Your book portrays the Dayton framework as having entrenched division and institutional paralysis. Thirty years on, do you see any realistic pathway for reform within the existing constitutional order, or does Bosnia and Herzegovina require a more fundamental reconfiguration to overcome what you describe as a “straitjacket”?

The problem with reconfiguring Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is that it requires consensus amongst political leaders who have fundamentally divergent visions of the country. Bosnia’s Croats continue to push for a third entity, for instance, whilst Republika Srpska repeats calls for succession. The Bosniaks, meanwhile, generally prefer greater centralisation. These positions have remained incompatible.

There has been no serious attempt at constitutional reform since the failure of the April 2006 package (which failed by only a couple of vites), despite repeated verdicts by the European Court of Human Rights about discriminatory provisions. It simply isn’t a debate that is being had, despite the obvious shortcomings of Dayton.

Reforms to rationalise the institutional framework and strengthen the functioning of the state can only happen if there is a tangible prospect that BiH can join the EU. In the interim, measures required by the Reform Agenda to unlock substantial funding will hopefully assist the country’s green and digitical transitions, whilst helping develop the private sector and strengthening the rule of law. Then there might be a better socio-economic environment in which compromise could be reached, though similar approaches have been tried previously without achieving the desired results.  

The notion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a space of “negative peace” runs throughout the book. In your view, what are the key obstacles preventing a transition towards a more substantive, positive peace—particularly in terms of reconciliation, education, and collective memory?

The divided education system is a fundamental problem. Young people are learning different versions of history and often growing up in mono-ethnic communities. They are not exposed to the diversity of opinions that help foster critical and analytical thinking, making them more vulnerable to the hostile, nationalistic rhetoric of many of BiH’s politicians.

There are, however, notable exceptions that provide optimism – young people who are confronting BiH’s history through alternative approaches to memorialisation, or those who are resisting further segregation in education. There are artists, writers, musicians, film-makers and others – several of whom feature in my book – tackling topics related to war and nationalism, deconstructing the past to help build a better future. 

They are the generation who are beginning to hold up a mirror to contemporary Bosnian society, posing questions about the war and how it is remembered. In a context where genocide and war crimes are denied, and war criminals celebrated, this is an important development; one that challenges the prevailing narratives that BiH will inevitably be divided. 

The fundamental question, however, is how many people will choose to build their lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If young people continue to leave, this new energy and conception of the future will be lost.      

Several contributions suggest that inconsistent or insufficient international engagement has enabled political stagnation and regression in the country. How should the EU and wider international community recalibrate their approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina to avoid perpetuating the status quo while still safeguarding stability?

The EU perspective has long had an overbearing influence on the sense of what is possible in BiH. If there is no prospect of membership, nothing can be achieved, or so the adage goes. Politicians don’t take responsibility for difficult decisions, preferring instead to blame the international community, whilst their electorates don’t hold them accountable.

One fundamental problem today is that many leaders in the Western Balkans are calculating that the EU will decide to enlarge out of geopolitical or geostrategic considerations, rather than because these country’s have fulfilled the accession criteria. It is a debate that has emerged out of Ukraine’s own membership bid, and the accelerated timeframes that have been discussed. They further undermine the conditionality tool that Brussels attempts to wield in BiH. 

With respect to Trump, the administration’s dropping of sanctions against former Republika Srpska president, Milorad Dodik, shocked many in BiH. Having been stripped of the presidency, Dodik looked politically vulnerable, his financial room for manoeuvre restricted the US measures. Instead, he has been welcomed to Washington with open arms and high-level meetings. The concern in Sarajevo is that the US will side with the Banja Luka perspective and push for a revision to Dayton that favours the latter.  

Bosnia continues to grapple with enduring challenges to its state institutions and the resurgence of secessionist rhetoric from Republika Srpska. This has raised concerns about potential escalation even without Dodik’s official power.  Drawing on your  experience, how serious is the risk of institutional rupture or destabilisation today?  Furthermore, which domestic or external factors are most likely to determine whether Bosnia and Herzegovina moves towards crisis or containment?

The risk of destabilisation is pronounced, especially in an election year. Dodik’s political future rests upon the continued dominance of his party, the SNSD, in Republika Srpska, through which he maintains de facto control over the entity. The race for the presidency – to replace Dodik after he was stripped of the post – was tighter than expected. This has given hope to the opposition. Dodik will endeavour to make the campaign about what he alleges are injustices against himself and the Entity.  

The question is how far Dodik will go to assert Republika Srpska’s autonomy. The opening of an Office for International Cooperation is a direct challenge to the state’s foreign policy competencies (where there has been substantial divergence on questions such as Israel and Hungary). Institutional frictions will continue on various fronts, with repeated calls for Serbs to boycott state-level institutions. Dodik has previously threatened to prevent BiH’s law enforcement and judicial/prosecutorial actors from operating in Republika Srpska, whilst there could also be attempts to harden the invisible Inter-Entity Boundary Line. The international community must be prepared for a range of scenarios.

With the current institutional and political power structure in place, is there any hope that Bosnia and Herzegovina will focus on the future, particularly EU integration and overcoming ethnic divisions? 

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s future will ultimately depend upon the enlargement dynamics of the entire Western Balkans, otherwise it is hard to see how the lack of progress of the last decade or so can be overturned. If Serbia were to advance, along with Albania and others (including ultimately Kosovo), BiH would surely be carried along in a positive wave. Part of this process would inevitably include the closing of the Office of the High Representative, an almost permanent fixture of BiH politics since the end of the war.

There are fundamental issues like state property that remain outstanding, despite years of conjecture. The question of who owns public lands – rivers, forests, and, most importantly, what lies beneath – is one of the key issues facing BiH. There are various mining (including lithium) and hydro projects earmarked in Republika Srpska that are worth sizable revenues to the entity. Without a compromise on this question – and that of military property – progress on other fronts will likely remain gridlocked, and BiH will remain unstable.