The second and final round of Romania’s presidential elections resulted in the victory of pro-European centrist Dan over far-right leader Simion. How Dan managed to prevail?

In an unexpected mobilisation of all those who did not want to see the far right leading the country, Romanians managed to push Nicosur Dan to the presidency. I think several explanations exist here.

The first is the resignation of Prime Minister Ciolacu in the aftermath of the first round. At that point, it became clear that the power of the new president would be significantly greater in the new scenario, as the president would have the authority to appoint the new PM. In that sense, the president’s figure became a kind of kingmaker, potentially shaping the new parliamentary majority and gaining a broad margin for manoeuvre. This is why the presidential election became even more important than initially expected.

Secondly, a broad range of representatives from civil society, academia, various organisations, as well as ordinary citizens and grassroots initiatives, mobilised and helped engage influential voices to further rally public support. Their efforts focused on opposing the prospect of the far right coming to power. They publicly highlighted Simion’s past, his ties to far-right movements, and his lack of the necessary qualities to credibly represent the country.

Furthermore, Simion’s campaign did little to help his chances, as he made a series of notable missteps. He refused to participate in any debates during either round of the election. He also announced plans to lay off 500.000 state employees out of a total 1,3 million, an enormous blunder that alarmed many people whose livelihoods depend on public sector jobs, effectively threatening to dismantle the state apparatus. In addition, he warned of the imminent end of Christianity due to migration and went so far as to call French President Emmanuel Macron a dictator, remarks that were seen as unacceptable, even by some of Macron’s critics.

All in all, Simion ran a poor campaign, which significantly contributed to Dan’s ability, and that of the pro-European forces, to mobilise voters more effectively and secure broader support.

The contest between Dan and Simion was widely perceived as a clash between two very different visions of Romania. What did each candidate represent, and what broader societal divides did this election lay bare?

The two candidates represented opposites, both in terms of life paths and core values. Dan is a brilliant mathematician, a winner of several international mathematics Olympiad medals, and earned a PhD from the Sorbonne. He later became a civic activist, perhaps a rare point of similarity with Simion, though from a vastly different perspective. Dan focussed his activism on exposing abuses in urban planning, challenging real estate tycoons, and combating administrative corruption. He was elected mayor of Bucharest in 2020 and re-elected in 2024, and he is known for his cautious approach, avoiding promises he couldn’t fulfil, and for his efforts to clearly explain and detail the measures he implemented as mayor of the capital.

Simion began his public life as the leader of the national football team’s supporters’ group, an organisation often associated with hooliganism and frequent clashes with police in stadiums. He later shifted his focus to campaigning against so-called “neo-communism” and advocating for the unification of Moldova and Romania. His activism around the Moldovan issue was particularly controversial, his repeated claims that the Moldovan state did not truly exist eventually led to him being banned from entering Moldovan territory. During this period, he also began to position himself more prominently in the political sphere.

Following the 2018 campaign for the referendum on the “traditional family”, Simion decided to co-found, together with traditionalist journalist Claudiu Târziu, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), a far-right, nationalist and Orthodoxist political party. AUR entered Parliament in 2020, giving Simion a national platform and the notoriety he would later leverage in his bid for the presidency.

All in all, the two candidates had fundamentally different profiles, and these stark contrasts helped galvanize both sides to campaign more actively.

⁠The Western world had expressed clear concern over the potential election of Simion. How serious was the risk?  

Normally, I try to remain very balanced in my opinions, but I can say that the threat was genuinely serious, as these were far from normal elections. These were elections entirely distorted by Russian-driven forces. As for Simion, let’s say that after his experience in November 2024, when he was somewhat more moderate and charting an independent, or at least a sovereign path without considering incentives from abroad, and then lost, he realised that his only solution was to follow Georgescu’s example and align himself with him.

By joining forces with Georgescu, Simion adopted a radical discourse aimed at the electorate. But on the other hand, and this is crucial, he also came under the full control of the networks that operate behind Georgescu.

These networks have now been thoroughly documented by numerous journalists. They are based in Russia and managed by intermediaries who control several companies in Vienna with Vienna being the real operational hub. It was there that both Georgescu and Simion travelled multiple times during the campaign. Simion also visited Vienna after the first round of the election, reportedly to receive orders and instructions from those truly orchestrating his campaign.

The risk was substantial, as Simion appeared to be far more tightly controlled by Russian interests than it initially seemed. In fact, he was, willingly, a puppet. He actively chose to play that role for the Russians in this political game. This became increasingly evident after his loss in the second round. His initial reaction was to concede defeat, a natural response. But soon afterward, under Georgescu’s direction, he reversed course. On the Monday following the second round, he officially conceded, only to later retract that and return with a new line: refusing to concede, alleging fraud, and challenging the results before the Constitutional Court. All this clearly points to his deep connections with Russian influence networks. 

Was this electoral campaign conducted with greater transparency and fairness than the one held last year? 

This campaign was less affected by foreign attempts at interference. One contributing factor was an improved electoral law, which gave the Central Electoral Committee the authority to request that social media platforms immediately remove posts deemed illegal or undeclared political advertising. However, this mechanism was only effective within Romanian jurisdiction. It proved impossible to regulate platforms not officially represented in Romania, Telegram, for instance, making it difficult to fully prevent intrusions by bots or trolls disseminating content to a wide audience.

That said, a large portion of the radicalised electorate had already been mobilised by 2024, limiting the additional impact of such efforts. This was also one of the reasons authorities refrained from aggressively pursuing certain foreign-based attempts at interference: they recognised that the core of the radicalised base had already been reached, and further action would likely have had limited effect.

⁠Do you believe Dan’s victory could finally bring political stability to Romania, especially in light of the instability and government crisis that followed Simion’s first-round success? And there still a risk of further destabilisation, considering the polarisation in Romanian society?

We are witnessing what appears to be a clash between at least two Romanias but framing it in such stark terms may be too simplistic. Both the vote for Simion and the vote for Dan carried a strong message of rejection toward the established party system. Each candidate positioned himself, in different ways, as anti-system. Dan embodied a form of technocratic, civic-minded critique of political institutions and parties, while Simion represented a more overtly national-populist, anti-elitist discourse.

Many voters found themselves somewhere in between, opting for either Dan or Simion not necessarily out of ideological conviction, but because they resonated with a broader critique of the system. Ultimately, the underlying aspirations were not so different: people want a better system, a more efficient state, stronger institutions, less corruption, and more competent leadership. If the new president can deliver on these goals, even partially, this could open the door to a more natural reconciliation within society and help soften current divisions.

On the other hand, if the new president is obstructed from implementing promised reforms, the divisions could deepen. The current opposition between national-populism and pro-European liberal democracy may give rise to new fault lines, perhaps along ethnic or social dimensions. Reconciliation is necessary, but the divide we’ve seen in these elections is only one layer of a more complex reality.