Two years on from our last conversation, North Macedonia’s EU accession process remains stalled due to Bulgaria’s veto over the constitutional inclusion of the Bulgarian minority. Do you foresee any meaningful progress on this front in the near future? And what impact are these delays having on public support for the EU within the country?

Allow me to begin my answer in reverse order, which in fact reflects more accurately the chronology of the decline in public support for the EU.

This decline began roughly at the time of the so-called Prespa process — the change of the country’s name and Constitution, imposed in open contradiction to the referendum-expressed will of the citizens. It was a moment of awakening, not only regarding the high price the country was expected to pay for integration, but also the realization of an EU that applies double standards. It demands compliance with the Copenhagen criteria; on the other, it turns a blind eye to an obviously undemocratic process in which the principle of rule of law was completely sacrificed for a “higher goal.”

Regrettably, despite all the promises and reassuring messages — from Angela Merkel and Theresa May to Emmanuel Macron in the summer of 2018 — that “higher goal” was never related to EU membership, but to NATO’s geopolitical agenda. Bulgaria then reacted with the logic: “If Macedonia can accept such a high price in its dealings with Greece, why should we not step outside the framework of the Friendship Treaty (which does not require constitutional changes, nor is it about minority rights)?” This created yet another paralysis, a new dilemma, and deeper polarization within society.

The data on public support for the EU looks even worse when broken down along ethnic lines. Ethnic Macedonians once again find themselves as the group expected to make concessions regarding their history, origins, language, and identity. The narrative of a Bulgarian minority is an added layer of pressure, exercised from a position of political power rather than justice or legal principle. According to the latest census, it concerns approximately 3,000 citizens who self-identify as Bulgarians.

Another factor contributing to public disillusionment is the fast-tracked negotiation process with Ukraine, despite the fact that the situation there in no way corresponds to the image of a society implementing European reforms.

The EU is no longer the same entity: it now defines itself as a geopolitical Union, one that increasingly operates within military and security domains, rather than prioritizing social welfare and well-being – even of its own citizens. It is therefore hardly surprising that people in the European neighbourhood see that this is not the Union they hoped to join — not the Union that would lift them out of poverty, unemployment, and corruption.

Some Western Balkan states, such as Montenegro and Albania, appear to be accelerating towards EU accession with strong backing from Brussels. Meanwhile, North Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to mention Kosovo, remain effectively on hold, for different reasons. Are we witnessing the emergence of a two-tier enlargement process in the Balkans? And what implications might this have for the region, particularly if Podgorica and Tirana were to join the EU by 2030?

Under different circumstances, the success of Albania and Montenegro would have been excellent news for the others. Unfortunately, the EU lacks a consistent enlargement policy – I already mentioned Ukraine, but Moldova should also be included here.

Let’s analyse the situation in the countries you listed, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo. The first impression is that these are states characterized by frozen conflicts, which the EU has failed to resolve over the past decades.

Within this group, Serbia stands out as attempting a hedging strategy in international affairs: cooperating with the EU (and even with NATO), while at the same time maintaining ties with “third countries” such as Russia and China, toward which Europe has been building a hostile narrative. Added to this are the sanctions and pressures coming from Washington, especially concerning the energy situation. Serbia has been in a prolonged political crisis, which I interpret as containing elements of a “colour revolution”, although this development is neither as rapid nor as successful as the one in North Macedonia in 2015–16. The reason lies in the changed geopolitical landscape and the policies of the Trump administration.

The potential accession of two countries to the EU will not change much, because each of the states with a “frozen conflict” faces specific internal crises, and here the attractiveness of the EU no longer has the mobilizing effect it once had. The EU is no longer a peace project; it is undergoing militarization. Statements such as “prepare to lose your children on the front lines” (by a French general), or messages slipped into mailboxes in the Netherlands saying that we are not at war but neither living in peace, send extremely troubling signals to a region that has not yet recovered from its own wars and whose priority should be economic and social development.

The EU insists that enlargement remains a strategic priority. Yet, in practice, countries are advancing at very different speeds, and reservations among some EU capitals continue to slow the process. How important is it for the entire Western Balkans to enter the EU in the near future? And what risks does the region face if it is left in a prolonged state of limbo?

You know, the politically correct narrative would require me to answer this question with the familiar mantra about “the need to build resilience against harmful influences from third centres of power”. That is the refrain repeated by every politician in my country, from the President of the Republic to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, echoed by the NGO sector and the media alike. It is the deliberate spreading of fear and paranoia about some powerful Russian influence and the threat allegedly posed by China.

My view is that every sovereign state has the right to diversify its relations according to its own interests.

These days, President Macron is visiting China in search of Chinese investments, while the US imports uranium from Russia. Why then should only the Balkan states be disciplined and instructed to look exclusively toward Brussels and Washington? In practice, they are deprived of both sovereignty and their own foreign policy. Our Prime Minister, like several others, openly states falsehoods when he claims that importing liquefied gas from the US is the cheapest option for acquiring energy sources. Everyone knows this is untrue, yet they remain silent and obedient.

If this continues, these countries will experience dramatic internal crises. We do not need Russia or China to destabilize us; this irrational policy of the EU itself is sufficient.

Two key countries in the region are currently grappling with serious political and social crises: Serbia, shaken by more than a year of protests, and Kosovo, heading towards early elections after the failure to form a government following the February vote. How do you assess the situation in both countries, and do you see any prospects for stabilisation in the short term?

The case of Serbia and Kosovo is a clear illustration of both the EU’s failure to understand the Balkans and the lingering chaos left behind by the United States (NATO) from 1999 to the present day.

The crises facing these two entities are, first and foremost, internal: crises of the political paradigm of Western democracy and neoliberal economy in the midst of a deep economic downturn. The problem extends beyond individual states; the whole region is being drained of its young and most capable population. From this perspective, there is one “positive” implication, although a rather cynical one: I do not foresee a renewed military conflict. Both societies are decaying from within, and they will ultimately have to find their own solutions, because no Western therapy — political or economic — has proven effective yet.