. She also holds a Master 2 in International Security and Defence from Pierre-Mendes France University in Grenoble.

SPECIAL INTERVENTION

Benedetta Berti

Head, Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary General, NATO HQ, Brussels

Dr Berti is the Head of Policy Planning at the Office of NATO Secretary General. A policy adviser and consultant, as well as an Eisenhower Global Fellow and a TED Senior Fellow, she has held positions at Harvard University, West Point, the Institute for National Security Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, among others. In the past decade, Dr Berti has worked in NGOs and research institutes in Latin America, the Middle East, and the US, focusing on human rights, internal conflict, and political violence. Her areas of expertise include human security, internal conflicts, integration of armed groups, post-conflict stabilisation and peace-building, as well as violence prevention and reduction, crisis management and prevention. Dr Berti's comments and interviews have been featured in The New York Times, Time Magazine, the Wall Street Journal and Al-Jazeera. She holds a Ph.D in International Relations from the Fletcher School (Tufts University) and two post-doctorates in International Relations and Political Science.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Piero Fassino

President, Foreign Affairs Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Rome

Piero Fassino is the President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Elected for the first time in 1994, he was re-elected in all the following legislatures until 2011- when he became mayor of Turin (2011-2016) - and elected again to Parliament in 2018. He is currently also a Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and Vice President of the Political Commission, President of the Italy-France friendship section of the Inter Parliamentary Union. Undersecretary of State for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996-1998 in Prodi government) and, in the same period, Undersecretary for European Union Policies to the Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Trade (1998-2000 in D'Alema government); Minister of Justice (2000-2001 in Amato government). From 1991 to 1996 Honourable Fassino held the role of International Secretary of the Democratic Party of the Left. From 2016 to March 2020, he was President of the Socialist Group and spokesman for the Mediterranean at the Congress of Local Authorities of the Council of Europe.



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ROME, THE 9TH AND THE 10TH OF JUNE 2021

Venue: Live streamed from the Rome Cavalieri, A Waldorf Astoria Hotel

Via Alberto Cadlolo, 101, Rome

- 15,00 - 15,15 **Welcome Remarks**
- Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
 - Olivier Rittimann, Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome

- 15,15 - 15,25 **Initial Intervention**
- Baiba Braže, Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO HQ, Brussels (Virtual)

SESSION 1 **HOW TO REFOCUS NATO?**

The world is very different from the one the Alliance has known during the Cold War and its aftermaths. Allies need to strengthen their cohesion and be more effective in decision making in a fast-changing strategic environment. More challenges must be addressed to guarantee peace, stability, and the rule of law in the Euro-Atlantic area. The cooperation between the Alliance and the European Union is also to be reinforced on issues of common interests, taking advantage of their different capabilities and tools. A new Strategic Concept should be in the making.

- 15,25 - 16,40 Chair: Adriana Cerretelli, Editor for Europe, Il Sole 24 Ore, Brussels
- Ian Lesser, Vice President; Executive Director, Transatlantic Centre, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels (Virtual)
 - Tacan Ildem, Former Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy of NATO, Ankara
 - Marta Dassù, Senior Director of European Affairs; Editor-in-Chief Aspenia, The Aspen Institute, Rome
 - Benoît d'Aboville, Associate Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

Q&A

INTERVIEW **THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES
AND MULTILATERALISM**

- 16,40 - 17,10 Interviewer: Hannah Roberts, Freelance Journalist and POLITICO Correspondent, Rome
- Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C (Virtual)
 - Julian Lindley-French, Chairman, The Alphen Group, Rotterdam (Virtual)

- 15,00 - 15,10 **Special Intervention**
Benedetto Della Vedova, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome

SESSION 2 **NATO WITH GLOBAL PARTNERS**

NATO needs more than ever global partners to tackle the security challenges coming from different sides. The partnerships in the South (the Mediterranean Dialogues and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) should be energised, strengthening the Alliance political engagement, promoting capacity building tools, and possibly engaging with civil society. A process of consultations should be put into place with Indo-Pacific partners to better define the perimeter of the security architecture of the Western world.

- 15,10 - 16,30 Chair: Stephen Mariano, Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome
- Rajendra Abhyankar, Former Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs; Former Ambassador of India to the European Union (Virtual)
 - Karl-Heinz Kamp, Special Envoy of the Political Director, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin
 - Oded Eran, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv (Virtual)
 - Chloe Berger, Faculty Adviser/Researcher, NATO Defense College, Rome

Q&A

- 16,30 - 16,40 **Special Intervention**
Benedetta Berti, Head, Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary General, NATO HQ, Brussels (Virtual)
- 16,40 - 16,50 **Concluding Remarks**
Piero Fassino, President, Foreign Affairs Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Rome



Official portrait of NATO Allies at the Brussels Summit
Source: www.nato.int





The background of the page is a dark red color. It features a stylized, light red outline map of Europe and North Africa. In the upper right corner, there is a compass rose with a large 'N' indicating North. The text is arranged in several paragraphs on the left side of the page.

The 2021 NATO Summit hosted in Brussels had a special meaning for at least two reasons.

In political terms, it confirmed the *raison d'être* of the Alliance. NATO has been, historically, the hard core of the Western security architecture. Today as yesterday, international security is a matter of paramount importance. The scenario is changing fast, new challenges appear (climate change, artificial intelligence, new technologies, and pandemics) and the Alliance has to focus on how to deal with them. It is clear that, at this point, a renewal is necessary, realigning priorities and procedures.

On the other hand, the Summit underlined that multilateralism is the best mechanism to ensure stability and security. Building on the transatlantic bond as a vital backbone, NATO should explore valid solutions to achieve mutual benefits with global partners, in the framework of a credible engagement and possible deterrence.

After a period where the perceived threats were palpable and easily recognizable, the Atlantic Alliance has now the delicate task to rebuild a consensus on its fundamentals and its missions. In an era of heightened "geostrategic competition", what kind of political role for the Alliance: purely regional or with an important out-of-area component? How to articulate this role with the EU and outside Europe? What does really mean 360-degree security?

To this extent, the Secretary General launched a process of reform called NATO 2030. It involves an in-depth discussion among Allies for a renewed Alliance, starting with its political dimension and a definition of the most pressing issues. In addition, a new Strategic Concept is also needed to replace the one adopted in 2010, to make the Alliance flexible and adaptable in facing the security challenges of tomorrow.

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