Turkmenistan’s strategic energy priorities for 2026

Economic and energy diversification remain key cornerstones of Turkmenistan’s development strategy, aimed at enhancing the country’s visibility at both the regional and international levels. In early January, Turkmen President Serdar Berdymukhamedov identified the completion of the Serhetabat–Herat gas pipeline (a key segment of the TAPI interregional pipeline) and the development of new production phases at the giant Galkynysh gas field as priorities of the national economic and energy agenda for 2026 (Turkmenistan Golden Age, Meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, 9 January 2026).

The realisation of the TAPI pipeline would enable Ashgabat to implement its export diversification strategy by opening a new corridor designed to transport 33 billion cubic metres (bcm) of Turkmen natural gas to the Indian and Pakistani markets via Afghanistan. Within the framework of the dialogue on infrastructural cooperation established with the Taliban authorities, Turkmenistan has committed to financing the construction of the gas pipeline from the border town of Serhetabat to the Afghan city of Herat, to accelerate the completion of a strategic corridor for the country.

This section is expected to be linked to the already operational gas pipeline that carries natural gas from the Galkynysh field to the Turkmen–Afghan border. The TAPI pipeline would strengthen Turkmenistan’s role as a regional and global energy supplier, securing revenues from hydrocarbon exports to India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Taliban’s uncertain commitment to ensuring the security of the pipeline, the lack of international recognition of the Afghan government, and unresolved tensions between India and Pakistan continue to delay the possibility of attracting external investment to complete the infrastructure (F. Indeo, TAPI Gas Pipeline: a paradigm of the Central Asian pragmatic approach toward the Taliban, TRENDS Research & Advisory Insight, 28 April 2025).

The realisation of TAPI would also contribute to a better balance in Turkmenistan’s national energy strategy, within which China currently plays a dominant role, importing approximately 40 bcm of Turkmen gas annually via the China–Central Asia Pipeline. However, considering that Chinese energy companies have traditionally played a crucial role in developing domestic production ( investing more than USD 10 billion in upstream and downstream projects) and remain the main partners in the exploitation of the Galkynysh gas field, the objective of diversification appears more difficult to achieve.

The Chinese company CNPC has been instrumental in developing Turkmenistan’s existing fields, increasing domestic production and investing in processing and transportation infrastructure. CNPC developed Phase 1 of the Galkynysh project – the only phase currently operational – which can produce 30 bcm of gas per year. Meanwhile, negotiations are under way, in partnership with the Emirati company Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, for the development of Phases 2 and 3, following CNPC’s acquisition of the contract to develop Phase 4 of the project. Once operational, Phase 4 could generate an additional 30 bcm of gas annually (Chinese company poised to expand production at massive Turkmen gas field, Eurasianet, 12 January 2026).

The Galkynysh giant gas field has been divided into seven development phases. According to estimates by independent analysts, the broader Galkynysh area – which also includes the Garakol and Yashlar fields – contains natural gas reserves amounting to approximately 27 trillion cubic metres, making it the second-largest gas field in the world after Qatar’s North Dome. If exploited in a rational and sustainable manner, these reserves could support an export capacity of up to 200 bcm of gas per year for several decades (Nebit-Gaz, Development of the fourth phase of the Galkynysh field will begin in early 2026, 29 December 2025).

These prospects reinforce the Turkmen government’s intention to accelerate the expansion of gas production and the development of export routes capable of absorbing increasing volumes of extracted gas. In addition to TAPI, Ashgabat is showing growing interest in the European market through potential participation in the EU-promoted Southern Gas Corridor project. The construction of a Trans-Caspian subsea pipeline would enable Turkmenistan to open an additional export corridor, through which Galkynysh gas could be transported via the East–West pipeline built in recent years, connecting eastern gas fields with Caspian Sea ports.

However, the long-standing opposition of Russia and Iran to the construction of underwater energy infrastructure in the Caspian Sea continues to constrain the effective capacity of this option. As a result, only limited volumes of gas could potentially be delivered via maritime routes – an alternative that would, in any case, require the development of LNG terminals along the Caspian Sea coastline.