In “What Does the Western Balkans Cost Me?” (see Economics section) you calculated how much each EU citizen would pay per year to support the Western Balkans’ immediate accession to the EU; around €6 per person, a strikingly small sum. What message should this finding send to the EU?

The goal of the study was to demystify the implications of enlargement to the Western Balkans in the eyes of EU citizens and to ensure that EU decision-makers approach the financial implications of enlargement with greater clarity and precision. With that in mind, we argue that enlargement would be more than manageable for the EU.

Put in the most practical terms, the cost of enlargement amounts to roughly the price of a cup of coffee per EU citizen per year. The costs decrease further when accounting for an often-neglected fact that newcomers would be required to make mandatory contributions to the EU budget. Essentially, even in the unlikely scenario of the entire Western Balkan region joining the EU simultaneously, EU citizens would hardly notice the difference.

Costs matter, but enlargement is also deeply political. Do you think your study could help persuade sceptical EU leaders and citizens that the Western Balkans’ accession would not require a significant financial effort? Is that also the main goal of the study?

We fully understand that, amid multiple crises, efforts to enlarge the Union – no matter how small the associated costs may be – will nonetheless have to compete for limited financial resources in the years ahead.

However, once the political and security dividends of enlargement are considered, along with the deepening of economic ties that would follow membership, we argue that the benefits of enlargement would far outweigh its financial costs. By integrating the Western Balkans, the EU would consolidate stability in its immediate neighbourhood, counter external influence, and strengthen the single market, objectives that closely align with broader European strategic priorities.

Our hope is that the study’s findings can help reframe the enlargement debate, moving it beyond exaggerated cost concerns and toward a strategic understanding of the Western Balkans’ accession as a low-cost investment in Europe’s security and competitiveness.

What immediate benefits would an in toto integration bring to the Western Balkans, for instance in funding social policy or the green transition? And what would the EU gain in return?

A defining feature that will accompany the Western Balkan countries as they progress from candidate state status towards membership is the obligation to programme – and the capacity to absorb – funding linked to the green transition. Given that the structures of both pre-accession assistance and post-accession funding priorities foresee investing roughly 30% into climate-related objectives, allocations for newcomers will, in effect, represent a green investment for the EU. With ambitious climate goals already in place, these funds will help realise investments with transnational, and even pan-European, positive impact. This indicates that the bulk of investment in the Western Balkans will contribute to the EU’s broader green and just transition agenda.

In practice, however, apart from Albania and Montenegro, the other four candidates appear stuck in the accession process. If Tirana and Podgorica were to join while the rest remain outside, what risks would that create for the region and for the EU? Do you expect a tangible acceleration of integration by 2030; and if not, what are the main risks?

If that happens, I would argue that it would create significant opportunities. Citizens in countries that are stagnating on their EU path would realise that the EU is not to be blamed for their countries’ lack of progress. Instead, it would become clearer than ever that insufficient rule-of-law reforms – and, in some cases, a lack of foreign policy alignment – are the principal reasons for stagnation. Rather than gazing toward Brussels for answers, citizens would be compelled to hold their own governments accountable.

By enlarging to Montenegro and Albania, the Union would also dispel long-standing doubts about its intention to integrate the region. The risks, however, become substantial – to the point of potentially extinguishing the enlargement dream for the entire region – if the Union fails to deliver vis-à-vis Montenegro and Albania (assuming they fully meet the reform criteria). Should, for instance, a single member state decide to block the ratification of Montenegro’s Accession Act in the years ahead, it would send a deeply damaging signal to the rest of the region. This is why enlargement policy must succeed, now more than ever, particularly in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.

Finally, are you optimistic that also countries in the region that stalled in the EU integration process, particularly Serbia, would manage to engage again in a more proactive way to reach the goal?

As for Serbia’s path to the EU, I have little optimism left. The government is increasingly losing both its internal and external legitimacy; the former due to its mishandling of the situation following the canopy collapse in Novi Sad in 2024, particularly its use of violence against peaceful protesters. The latter is eroding as well: not only is the US pillar of Serbia’s foreign policy crumbling, but relations with the EU have also reached a new low. The Serbian President’s decision not to attend the EU–Western Balkans summit in December 2025 merely reflected this backsliding in relations. Moving forward, the EU needs to keep Serbia firmly on its radar: by strengthening its monitoring of violations on the ground and by ensuring that the Reform and Growth Facility under the New Growth Plan remains fully conditional. This all points that the EU should focus on strengthening its partnership with civil society, who have traditionally been the key pillar of pro-EU sentiment in the country.