DRC, Rwanda and the USA. “Peace-for-Resources” Diplomacy in Central Africa

The US-brokered peace deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), signed on the 27^th of June, exemplifies a growing trend of “peace-for-resources” diplomacy (Source).

While this provisional agreement aims at ending hostilities, it also explicitly links to American strategic interests in the DRC’s vast mineral wealth (including cobalt, coltan and lithium), all critical for global tech and green transitions. Alongside ethnic tensions and cross-border interference, mineral riches have fuelled the conflict in eastern DRC with the heavy involvement of M23 (a Tutsi militia recently supported by Kigali and Kampala). While presenting itself as a guarantor of peace, the USA seeks privileged access to these minerals to secure supply chains and counter other powers’ dominance in Africa. The deal includes provisions on disarmament, the integration of non-state armed groups, and the return of refugees and displaced persons in eastern DRC.

Since coming to power in 2019, President Félix Tshisekedi has shown openness to closer ties with Israel, including support for Israel’s observer status in the African Union (which Tel Aviv lost in 2025) and cooperation on security. Israeli businessman Dan Gertler has played a major role in the Congolese mining sector, maintaining close ties with political elites and controlling extensive mining concessions. Sanctioned by the USA in 2017 for allegedly opaque and corrupt mining deals that caused major losses to the Congolese state, Gertler saw these sanctions quietly eased by the Trump administration in 2021. Consequently, the United States places considerable trust in Tshisekedi.

However, this “peace-for-resources” approach carries significant risks: by prioritising resource access, it risks perpetuating the exploitative dynamics that have long plagued the DRC. The absence of key armed actors such as the M23 the text of the agreement, that mentions only the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Ruanda, a Hutu irregular force opposed to Kigali and supported by DRC and Zimbabwe), is a peculiar aspect of the peace agreement, raising doubts about its effectiveness and its balanced approach. Critics, including Nobel laureate Denis Mukwege, warn that such deals may “reward aggression” and legitimise resource plundering instead of addressing root causes such as weak governance and historical injustices.

The deal also reflects a broader geopolitical recalibration. For Rwanda, continued alignment with Washington offers legitimacy and economic incentives; for Kinshasa, US support promises security backing and development finance in exchange for resource concessions. Qatar’s role as mediator highlights the growing power of Gulf states in African peace processes, underlining the weakness of local actors.

Ultimately, success will depend on effective control of the territory and monopoly of violence by the RDC (translating into effective deterrence against transborder “militias”), transparent implementation, strong accountability and genuine inclusion of civil society. Without these, peace may remain fragile, benefiting elites and foreign interests rather than bringing stability to millions of Congolese civilians. In fact, the plundering of Congolese resources towards Rwanda has been accelerated in these weeks. The “peace-for-resources” trend will likely shape future African conflict resolutions, demanding scrutiny to prevent it from becoming a new form of neo-colonial extraction disguised as diplomacy.