Despite the formation of a new government, protests and instability in Serbia have persisted into April, with no signs of abating. Are you concerned that this prolonged unrest could trigger a broader destabilisation of the country? What could be a potential path out of the crisis?

The country is completely paralysed politically. The tragedy of the canopy collapsing at the Novi Sad train station and killing 16 people, followed by the nationwide student-led protests, has swallowed every other issue in the country, irrespective of whether these are domestic or foreign policy issues. The regime is wounded and bleeding out, losing support and legitimacy. The students have reawakened society from political slumber. The new government is just a smokescreen and bidding for time, with real political power still to be concentrated in the hands of the President and not the Prime Minister. The central problem and the question that no one knows how to answer is still how to politically articulate these protests and convert the dissatisfaction of citizens into electoral votes.

The European Union has largely remained on the sidelines regarding the protests. Do you believe the stance taken by key European capitals and Brussels risks further eroding public support for EU integration in Serbia?

There is a growing cynicism and dissatisfaction with the EU. While the EU and its member states talk big game about values, in practice, the Serbian public sees that Brussels and the European capitals still treat the regime as a partner. In contrast, the ongoing protests are being ignored, or when they are being talked about, most of the time are very shallow, formal and cautious statements that are not being taken seriously by the Serbian citizens who are protesting. The prestige of the EU in Serbia has already been weakened by the crises transpiring in Europe, the neglect of the Balkans by Brussels, and the anti-EU campaign that the Serbian government has been carrying out since 2014. Now, Serbs perceive the EU as an actor that talks about democratic values but, for the sake of Serbian lithium and political expediencies, deals with a regime which does not embody these same values that Europe claims to uphold.

Serbia is not the only country facing a serious crisis. What is your assessment of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Are you worried that tensions between Bosnian Serbs and central institutions could escalate further? What are the potential risks?

Bosnia and Herzegovina is in a serious state of turmoil, and this crisis can escalate into political instability with sporadic acts of violence. This crisis is primarily the struggle of one man, Milorad Dodik, to survive politically. Dodik’s political fate may well depend on the outcome of Serbian protests. If Vučić goes down, Dodik is going to follow. However, it does not have to go in that particular order. I would not eliminate the possibility of Vučić letting Dodik go down in order for Vučić to buy the political friendship of some of the Western capitals.

Amid the current regional turmoil, some Balkan nations – such as Montenegro and Albania – appear to be accelerating their EU accession efforts. Are you optimistic that at least some countries in the region could join the EU by 2030? And what prospects do you see for the others?

Montenegro is the only country in the Western Balkans that has a realistic chance of joining the EU. While Albania has made formal advances, I am still sceptical as there are all sorts of unknowns, like organised crime, the rule of law, and the geopolitics of ethnic Albanians across the region. Even in the case of Montenegro, the window of opportunity might close over time, as no one knows what can happen next, neither in European politics nor internationally. The chances of other countries joining the EU are non-existent at this point. Given the extent of the geopolitical crisis in Europe, including the political crisis of European leadership, I fail to see where the impetus for enlargement can come from. Plus, in countries like Serbia and North Macedonia, there is a strong cynicism that even if they meet all the conditions, there will always be some EU member states willing to veto their membership for whatever reason. Europe is in crisis, and the region appears poised to remain the European periphery with the current trends.

One final question: Considering the ongoing crises and unresolved issues such as Kosovo, should Europe be more concerned about the security situation in the Balkans? If so, what actions should it take?

The only serious flashpoint remains Kosovo, or to be more precise, Serb-populated municipalities in the North of Kosovo. We will not see a full-fledged war, but more localised violence between the Kosovo authorities and the Serb community, backed by Belgrade, is possible. There are two potential conflict scenarios: either Prime Minister Kurti, presuming that he succeeds in forming the government again, tries to continue his crackdown on Serbian municipalities unilaterally, trying to suffocate their autonomy or Vučić, to divert attention from domestic troubles, tries to stir trouble in the North. However, it remains uncertain if Kurti will form the new government. Moreover, for Vučić, the best scenario would be that Kurti tries to break the status quo first. In that case, Vučić would have an external enemy for his public and would use this to present himself to the West as a more cooperative and reasonable partner than Kurti, especially since Vučić knows the personal animosity that Donald Trump’s envoy for special missions, Richard Grenell, has towards Kurti. There is very little that Europe can do regarding Kosovo since the key actors remain Kurti, Vučić, NATO’s KFOR mission on the ground, and the Trump administration via envoy Grenell. For now, Vučić can wait, happy that Kosovo Albanians are distracted with their own political crisis, leaving him with one less thing to worry about while struggling with protests at home.