The weaponisation of migrants

Exacerbated by ongoing conflicts in Africa and persistent instability in the Middle East, migration is likely to remain a dominant theme for EU policymakers, despite evidence suggesting that the number of arrivals has remained steady, if not declined, over the past year. Data released in December by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) indicate that irregular entries into the EU fell by 25% in the first eleven months of 2025, to just over 166.900.

According to Frontex, the Central Mediterranean route remains the busiest migration corridor, accounting for nearly 40% of all irregular entries. While Libya continues to dominate as the main departure point, a notable shift in migration patterns has also emerged, largely driven by the EU’s externalisation policy. Although flows towards Italy have remained broadly unchanged compared to the same period last year, the Libya–Crete corridor has experienced a surge of 260% in the first eleven months of 2025.

The increase in migrant arrivals in Crete has occurred amid a diplomatic flare-up between Greece and the authorities in eastern Libya. Threats by the House of Representatives (the Libyan parliament based in Benghazi) to ratify a Memorandum of Understanding with Türkiye have infuriated Athens, further complicating the delimitation of maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, General Khalifa Haftar may have chosen to look the other way as migrants departed for Crete, to increase pressure on Greece and secure greater international recognition.

Haftar, however, may not be the only actor seeking to weaponise migration. A journalistic investigation published by the German broadcaster Tagesschau pointed to the role played by Belarus in the migration crisis. According to intelligence sources, Belarus may have facilitated the transfer of undocumented migrants from Minsk to Benghazi via air routes operated by its national carrier, Belavia, which has increased the frequency of its flights to eastern Libya. Similar claims have also been made by the EU Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner. In the meantime Belavia has been freed from US sanctions by President Trump by November 2025.

Strengthening ties between Benghazi and Minsk could lend further credibility to these allegations. Belarus has stepped up cooperation with both military and civilian authorities in eastern Libya, as illustrated by the visit of Saddam Haftar, Deputy Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), in October 2025. Widely regarded as a likely successor to his father Khalifa, Saddam Haftar also maintains close relations with Russia, which has been present in Libya through its paramilitary Afrikanskjy Korpus (formerly the Wagner Group) in support of the LNA during the country’s civil war.

Against the backdrop of growing confrontation between Russia and the West, the potential use of Libya as a springboard for hybrid warfare against NATO’s southern flank has deeply concerned European capitals. Minsk and Moscow have already employed migration as an instrument to influence public opinion along NATO’s eastern flank. The influx of migrants, primarily from the Middle East and North Africa, that reached the borders of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in 2021 serves as a clear example.

Nevertheless, the lack of publicly available evidence warrants caution, as it remains far from certain that Russia and its Belarusian ally are already actively directing migrant flows towards Europe from Libya. While Frontex has acknowledged the risk, noting in its Annual Risk Analysis 2025/2026 “Russia’s potential to instrumentalise migration flows as a tool of hybrid warfare against the EU”, Libya’s complex domestic dynamics should not be overlooked. Migration continues to represent a lucrative business for a wide array of militias operating across the country.