Bosnia and Herzegovina looks set for major destabilization this autumn, with the Bosnian Serb referendum on Dodik’s role, the clash with the authority of HR Schmidt and the presidential elections in the RS, that Dodik urged people to boycott. How worried are you about the country’s future, starting with this referendum? Is Bosnia heading towards something more serious than a political and institutional crisis?
Bosnia and Herzegovina has faced a grave political, legal and institutional crisis since the final verdict against Milorad Dodik in August 2025, though not the escalation seen in February 2025 when, after the first instance ruling, Dodik’s supporters swiftly carried out unconstitutional acts and seriously risked armed conflict between state and entity security agencies.
Since the second-instance verdict, Dodik and his supporters have continued to publicly claim he remains president, yet they have so far walked a careful line to avoid major escalation or direct confrontation. Dodik is making use of all available legal means, including a possibility to replace his prison sentence with a fine. At the same time, he and his allies have even signalled a readiness to participate in early elections which, if and once implemented, would see a new president replacing Dodik.
Is there a realistic way out of the crisis around the RS leadership? How can Bosnia return a constitutional government in Banja Luka and a legitimate president, given Dodik’s stance and the Bosnian Serb leadership’s conflictual position?
The only solution is legal: Dodik must step down and early elections on the 23rd of November must be held and implemented. Any boycott or parallel structures would deepen the crisis.
Unlike in February, Dodik now signals he might comply, calculating that defiance could isolate him, push Republika Srpska into legal chaos, and weaken his clique’s grip on the party and public resources. His calculation: if he respects the verdict, Dodik may retain influence from behind the scenes, avoiding isolation and further sanctions.
Russia is once again meddling in Bosnia’s internal affairs, openly backing Dodik and the RS referendum. Does this point to a deliberate Kremlin strategy to destabilize Bosnia and the wider Balkans to distract Europe from the war in Ukraine?
Russia and Dodik use each other. Moscow seeks influence in EU’s and NATO’s neighbourhood, Dodik leverage with the West, mainly through the threats of chaos and a Russian veto on EUFOR ALTHEA’s military mission mandate in the UN Security Council.
He publicly frames his goal as staying president and ending international oversight, but his strategy seems to be more tactical: to preserve control over his party and its central role in Republika Srpska’s government, and also to secure sanctions relief for himself and his family, and to negotiate from a position of apparent strength. The referendum talk fits this pattern of testing loyalty and threatening instability without necessarily acting.
Moscow benefits as it gains an ally disrupting Bosnia and distracting Europe while the war in Ukraine continues. Dodik benefits as Russian backing gives weight to his defiance. Yet the risk for Dodik is that openly relying on Moscow and escalating beyond rhetoric could trigger further isolation, stronger Western unity and further criminal charges.
Are Western powers, especially the EU but also NATO, doing enough to keep the situation under control in BiH? If not, what concrete steps should be taken now to prevent a dangerous escalation this autumn?
Escalation cannot be ruled out, particularly if Dodik receives backing from Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vučić. Yet, to the surprise of many, Western unity is stronger now than in February.
The United States has taken the lead in managing the immediate crisis, making clear to Dodik that the verdict must be implemented and warning him against defiance. The European Union, however, must assume responsibility for long-term stability: anchoring Bosnia more firmly on the accession path, phasing out the Dayton instruments, and guaranteeing security through EU and NATO integration. Christian Schmidt’s revival of the Bonn powers has come at a price, as enforcing them demands greater diplomatic, financial and even military resources. Only credible EU commitments and deeper integration can alter political incentives.
For now, Western actors should insist on early elections in November, reject any referendums or parallel structures, and prepare sanctions against those undermining state institutions. This would contain Dodik’s manoeuvres and demonstrate that neither Moscow nor local strongmen can endanger European peace and stability.