

NATO 2022

A RELEVANT ALLIANCE IN A CHANGING WORLD

NATO 2022 A RELEVANT ALLIANCE IN A CHANGING WORLD

Conference organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation

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NATO Defense College Foundation

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The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of co-operation with NATO. Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings. The Foundation was born eleven years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staffs. Actually the Foundation is active in three areas: high-level events, strategic trends research and specialised decision makers' training and education.

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ALESSANDRO MINUTO-RIZZO President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

FOREWORD

This conference focuses on the Atlantic Alliance, its incoming Summit, the new strategic concept and some outstanding issues of general relevance. It is a good thing than we can meet fully in presence after two years of restrictions.

Last year we met at the same date, in the month of June. At that time the title was "Refocusing on change". Why? Because we were in the middle of a process of reform, a reform considered to be useful after more than 70 years. The focus was especially on the political dimension, to be updated in order to be in tune with a changing security environment. How to adapt to the emerging technologies and how to enlarge the horizon to new partners were also high on the agenda.

Today we meet in a different environment: we are forced to take into account the tragic war unfolding in Ukraine after the Russian invasion of the 14th of February. On the one hand, we feel the moral necessity to defend the aggressed, on the other we hope that a negotiated solution can be found as soon as possible. Today we would like to look at a larger horizon and not to concentrate on this issue discussed at length every day.

A new Strategic Concept is adopted on average every 10/12 years by the Allies. This will be the case of Madrid Summit on 28-30 of June, replacing the one decided in 2010 at the Lisbon Summit. That text pointed out at three clear priorities: common defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

We have not yet the language of the new concept, but it is clear that the war has an impact on the reflection concerning the reform process. A few things however can be said. We need to look at international security at "360° degrees". Security is global and has to be addressed projecting stability in all directions. Multilateralism is far from being obsolete. We see every day that we can confront emerging challenges of all kinds only united. No country alone can do that.

It is logical because most challenges are of a global nature. Climate change and security, high technologies, Space and Artificial Intelligence, resilience, a safe international order, health, cybersecurity are all issues to be addressed together.

We can also be comforted by the fact that what we call "the West" is showing a cohesion that seemed to be lost a few years ago. A positive fact is that the historic transatlantic bond has found new life after some years of neglect. The Alliance has already a high number of partners in different regions in various ways. But we have to take a fresh look at geography. Towards areas of growing importance like Africa and the Sahel. Of course, the Indo-Pacific region is also becoming a natural area of mutual cooperation in the global landscape.

Speaking from Rome it is impossible not to advocate the enhancement of a partnership in the south, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Foundation has done its best to offer what we think is an interesting programme. As always, we are promoting a debate at high international level, in a scientific way and in a spirit of reciprocal respect, addressing problems of strategic relevance.

Structured in three lively panels, the conference deals with different subjects. The Honourable Fassino, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber is opening the debate. The Government is represented by the Under Secretary of State Della Vedova. We have gathered here a number of high-level speakers coming from various countries.

I thank them all as well as the moderators. I owe special thanks to those who have supported us, first of all PMI International and Compagnia di Sanpaolo, the NATO Defense College and our media partners. The same goes to the staff of the Foundation for their excellent work.

After having served at the Italian Embassy in Washington DC and as Commercial Counselor at the Embassy of Italy in Prague, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo worked as Head of the External Relations Office of the EEC from 1981 to 1986. In the next years, his career focused on Europe and Space Policy. In 1997 he was appointed Diplomatic Counselor of the Minister of Defence Beniamino Andreatta, then of his successors Carlo Scognamiglio and Sergio Mattarella. In 2000, Minuto-Rizzo held the position of Italian Ambassador to the Western European Union and to the Political and Security Committee of the EU, of which he was among the founding members. He was Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance between 2001 and 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in the strategic-political industrial area and in the relations with sensitive countries such as those in the Gulf and the Southern Mediterranean. He is the author of the books: *The road to Kabul* (II Mulino-Arel, 2009); A political journey without maps. Diversity and future in the Greater Middle East (Rubbettino, 2013); and NATO and the Middle East: The Making of a Partnership (New Academia Publishing, 2018).



OLIVIER RITTIMANN Commandant, NATO Defense College,

WELCOME REMARKS

It is with great pleasure that I answer to the call of Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo to provide some opening remarks to your very interesting conference: it cannot be more connected to the reality with such a title: "A relevant Alliance in a changing world".

As you might know, the NATO Defense College tries also to keep to the forefront of the challenges facing NATO, and one thing is sure, we do not lack challenges! The war in Ukraine, even if one does not understand the logic that pushed Putin to start it, is the culmination of tensions between Russia and the West which started in 2008 with the invasion of Georgia, that many did not want to consider a turning point at that time, and of course the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

Looking back, the current war justifies all the adaptation measures taken by NATO since then: Readiness Action Plan, Graduated Response Plans, enhanced Forward Presence, Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, Readiness initiative (4x30)¹, NATO Military Strategy, the Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Area, the Warfighting Capstone concept, etc.

These dissociated measures very often empirical at their onset need now to be integrated to an overall plan that covers the whole Area of Responsibility, and this is being done by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). But all this military literature needs also a political chapeau and this is what is expected from the new Strategic Concept.

One cannot yet speculate about the content of this document which will be published shortly, but it will most likely insist on the protection of our common values, the reinforcement of the allied military means, the resilience of our societies, the acknowledgement of the global challenges and the role of NATO as an institutional link between Europe and North America.

 $^{^{1}}$ NATO Readiness Initiative: on the 7^{th} of June 2018, Allies agreed a NATO Readiness Initiative. Allies have committed, by 2020, to having 30 battalions; 30 air squadrons and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.

NATO's Secretary General underlines that the Alliance has never been as united as nowadays since the beginning of this war. This is undeniable, but this sacred union feeling should not let us forget NATO's capabilities gap, in particular as far as European Allies are concerned, and the Alliance must therefore reinforce its determination to reach the famous 2%-20% target, by acquiring modern capabilities able to confront war in the future. What is meant here is cyber, space, artificial intelligence, anti-hypersonic missile defence, autonomous drones, etc. It is not about repairing old legacy equipment... Let us not be abused: even if the Russian display is far from convincing and even if it sheds light on significant gaps in matters of command and control, logistics, precision strikes, Russians will learn from their failures, and it would be a big mistake for the Europeans to jump to the conclusion that the Russian threat is finally not so overwhelming as was expected, and thus reduce their level of commitment.

The Alliance must therefore prepare for a war that will be much better conducted in the future, and deter Russia from waging it. And this deterrence can no longer exclusively rest on American capabilities, because with the rise of China, the United States will inexorably turn their attention to the Indo-Pacific region, and even their resources are not unlimited. If the Europeans – whether in NATO or in the EU – are not able to deter and possibly defend their territory against a Russian threat, they will be defeated even before the fight.

The question of European strategic autonomy, I would rather say strategic responsibility, is therefore all the more actual. The Russian aggression will focus NATO's attention on the Eastern flank, putting Collective Defence to the forefront: the College is just back from a Field Study in Sweden and the three Baltic States: there was absolutely no doubt in their minds. This will come to the detriment of the two other core tasks, cooperative security and crisis management. They will certainly remain in the new Strategic Concept, but might encounter difficulties in raising the interest of the Eastern Allies.

It is clear that a crisis response operation of the magnitude of Afghanistan is not very likely in the foreseeable future. But even the Southern Flank Partnerships, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Mediterranean Dialogue might suffer from the Eastern Flank exclusivity. And this will probably also be the case for the European Union missions, because it could be difficult to enrol Poles, Baltics or Romanians, understandably so. Yet the refocusing of NATO on its core mission of Collective Defence offers an opportunity for European defence. As a matter of fact, if the defence of Europe cannot be conceived outside of NATO, at least for the time being, the European defence must take care of its Southern Flank, a zone of political and social instability, of mass emigration and illegal traffics, but also an area of natural resources and energy where Russians and Chinese roam freely without being contested.

A European Union action in this Southern Flank would constitute a concrete translation of the cooperation with NATO, by sharing the burden between the two organisations. To conclude, NATO must be able to count on the increased military capabilities of its European Allies to alleviate the burden on the US shoulders, but at the same time, these European Allies should not neglect the Southern Flank and could via the EU participate to the stabilisation of the area and contest the penetration of our systemic rivals, because the Americans will not get involved there.

Since July 2020, **Lieutenant-General Olivier Rittimann** is the Commandant of the NATO Defense College in Rome. After graduating from the Military Academy of Saint Cyr and the Army Engineer School, he chose to serve with the Foreign Legion and he took part to operations in Chad, Mayotte, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. After an operational tour at the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) in 1997, he was assigned to the Allied Forces North Headquarters in Brunssum in 1998. Then, he was posted to the Joint Staff in Paris, as Chief of the NATO branch. Promoted Brigadier General in 2010, he was deployed in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) from January 2011 to January 2012 as Chief of Operations and assigned as French Deputy Military Representative (MILREP) to NATO Headquarters. After that, Rittimann became the French National Military Representative to NATO's Allied Command Operations in Mons (Belgium).



PIERO FASSINO President, Foreign Affairs Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Rome

OPENING REMARKS

We are meeting while Europe is confronting the war in Ukraine and on the eve of the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid on the 29th and the 30th of June during which the Atlantic Alliance is set to adopt its new Strategic Concept.

For over 70 years NATO has been the political and military institution that has granted the security of Europe and the West. The duration of this relationship shows that this Alliance is not the fruit of short-term interests and contingencies but instead, reflects the shared liberal and democratic values that free societies rest upon. Thanks to security granted by NATO western societies have been able to build their prosperity upon these very values.

Today, faced with a world that jeopardises European security and stability, we can fully appreciate just how essential an institution as NATO is and has been, and the recent accession requests of Sweden and Finland confirm this.

The economic crisis between 2008 and 2015, three years of Covid, and now the war in Ukraine have given us a world that is far less secure. The pandemic followed by the military assault, the subsequent energy crisis and the food emergency comprise a unique series of events that must be tackled with resilience and foresight.

The war itself showed that depictions of NATO as an obsolete institution from a bygone era were rash and unfounded. Quite the contrary: not only the European continent, but the world as a whole needs NATO, its values and its example. Without a determined and cohesive NATO supporting Ukraine, Kiev would not have made it. And NATO is an irreplaceable pillar of the transatlantic relationship between United States and European Union, which President Biden has significantly boosted.

This is why we must see a different level of awareness and commitment on the part of the European alliance. Particularly after having long left security issues in the hands of sovereign member states, the European Union is now committed to the goal of adopting its own defence and security system, not as an alternative to NATO but as a complementary component in which Europe takes increasing

responsibilities and boosts its operational capabilities in order to be more efficient. Such a security system requires a European Union where foreign policy is more assertive and effective.

This is why we, Europeans and Americans, need to step up. Europeans must be fully aware that security is a priority and take on all the necessary responsibilities including devolving 2% of GDP to defence. This is one of the major challenges we will face in the coming decades: European defence within the Atlantic Alliance not as a form of competition but as cooperation.

Looking at nearby scenarios, there are three geopolitical areas where our security and stability strategies should focus.

The first is South East Europe. It is often said that the conflict in Ukraine is a war in the heart of Europe. The war began in an area outside the border of the European Union as did the wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The conclusion to be drawn is that integrating these regions into the European Union is an undeferrable strategic goal to guarantee the security of the entire continent: this should be true for Ukraine and Moldova, but it must also holds true for the Western Balkans, which were promised integration into the Atlantic institution almost 30 years ago and they are still waiting. As NATO opened its doors to Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia, the European Union has followed up the enlargement at a snail's pace and this is no longer tolerable.

This misalignment has exposed the Balkans to economic stagnation, immigration, a rise in nationalism and new tensions among countries that were at war just 20 years ago. At the same time, new actors such as China and Russia have become more assertive there. Thus, it is time for the European Union to pick up the pace and bring to completion an enlargement process that has dragged on for too long.

The second area is the Mediterranean, where crisis spots are arising warningly fast: tensions between Greece and Turkey, a deteriorating situation in Lebanon, the present civil war in Syria, the general failure of the Arab Spring, the crisis in Libya, the instability in Tunisia, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria over Western-Sahara, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has dragged on for over 70 years without a viable solution.

In recent years, the Mediterranean has suffered from international indifference and a lack of attention, and yet it should be clear that everything that happens in the Mediterranean has a strong direct impact on the stability of Europe, on the entire and vast region between Gibraltar and the Strait of Hormuz, and on the international order. It is time to put the Mediterranean once again as a priority item on the agenda of the EU, the US and NATO, combining deterrence and dialogue to restore security and stability in the basin.

Then we have the Horn of Africa and the Sahel: here the risk of mass migration and consequent instability in the Mediterranean and Europe is fuelled by civil wars, constant *coups d'état*, the presence of foreign armed groups and jihadist terrorists - all combined with the climate crisis. Besides, we must not forget that, as the Balkans and the Mediterranean, this region features a Russian presence that is all the more worrying in light of the war in Ukraine.

By indicating these three geographic areas, it is also clear to me that there are other scenarios equally strategic for international security and stability.

Chinese expansionism into the Indo-Pacific region is a menace to stability, and not just in Asia. Of great significance is the alliance between NATO and AUKUS, a great alliance of the oceans at the service of open societies, democracies and the rule of law. Equally strategic is the future of the Arctic ice pack, which due to the consequences of climate change is becoming an increasingly crucial hub for East and West relations.

Finally, we must remember that armed conflicts are not the only risk to security and stability: climate change is altering crucial conditions for human life; poverty still affects great multitudes and triggers migratory flows that are changing the world demographic profile; digital technologies and artificial intelligence can be harnessed not only for the common good, and cyber security is an increasingly high priority of security strategies; forms of hybrid warfare are arising; and space is turning from a place of cooperation into an arena for competition.

In other words, there are multiple security dimensions facing the world, and this is true for NATO as well. In order to truly be a relevant Alliance in a changing world, in addition to its military capabilities it will have to develop an equally strong, effective and pervasive political capacity.

This is why the issues that will be discussed and approved at the Madrid Summit, which will centre the new Strategic Concept around the ability to combine military deterrence with political initiative, are extremely important. One supports the other: without deterrence, political initiative is weak and powerless; without political initiative, deterrence may risk becoming merely an armed farce. To stem the increase in insecurity and instability we need both deterrence and dialogue, political capacity and military capabilities, technical skills and creativity.

In conclusion, to paraphrase President Kennedy, we must not hope for ourselves and for NATO to have tasks equal to our powers, but rather to have powers equal to our tasks. The world is asking us for stability and security, peace and development. We must be ready. And so let us roll up our sleeves, let us begin now, let us begin here.

Honourable Piero Fassino is the President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Elected for the first time in 1994, he was re-elected in all the following legislatures until 2011- when he became mayor of Turin (2011-2016)- and then elected again to Parliament in 2018. He is currently also a Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; Vice President of the Political Commission; and President of the Italy-France friendship section of the Inter Parliamentary Union. Honourable Fassino served as Undersecretary of State for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Prodi government (1996-1998) and, in the same period, as Undersecretary for European Union Policies to the Prime Minister. He then was Minister of Foreign Trade for the D'Alema government (1998-2000), and Minister of Justice for the Amato government (2000-2001). From 1991 to 1996, he held the post of International Secretary of the Democratic Party of the Left. From 2016 to March 2020, he was President of the Socialist Group and spokesman for the Mediterranean at the Congress of Local Authorities of the Council of Europe.



ALESSANDRO POLITI Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

POLITICAL SUMMARY

The conference discussed three relevant themes: the evolution of the Alliance, the Indo-Pacific issue and food security. On the one hand, regarding NATO, its need is evident to anybody after the invasion of Ukraine.

On the other hand, it is clear that the EU intends with its Strategic Compass to be complementary to the Alliance and that European countries need to focus on three areas.

The first is South East Europe which is an unfinished Euro-Atlantic integration job since 23 years). The second is the Mediterranean with its numerous tensions and wars and the third is the Sahel/Horn of Africa zone, featuring a relevant Russian presence (as in the Balkans and the Mediterranean) and numerous civil wars, organised criminal groups, terrorists and instabilities.

Therefore, security needs to remain indivisible and at 360°, while nuclear deterrence needs to remain credible.

Concerning the Gulf, the real centre of gravity of the Middle East, NATO can usefully contribute to stabilisation dynamics by preserving the good results achieved at international level in maritime security around the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and strengthening the NATO-EU cooperation in Iraq, also through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre, Kuwait.

The Indo-Pacific and the Arctic, in different measure, require the attention of the Allies too, together with a host of global problems influencing peace and stability like: climate change, poverty, cybertechnologies and space.

At the same time European countries need to recover their capability to contribute effectively in protecting the lines of the communications in the Atlantic, to be really interoperable and compatible in equipping their armed forces in order to spend money wisely and be effective in terms of the primary core task of deterrence and collective defence.

Another important subject for both the Alliance and the European Union is the introduction of more flexible and rapid decision mechanisms especially in crisis times.

The five-month long blockade and negotiation to allow ships with vital crops to sail out of Odessa, has starkly shown that food security is not fragile countries specialist topic, but is a risk factor directly impinging on the strategic calculus of European and Mediterranean countries. This is particularly true for the stability of the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab Revolts of 2011 and for the long-distance consequences stemming from insecurities across the Sahel.

Just as an example, the Mediterranean area is the most affected by the consequences of the Ukrainian conflict. Russia and Ukraine, as far as cereals and seed oils are concerned, count for 80% of the total production of seed oils, 32% of wheat production, 33% of barley and 17% of corn.

In the MENA region there are 403 million people, with 41% of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture contributes to 14% of the region's GDP (excluding GCC countries), represents a 25% import of world wheat production and provides employment to 38% of the economically active population.

GCC countries import 85% of their food but, for a combination of factors, are among the most food secure according to global indexes; actually, they started some local production too and made food supply investments in India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Philippines.

Sudan is a different case because it has 45% of the total cultivatable land in the Arab world and a 110 million strong livestock, promising to be a food basket, thanks also to important investments by Qatar, UAE and other Gulf countries.

These potential progresses do not happen in a security vacuum. High food insecurity is related to the Arab Springs as well as to a rise in conflicts both in Lake Chad and in the Sahel regions, but there is a strong causal link between food insecurity and conflicts themselves.

Evidence is telling us that the likelihood of conflict increases everywhere from 3% to 20% as a consequence of food insecurity: from interpersonal conflict to intertribal conflict, and for example, in the Sahel area, where there are mixed groups, the likelihood of conflicts goes up to 54%. This means also that successful development aid reduces by seven the humanitarian assistance costs and, indirectly the costs of military humanitarian interventions.

Further developing the economic perspective, the Covid-19 and the Ukrainian conflict have led to the end of three supply-chain mantras: budget efficiency generated by zero-stock; taking for granted the supply of microchips and semiconductors and intrinsic resilience of the general IT-based system integration vis-à-vis the specific informatic weaknesses of logistic operators. Redundance both at governmental and

private level seems to be an appropriate response, as shown by the parallel problems of gas stocks and ammunition reserves.

At the same time food security is strictly connected with food safety and protection against the threats to human health: hence the possibility to see, as already in the past, the use of food as a potential weapon for political coercion.

Alessandro Politi is Director of the NATO Defense College Foundation. A specialist in political and strategic affairs, he has worked with different top decision makers in Italy and abroad both in public institutions and private companies. He teaches geopolitics, geo-economics and intelligence at the Italian MFA-affiliated SIOI School.

BACKGROUND POLICY PAPER

NATO is the most successful political-military alliance in history, and yet it is time to focus once again on the purpose of the transatlantic relationship. The Alliance was born as part of a rather coherent environment of international norms influenced by democracy, free market and international cooperation, based on a relatively rule-based order. Today, rules are often considered less cogent by a number of democracies and authoritarian states, in some cases they are brutally broken despite ratified treaties. Therefore, trust and political consensus among Allies is a crucial necessity.

A critical element of consensus is evidently the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, one of its most important documents, that will be presented at this year's NATO Summit in Madrid (29th and 30th of June). The need to rebuild a consensus was clearly identified in the reflection exercise *NATO 2030*, started in December 2019 and concluded on the 25th of November 2020. The process continued with a food for thought paper of the Secretary General, published on the 11th of February 2021.

The recent tragic events have proven that the Alliance has to reassess in-depth its *raison d'être* in terms of transatlantic relationship and the strategic consequences of specific political choices because it must remain the most important security provider in this fragmented and potentially dangerous environment.

The war has obviously put collective defence in the fore because Putin has clearly broken an already shaky European security architecture, yet crisis management and cooperative security are not abstract alternatives, they are just complementary instruments of a security triad.

Facing such an adversary will need to overcome stale debates and to concentrate instead on concrete capabilities that have to be generated in equal proportions by North American and European Allies alike in the European theatre. Keeping a technological edge in critical sectors like emerging and disruptive technologies, in order to face also cyber and hybrid threats, is of paramount importance, while preserving a robust and adequate industrial and technology base on both sides of the Atlantic.

An important point will be to acknowledge that NATO's security is effectively at 360° , firstly because all-round solidarity produces an indivisible security. This is what made and will make credible Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: indeed, its first invocation in 9/11, against any possible forecast, clearly demonstrated what indivisible security means.

Secondly, because evident infiltrations and encroachments in the Gulf, the Levant, North Africa and the Sahel create security threats or risks that span from the Southern Region, to the Balkans, to Eastern and Northern Europe. Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Partners are clearly affected by these developments, touching also food, energy and maritime security in a serious way.


While Article 5 remains the guarantee for Allies, partnerships need much more investment and focussed political engagement in order to strengthen simultaneously political connections, local capacities and political resilience by carrying out cooperative security according to local priorities and not to some externally imposed paradigm. These Partners too deserve the same amount and quality of discreet help that the Ukrainians got in the past and that helped them remarkably in the present, because we cannot afford to have other Partners risking to be jeopardised.

NATO remains by treaty and concrete experience a defensive regional organisation, but this does not preclude a wise global awareness on security links, ramifications and interdependences. China is considered a relevant global power to engage and the past experience of the Harmel method (dialogue and deterrence) will be particularly useful.

The transatlantic bond has proven on several occasions through seven decades to be a formidable added value to project security and stability and this historic Summit will confirm its important function in different and difficult times, while dispelling fears of obsolescence.

How to preserve the indivisibility of security?

What are NATO's future perspectives?





ERIC TERZUOLO

Professorial Lecturer, School of international Service,

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TOWARDS A NEW DIVISION OF LABOUR AND RESPONSIBILITIES

I am sceptical about our ability to define *a priori* the right rules and architectures for an international division of labour. Considering the NATO-EU case for example, we have been working on these issues for about 30 years and have made some significant valuable steps. However, it is time-consuming, labour-intensive and perhaps also one might even debate the cost vs. benefits, although I think this has been a worthwhile activity on the whole.

Innovation is important. But there is a strong case to be made for focusing on established core functions of organizations and entities and on how to bring them up to date. We are seeing this in the current crisis. It is interesting to see how multiple international bodies seem to be falling into "a natural division of labour", as I would call it, with each one playing to their respective strengths. And in a crisis, you have to lead with your strengths.

We need to think about the future. For example, there is a very interesting EU document, the Strategic Compass¹ (released in March 2022) that has a lot of virtues: it does a great job of cataloguing a vast series of security threats and challenges that "we", in a broad Western sense, will be facing in the coming period. I hope that the High Representative's argument, that the Strategic Compass represents a kind of sea change in an EU approach toward a much more active policy on defence and security, plays out.

The question we will need to answer over time — or see answered over time — is to what extent the Strategic Compass can really offer us guidance and a clear sense of priorities going forward. It is interesting that the Strategic Compass stresses complementarity between the EU and NATO. We have to recognize the continued,

¹ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/.

irreplaceable and central nature of NATO when it comes to dealing with the security challenges that we face in the Euro-Atlantic area and on the European continent.

My soundings in Washington suggest, at least from an official view, that NATO is adapting well to this changing situation, maintaining its focus on core functions — collective defence first and foremost — but also on what needs to be done to fulfil those functions. I will cite the great American humourist Mark Twain to say that reports of NATO's brain death were greatly exaggerated. In fact, it has shown considerable adaptability.

Now we are in a crucial phase for NATO: there was a very interesting and important NATO Summit in Brussels last year, notably taking cognizance of the China challenge in an incisive way as never happened before within NATO; there are high expectations for the upcoming Madrid Summit (Ed. 28-30 June 2022), particularly for the new Strategic Concept². My Washington soundings suggest a high degree of optimism about getting a good result on the Strategic Concept.

Only six months ago, the expectation for the new Concept might have been summed up in the three "Cs": China, cyber and climate. Obviously, things have changed since then. There are people on the US side who advocate for a new Strategic Concept based on three "Rs": Russia, Russia and Russia. This is not going to happen though, nor do I think it should. I anticipate it is going to be about Russia and China among other things, and that there will be space, in a distinct rubric, for the Russia-China relationship as well.

As I said, there is a good degree of optimism in Washington on a positive result for the Strategic Concept and on the tricky issue of Finnish and Swedish NATO membership. There is also confidence that Erdogan's concerns can be addressed. In fact, when the Finns and Swedes come in, it will also be interesting to see how this affects the balance between NATO and the EU when it comes to defence and security issues.

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² https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.



BENOÎT D'ABOVILLE

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THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE BETWEEN EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

The future of NATO is at stake just now because we cannot afford to fail on Ukraine as we have failed in Afghanistan. So far, the Ukrainian crisis has brought an unprecedented cooperation between EU and NATO on sanctions but also in sending arms. For the first time, the EU has mutualized the funding for sending arms from European countries. Moreover, there is not much difference between the Strategic Concept and the EU Compass. The only real nuance is about the assessment of the challenges represented by a rising China. The outlook for an increased cooperation between NATO and EU is therefore favourable.

There is a certain ambiguity about the ultimate Western goals in Ukraine. We are all united in helping Ukraine to resist to the Russian aggression and in saying that it is up to the Ukrainian people to decide what kind of peace they should aimed at.

There is however a difference of vision about what the kind of outcome we could seek, including by sending armaments. Some, especially in Washington and in London, are waiting for Russia to be soundly defeated. In aiming to such a result, they hope to prevent that a defeated Russia can rise again in the future. It is however important that we do not consider the Ukrainian crisis as a kind of proxy war for reaching our own aims. The people who are dying now are the Ukrainians. So other capitals are more realistic and consider that it is for the Ukrainians to decide on three things: their territorial integrity, the security guarantees they can get from the international community and also the kind of rebuilding they will want to get from the international community — because now they are being destroyed and probably the EU will have to give them a lot of funding.

What are the consequences on the international situation? The UN can recover from brain death like NATO did but, for the time being, it is absolutely unable to play a decisive role, including on the food crisis, where bilateral talks with the help of Turkey are key. Moreover, we will probably not get, at least for the year to come, Russian cooperation on non-proliferation on Iran and North Korea. We also have quite a problem on the way the sanctions policy we are applying in the context of the Ukraine crisis has been received by part of the world: 35 countries, half of them among the most populous, including China and India, are not following us on Ukraine. They are indeed not making a new block of non-aligned countries, for each of them have different reasons not to support us. While they do not condone the Russian aggression, they consider that the West is using a double language and consider that we have been rather imprudent in the past to use armed forces against other countries, as in Iraq.

There is a further aspect of the Ukrainian war which relate to nuclear deterrence. In this crisis it still plays a key role in managing adversary relationships. US President Biden has been very careful from the start not to involve NATO and the US. And Moscow, despite the threat, it is not — for the time being — attacking NATO. Therefore, nuclear deterrence remains an important factor and the NATO Strategic Concept will reaffirm it.

The last point I want to stress again is that we will have to help to rebuild Ukraine. It will be quite costly and, in that context, it is very important that the EU had just said to the Ukrainians that we are ready to agree to their EU candidacy. It will take some time to negotiate it but nevertheless they are now more closely associated with Europe than they were already in 2018.

We know also that Ukraine's EU candidacy will have an unavoidable an effect on other candidates, including in the Balkans, and in Georgia and Moldova. A new political framework for the 29 states of the European Union will have to be built and it will be a difficult task as it will change the balance of power within EU and the way EU is functioning.

At the same time, NATO will also modify its internal balance. Poland, the Baltic countries and Romania are now three "front" states. In February, France, for example, sent approximately 1.000 troops in Romania¹ and they will be based there for at least five years. However, it remains important for the future cohesion of NATO that it does not look only to the East but also consider that the threat against Europe security may also come from other directions, including in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel areas.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/first-us-reinforcement-troops-arrive-romania-2022-02-08/.

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RETHINKING A EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The Euro-Atlantic security order is in a state of flux. Open questions concern the character of this order itself; NATO's place within this order; the role of the United States within the Alliance; and NATO's institutional setup. An additional and particularly crucial question concerns the place of Ukraine within this order and how its security will be guaranteed. Many things will depend on how Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine will end. As of now the most realistic scenario seems to be that the war simmers on or that it ends with a cease-fire that leaves territorial and other disputes unresolved and that "Putinism" continues to reign in Moscow. Assuming this, it seems likely that: (a) the security order will be rather antagonistic; (b) NATO will regain its preeminent place among Europe's foreign and security institutions and, (c) among NATO's core tasks, collective defence will be a *primus inter pares*¹. However, NATO will remain committed to its 360 degree approach to security, and the effectiveness of collective defence will depend at least in part on NATO's ability to provide security beyond the core task of deterring and defending against Russian threats.

It also seems likely that the United States will remain committed, at least to some extent, to European security and defence. As conflicts over burden-sharing will probably be less toxic, this will also hold in case Donald Trump, or someone equally committed to a more unilateral foreign policy, is elected in 2024. However, the shift of the American attention and presence to the Pacific area will continue. Thus, as the demand for NATO and for security provided by the alliance is increasing, the American leadership role and the institutional effects associated with this leadership may be decreasing. In other words, NATO will occupy the centre of the

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2022-russias-invasion-ukraine-implications-allied-collective-defence-and-imperatives-new.

European security stage but the Alliance will be hindered by those institutional and political shortcomings that have been discussed widely in recent years and that have culminated in President Macron's diagnosis of the Alliance as brain dead.

Being an intergovernmental organisation, NATO suffers from the typical weaknesses of such organisations: the consensus principle in combination with the growing membership and increasing heterogeneity of interests and outlooks often impede rapid decision-making and effective responses to external challenges. NATO may be institutionally better suited to function effectively than other organisations. However, differences (in particular between Türkiye and other member states) have sometimes made effective decision-making difficult.

In the past, the United States' hegemonic position and leadership role has exerted a disciplining influence and has helped to overcome institutional blockages. During Trump's tenure, the American leadership role waned and disputes among memberstates threatened NATO's effectiveness.

In the future, the shift of America's attention away from Europe will call for other responses. I will briefly discuss some of them. Institutional theory has identified three avenues towards more effectiveness, namely: the introduction of majoritarian decision making, delegation of authority to supranational bureaucracies and a change of the membership and of core tasks. In NATO, the first avenue remains blocked. For good reasons, intergovernmental principles will define decision-making within NATO. For example, the report of the Reflection Group appointed by the NATO Secretary General, also known under the official title "NATO 2030: united for a new era", proposes only slight institutional changes that aim at a more effective implementation of consensual decisions.

The second avenue has limits as well. In NATO, the Secretary General is still more a secretary than a general: he possesses agenda setting powers but he cannot coerce and not even nudge member states to do something that they do not want to do. The Reflection Group's report proposes a few ideas to enhance the delegated authority of the Secretary General. However, the report restricts even these limited recommendations to the area of the Secretary General's managerial tasks.

The third avenue may be more promising. As mentioned, the 2022 Strategic Concept offers new emphasis on the core task of collective defence. Effectiveness in this area will be guaranteed by NATO's military planning and e.g. its New Force Model. However, with regard to other core tasks, especially crisis management, the same effect is rather unlikely. The question then is whether a change of membership – especially the introduction of formalised or informal subgroups – may add to

 $^{^2} https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.$

NATO's effectiveness. One example of such a flexible ad hoc arrangement was the use of NATO's command structure by a coalition of member states that intervened in the war in Libya in 2011.

Moreover, NATO's Framework Nations Concept³ is another example of a more formalised subgroup concept. The Reflection Group's report also mentions the establishment of coalitions inside of NATO, inside of the existing Alliance structures, to achieve more effectiveness. It also outlines some conditions for the working of such subgroups to alleviate the risks that go hand in hand with the establishment of these institutionalised subgroups.

To summarize, member states expect NATO to play a pivotal role. In light of a reduced American leadership role and in order to be able to live up to these expectations, NATO might want to explore the opportunities of more flexibility.

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 $^{^3\,}$ https://www.nsfacoe.org/the-framework-nations-concept-italian-led-group-fnc-ita-visits-the-nato-sfa-coe/.



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NATO AND ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

I would like to say something about the military side of this issue. Politically, we have a large consensus on the things we have to do but not on how to do them. The point is that if we have a political consensus, we also need to have the resources to make it work and ask ourselves whether the instruments we have are properly structured.

I recall that in 2010-2011 there was a drawdown on the command structure of NATO. It was a very delicate moment. At the time I was Chief of Defence and I was not pleased with the decisions that were taken: we had to spare money and manpower. And we drew down our command structure from 18.000 to roughly 9.000 units. Then the world was in a good health and there was no need to have big muscles. This was the decision taken, although, on the military side many were not happy.

A few years later, things started to change — for example the attitude of Russia was one key element but certainly not the only one — and it was decided to revise NATO's command structure. I was part of the senior expert group. We were due to advise the two supreme commanders who were supposed to come up with a solution. It was a very interesting moment which required a lot of efforts. Indeed, when the two strategic commanders were given the responsibility to put forward the proposals, they started to work separately. Consequently, the problem was that each commander was offering the Council his own solution which was incompatible with the one presented by the other commander.

However, we eventually succeeded in putting them together and, in order to strengthen the command structure, it was decided to rearrange it. I am convinced this was the proper thing to do because, at that time, we were trying to fulfil the concept laid down during the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit¹: the "360-degree approach".

¹ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_132023.htm.

This concept had been lost as well as the awareness that we needed to be able to hold the military power in the North and in the Atlantic area to protect the lines of a communication from the American to the European continent and to the South too. We realized that we had some problems in the South as we had already experienced during the famous Arab Springs and in the East as well. The "360-degree approach" required a different structure of command but there were some people who were not complacent with this. In order to fulfil this plan, we had to find the right people to send to the right places and it was not the easiest thing to do.

However, this was only a fraction of a wider military problem. Indeed, the hardest part of the issue we were confronted with was the capability to operate together. We encountered some difficulties because, since the time of the Cold War, we lost the concept of interoperability and compatibility of forces. Although we were fighting together in Afghanistan and in other places, each country was extremely jealous about developing its own military equipment. Today, people keep talking about the need for defence spending to reach the 2% of GDP for each country. But this can be senseless if we do not spend this money wisely.

Since we have many different pieces of equipment used to do "the same job" in Europe, each piece costs at least three times what it should cost. This problem could be solved if we were able to produce together these appliances. It is a question of money and of operational capability. And it is not something which can be solved only at the expenses of the job market of a single country. In fact, we can reasonably make agreements for producing together the same piece of equipment.

The weapons we are providing to Ukraine are coming from different countries. Thus, they are of different types and require the appropriate training. How much time do the Ukrainians need to learn how to use these different kinds of heavy artillery? This is one of the main issues we have to face but, as long as we are aware of it, we can find a solution. And it is certainly something we have to do.

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How to tackle instability in North Africa and the Deep Maghreb?

How is evolving cooperative security through global partnerships?





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HARMEL II IN THE PACIFIC: DETERRENCE AND DIALOGUE. HOW SHOULD NATO CONTRIBUTE?

How to deal with an ascendent China is a major issue complicating transatlantic relations today, right at the top of the NATO agenda. As a historic Asian power with key interests in the Pacific region, the US views China's preponderant economic strength, trade practices, growing presence in international organizations and assertive military activity in the East and South China Seas as dangerous developments¹.

Many "China-Firsters" in the administration also urge that NATO become more directly involved; they would like to see NATO more definitively engaged in the Pacific and more explicitly committed to provide forces in the event of conflict there. This view stands in contrast to that of many European leaders. For example, while sensible to the threat of a rising and authoritarian China, the EU is China's largest trading partner and does not share the same security interests in Asia-Pacific as the US.²

In Europe, China is not seen to present the same security threats and challenges. An important factor is that the Washington Treaty in fact has a specific geographic focus and most European publics are not likely to support committing large military forces should conflict erupt in Asia with China.³

¹ "Throughout President Joe Biden's first 100 days in office, his administration has largely continued the Trump administration's hawkish approach toward China". Cheng Li, "Biden's China Strategy: Coalition-Driven Competition or Cold War Confrontation?" *Brookings*, May 2021.

 $^{^2}$ EU-China trade goods in 2020 totaled \$586B, compared to \$555B with the US. If trade in services is included the US remains the largest EU partner. Source: The European Commission.

³ "The American vision of NATO acting globally is not widely shared by the European allies. For most of the Europeans, NATO's fundamental purpose is to provide security in and for Eu-

These somewhat different perspectives and national interests combine to introduce tension in transatlantic relations, as with the recent spat over the introduction of Chinese 5G technology in Europe, as well as China's commercial presence in the ports of Piraeus (acquisition), Genoa (limited partnership), Hamburg (35% stake), Bilbao (minority stake) and Trieste (limited partnership).⁴

Accordingly, pressing NATO Allies to commit to military action far from the North Atlantic area may well introduce more dissension to a set of relationships that is already stressed by many other factors. These include of course a very dangerous and high-intensity war on NATO borders in Ukraine, but also immigration from the Middle East and Africa, terrorism, difficult allies like Orban in Hungary and Erdogan in Turkey, defence spending and readiness disagreements and others.

First, we can observe that there is an ideological component to this issue — perhaps not as explicitly as during the ColdWar, but real nonetheless. China is an authoritarian state and wishes to legitimize its system of government. Other authoritarian rulers around the world seek to bandwagon with China to cement their own rule. In this sense, China represents a direct and serious challenge to Western democracies and values. A "business as usual" approach in my view is ill-advised. An example in recent years has been an apparent tendency to temper criticism of China in European political discourse for fear of a strong Chinese reaction. Chinese officials have been quick to attack any such criticism, however justified. In recent years NATO has taken note of these tensions and become more pointed in addressing China.

The June 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels was particularly noteworthy, describing China as "a destabilizing force and systemic challenge, whose actions threaten the rules-based international order".

With all of this in mind, what then should NATO's posture be with respect to China? I suggest that a good starting point is at home, in Europe, where Chinese commercial and intelligence activities provide opportunities for China to penetrate European politics to create dependencies and liabilities to be used to further Chinese global interests and priorities.

In this regard, limits on European-PRC dual-use technologies and commercial activities are well within NATO's remit and should be pursued in concert with the EU. On the security front, European leaders will probably to resist calls for explicit

rope." Ivo Daalder, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force", *Brookings*, March 1, 1999. The North Atlantic Treaty limits the commitment to act in the event of armed attack on a treaty member to "the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer".

⁴ Carisa Nietsche and Martijn Rasser, "Washington's Anti-Huawei Tactics Need a Reboot in Europe: Efforts to Convince Allies of the Chinese Threat in 5G have Floundered." *Foreign Policy*, April 30, 2020.

military commitments in Asia, for a number of reasons: European force projection capabilities are limited; Russian aggression in the European security space is a direct and immediate threat; European military force structure and resources are limited; European publics are unlikely to support large scale military ventures in Asia; US Allies and potential partners in the region (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Australia) possess powerful militaries that together, with US assistance, can contain or defeat Chinese aggression.

In a recent statement, Secretary General Stoltenberg hearkened back to the 1967 Harmel Report as a guide, observing "it has stood the test of time" because it is historically important and currently relevant. "The conclusions of the 1967 Report are summarized as the "dual-track" approach in which NATO maintained a strong defence and deterrence posture, but also engaged in meaningful dialogue to ease tensions. Secretary General Stoltenberg also noted "adaptation" as a wider theme of the Harmel Report, underscoring that this was another example of the report's continued relevance. "The report makes clear that a dynamic and vigorous Alliance must constantly adapt to changing conditions. And NATO's adaptability remains one of our greatest strengths. We continue to adapt to the most serious security challenges in a generation".

This remains a sound approach. Though not always realized in the USA, a sound and effective European-based deterrent against Russia in Europe frees US resources to confront an aggressive China, if needed. Ongoing partnerships with countries like South Korea, Japan and Australia confer benefits on all parties and encourage a global geostrategic view and posture and this is important in an era where Chinese cooperation with powers like Russia and North Korea is very probable.

This approach of course does not preclude bilateral actions on the part of individual members, who for national reasons might choose to provide contingents in an Asia-Pacific scenario. But across the Alliance, focusing on the geographic area described in the Washington Treaty is both sound strategy and sound policy.

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Rajendra Abhyankar

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UNTANGLING THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

With the rise of China, the United States will inexorably have to turn to the Indo-Pacific region. As it happens, the Indo-Pacific is therefore becoming the world centre of gravity. It has half the world's population, two-thirds of the world's economy, seven of the world's largest militaries and the largest US military presence compared to any other region. Moreover, it supports 3 million US jobs and it is a source of 900 billion foreign direct investments into the US. The US—Indo-Pacific trade was 1.75 trillion dollars in 2020 and the US is the biggest investor in this area. And finally, 68% of international students who study in the United States are from the Indo-Pacific. Thus, it is clearly a region that needs considerable attention.

The US interest can be secured or advanced only if it firmly anchors itself in this region and if the relations with its closest allies and partners are strengthened. I would like to stress the relevance of these relations for a simple reason: with the engagement of NATO in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is not certain by when NATO will be able to extricate itself from this commitment in order to move or provide any kind of support to the Asia-Pacific area (ed. as of 22nd of June 2022) but when it does it will be a force multiplier. The question is: when it will do it?

The Indo-Pacific region has mounting challenges. The first is related to the fact that China has been using its economic, diplomatic, military and technological prowess to carve out a sphere of influence for itself in the South China Sea. Then there is the question of Taiwan because of its strategic value and its assets — mainly its military equipment and its semiconductor industry. China has used its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)¹ for political bullying and economic aggression. We also see that happening in Europe although China is far away but it has been targeting European countries in this matter. It has tried coercion with Australia and it has an ongoing conflict with India on our borders. Then, there is climate change which continues

to be a threat, the continuously mutating Coronavirus pandemic – which does not seem to end – and North Korea's pursuit of nuclear supremacy.

How will it be possible to make the Indo-Pacific free, open, secure and resilient? The US should strengthen its role while reinforcing the region to ensure that international rules apply there, those same rules that China is trying to sabotage, particularly the law of the sea. There is of course the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)² which also includes the United States and has a specific agenda: from increasing the number of vaccines available to encouraging the development of emerging technologies, from supply chain cooperation to joint technological expansion.

When NATO engages in this region it will be seen as a force multiplier. However, the Alliance has to be aware that it will not be extensively welcomed with positive sentiments. The memories connected to the Southeast Asian Treaty Alliance (SEATO)³ are not very pleasant as it involved the US actions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The US interventions in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq are a negative factor as well. All of them are indeed not seen very sympathetically in the Indo-Pacific region.

Lastly, China is waiting to see NATO's next moves. It is indeed its conviction that an "Asia-Pacific NATO" should be created. Whether this will happen or not, there are several statements by the Chinese foreign minister where he affirms that the choice is between setting up a smaller group like the "Asia-Pacific NATO" or keeping the Indo-Pacific "available". The question remains open.

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² https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know.

³ https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato.



CHRISTIAN KOCH
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Jeddah

A BRAVE NEW ARAB WORLD: NORMALISATION AND NATO'S PARTNERSHIPS

I would like to start with a comment from NDC Commandant Rittimann, who mentioned the danger of concentrating just on the Eastern flank while ignoring other areas. The Middle East continues to be in a very fragile, volatile and multi-dimensional threat environment that at any time can erupt again into another crisis. And therefore, whatever happens in Ukraine will have an impact also on the wider area around the Middle East.

It is also important to understand the changed circumstances in the region. When NATO established some of its outreach to the Middle East – Mediterranean Dialogue, MD¹ and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, ICI² –, there was a sort of a division between the Levant, the Maghreb and the Gulf region. What we have witnessed in the past two decades, specifically since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is much more of a shift towards the Gulf.

The Gulf has become the strategic centre for part of the Middle East and there has been a big transition in the region towards regional actors. Today, Gulf states play a much more important and distinct role in regional affairs than they have ever played before: they can no longer be considered "the oil producers" or "the world's gas station". This has indeed changed completely as the Gulf states have a lot of power and what they have shown — specifically over the last five to ten years — is an increased readiness also to enter into the strategic environment in the overall region.

In the region, the problem is still uncertainty at multiple levels: domestic and international. Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon's instability is a concrete concern,

¹ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52927.htm.

² https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52956.htm.

while the Arab Gulf states have a particular issue with Iran being a sponsor of proxy forces to the region. This undermines the stability of those states but so far there has not been an effective answer against this kind of challenge. It is disruptive that we do not have an organizing principle on how to deal with violent non-state actors. It is a huge issue. Then there are the domestic challenges of governance and leadership, for example on energy transition. The Ukraine war has once again brought energy security to the forefront and has highlighted the importance of the oil producing states. At the same time, they themselves know that, due to climate change, they have to make the transition from hydrocarbons. There has been a lot of emphasis on this, but it is still a challenge.

Another multi-level challenge for the region is represented specifically by Iran and this is where international support is needed given that the challenge itself is international.

Another concern concerns the future role of the US in the region as they have been the main security provider for the Arab Gulf states in the past. In recent times, however, there have been several disappointments for the region: the announced "pivot to Asia"; the withdrawal from Afghanistan which has not inspired confidence; the attacks on the Saudi oil installations in September 2019 where there was no response. It was a clear violation of international law and the region felt exposed. As a result, the Gulf states are looking for alternatives. Can they keep relying on the American security umbrella? What is the alternative to that? Economically, the region has already shifted to Asia: most oil exports are going there. This has certainly been a new development in the strategic relationship with Asia. Moreover, maintaining the cooperation with Russia and the OPEC Plus framework³ is important because it influences the stability of the market.

There is a big question mark now in the region about how one position oneself. Here, NATO can come in and play an important role. But I also think that NATO needs to adjust itself to the circumstances in the region by acknowledging the agency of the Gulf states, intensifying the political dialogue and listening to their point of view. Ultimately, if we want to come up with a solution for the region, it has to come from the region itself as it cannot just be imposed from outside. The region has ideas that need to be listened to and also eventually invested in. This has not happened before. There has not been much listening to the region. Here, I think NATO has the chance to make a difference, for example through the NATO-ICI Regional Centre, established in Kuwait City in 2017, that could be a platform for exchanges on a regular basis.

³ https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/4580.htm.

Reflecting on the medium and long-term implications of a changing world order, how do the Gulf and the Middle East see themselves? I am convinced there needs to be more investment in the bilateral and multilateral levels and that we need to review the institutions of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI and bring them more together under one umbrella. Indeed, as I said, the Gulf states are active in Egypt, Libya and in the Mediterranean area. It is hard to divide the two lines.

I have two other concrete proposals where I think effective cooperation can be pursued: one is on maritime security and the other on stabilization strategies. The strategic region of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, where a majority of the world's commercial traffic is going through, is an area where there needs to be more emphasis and where NATO can certainly play a role.

As it sits at the heart of the Middle East, Iraq could in the meantime make a very interesting case for the stabilization strategies for the region. Whatever happens in Baghdad has in fact implications for the whole region. Iraq is very fragile at the moment: they had elections in October but they still do not have a government. Therefore, it could easily enter another era of violence. NATO has already expanded its force in Iraq. Cooperation with the EU in conjunction also with the Gulf region on political and economic stabilization measures could likewise be one way of considering bringing greater stability to the region.

Dr Christian Koch is the Director of Research for the Gulf Research Center. He also leads the Tafahum Project on a Security Roadmap for West Asia and the Arabian Peninsula sponsored by the German Federal Foreign Office. Dr Koch served as Director of the Gulf Research Center Foundation, Research Program Leader on Gulf-Europe Relations at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai and as Head of Strategic Studies at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research in Abu Dhabi. From 2018 to 2020, he was a Senior Advisor and Director of Research at the Bussola Institute in Brussels. From 2018 to 2021, Dr Koch was also a member of the Bertelsmann Foundation Strategy Group on "The EU and Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia: Strategies for the EU Neighbourhood".



SPECIAL INTERVENTION





BENEDETTO DELLA VEDOVA Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome

SPECIAL INTERVENTION

We are right on the eve of the NATO Summit in Madrid (28-30 June 2022), where Allied Heads of State and Government will have a rich and complex agenda on their table. The gathering comes at a remarkable moment, as we are finalising a new Strategic Concept that reaffirms our core values, restates our core purpose and outlines our core tasks for years to come. Since the end of the Cold War, this document has been updated approximately every 10 years to take into account changes to the global security environment and to ensure the Alliance is prepared for the future. It drives NATO's strategic adaptation and guides its future political and military development.

At the Madrid Summit two significant sets of issues will come together. First, we must endeavour to accomplish the NATO 2030 Agenda, an ambitious plan launched at the Leaders' meeting in London two years ago, to make certain NATO is fit, strong and united for a new era of increased uncertainty. As NATO adapts to growing global competition and more unpredictable threats including terrorism, cyber-attacks, disruptive technologies, climate change and challenges to the rules-based international order, it is more critical than ever that Allies stand shoulder to shoulder in the face of an increasingly complex and unpredictable world. Second, it is clear that the Madrid Summit will take place in a new geopolitical context, as Russia's attack on Ukraine has fundamentally altered the security architecture of our continent.

In the wake of the unprovoked and unlawful attack by Russia on Ukraine, NATO Allies responded immediately to increase our readiness to defend our collective security and the values of democracy and individual freedoms on which the Transatlantic bond is built. Russia's indiscriminate attacks in the months that followed have had catastrophic humanitarian consequences. The people of Ukraine have endured horrific violence, senseless suffering and growing food insecurity. The regional and global implications of Russia's aggression, as we know, cannot

be overstated. However, Russia's blatant violation of the fundamental principles of international peace and security and the breach of international law have not gone unanswered. Allies imposed unprecedented and far-reaching economic and financial sanctions.

Without a doubt, we stand at a critical juncture and we need to take stock of the implications of this brazen attack on a sovereign state and the overall security of our continent. But we must also take a wide-reaching approach, taking into the account the various elements that are relevant for our shared security.

From the very beginning of the crisis, our position on Ukraine has been clear-cut and unambiguous. Italy has provided Kyiv with lethal and non-lethal equipment, including heavy weapons. We have supported hard-hitting sanctions against the Kremlin and contributed to consolidate a wide international coalition that rejects Russian aggression. We have also prioritised food security, which is instrumental to prevent political upheaval, mass migration and radicalisation across our region and beyond. Looking ahead, Prime Minister Draghi has taken a strong leadership in advocating in favour of granting Ukraine the status of EU candidate.

Against this backdrop, we have to outline a few points on Italy's role, position and vision for the future of the Alliance. For Italy, NATO must remain fit for its core tasks, flexible and forward thinking. We must continue to pursue a holistic approach to protect and defend our indivisible security. In other words, we believe NATO is more relevant than ever to our own security.

As with any global conflict, there is a natural propensity for public debate about the usefulness of NATO and its effectiveness in fostering peace and stability. We should not shy away from this. After all, open debate and discussion are critical for successful democracies. For Italy however, NATO has not been historically just one of many options to guarantee the stability of the governing principles of international peace and security. It is the enduring and long-term option to safeguard our interests and defend our values. Italy's participation in NATO has been, and still is, quintessential to what we stand for. Since the signing of the Treaty of Washington in 1949, our membership in the Alliance has been intertwined with our commitment to democracy and to individual freedoms. It has also been a key component, together with our European inspiration, of our foreign policy. Our contributions to NATO have substantially advanced Allied shared security throughout the Cold War and beyond. Simply put, NATO is part of our DNA.

The question we must address is how NATO will continue to stay relevant as a defensive Alliance, fulfilling its mandate to protect one billion citizens. The answer lies in our ability to balance wisely the threats and opportunities that await us. We believe the Alliance must stay open, agile and adaptable, at 360° degrees. And by "open" I also refer to new memberships. Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO

would make the Alliance stronger and the whole Euro-Atlantic area more secure. In this respect, there is no guarantee of a swift timeline and the NATO Summit in Madrid will probably not represent an endpoint. However, we must avoid the situation to freeze.

As previously said, NATO must be fit for today but we need to invest in the instruments and capabilities that will ensure our collective security for tomorrow. This underlines a point that the current dramatic state of the world is making clear and urgent: the old mechanism governing the international order, based on the rule of unanimity for the adoption of major decisions, is not up to the task anymore, as it often translates into a less than constructive veto power. This new and unexpected crisis created by the Russian aggression has only but accelerated the need for organising world governance on different and more efficient grounds.

When it comes to the European Union and its decision mechanisms, the recent Conference on the Future of Europe¹ saw its citizens ask for more European integration in the field of foreign and security policies among others and to move in the direction of a qualified majority vote. This is an urgent wake-up call also for NATO where important decisions risk being taken hostage by dynamics that have nothing to do with collective security but rather with leveraging for other concessions or, even worse, for merely domestic reasons.

We must continue to ask ourselves what we stand for, not what we stand against. NATO is not an Alliance that stands against some pre-defined adversary but, rather, a community that stands for its shared values. Italy's contributions to the Alliance are critical to protecting our freedom and the values we all share: individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. These values are enshrined in the Washington Treaty. They serve as the bedrock of our unity, solidarity and cohesion.

NATO's longevity and enduring ability to adapt to a changing environment can be attributed to the simplicity of the principles outlined in the Washington Treaty. We stand for a rules-based international order and we commit to consultations when the security or stability of a member of the Alliance is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk. The challenges and threats of today and tomorrow are numerous, complex and interconnected. The Alliance cannot aspire to address them all. NATO must however sharpen its tools and upgrade its capabilities to focus on the ones that matter most for our democracies. The Russian attack on Ukraine has led us to come together and apply the defensive principles of the Washington Treaty in the face of new and emerging challenges: hybrid threats and disinformation tactics carried out with increasingly sophisticated methods and technologies.

¹ https://futureu.europa.eu/?locale=en.

In a rapidly changing world, the simple nature and the straight contents of the Washington bond are still key to preserve and enforce our security, to deter our adversaries, to advance the values we stand for, in order to pass them untouched to the next generation.

Benedetto Della Vedova has been a Member of the Radical Party for 30 years. From January 2019 to March 2021, he was Secretary of +Europa, the movement he helped to build together with Emma Bonino. Dr Della Vedova was President of the Italian Radicals (2001-2003) and leader of the Liberal Reformers movement (2005-2009). Previously, he was Member of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2004; Member of the Italian Parliament from 2006 to 2013; Senator from 2013 to 2018, and Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Renzi and Gentiloni governments. From the 1st of March 2021, he is Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in the Draghi government.

Are public-private partnerships able to ensure food security?

Why resilience investments trump humanitarian aid?





NASER M. Y. AL BELOOSHI Ambassador of the Kingdom of Bahrain to Italy, Rome

NOURISHMENT AND REGIONAL STABILITY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE SOUTH

Food security is an extremely important topic that must be tackled with strategy and grace as it is directly related to the entire world's livelihood. There is definitely an intrinsic relation between stability and food security which is the availability of nutritious food for all. Although water scarcity, climate change and lack of clear vision are the most fundamental challenges in the region, I will concentrate on geopolitics and legal factors.

The MENA Region is historically known as the home of exceptional civilizations which were based on trade and agriculture. The Romans considered this region as an important source for wheat production and storage. But today, the region is a net importer of wheat and other food products.

Unfortunately, and since the beginning of the last century, the region has constantly witnessed prolonged political and social unrest:

Between 1516-1918 the Ottoman occupation, from 1920 the British, French and Italian mandates and colonization, which were followed by the struggle for independence;

- Between 1947-1974, the Arab-Israeli wars;
- 1975-1990 the civil war in Lebanon and the birth of Hezbollah in 1980;
- 1980, the Iran-Iraq war after the revolution in Iran in 1978;
- 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
- 2001, 9/11 attack on the USA and the US invasion of Afghanistan;
- 2003, the US war on Iraq;
- 2011, the Arab Spring causing the destabilization of the whole region wars in Syria, and Yemen as well as a civil war in Libya – that continues up to the present day;
- 2013, the rise of Daesh;

- 2015, the spread of Daesh affiliates in at least eight countries of the region today their nest is flourishing in Afghanistan;
- 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic crisis;
- 2022, the Russian-Ukrainian war disrupting food supplies around the globe.

The region rarely witnessed prolonged times of political stability and effective governance that is crucial for steady economic development and the implementation of long-term governmental development plans and strategies towards insuring food security. Today, the MENA region is home to 403 million people, with 41% of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture contributes to 14% of the region's GDP – excluding the Gulf Cooperation Council countries¹ – and provides employment to 38% of the economically active population. As of today, they import 25% of world wheat exports. This has to be changed by creating laws protecting foreign investors opening their markets and putting forth new plans for food security.

As for the GCC countries that are deprived from natural water resources and arable lands, they import 85% of their food: rice (100%); cereals (93%); meat (62%); vegetables (56%). And yet they are considered among the most food secure according to the global food security index — availability, affordability, quality of food supply, safety of food supply. Nevertheless, the Covid-19 crisis has increased this instability and exposed the GCC countries' vulnerability. It has pushed GCC leaders to launch immediate intervention measures to enhance food security in their countries. Indeed, they are applying advanced farming technologies tailoring them for the needs of every specific country. For example, today in Bahrain, through hydroponics², different kinds of vegetables are produced and other products as well. Saudi Arabia also started its own plan becoming one of the main exporters of olive oil. Despite the problems they have, they are doing their best.

The GCC countries could also invest in countries that have arable land and water resources — successful examples of these types of investments are the ones in India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Philippines. Indeed, from there, food is exported to the rest of the Gulf. GCC states could also invest in other countries to produce food for themselves and for the host-countries. But foreign investors should be protected

¹ Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. The GCC was established in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 1981. The purpose of the GCC is to achieve unity among its members based on their common objectives and their similar political and cultural identities, which are rooted in Arab and Islamic cultures.

² Hydroponics: also called aquaculture, nutriculture, soilless culture or tank farming, is the cultivation of plants in nutrient-enriched water, with or without the mechanical support of an inert medium such as sand, gravel or perlite.

by the laws of the host countries and the Middle East countries should draft them. Hereunder let me propose some possible solutions related to the region's problems:

- a. The role of the private sector is indispensable and the governments of fragile countries in the region must implement effective policies and regulatory changes. It is important to create more convenient business and investment environments to facilitate investments from the private/public sectors richer countries.
- b. Stability and responsible governance together with the rule of law and flexible regulations and reforms can facilitate the engagement of the local and foreign investments in the agricultural and food production of these countries.
- c. Many private companies in GCC countries have established foreign investments in many countries around the world but are reluctant to venture in troubled parts of the region due to the ongoing instability and the high risks related to it. Nevertheless, there are promising examples of how political stability and the elimination of sanctions can incentivize investments in the region. For example, Sudan, with the transitional government and the normalization of relations, is viewed as the food basket of Africa and the Middle East. It is a country of 170 million acres of arable fertile lands that enjoys sufficient access to the Blue and White Nile, which is the ideal form of irrigation, in addition to adequate rainfall with warm climates, vast aquifers and transportable proximity to several neighbouring countries. Its rich land accounts for 45% of the total cultivatable land in the Arab world. Coupled with its vast land, Sudan is home to over 110 million heads of livestock (cattle, goats, sheep and camels), which has made it a centre for 10-digit investments by Gulf countries.
- d. The investments in agricultural production have seen Qatar as a protagonist in 2014, revealing its long-term investment plans for Sudan's agriculture sector. UAE has a mega-scale agricultural project for grains and forage in North Sudan, while Bahrain acquired approximately 40.470 hectares³ in 2018.
- Governmental bodies and funds from GCC countries tend to offer funding for technical assistance and project loans such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.
- f. To safeguard small holders, "contract farming" is a business model that engages small-scale producers with high-value agribusiness chains. Evidence shows that under a 'favourable environment', contract farming can sustainably increase investments in agriculture whilst also safeguarding the livelihoods and incomes of smallholders⁴.

³ "Why is Sudan the next food basket?", https://africantradealliance.com.

⁴ https://www.fao.org/in-action/responsible-agricultural-investments/our-work/private-sector/ru/.

- g. The MENA Region should undergo reforms to invite local as well as foreign investors as both cannot invest in an environment where their investments are not protected.
- h. In the meantime, the governments of this region should follow and adopt the policies and guidance of FAO for sustainable development goals that were set by experts and through broad international consultation.
- i. Nevertheless, proper utilization of limited natural resources will not be successful if the private sector is not assured to participate under legal protection.

Through collaborative work and unified vision, we can ensure a safer and more stable world for all of us.

Ambassador Naser M. Y. Al Belooshi is the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the Italian Republic. Ambassador Al Belooshi served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the Advisor to H.E. the Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa for Political and Economic Affairs. From 1992 to 2003 he was also the former Executive Director of Management Services at the Central Bank of Bahrain. From 1995 to 2001, Ambassador Al Belooshi also served as a non-resident Executive Director of the Arab Monetary Fund, Abu Dhabi, and UAE. In August 2005, Ambassador Al Belooshi was appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United States, and a non-resident Ambassador to the Republic of Argentina and to Canada. Moreover, in 2008, he was appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Bahrain to France, and a non-resident Ambassador to the Holy See, Switzerland and Spain.



JYOTSNA PURI Associate Vice-President, Strategy and Knowledge Department, IFAD, Rome

INTERDEPENDENCE AND SUPPLY BOTTLENECKS. WHICH ROLE FOR FINANCIAL INTERNATIONAL ACTORS?

There is a big relationship, that is causal, between conflict and food security. It is becoming more evident over the years and, as a consequence, it has an impact on inflation: in many countries, food inflation is actually far greater than the overall inflation that they are witnessing. In countries that are in conflict, acute malnutrition is 88% higher compared to where there is no conflict. The causality could go both ways but the strength of causality from conflict to food insecurity is actually very high.

What we are seeing is that climate is a threat multiplier in all of this. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) points it out with very high confidence. I am an economist by training and I put a lot of emphasis on what the confidence intervals are on the evidence that is coming out. Food security, water security or forced migration are a consequence of drought. High food insecurity is related to the Arab Springs as well as to a rise in conflicts both in Lake Chad and in the Sahel regions. Evidence is telling us that the likelihood of conflict increases everywhere from 3% to 20% as a consequence of food insecurity: from interpersonal conflict to inter-tribal conflict, and for example, in the Sahel area, where there are mixed groups, the likelihood of conflicts goes up to 54%. These are really important issues when talking about global stability.

In recent researches, looking at past data, there have been simulations on what a one-degree Celsius increase in temperature means and the evidence published both in 2022 and in 2017 say, for example, that in Africa, there has been an almost 11% increase in conflict incidents and a 54% increase in conflict probability in mixed areas.

In the work that we are doing at the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), we found out that when we invest in food security, the likelihood of conflict goes up and when we do not invest in food production – food capacity in markets – that likelihood goes up as well. The big focus for us is resilience: the capacity that ensures that adverse deeds, stresses and shocks do not have long-lasting adverse development consequences. Investments in resilience interventions are far more cost-effective than bearing the cost of subsequent shocks and it is my top and headline message when we are thinking about whether to invest in resilience or in humanitarian assistance. If you put a trillion dollars into development, you actually reduce the amount of humanitarian assistance that you have to put out by 7,1 trillion dollars: that is a 7 to 1 return. We have to think more about the multiplier effects of investment in resilience and in food security.

One concept to stress is the importance of markets: how can we get the private sector to come in? One clear piece of evidence coming out is that whether you are looking at conflict areas, at areas that have been affected by climate change and immediate shocks or areas with chronic shocks, markets work. Not only cash markets, but also barter economies thrive as well. They are really effective in helping to smooth out the impact on human beings as well as on animals, livestock and on other facets of the economy. This is the one thing that Covid-19 has taught us too. We are talking about vaccine sovereignty in the context of Covid-19 and we should also be talking about sovereignty in the context of food insecurity.

Local and regional markets help to reduce the vulnerability that smallholder farmers — which is "where" IFAD works — felt as a consequence of Covid-19 when and if they were not connected to global supply chains. We are working with a whole range of market-based instruments to draw in the private sector like: Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) — where you can actually cost a public good and incentivize private investors to come in and pay for something which is otherwise an externality — which is keeping forests intact and leading to greater economic resilience as well as environmental resilience; investing in Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA); paying farmers for any adaptation benefits (Certified Adaptation Benefits, CAB) so when they invest in agroecological systems, they generate soil health that in turn leads to greater resilience and reduces the indebtedness of societies.

We are experimenting all these things through our IFAD's Resilience Scorecard, certified adaptation benefits with other agencies in the UN system as well as resilience bonds where private investors can come in and get returns based on performance that is linked very intimately to overall resilience. The critical thing is measuring resilience in an objective way. We know that in the public good space that has been done with carbon emissions and we are very close to doing that as well with resilience.

Dr Jyotsna Puri is the Associate Vice-President of the Strategy and Knowledge Department at the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Dr Puri leads the Organisation's strategy work in IFAD's key areas targeting agriculture, climate, gender, nutrition, youth and social inclusion. Also, she is an Adjunct Associate Professor at Columbia University in New York, where she was also a research scientist. Previously, Dr Puri has worked for several organisations like the Green Climate Fund, 3ie, UNEP, the World Bank and UNDP. In 2019, she was selected one of 16 women who have shown leadership in restoring the earth through their efforts by the Global Landscape Forum.



ALFREDO ANTRO

Commander, Investigation Department, Carabinieri for Public Health Protection (NAS), Rome

FOOD FRAUD DYNAMICS DURING SHORTAGES. THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE

Carabinieri for Public Health Protection (NAS) is a specialized department of the "Arma dei Carabinieri" (Carabinieri Corps), a police force with a military status. NAS units are specifically tasked to deal with all the issues and challenges related to the protection of human health at "360 degrees", including not only sanitary and pharmaceutical aspects, but also food and beverages.

Taking into consideration food related issues, it is necessary to pay attention, as we can say, to two different sides of the same coin: indeed, when talking about "food security", we should make a reference to the concept of "food safety" which is another important and sensitive point to be highlighted. We usually think about "security" from a police perspective, considering, for example, the attempts made by criminals to penetrate the legal chain of distribution to make profits. Nevertheless, we have also to consider the "safety" aspect: a concept which is directly linked to quality and health. Taking into consideration this definition, "safety" is likely more related to human health protection, to the threats moved to human health. But we have to consider that these are two aspects of the same problem. From this perspective, we should imagine food as a potential "weapon" to be used against countries and governments to force their political choices.

Therefore, it is necessary to promote a new integrated and international approach to "food security". In Italy, for example, NAS has signed many technical agreements and has established a close and fruitful cooperation with all the most important institutions and relevant actors, like Philip Morris International and Coldiretti.

As Carabinieri for Public Health Protection, we are aware of the necessity to consider the international and transnational dimensions of the phenomenon. That is why we are currently co-leaders and participants in the most significant police operation activities conducted by both Europol and Interpol.

For example: Operation "OPSON1", which is directly related to the counterfeiting of food and beverages, Operation "Silver Axe2" which directly deals with pesticides, with a particular focus on the risks of pesticide counterfeiting. Carabinieri for Public Health Protection is also leader of a specific operational action related to seafood and fish counterfeiting and to the use of counterfeited documents in order to trade low-quality fish, carried out in the framework of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT)3. Moreover, NAS is part of the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF)4 through the Ministry of Health: the functional dependency from the Ministry of Health is another particular aspect of our special role in the police forces system as far as Italy is concerned.

We have gained a lot of experience and learnt many lessons since NAS was founded in 1962 (in fact, in October 2022 we will celebrate our 60th anniversary) and we strongly believe in the opportunity to develop a comprehensive and common approach to raise both public and institutional awareness on the problem of "food security".

As previously said, NAS has established a close cooperation with the relevant national actors and we take part in lots of international boards. Hence, the way forward is to approach the food challenge as a global issue, not only from a police point of view but also from an institutional perspective.

Since September 2019, **Colonel Alfredo Antro** is the Investigation Department Commander of the Carabinieri for Public Health Protection Command (NAS). In the Carabinieri Corps since 1996, Colonel Antro has served as Operative Unit and territorial Company Commander in Sicily and Tuscany and, once become Major, was sent to the Carabinieri General HQ where he was Section Chief at the Public Information Office and the Warrant Officers' Office. Later on, after being promoted Lieutenant Colonel, he was also appointed as Logistic Support Department Commander. From May 2008 to February 2009, when he was Captain, Colonel Antro served in Kosovo as well, taking part in the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) as acting Chief of Staff of the Special Police Department.

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ https://www.europol.europa.eu/operations-services-and-innovation/operations/operation-operation.

 $^{^2\} https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/pesticides-worth-to-\%E2\ \%82\%AC-80-million-in-criminal-profits-seized-during-operation-silver-axe-vi.$

³ https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-statistics/empact.

⁴ https://food.ec.europa.eu/safety/rasff-food-and-feed-safety-alerts_en.



PAOLO DI STEFANO Head of International Affairs, Coldiretti, Brussels

REDEFINING FOOD SECURITY IN EUROPE: ISSUES, WAYS AND MEANS

As one of the largest farmers organizations in Europe, Coldiretti is very active and concerned about food security issues. We are working at national level but also at European and international level as members of the world farmers' organizations to increase the production of food. The kind of food to which we aim needs to be high-quality, affordable and sustainable.

Food security is strictly connected with food safety. We are not as farmers ready to accept compromises on that. In Europe, when the war against Ukraine started and the first consequences were tangible, there were some interest groups trying to undermine and lower the quality standards of the products in order to have more products on the market. In our opinion, this is not the way forward as we need to stick with the food safety standards that we reached both at European and global level to provide healthy food to the consumers.

The situation is quite complicated: while the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic were already pushing up the prices of certain basic goods, the situation is at risk of becoming destabilising, requiring structural interventions by national, European and international policy-makers. The time of urgency and self-sufficiency seems to have returned in a way: this situation that is taking us back to the post-war period when Europe put a lot of energy on food self-sufficiency. It was back in that time when the Common Agricultural Policy was born. In Europe, there is a huge ongoing debate on food security and on its relations with the Green Deal¹. The Green Deal is the biggest flagship programme of the European Commission. It is the way forward to "green" the production chain at all levels and of course agriculture is one of the

¹ https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en.

main sectors involved in this discussion.

We need to remind ourselves of the conflicts around the world, of the climate change challenge and of the drought issue. In Italy in particular, this is a very severe problem. As a consequence, there has been a drop in maze and corn production by about 50%.

What is happening today with the increase in prices of some products and logistical facilities? The prices of chemical fertilizers have more than doubled in relation to last year. The main difference can be seen on ammonium nitrate whose cost went from 360 euros per ton to 860 euros per ton.

Moving the attention to the price of natural gas, in March 2021 its price was 17 euros per MWh, now is 160 euros MWh. The cost of transport via containers has increased very much, mostly from Europe to South America due to energy costs.

The Mediterranean area is the most affected by the consequences of the Ukrainian conflict. Russia and Ukraine, as far as cereals and seed oils are concerned, count for 80% of the total production of seed oils, 32% of wheat production, 33% of barley and 17% of corn.

Given the situation, we would like the governments and the international community to act urgently, engaging with farmers to keep global agricultural trade flows open to prevent that the war can worsen the hunger crisis. Trade flows have been put under pressure also by the protectionist decisions of some countries. Indeed, in Europe, we have experienced some coordination troubles, a situation that forced the European Commission to intervene.

What is the situation in Europe? The European Commission is working hard on the Green Deal. It was the first idea of the new Commission back in 2019 but now the scenario has changed, as we repeatedly indicated to the Commission. All the proposals by the Commission to reduce pesticides and antimicrobial fertilizers are led by correct reasons and objectives, but the consequences can be very dangerous at this time and cause a drop in the production at European level, if these measures will be applied and if the European Commission is not giving farmers any instruments to tackle their challenges.

We refer to what is necessary for farmers in terms of investment, innovation in order for them to use precision agriculture and digital tools, making these technologies affordable, ready to be used by small and older farmers. Paolo Di Stefano is Head of International Affairs at Coldiretti (the main Italian and European farmers' organisation) in the Brussels' office. His career in Brussels started in 2002 as a consultant in the Agricultural, Environmental, Energy and Research legislation field. Mr Di Stefano also worked as a legal officer in the European Commission, contributing to the legal evaluation of the compliance of Member States' state aid applications in the agricultural sector with European rules. Mr Di Stefano represents Coldiretti at EU and international level, working closely with European institutions on agri-food dossiers. He is also Member of the Policy Coordination committee in Copa-Cogeca, of the steering committee of Farm Europe and Facilitator of the working group on value chain at the World Farmers organization.



PIERGIORGIO MARINI Manager, Illicit Trade Prevention, External Affairs, Philip Morris, Rome

MANAGING CRISES IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS

In Philp Morris, we have more than 100 professionals around the world fighting against illicit trade. Indeed, it is a top priority for Philp Morris especially now that we are transforming our company towards a smoke-free future.

Talking about resilience of supply chains, let me refer that in the last months we have experienced some disruption in supply chains, as they went through their "pandemic" as well because of the fall of three mantras. One was the scouting for efficiency that led many companies to work with almost zero stock. With Covid-19 we brutally realised that whatever happened and had an impact on one element of the chain automatically hit the rest of the chain. The second mantra to fall was the sophistication of the product with a common element: the microchips semiconductor. The 5G increased demand and some geopolitical factors made it worse so, at the end of the day, this crisis was affecting many different products and not just computers. I will give you a concrete example.

We are developing one specific strategy, because one day, we will stop producing cigarettes and we will manufacture alternative products to combustion, like heated tobacco, for instance. We have a short supply chain here in Italy, where we buy more than 500 million euro of tobacco and this helped us in this crisis. The problem is that heated tobacco needs an electronic device to be heated, so we were hit as well. The third mantra to fall was the integration of the system because you can have a short supply chain, direct source and a less sophisticated product but what if the IT system of your logistic operator is down? You are in trouble as well.

In the next years, we will talk about supply chain disruption for many different products. And this will cause scarcity, that is a factor that opens the door to the black market and drives it. We have already experienced it with the vaccine during Covid-19. Some vaccines were diverted to other markets where they were more profitable because organised crime jumps in. Unfortunately, the cigarettes industry

has a long experience in the fight against illicit trade not due to scarcity but because in our sector the driver is the price gap. This is driven by different taxations and costs of living. At the end of the day, there is always a gain in moving cigarettes from one place to the other.

At Philip Morris, we base our strategy on two pillars: control related to technology and collaboration. Everything starts from procedure. We have an anti-diversion committee identifying the situations that are at high risk of diversion. We implement tools like volume monitoring and we exploit as much as we can also our technology. For instance, the European Tracking and Trade System is one of the most advanced in the world. We track each and every packet of cigarettes leaving our factory and we follow it across the entire supply chain to avoid diversion. We use anti-tampering features, security features — visible and not visible — but this is not enough. We need also the second pillar which is collaboration: no government or industry can fight against illicit trade on its own. Cross-sectoral collaboration and public and private partnership are most needed.

Philip Morris has a lot of agreements with law enforcement for capacity building programmes or for forensic support. We also have a general public awareness rising campaign or cross-sectoral collaborations because criminals work in networks, bootleggers use channels where they smuggle products like cigarettes, weapons, drugs, human beings and most probably in the near future food and medicines as well. We like to share our knowledge about it to help other sectors out.

We are proud of one initiative called PMI Impact¹. It is an initiative that started in 2016 from Philip Morris thanks to which we financed projects against illicit trade. So far, we have spent more than 50 million dollars financing more than 60 projects in 33 different countries around the world.

Illicit trade hits our business as Philip Morris but fighting illicit trade means also fighting and protecting consumer health. We see more and more counterfeit cigarettes lacking all the basic elements and standards of safety and quality. Whatever effort we make to protect our security and our supply chain is also an effort that helps to protect consumer health. People must know what is behind the illicit trade, which are the risks and that there are alternatives available on the market which are much more difficult to be counterfeit and they are already available to be used if they want to switch to this kind of products.

¹ https://www.pmi-impact.com.

Piergiorgio Marini is the Head of the unit in charge of fighting and preventing the illicit traffic of tobacco products for Philip Morris Italia. Mr Marini has extensive experience in different corporate functions both in Italy and abroad. He is the initiator and board member of Maciste, the Italian observatory on the illicit trafficking in the tobacco and e-cigarette sector, which has been developed through Fondazione Agromafie and funded by Philip Morris Italia. He is member of the board of Indicam, the Italian association for the protection of the intellectual property.







NATO 2022 A relevant Alliance in a changing world

High-Level Conference organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation in cooperation with the Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo and the NATO Defense College

Rome | Thursday, the 23rd of June 2022 Venue: Parco dei Principi Grand Hotel,Via Gerolamo Frescobaldi 5, 00198 Roma

14,30 – 14,40 *Welcome Remarks*

- Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
- Olivier Rittimann, Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome

14,40-14,50 Opening Remarks

Piero Fassino, President, Foreign Affairs Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Rome

14,50 - 16,00

Panel I Relevance and evolution

Recent major crises have highlighted more than ever the need for a robust political guidance and decision-making of the Alliance. The new Strategic Concept is an important tool to clarify overall direction and priorities. At the same time, the concrete interests of major Allies could necessitate new formats within the established institutional framework. How can North American and European allies' visions and priorities be better harmonised? What are

the best yardsticks to measure contributions to the common effort? Especially, how to preserve indivisibility of security with a general division of labour?

Chair: Frediano Finucci, Journalist, La7 Television, Rome

- EricTerzuolo, Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University, Washington DC
- Benoît d'Aboville, Associate Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
- Matthias Dembinski, Senior Researcher, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Frankfurt
- Vincenzo Camporini, Former Italian Defence Chief of Staff, Rome

Q&A Session

16,00 – 16,30 Coffee Break

16,30 - 17,20

Panel II Balancing threats and opportunities

The Covid-19 pandemic crisis in Shanghai has put again China at the centre of the strategic stage due to all ramifications that this country has in the globalisation process. At the same time the Southern Region of NATO continues to have its stability jeopardised by a combination of encroaching powers, aggressive non-state actors and multifaceted internal fragilities. How can cooperative security be extended to global partners, including Asia? What is the next effective approach to avoid the spiralling of the security situation in North Africa and the Deep Maghreb?

Chair: Giulia Pompili, Journalist, Il Foglio Quotidiano, Rome

- Richard D. Hooker, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council, Washington DC
- Rajendra Abhyankar, Former Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs;
 Former Ambassador of India to the European Union, Mumbai
- Christian Koch, Director, Research Division, Gulf Research Center, Jeddah

Q&A Session

Benedetto Della Vedova, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome

17,45 - 18,45

Panel III Food security. Geopolitics and the private sector

Food security is an integral part of the emerging challenges that have been considered by the Alliance. What are the scenarios and the contributions for a public-private partnership in managing important aspects of those challenges? What are the lessons learned and what kind of innovative approaches can be proposed? How can the international community best harness this potential?

Chair: Andrew Spannaus, Journalist and Political Commentator, Milan

- Naser M. Y. Al Belooshi, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Bahrain to Italy,
 Rome
- Jyotsna Puri, Associate Vice-President, Strategy and Knowledge Department, IFAD, Rome
- Alfredo Antro, Commander, Investigation Department, Carabinieri for Public Health Protection (NAS), Rome
- Paolo Di Stefano, Head of International Affairs, Coldiretti, Brussels
- Piergiorgio Marini, Manager, Illicit Trade Prevention, External Affairs, Philip Morris International, Rome

Q&A Session





A new Strategic Concept was in the waiting prior to the Madrid Summit last June (29-30th of June 2022). After more than 10 years, NATO Allies approved this document that shapes the next strategic directions of the Alliance and is second in importance only after the Atlantic Treaty; the timing could not be more appropriate. Indeed, at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, the favourable endorsement given by Allied Heads of State and Government to the Concept represents a confirmation to NATO's deterrence and defence strategies for the longer term and the acknowledgment of the urgency to address hybrid threats, climate change and human security.

At the NDCF NATO 2022 Conference, specialists from various fields discussed the future of the Alliance keeping in mind recent major crises. They also focused on different theatres of instability, namely the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, and on how to strengthen cooperative security through fostering the network of partnerships across the world. The hurdles imposed by the pandemic to a globalized world were also mentioned while stressing the importance of the Southern Region of NATO and its conflicts. Concerning emerging challenges, the debate showed that food security is certainly as important as energy security of supply.

The different panels showed that consensus on the fundamental values and functions of the Alliance is indeed based on a lively debate between different strategic evaluations and priorities according to the different issues: While duly highlighting the ongoing conflicts in the arc of crisis around Europe, the general view was that the global context and developments had to be constantly kept in mind in order to assure the credibility of NATO's three core tasks (deterrence and defence as a growing priority, crisis prevention and management, cooperative security).