How would you define the core drivers of the current political crisis in Kosovo, and to what extent do they stem from institutional weaknesses versus political fragmentation?
The crises in Kosovo are political, institutional and constitutional. And the current political structures have many flaws.
Following years of international supervision and support, during which the Kosovar political and institutional system was developed and strengthened, Kosovo finds it difficult to operate independently. The young political structures in Kosovo, both in government and in the opposition, find it difficult to adapt to and operate within the very constitutional and political system established under Ahtisaari, which was built by Kosovo’s international supporters.
The ruling party does not like the constitutional checks and balances, and the weak opposition does not know how to operate within a proportional system where the ruling party has a majority. The Kosovo proportional electoral and constitutional systems require dialogue and consensus in implementing election results and a clear division of constitutional roles, while maintaining checks and balances. Thus, an immature political system seems to lack experience operating within a modern constitutional order, contributing to the weakening of the institutional system.
What role has Prime Minister Albin Kurti played in shaping the crisis, and how have his governance choices affected relations between political actors? And what are the responsibilities of the opposition in the current crisis?
The Vetevendosje (VV)-led government came to power as an anti-establishment force and has long opposed the internationally shaped arrangements for the functioning of Kosovo’s political and institutional system. The opposition parties still rely on the old system of dialogue, consensus and power-sharing, embedded by the international community in Kosovo since 1999.
VV and Kurti object that, and this is the source of the crisis. VV behaviours with 51% of the votes, are similar to those in majoritarian electoral systems, where the winner takes all, while the opposition, coming from an established system of power-sharing, still demands strict implementation of the classic Kosovo proportional system where key constitutional roles are shared, and checks and balances are maintained.
Furthermore, the young political leadership across the board is less willing to talk to or negotiate with one another. Disagreements concern key policies, the functioning of the constitutional system, dialogue with Serbia, and relations with the West and international partners.
To what extent is public trust in political institutions being affected, and could this crisis deepen political polarisation within Kosovo’s society?
The public trust is reducing dramatically. Many Kosovars believe that the next elections are not the last and that the crisis could continue.
Kosovo loses 2% of its population each year; between 35.000 and 40.000 citizens migrate annually. Polarisation and growing populist agendas have obstructed Kosovo’s progress on vital development and integration goals. Kosovo’s economic indicators have worsened dramatically, and progress on key peace, dialogue, and integration agendas with the Council of Europe and the EU has stalled.
Yet, with some degree of maturity, Kosovo can make a considerable progress. Should the leaders change their narratives, Kosovo may advance quickly in establishing fully functional institutions and pursue implementation to advance the dialogue, regional agendas, the growth plan, and membership in the Council of Europe. The current leadership need to stop pursuing political fragmentation.
Looking ahead, what are the most plausible scenarios following the next elections, and how might they influence Kosovo’s internal political stability and governance trajectory?
First, citizens and observers need to be convinced that there will be no other elections after this. Thus, elections per se will not change much. Change of political discourse of key political actors is needed. Leaders feel that voters are exhausted, and I hope they will sit and negotiate arrangements to secure the full and stable functioning of the institutions.
Also, key international partners and allies are disappointed with Kosovo and are losing patience. The real test for Kosovo will come soon, in July or August. It will be a choice between institutional breakdown and consolidation; a choice that is in the hands of Albin Kurti first, and the other two or three leaders that will emerge after the elections. We hope they will act in the spirit of the Constitution right after the elections.
The constitutional order offers a clear path to the formation and functioning of institutions, extensive powers for the government, and clear checks and balances that could enable the country to function as a democratic, value-based state. The leaders just need to follow this. And the pile of pressing issues for Kosovo has grown dramatically in recent years, including return of functional institutional system, implementation of the Growth plan and other regional cooperation agreements, implementation of the dialogue, (re) integration of the Kosovo Serbs, implementation of multiple international financial agreements, advancing dialogue and relations with NATO, membership to the Council of Europe and pursuing aspirations to earn the status of candidate country for membership to the EU.
Finally, what impact could the post-election outcome have on the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue, and is the current stalemate likely to persist or could a new political configuration create space for renewed engagement?
The progress in the dialogue on the normalisation of relations with Serbia does not depend solely on Kosovo.
Serbia has long been in crisis and resistant to dialogue, normalisation and implementation, and this is unlikely to change even if Kosovo becomes more stable and more active in the dialogue. No matter what Kosovo does, Serbia is unlikely to make any progress on normalisation for numerous reasons, including domestic developments. Serbian leadership has long made up their mind (at least since the COVID-19 pandemic) not to pursue normalisation and peace with Kosovo, and to reject the EU agenda. Full implementation and normalisation with Serbia are not possible without Belgrade’s full cooperation. But Kosovo and the EU need to understand that this is not feasible and very unlikely in the years to come.
Yet, Kosovo can do a lot on its own and in partnership with the European partners. First, Kosovo needs stable institutions and working political relations between the government and the opposition to advance the dialogue and implementation. For Kosovo, the dialogue is about its EU perspective, not so much about the relations with Serbia. Kosovo does not have to wait for Serbia’s readiness.
Thus, Kosovo can take immediate steps to first ensure the full reintegration of the Kosovo Serbs and address their most pressing issues, including education. Kosovo can take steps to establish an Association of Serb majority Municipalities (ASM) for the Serb community, a mini-ASM to advance Serb integration, implement key elements of the Brussels agreement and pursue its ambitions to join the Council of Europe. This will advance Kosovo’s position domestically and internationally. By doing so, Kosovo can become a reliable interlocutor for the EU to advance its membership aspirations, which will help Kosovo secure more recognition.