Long regarded as the primary threat to Türkiye’s national security, the experience of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) may have come to a definitive end. After holding its 12th Congress in northern Iraq, the group formally announced its disbandment and the conclusion of its armed struggle on 12 May. This declaration follows a call from the historic PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from prison and could mark a turning point for both Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policy.
The PKK has constituted a vital issue for Ankara since 1984 due to its separatist aims, which later evolved into autonomist aspirations. Since then, the armed conflict with Türkiye’s security forces has resulted in a minimum of 40.000 fatalities and has led to the designation of the group as a terrorist organisation by Türkiye, the United States, and the European Union.
A prior significant attempt at peace negotiations had been made between 2013 and 2015, which proved unsuccessful. However, two elements change the circumstances in question today from those that existed a decade ago. First, there has been the involvement of Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) party. MHP and its nationalist members have historically been opposed to any overtures towards the Kurds. Therefore, the fact that Bahçeli shook hands with members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy party (DEM) in the Parliament represents a considerable development.
Second, the situation in the Middle East has changed. In 2015, a key factor that led to the resumption of hostilities was the fear among the Turks that, in the context of the Syrian civil war, a new Kurdish state could emerge in northern Syria. In that area, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is part of the same umbrella organisation as the PKK, and its military wing, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), had acquired significant portions of territory and support from the US.
In contrast, in the contemporary geopolitical landscape, the new government of al-Shara’ in Damascus is expected to align with Turkish interests, while the Trump administration is concerned with more pressing issues than providing support to the Kurds. Likewise, in Iraq, where the PKK has been based for several years, security cooperation between Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is putting the group under pressure.
The end of the forty-year conflict could benefit all parties. Domestically, “Erdoğan could be remembered as the Turkish leader who resolved what many see as the nation’s biggest security challenge”, as rightly pointed out by the International Crisis Group. Furthermore, the peace could pave the way for Erdoğan to secure a third term in office. By obtaining the support of the DEM party, the AKP could propose a constitutional amendment or call for early elections. Both these scenarios would enable the President to exceed the two-term constitutional limit. Regionally, Türkiye would enhance its position as a key player, with more resources available to employ in other areas. Moreover, the resolution of the conflict could improve the country’s public relations with the West, given the sympathy for the Kurds among some sectors of the Western population.
From the Kurdish point of view, the success of the disbandment could lead to amnesties for the members of the PKK or exile for the leadership, recognition of Kurdish rights, the cessation of repression for the DEM party’s members, a lowering of the 10% electoral threshold, and better conditions for Öcalan imprisonment, while the potential recognition of the Kurdish language remains a more problematic issue.
Looking ahead, the most likely scenario is that the disbandment of the PKK will result in a decrease, albeit not the complete cessation, of armed conflict between the Turkish State and the Kurdish groups. Especially in the case of limited concessions by Ankara in terms of rights, it is likely that the most radical elements within the PKK could reorganise and decide to continue the armed struggle, also because the dissolution of the group does not remove the conditions that produced it. Indeed, it is unlikely that Ankara will adopt broad reforms on sensitive topics, like citizenship and language.
This scenario presents a range of opportunities for the parties at the government and Erdoğan. First, they could claim victory over their historical rival and present it as a crucial success, bolstering their positions. At the same time, the dissolution of the main threat could lead to a decrease in repression and crackdowns on legal Kurdish parties, thereby enabling Erdoğan to gain their support during pivotal moments and divide them from other Kurdish groups (and consequently divide the Kurdish movement). Concurrently, Erdoğan could show the international community his openness to dialogue thanks to the end of the main conflict. Finally, the presence of a residual fringe of extremists would allow Ankara to maintain a security narrative and posture that can be employed, when necessary.
In conclusion, even if the peace process could represent a win-win situation, its implementation will not be simple. The aforementioned “most likely scenario” does not represent true peace, but rather a strategic absence of crisis. True peace would require complete demobilisation (a complex process in itself) as well as a broad recognition of the rights of the Kurds, and their political and cultural inclusion, possibly with constitutional modification. To date, this seems unlikely, as demonstrated by the lack of a specific roadmap and timeline by Ankara to address the disarmament and demobilisation process. It depends from the government first, and from the opposition (in particular the People’s Equality and Democracy Party, DEM, and the Republican People’s Party, CHP), how this political transition will be really managed.

Matteo Baldassari
Mr Baldassari is completing the Master's in International Relations with a major in Security at LUISS Guido Carli University, enriched by an exchange program at Sciences Po Paris. He focuses primarily on the wider Mediterranean area as well as terrorism and extremism in the region.