Monthly Journal
November 2025
The NATO Defense College Foundation, which has always promoted high‑level dialogue and analysis, particularly focusing on the Balkan region, has organised another High-Level Conference titled “Balkans and Black Sea Perspectives 2025. Building bridges: defusing hybrid threats for regional stability”. Do you want to catch up?
Here is the clickable YouTube link!
International Press Review
The most relevant events of the area through international sources
Kosovo approves site for first domestic ammunition factory
Intellinews
Kosovo approved the expropriation of land near Gjakova to build its first Defence Industrial Zone, enabling domestic ammunition production from late 2026. Acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti said the decision, adopted on 27 November, opened the way for the Turkish manufacturer MKE-backed factory to supply the Kosovo Security Force and expand defence capabilities. The wider zone would host further defence manufacturers, including drone manufacturers, as defence spending rose sharply in recent years. Kurti pledged over one billion investments in defence if he secures another mandate following the upcoming snap elections, to be held on 28 December.
Montenegro dismantles Russia-linked mercenary network
Indeksonline
Montenegrin police dismantled a network of mercenaries from the Balkans fighting for Russia in Ukraine, arresting Bosnian citizen Danko Savic, who had permanent residence in Montenegro and 1,5 million euros allegedly earned from service in Russian formations. As part of “Operation Lugansk,” officers seized also 12 kilograms of explosives and searched 13 locations in Danilovgrad, Niksic and Podgorica. Twelve people were involved in the investigation, which was coordinated with intelligence services of two NATO states and targeted individuals linked to pro-Russian groups in the region. Similar operations were recorded in the previous months in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.
Bosnia 30 years after Dayton, an analysis of the constitution framework
Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso
Thirty years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina remained trapped in a transitional constitutional framework that ended the war but entrenched a fragmented and unwieldy system, a new scholarly volume argued. Despite EU candidate status, the country’s Dayton-based order is incompatible with modern democratic governance and EU accession standards, the study claims. The contributors stressed that Dayton secured peace yet preserved the institutional logic of wartime divisions, leaving Bosnia unable to evolve into a fully functional state.
US warns Montenegro over China-linked vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure
Vijesti
The US State Department said China-based cyber actors had repeatedly breached global telecom networks, urging stronger collective defences and warning that Huawei’s 5G equipment posed heightened security risks. One of Montenegro’s telecom operators used Huawei base stations, prompting US and NATO officials to caution that unreliable suppliers in critical infrastructure endangered the security of Montenegro, the US and NATO. Washington pressed governments to prioritise security over cheaper technologies, while Montenegro’s authorities offered no comment despite a law allowing procurement restrictions on national-security grounds.
EU puts Albania on track to conclude accession talks by 2027
Euronews
The EU opened the final phase of accession negotiations with Albania, projecting that talks could be completed by 2027 and membership achieved by 2030. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos said Albania exemplified the transformative effect of the process but stressed the need to accelerate reforms in justice, judicial independence and the fight against corruption. Prime Minister Edi Rama welcomed the renewed momentum, arguing that progress reflected a decade of reforms and that the coming two years would be decisive as all candidates sought approval from the 27 EU member states.
Russian drones threaten Romania and Moldova
DW
Serious airspace violations by Russian drones alarmed communities in Romania and Moldova after two drones crashed on 25 November, one on a farm in Puiesti and another in Cuhurestii de Jos. Villagers described panic as the devices struck during a large Russian attack on Ukraine, during which six drones entered Moldovan airspace and one reportedly crossed Romania for hours. Moldova summoned the Russian ambassador, while Bucharest remained cautious despite earlier protests over similar incidents, deepening anxiety in both countries.
Germany urges Serbia to move closer to the EU
N1
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Serbia faced a decisive choice at upcoming elections, stressing after talks in Belgrade that EU membership required genuine reforms and adherence to core democratic standards. He said President Aleksandar Vucic and Foreign Minister Marko Djuric assured him of Serbia’s EU orientation but underlined that freedom of assembly and expression were non-negotiable pillars for any candidate state. Vucic called the meeting constructive, highlighting cooperation with Germany on energy, infrastructure and economic reform. Wadephul continued his regional tour with visits to Pristina and Skopje.
Bulgaria moves to take over Lukoil refinery
Moscow Times
Bulgaria’s parliament adopted legal changes to place the Russian Lukoil-owned Neftochim refinery under state control after new US sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil threatened to halt its operations in November. The ruling coalition said sanctions taking effect on 21 November would effectively shut the plant as counterparties refused payments to Lukoil entities. The law allowed a special administrator to assume shareholder rights and potentially sell the refinery, subject to government approval. Opposition MPs accused the government of rushing the process and warned of possible legal challenges.
Rio Tinto suspends its Jadar project in Serbia
Balkan Green Energy News
The mining giant Rio Tinto suspended its massive and controversial Jadar lithium project in Serbia, placing it in a care-and-maintenance regime after prolonged delays in securing permits. An internal memo cited the lack of progress as the reason for scaling back spending, although the company still viewed the deposit as strategically important for Serbia and Europe’s energy transition. The EU had designated Jadar a key project amid rising competition for critical minerals. Rio Tinto said it would remain in Serbia, support employees during the transition and continue meeting obligations to local communities.
Students and citizens protest against “Trump Tower” in Belgrade
Vreme
Students from several faculties and Belgrade citizens staged a significant protest against government plans to demolish Serbia’s former General Staff building (“Generalstab”), bombed in 1999 by NATO, to make way for the so-called controversial Trump Tower complex. Demonstrators formed a human ring around the site and marked a red line around the structure, declaring it a cultural asset that they would defend with their bodies. Students from the Faculties of Applied Arts, Architecture and Philosophy said the action aimed to warn President Aleksandar Vucic against removing a symbol of Belgrade and of the Serbian history. The “Generalstab” case risks to provoke serious headaches for the authorities in power in Belgrade.
Vucic open to sell ammunitions even if they end up in Ukraine
Euronews
President Aleksandar Vucic said Serbia was ready to sell ammunition to EU states even if it ultimately reached Ukrainian forces, arguing that the country needed export revenue and could not fully control end use. In an interview with Euronews, he acknowledged that shells had previously appeared in the war zone in Ukraine despite Belgrade’s efforts to avoid this. The stance marked a shift from last year, when Belgrade froze ammunition exports under Russian pressure. Vucic reaffirmed support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity but again refused to join EU sanctions on Russia, complicating Serbia’s accession bid.
The Insight Angle
Srdjan Cvijic
Srdjan Cvijic is President of the International Advisory Committee at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), one of the Balkans’ leading think tanks. Before joining BCSP, he served as a Senior Policy Officer in the Open Society Foundations’ Europe and Eurasia Program. A former senior Serbian diplomat, Cvijic has worked with the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the European Policy Centre in Brussels, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He is also a member of the Europe’s Futures Initiative and Fellow of the IWM. He has authored numerous policy and academic publications, including Democracy Beyond the Demos: Bringing the Immigrants (Back) In (2008). Cvijic holds a PhD from the European University Institute in Florence and is a Senior Fellow at ISPI.
The tragedy in Novi Sad triggered the largest protest movement Serbia has seen since the Milošević era, led primarily by students and young people, organised through forms of direct democracy and without a defined leadership. Were you surprised to see such a movement emerge in Serbia? And, one year on, has it consolidated into a credible political interlocutor?
I was not surprised that the protests erupted. The collapse of the canopy acted as a tipping point for accumulated discontent and can be seen as a continuation of the months-long protest cycles that have recurred annually since 2016. What did surprise me was the scale and persistence of the mobilization.
However, one year on, the movement has not consolidated into a credible political interlocutor. This is partly due to its intentionally leaderless, horizontal form of student organizing, but even more to the deep and longstanding divisions within the broader democratic camp, which limited the movement’s ability to translate momentum into political structure.
In the BCSP report “Political and Institutional Crisis in Serbia: Possible Scenarios”, you examined several potential outcomes of the current crisis, including the scenario of “controlled repression, waning protests, and silent authoritarian consolidation,” which appears to describe the present moment. Do you agree? And what do you expect in the coming period?
Yes, I fully believe we are living through Scenario 1. I expect this trajectory to continue for the foreseeable future, although all three scenarios remain possible over the longer term, at least until June next year, which was the time horizon for our analysis.
The political crisis in Serbia is so profound that it cannot be resolved without free and fair elections. Under such conditions, almost any new incident has the potential to spark another wave of protests. What is certain is that a return to the pre–1st of November 2024 status quo before the canopy collapse is no longer possible.
One of the scenarios involves a more proactive role for the European Union. Do you see any realistic chance that Brussels will intervene in Serbia? And how, taking into the current limited weight of the Union in Belgrade?
As things stand, I do not see a realistic chance of meaningful EU intervention. However, if the situation deteriorates, moving closer to our third scenario, with Serbia increasingly resembling the trajectory of Georgia, and with multiple red lines crossed, the EU could be prompted to engage more forcefully. Even if only to prevent regional spillover of Serbia’s instability, Brussels may decide that a more proactive role is unavoidable. For this we would have to have some sort of an invitation from the government in Belgrade, like we did in North Macedonia in 2015-2016 when the EU was invited to resolve the political crisis there. This, however, is difficult to imagine at this point and the Serbian president refuted such a possibility on multiple occasions.
Scenarios three and four point, respectively, to harsher repression with a risk of instability, or to an early return to the polls. Which of these do you see as the more plausible path? And do you believe the leadership in Belgrade would be prepared to escalate further, if necessary, in order to maintain its grip on power?
I cannot make a methodologically grounded prediction about which scenario is more plausible. What I can say is that President Vucic will call elections only when he is confident he can win them. Of course, political leaders sometimes miscalculate, like Milosevic did so in 2000, believing the outcome was predetermined.
But even in a scenario where a student list and the opposition were to win, I am convinced that Vucic would refuse to recognize the results, which could push Serbia towards Scenario 3 involving harsh repression and heightened instability.
Finally, if early elections are called, do you believe the Student List stands a realistic chance of winning?
At present, we lack credible polling data to support or refute claims about the Student List’s chances. It is therefore impossible to say with confidence. What can be stated is that, given the current fragmentation of the democratic camp, between students and the opposition, and within the opposition itself, it is difficult to imagine an electoral victory under these conditions.
In such a context, the most plausible outcome is that Vucic continues to prevail. Vucic’s popularity seems to have dropped significantly, the protests managed to penetrate into his traditional electorate. However, only unity of the democratic camp can mobilise the voters to go out to the polls and vote the regime out of power.
The Key Story
Strategic trends
Kosovo edges towards new elections as political paralysis deepens
Kosovo entered one of the most acute political crises of its post-independence era, still unable to form a government months after the inconclusive February parliamentary election and now headed towards early polls at year’s end. The prolonged stalemate paralyzed institutions, further stalled the dialogue with Serbia and risked slowing Pristina’s progress on the EU path, exposing the persistent fragility of the country’s political system.
The crisis reached a new peak in November, when the Assembly rejected a second attempt to form a government based on the 9th of February vote. Glauk Konjufca, acting PM’s Kurti’s party Vetevendosje (LVV) nominee, was voted down on 19 November with 56 votes in favour, 53 against and four abstentions. His defeat followed the earlier failure of LVV leader Albin Kurti, whose proposed cabinet fell short of a majority on 26 October.
Political reactions following the rejected vote were swift and harsh. Vetevendosje MP Hekuran Murati accused the opposition of uniting with the Serb List solely to block Kurti, arguing they were willing to jeopardize salaries for public employees and benefits for children and pensioners. AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj criticized Konjufca for seeking parliamentary backing without first presenting a governing program. PDK MP Memli Krasniqi said the collapse of the second attempt to form a government had been predictable. He insisted President Osmani should now set an election date as soon as possible and rejected Vetevendosje warnings over Kosovo’s finances, stressing that EU funds and salaries were not at risk.
Under the constitution in Kosovo, once a second nominee fails, the president must dissolve parliament and call new elections within 40 days. President Vjosa Osmani cautioned that returning to the polls would delay essential financial support for Kosovo. She attempted to rally parliamentary groups for one final session to adopt the 2026 budget, ratify EU-related agreements and approve loans from international partners — but the political impasse left no room for consensus. After further consultations, however, Osmani set early elections for 28 December, a date supported by Vetevendosje, probably hoping to get support from the seasonal return of diaspora voters. Most opposition parties had preferred 21 December.
The stakes at the elections are significant. Albin Kurti, who first took office in 2021 after LVV secured more than 50%of the vote, enters the campaign seeking to reclaim a majority lost in February. He has presented a program centred on innovation, including a state-backed digital currency designed to boost the tech sector, and investments in defence. Yet polling suggests the December contest may again prove inconclusive, raising the risk of another protracted stalemate; a “Bulgarian scenario” marked by repeated elections and fragile parliamentary arithmetic, as happened in Bulgaria in the previous years.
Whether the 28 December vote breaks the deadlock or deepens it will determine Kosovo’s ability to restore institutional stability, unlock stalled reforms and re-energise its European trajectory. Without a strong majority, the country risks remaining trapped in a cycle of short-lived governments, at a moment of heightened regional uncertainty.
Further News and Views
Bosnian Serb ally wins Republika Srpska presidency amid fraud claims
Sources: Al Jazeera, Balkan Insight, Le Monde, Reuters
A close ally of the nationalist and Pro-Russian Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik won the presidency of Republika Srpska at the 23 November snap election, according to near-final results released a day later.
Sinisa Karan, backed by Dodik’s ruling SNSD party, secured just over half the vote, narrowly ahead of opposition candidate Branko Blanusa on roughly 48%. Blanusa rejected the outcome, alleging irregularities and demanding a partial rerun in Doboj, Zvornik and Laktasi, where he claimed the results did not reflect the will of the electorate. Opposition parties also accused the SNSD of bringing in ineligible voters from Serbia.
The vote followed Dodik’s removal from office in August after a court convicted him of defying orders by the international High Representative Christian Schmidt. Although Dodik avoided imprisonment by paying a fine, he was barred from holding public office for six years. Despite stepping aside, Dodik remains the dominant political figure in the entity and swiftly claimed victory on behalf of Karan, calling the result a triumph for Republika Srpska under difficult conditions.
Karan signalled continuity, pledging to maintain the policies pursued under Dodik, who has long advocated greater autonomy and has repeatedly hinted at secession. The former president has faced Western sanctions for his confrontations with international overseer Christian Schmidt, though Washington lifted its measures last month after Dodik agreed to comply with the court ruling.
Throughout the campaign, Dodik made clear he intended to retain influence, telling voters he would remain at their side and describing Karan’s victory as his own.
Serbia hit by US sanctions, refinery stops production
Sources: Reuters, Euronews, Balkan Insight, Balkan Green Energy News, European Western Balkans
Serbia is currently facing the most serious energy crisis in its recent history, as Serbia’s Russian-owned and US-sanctioned oil company NIS was forced to put its sole refinery into “idle” or hot-standby mode until the 2nd of December, as Belgrade awaited a possible reprieve from Washington.
Energy Minister Dubravka Djedovic Handanovic said the measure was necessary after US sanctions (introduced as part of restrictions on Russian Gazprom Neft) disrupted crude supplies. The sanctions stem from efforts to curb Moscow’s revenues used to finance the war in Ukraine.
NIS’s ownership structure has grown increasingly complex since the sanctions were announced in January. Gazprom’s share rose from 6,15 to 11,3%, while Gazprom Neft reduced its holding to 44,9%. In September, Russia’s JSC Intelligence assumed control of Gazprom’s 11,3% stake. Serbia retains just under 30% of NIS, having sold a majority stake to Gazprom in 2008 for 400 million plus a promised 550 million euros investment, a privatization widely criticised at the time as undervalued.
With crude deliveries via Croatia’s JANAF pipeline suspended, NIS said the refinery would operate in hot-standby mode to allow for a quick restart once supplies resume. Experts warned the mode should not be prolonged to avoid a negative impact on the refinery, while officials noted Serbia had sufficient short-term reserves but cautioned that a full shutdown would damage the economy.
Most fuel is currently imported from Hungary via the Danube, as well as by rail and road; Budapest secured an exemption from US sanctions this month to continue importing Russian crude.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said Russian owners, who together hold more than 50%, had 50 days to sell their stake before the government will intervene, taking over operations.
EU - NATO
EU enlargement package names Montenegro and Albania as frontrunners
Source: EU Commission
The European Commission adopted its 2025 Enlargement Package, confirming that EU expansion remained a strategic priority and increasingly within reach for several partners.
The report identified Montenegro and Albania as frontrunners in the Western Balkans, assessing that both could conclude accession negotiations by 2026 and 2027 respectively if reform momentum in areas such as the rule of law and fundamental rights was sustained.
At the same time, the package underlined that progress in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had stalled or regressed, citing political polarisation, rule-of-law concerns and limited implementation of key reforms. The Commission stressed that enlargement was a geopolitical investment in European security and resilience, especially in the Western Balkans, where credible EU integration prospects were seen as vital to counter external influence and stabilise fragile institutions.
The package also called on member states to prepare internally for a larger Union, signalling that future accessions would require both deeper reforms in candidate countries and adjustments within the EU itself.
ECONOMICS
Albania and Kosovo face major demographic decline
Sources: EBRD, Gazeta Tema, Euronews Albania
Albania and Kosovo have lost more people than any other post-communist state since 1990, the EBRD’s new Transition Report 2025–26 shows, with sustained emigration hitting both economies hard.
Albania has seen around 40% of its 1990 population leave, while Kosovo has lost roughly 50%. Higher birth rates softened the impact for a time but could not offset the negative outflow.
The result of the phenomenon is also slower growth. The EBRD estimates that Albania’s ageing, shrinking workforce has reduced annual per-capita growth by 0,2 percentage points since 2000, a drag that could double by 2050. Kosovo faces similar pressures. Fertility rates have fallen sharply, and most economies in the region now sit below replacement level.
The report warns that without stronger productivity, technological investment and reforms to extend working lives or attract labour, both countries risk persistently weak long-term growth despite superficially positive headline figures.
Stefano Giantin
Journalist based in the Balkans since 2005, he covers Central- and Eastern Europe for a wide range of media outlets, including the Italian national news agency ANSA, and the dailies La Stampa and Il Piccolo.
