In recent years, Hungary under the Orban’s leadership has emerged as a significant player in the Balkans, fostering strong relationship with leaders such as Vucic and Dodik. How do you interpret Hungary’s foreign policy in the region? Do you see the alliance of these leaders with Hungary as advantageous or disadvantageous on the path to joining EU?

This process is not entirely new. Orban had already begun cultivating special relationships with like-minded political leaders and parties in the Balkans several years ago. For instance, he established close ties with Slovenia’s former Prime Minister, Janez Jansa. Orban sought to exert influence on Balkan affairs, including sensitive issues like the Bosnia Peace Agreement and the future of the Serbian Bosnian Republic, Republika Srpska. Additionally, he aimed to shape the media landscape and support politicians who share illiberal ideas and display scepticism towards the European Union. Given the ongoing conflict and aggression by Putin in Ukraine, this becomes even more perilous, not only for liberal democracy but also for the Balkans.

When considering whether Serbia’s special relationship with Orban poses a problem for Balkan countries, I would argue that it does. In the eyes of the current Western liberal political elite, Orban is as a genuine problem and a disruptive force that frequently uses his veto power against a unified European stance. If these politicians in the Balkans maintain a close association with Orban, that could lead to increased scepticism regarding the future enlargement of the European Union to include new Balkan candidate countries. Existing EU member states are reluctant to welcome new members that could potentially form a bloc against like-minded, pro-European, and anti-Putinist political forces, which currently hold significant influence. Therefore, Orban likely aspires to play a pivotal geopolitical role in the Balkans and requires supporters from the region as he confronts what he perceives as the global political liberal elite. Hence, this can be viewed as part of Orban’s larger, somewhat megalomaniacal worldview and political agenda.

Orban and Hungarian Foreign Minister Szijjarto frequently visit Serbia to express support for Vucic. Is this the signal of the formation of a “new Visegrad,” with Hungary together with other Balkan countries led by semi-autocratic leaders?

The existing Visegrad cooperation has effectively ceased to exist due to Orban’s political stance. However, Visegrad has never truly functioned as a strong alliance, with limited cooperation between Poland and Hungary, and even less so with Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Visegrad is essentially defunct, and Orban might seek new allies in the Balkans. However, I believe it is an exaggeration to assume he can establish institutionalized cooperation with Balkan leaders who share similar views. Such a move would be detrimental to the European aspirations of these countries. Even Vucic exercises caution and seeks to maintain better relations with European institutions, particularly Germany, rather than solely relying on Orban, who is currently isolated at European level. Orban’s desire to create such a group may be wishful thinking at this point, as it is highly unrealistic to establish such an institutionalized alliance.

Orban may have, however, a ‘special relationship’ with Vucic and the Bosnian leader Dodik, along with one or two other leaders. Though, it is important to note that even within the Balkans, many democratic leaders might oppose this idea. Croatia, for example, would certainly not support such a special cooperation now. And from the Hungarian perspective, it makes little sense to forge a strong relationship exclusively with Serbia against the EU. Orban must also be cautious, and particularly the Serbs must exercise caution if they wish to maintain their European aspirations, avoid conflicts with Kosovo, and rely on EU support.

Furthermore, Orban’s isolation prevents him from being a decision-maker within the European Union. He is more inclined to obstruct decisions rather than make them. Additionally, his peculiar and close relationship with Putin poses a problem even for Serbia’s current leadership if they are to deepen their alliance with Orban. Hungary itself is an exception within the EU, for its robust ties with Moscow and China.

Hungary stands out as an exception within the European Union, maintaining strong relations with both Moscow and Beijing. A similar situation can be observed in Vucic’s Serbia. In your opinion, why is Budapest attempting to “break” the united front of the EU? 

Following Putin’s aggression, several EU member states modified their energy mix and re-evaluated their future energy supplies, shifting away from gas and oil towards renewable sources. Hungary could have pursued a similar path. However, Orban’s political ideology plays a significant role in this sector as well. He is acting more from a personal conviction and according to his hopes for the future than doing what is in Hungary’s best interest. Orban envisions Hungary as a key player, positioned between Russia and the West, between Ukraine and Russia. This concept, however, appears irrational given the current circumstances. Hungary has a strained relationship with Ukraine, and other EU leaders do not trust Orban. At the same time, Orban maintains a relationship with Russia, yet, he is not merely a puppet of Putin.

In any case, the dance Orban has played in recent years has become increasingly irrelevant. It is the EU that makes decisions, and his rhetoric now primarily serves domestic purposes. Orban is attempting to create manoeuvrability for himself in the future, while he continues to disregard European values. He believes he could have a significant historical role, potentially on a global scale if politicians like Trump regain power or if other changes occur globally or within Europe. It seems that Orban hopes to play an important role in European politics again, in the future. However, there are no rational economic arguments to explain why he is isolating Hungary at the European level or escalating conflicts with the United States.

The U.S. ambassador to Hungary, David Pressman, has expressed strong disapproval of Hungary’s special relationship with Russia. Orban’s actions cannot be understood from a liberal or rational perspective. It appears that he feels unable to retreat, as he still holds onto the belief that his time would come.

Hungary joined the EU in 2004, together with several other Central- and Easter European countries, where now populist and nationalist leaders are ruling. Given what we are witnessing for the last two decades in Poland and Hungary, was it too early for the enlargement? And what is the lesson we could learn for the Balkans?

When considering the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, along with the subsequent inclusion of Croatia, I would not categorize them as mistakes. At the time, nobody could have foreseen the rise of illiberal populist movements in certain countries, particularly Hungary and Poland. However, similar shifts could potentially occur in other countries aspiring to join the EU. What the EU should take more seriously are European norms, which may not have been given sufficient attention during the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Issues such as the rule of law, media freedom and human rights should be prioritized. While democratic backsliding can happen over time, it would be unwise to conclude that enlargement was fundamentally wrong or to assume that the EU should refrain from expanding towards the Balkan countries due to potential future risks. Instead, new safeguards should be introduced.

It is important to recognize that illiberalism and populism are not confined to the Eastern part of Europe; they exist in various regions. The EU should find ways to address leaders like Orban and the Polish leaders, including Kaczynski, without halting the enlargement process. The EU must develop mechanisms and set an example for these countries. We should not let the actions of a few troublemakers from Central and Eastern Europe impede the enlargement process.

It is more and more evident that newcomers or new candidates should meet all the necessary criteria and norms. However, Europe Union should not be afraid of enlargement. It is crucial to strike a balance by ensuring that aspiring members fulfil the required standards while maintaining a proactive approach to the enlargement process.