Middle Corridor’s implementation in the regional connectivity architecture

Despite the international tensions triggered by the escalating conflict in the Middle East, connectivity projects remain a key priority for the EU and the Central Asian republics to promote the development of resilient transit and energy corridors linking eastern and western markets. Among these projects, the Middle Corridor (or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, TITR) represents the most concrete option to fully engage Central Asian and Caspian countries in a framework of cooperation that emphasises their role as strategic hubs located in a region necessarily traversed by these alternative trade corridors.

Ashgabat recently hosted a meeting of railway officials from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to expand cooperation and promote the Middle Corridor. This initiative is conceived as a multimodal trade corridor (combining land and sea routes) that carries goods from Central Asia across the Caspian Sea, reaching European markets either by land (via the Turkish-Caucasian route) or by sea (from Georgian ports). The progressive involvement of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will contribute to the geographical diversification of this trade route, enhancing its strategic relevance as an alternative corridor to bypass Russian territory. Indeed, the European Commission originally identified Kazakhstan as the traditional linchpin on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, already crossed by railways and highways connecting the Sino-Kazakh border with the Kazakh Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk.

The project to open a southern branch of the Middle Corridor, within which the port of Turkmenbashi on the Caspian Sea will become the key hub, appears aimed at strengthening the connectivity architecture by offering a concrete transport alternative within this multimodal corridor. Uzbekistan is strongly committed to increasing its participation and role within the Middle Corridor, which would allow national goods to access international markets. In this perspective, Tashkent is betting on the realisation of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, currently under construction and expected to be completed by 2028, which would provide a faster and shorter trade route connecting East Asia and European markets (V. Guliyev, Southern Branch of Middle Corridor Gains Eurasian Connectivity Momentum, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17 March 2026).

In the meantime, the viability of the CKU corridor has been tested through a multimodal freight route (combining railway, maritime, and road transport), pending the completion of the Kyrgyz railway segment as well as some missing transport links between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. This route runs from the Chinese city of Kashgar to the Turkmenbashi International Seaport and then, after crossing the Caspian Sea, from the port of Baku along the existing Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway (Global Times, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan multimodal transportation system starts trial operation, 15 October 2025). Moreover, the Uzbek railway company, along with Chinese and Kazakh engineering firms, will construct near Tashkent the Silkway Central Asia complex, which is set to become the largest logistics hub in the region, capable of processing 3 million tonnes of rail freight annually after 2030 (UZ Daily, Construction of Silkway Logistics Center Begins in Tashkent Region, 18 November 2025).

Major international financial institutions are closely monitoring the future implementation and promising prospects of the Middle Corridor, pledging investments and economic support to strengthen connectivity in Central Asia. In March 2026, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) announced $5,4 billion to support Kazakhstan’s modernisation programme and development priorities. The ADB is also engaged in promoting a technical assistance package aimed at modernising border crossings across Central Asia and the Caucasus, thereby facilitating the transit of goods along the east–west trade corridor (Eurasianet, Asian Development Bank giving Central Asia lots of attention, 6 March 2026).

Furthermore, last year the ADB announced plans to invest $2,5 billion in Azerbaijan, a strategic partner in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, focusing on enhancing Baku’s role as a regional hub for connectivity, trade, and energy linking Central Asia and Europe (ADB, ADB President Announces Plans to Invest Up to $2,5B in Azerbaijan, Strengthen Partnership, 16 November 2025).

The Caspian Sea region has benefited from a long period of political stability and security, a condition that has made it possible to attract financial investment, political support, and cooperation from international partners aimed at developing trade and energy projects. However, the Caspian basin could become a north–south corridor for goods transhipment between Russia and Iran which, given the current conflict scenario in the Middle East, could contribute to the spread of a potentially dangerous condition of growing instability, negatively affecting the practical feasibility of these transport corridors.